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A basic tenet and challenge of copyright law is the need to balance the interests of a 
range of stakeholders, from authors and performers to publishers, producers, 
broadcasters, intermediaries, service providers and the general public. To ensure that 
this balancing act takes place, policymakers involve organisations representing these 
stakeholders in the development of policy and the drafting of legislation in several 
ways, including through meetings, public consultations, and stakeholder dialogues. 
However, the process by which stakeholders steer the course and substance of 
copyright law and policy, their behaviour, as well as the varying extent to which they 
impact and characterise the copyright policy framework, have rarely been the specific 
focus of empirical research in IP.  
The present thesis examines creators’ organisations (COs) as participants and shapers 
of copyright policy. Through a socio-legal study into the workings of The Society of 
Authors, the Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society, the Musicians’ Union, and 
the Performing Right Society on several contemporary policy issues, the thesis 
observes how two types of organisations: trade unions and collective management 
organisations, across the music and publishing industries, engage in policy work. 
Through in-depth analysis of primary data obtained from interviews with CO 
representatives as well as documentary data (public consultation responses, policy 
briefings, press releases, reports, academic studies, and more), the thesis captures and 
discusses differences in the behaviour of these actors and argues that these differences 
are not fully understood by policymakers. It illustrates how factors such as an 
organisation’s mandate, resources, membership composition, political power, and 
self-concept, influence an organisation’s policy proactivity. Some actors may be more 
concerned with influencing the copyright policy agenda itself, while others primarily 
seek to shape its outcomes.  
The thesis also identifies power dynamics and imbalances between the COs and 
argues that some actors are in a better position to effectively participate in policy 
vi 
 
compared to others. Furthermore, it discusses the effects of the plurality of actors with 
varying interests and priorities, as well as the competition of policy issues that this 
provokes. In this context, the thesis illustrates the complex structure of the copyright 
policy environment and, in particular, the role of umbrella organisations and ad-hoc 
coalitions in the furtherance of a particular policy issue or position. It concludes that 
as a result of complex stakeholder dynamics, power imbalances, and policymakers’ 
insufficient understanding of these phenomena, certain creators’ issues will not 
surface onto copyright policy agendas and will thus remain unaddressed by 
copyright law. The thesis further concludes that complex stakeholder dynamics 
challenge the objective of developing evidence-based policy and render the copyright 
policy process unclear and its outcomes unpredictable. Given the disparity of views 
and positions on many copyright law issues, policymakers often attempt to shape law 
and policy outcomes as a compromise between different stakeholder interests. 
However, this does not always produce sound or appropriate results for copyright 
law.  
 







A basic principle and challenge of copyright law is the need to balance the interests 
of a range of stakeholders, from authors and performers to publishers, producers, 
broadcasters, intermediaries, service providers and the general public. Policymakers 
try to ensure that this balancing act takes place, by involving organisations that 
represent these stakeholders in the development of policy and in the drafting of 
legislation. This occurs in several ways, including through meetings, public 
consultations, and stakeholder dialogues. However, our understanding of the process 
by which organisations influence the substance and direction of copyright law and 
policy is limited. In particular, it is unclear how individual organisational actors 
behave, what dynamics characterise the stakeholder environment within which they 
seek to represent their members, and what effect organisations’ behaviour, 
environment, and dynamics have on the way substantive copyright law is made.  
This thesis looks at the way creators’ organisations (COs) participate in and shape 
copyright policy. Specifically, it considers how The Society of Authors, the Authors’ 
Licensing and Collecting Society, the Musicians’ Union, and the Performing Right 
Society engaged with policymakers on several contemporary policy issues. The thesis 
thereby observes how trade unions and collective management organisations across 
the music and publishing industries engage in policy work. It draws conclusions 
about the behaviour, roles, and impact of these organisations on copyright law and 
policy based on interviews with respondents from the respective organisations, as 
well as based on documentary data (public consultation responses, policy briefings, 
press releases, reports, academic studies, and other). 
The thesis concludes that COs are important and valuable actors in copyright law and 
policymaking and that, contrary to rather generalising portrayals of the impact of 
these organisations on copyright law, there are in fact considerable differences in the 
behaviour of individual actors. Differences exist in the causes that individual 
organisations prioritise, in the positions that they advance to policymakers, as well as 
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in the extent to which actors are proactive, and thus concerned with actually 
influencing the copyright policy agenda itself, rather than ‘merely’ its outcomes. 
Common factors underlying these differences include organisational mandate, 
resources, membership composition, political power, and self-concept.  
The thesis further concludes that there are power imbalances and complex dynamics 
between individual actors, which means that some organisations are potentially more 
successful at shaping the way copyright law is made than others. In an environment 
populated by a large number of organisations with sometimes colliding interests and 
priorities, many different issues simultaneously compete for policymakers’ attention. 
Furthermore, certain issues benefit from the backing of influential multi-stakeholder 
alliances, or from joint action by several actors, while others do not.  
However, since differences between individual actors and the complex power 
dynamics that exist between industry organisations are not fully understood by 
policymakers, certain creators’ issues are less likely to find their way onto decision-
makers’ agenda. Consequently, these will not be considered in the balancing act of 
interests described above, which means that they will ultimately also not be 
addressed by copyright law. 
Moreover, to appease a wider range of copyright stakeholders, policymakers often 
try to shape the outcomes of policy as compromises between the interests of different 
actors. However, this approach does not always produce sensible or appropriate 
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Copyright law, like many areas of law, recognises and attempts to balance the 
interests of a range of stakeholders. These generally include authors, performers, 
publishers, producers, broadcasters, intermediaries, distributors and other service 
providers, collective management organisations, and consumers.1 Policymakers 
involve these stakeholders in the process of policy development and the drafting of 
legislation in a number of ways, including through meetings, public consultations, 
public hearings, stakeholder dialogue and other.2 However, the actors who 
                                                     
1 This enumeration is taken from the EU Commission webpage on the public consultation of 
the EU copyright rules (December 2013 – March 2014), particularly from the section defining 
the target group of the consultation 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/index_en.htm> 
(accessed 23 November 2016). For another enumeration, see Recital 9 of Directive 2001/29/EC 
of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the 
information society [2001] OJ L167/10 (InfoSoc Directive).  
2 Jessica Litman, ‘Copyright Legislation and Technological Change’ (1989) 68 (2) Oregon Law 
Review 275, 278. As a recent example, the UK Intellectual Property Office (IPO) has called 
for views on the European Commission’s draft legislation to modernise the European 
copyright framework. Among other things, it welcomes suggestions for how the language of 
the proposed legislation can be improved, see ‘Call for views: Modernising the European 
copyright framework’ (UK Intellectual Property Office, 25 October 2016) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/news/call-for-views-modernising-the-european-
copyright-framework> accessed 07 February 2017. For a list of recent UK public 
consultations in the area of IP, see ‘Publications: all consultations by Intellectual Property 
Office’ (UK Government) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications?departments%5B%5D=intellectual-property-
office&publication_filter_option=consultations> accessed 07 February 2017. For examples of 
stakeholder dialogues and public hearings of stakeholders, see ‘Licences for Europe’ 
(European Commission) <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/copyright/licensing-
europe/index_en.htm> accessed 07 February 2017 
and ‘Management of Copyright and Related Rights’ (European Commission) 




participate on these occasions are generally organisations representing the above listed 
stakeholders, rather than individual authors, performers, publishers, etc.  
The last two major reviews of the UK IP framework, conducted by Andrew Gowers 
in 2006 and Professor Ian Hargreaves in 2011, were both followed by consultations 
through which the Intellectual Property Office (IPO) asked stakeholders for their 
views and for evidence in relation to the policy proposals put forward by the 
government. The consultation taking forward Gowers’ review of IP was sent to 163 
stakeholders, all of which were organisations.3 The list included trade bodies 
representing phonogram producers, associations representing publishers, 
broadcasting companies, educational and cultural institutions, as well as trade unions 
and associations representing various creator groups. There was no mention that the 
consultation would be sent to any individual authors, performers, publishers or 
producers. Similarly, several years later, the stakeholders that Hargreaves met during 
his review of IP and Growth, as listed in Annex B of his report, were also 
representatives of 68 individual organisations and industry alliances.4   
The same practice of predominantly consulting and working with organisational 
stakeholders prevails on the EU level where the general direction of copyright policy 
is decided for the Member States. By way of illustration, in 2013 the European 
Commission initiated a structured stakeholder dialogue called ‘Licences for Europe’ 
with the aim of delivering rapid progress in bringing content online through practical 
industry-led solutions.5 The stakeholder dialogue was organised into four working 
                                                     
3 UK IPO, ‘Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Proposed Changes 
to Copyright Exceptions’ (Consultation Document, November 2007) Annex A 37 < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-
copyrightexceptions.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017. 
4 Ian Hargreaves, ‘Digital Opportunity: A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth’ (May 
2011) Annex B, Stakeholders Met during Review of IP and Growth 102f.   
5 ‘Licences for Europe: Structured stakeholder dialogue 2013’ (European Commission) 




groups and the stakeholders invited to participate in the work of these groups were, 
without exception, all organisations.6  
From the above, it is evident that organisational actors as opposed to individuals 
representing narrow or individual interests are the primary participants in 
determining the direction of copyright policy and the shape of the law. Creators’ 
organisations (COs), in particular, represent the most fundamental stakeholders of 
the copyright system. COs emerged as a result of collective action by groups of 
creators who, as individuals, were politically helpless and thus sought to unite into 
an effective force in order to achieve common objectives vis-à-vis publishers and 
other exploiters of their works.7 Today, COs, such as individual creator associations, 
unions and collecting societies, are very much part of copyright’s complex network 
of actors and they actively engage with other industry stakeholders and decision-
makers in an effort to shape copyright law and policy. However, there is limited 
research into the operations of individual COs in different industries and the 
implications of their work on law and policymaking in copyright.8 Existing literature 
on organisations active in the copyright system suggests that these actors influence 
the outcomes of policy through their relationships with other stakeholders, the 
                                                     
6 ‘Licences for Europe: Structured stakeholder dialogue 2013, Participants’ (European 
Commission) <https://ec.europa.eu/licences-for-europe-dialogue/node/63.html> accessed 07 
February 2017.  
7 For more on the history of COs, see: Victor Bonham-Carter, Authors by Profession: Volume 
One (The Society of Authors 1979); Victor Bonham-Carter, Authors by Profession: Volume Two 
(The Bodley Head and the Society of Authors 1984); Martin Cloonan, ‘Musicians as Workers: 
Putting the UK Musicians’ Union into Context’ (2014) 41 (1) MUSICultures 10; John 
Williamson, ‘Cooperation and Conflict: The British Musicians’ Union, Musical Labour and 
Copyright in the UK’ (2014) 41 (1) MUSICultures 73; Cyril Ehrlich, Harmonious Alliance: A 
History of the Performing Right Society (OUP 1989); Joyce Marlow, The ALCS Story: 1977 – 1997 
(The Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society Ltd 1997). 
8 Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, ‘Copyright from an institutional perspective: actors, 
interests, stakes and the logic of participation’ (2007) 4(2) Review of Economic Research on 
Copyright Issues 65; Monica Horten, A Copyright Masquerade: How Copyright Lobbying 
Threatens Online Freedoms (Zed Books 2013); Dave Harker, ‘The wonderful world of IFPI: 
music industry rhetoric, the critics and the classical Marxist critique’ (1997) 16 (1) Popular 
Music 45; John Williamson and Martin Cloonan, ‘Rethinking the music industry’ (2007) 26 
(2) Popular Music 305; Graeme B Dinwoodie and Rochelle C Dreyfuss, ‘TRIPS and the 
dynamics of intellectual property lawmaking’ (2004) Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 95. I consider this research in detail in Chapter 3, section 1.4.  
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evidence they present to policymakers, the way they define their representation unit, 
and, more generally, their lobbying power. However, it has offered little insight into 
the various COs’ behaviour, environment, and resulting effect on copyright policy, 
and ultimately, on copyright law.  
1. Objectives and significance of this research  
In terms of the copyright policy environment, the rise of digital technologies and the 
Internet have given birth to new stakeholders and actors, such as online 
intermediaries, online platforms, and content aggregators that are challenging the 
position of established parties.9 New ways of creating, disseminating, and enjoying 
copyright protected works are calling the effects and boundaries of copyright law on 
new technological capabilities into question and making the direction of copyright 
policy ever more contested. Against this background, a Centre for Copyright and 
New Business Models in the Creative Economy (CREATe), funded by several UK 
Research Councils, was set up in 2013 to explore questions around digitisation, 
copyright, and innovation in the arts and technology, as well as the interplay between 
these factors.10 Seven interrelated themes characterised the research agenda of 
CREATe, including themes on the openness of business models, on regulation and 
enforcement and on intermediaries and platforms, to name a few. The research on 
creators’ organisations, which is the subject of this thesis, forms part of CREATe’s 
fourth theme, ‘Creators and Performers: Process and Copyright’.11  
The objectives of this research were to study COs as participants and shapers of 
copyright policy, and to understand, in this context, how these actors behave, what 
landscape they operate in, and what effects this landscape and organisations’ 
workings produce on the nature and substance of copyright law and policy.  
                                                     
9 Bakardjieva Engelbrekt (n 8) 76. 
10 ‘CREATe: Creativity, Regulation, Enterprise and Technology’ (CREATe, 26 February 2013) 
<http://www.create.ac.uk/blog/2013/02/26/create-creativity-regulation-enterprise-and-
technology/> accessed 07 February 2017.  
11 For an overview of CREATe’s theme 4, see ‘CREATe, Theme 4: Creators and Performers: 
Process and Copyright’ (CREATe) <http://www.create.ac.uk/research-programme/theme-4/> 
accessed 07 February 2017.  
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Three questions guided my exploration of COs’ operations, the dynamics of their 
industries, and their impact on copyright policy:  
• How do COs participate in copyright policy?  
• What, if any, differences exist in the nature of and motives for participation 
between trade unions and collective management organisations (the two 
types of organisations that I looked at)? 
• What challenges do COs encounter in their efforts to participate in and shape 
copyright policy?  
An exploration of these questions within an empirical examination of COs’ 
engagement with policy work, their environment and the effects of organisations’ 
behaviour and environment on copyright law and policy will deliver insight into the 
different roles that these actors play in copyright policy, as well as into differences in 
the way individual organisations approach issues of copyright policy.12 This research 
will also throw light on the power dynamics at play in the copyright policy landscape 
and the effect of such dynamics on the way issues are advanced and agendas are 
potentially set, as well as on the considerations that underpin copyright policy 
outcomes.13 With knowledge of the way stakeholders shape the policymaking process 
and its outcomes, it will further be possible to consider how stakeholder behaviour 
influences the objective of developing evidence-based policy.14 This thesis will also 
offer a valuable perspective on how knowledge on the above issues can be absorbed 
and acted on further by researchers, the media, policymakers, as well as by COs 
themselves.15  
                                                     
12 See Chapter 8, section 2.1. 
13 See Chapter 8, sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
14 See Chapter 8, section 2.3. 
15 See Chapter 8, section 2.4.  
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2. Scope of the research  
Defining ‘creators’ organisations’  
The scope of this research is set in large part by my definition of creators’ 
organisations. I construe the term ‘creators’ organisations’ as referring to 
organisations whose membership consists, wholly or in large part, of individual 
creators (writers, musicians, etc.) and respectively shapes the organisation’s self-
identity, and where the purpose of the organisation is to further the interests of 
creators.  
In order to limit the scope of this key term, I drew on general concepts and 
classifications of organisations developed in organisational research. Specifically, my 
definition of ‘creators’ organisations’ combines elements of two ideas presented by 
Eldridge and Crombie.16 The first describes organisations as social systems with a 
collective identity, an exact roster of members and a programme of activity and 
procedures, while the second emphasises that organisations are systems deliberately 
constructed to seek specific goals and values.17 In application of this definition, my 
research focuses on trade unions representing creators, as well as on certain collective 
management organisations (CMOs) that either exclusively or predominantly consist 
of and represent creators. I will elaborate on my decision to include certain CMOs in 
the scope of my research, as well as on the considerations underpinning my specific 
choice of organisations in chapter 2.18  
At this point, it is sufficient to indicate that, by definition, a number of stakeholders 
fall outside the ambit of this research. Excluded are on the one hand trade bodies 
formed to represent the interests of publishers, producers, distributors, managers, 
intermediaries and other stakeholders, distinct from the creators. Such organisations 
                                                     
16 John Eric Thomas Eldridge and Alastair D Crombie, A Sociology of Organisations (George 
Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1974).  
17 Ibid 1, 23 citing Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Free Press 1960).  
18 See chapter 2, subsections 2.2 and 2.3.  
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include the BPI19, the Music Managers’ Forum20 and the Publishers Association21. 
CMOs that solely consist of stakeholders other than creators, like the Publishers 
Licensing Society also fall outside the scope of this thesis.22 Finally, my definition of 
‘creators’ organisations’ further excludes umbrella organisations, like the British 
Copyright Council23 and UK Music24 which house a wide range of different industry 
stakeholders. These industry alliances are typically only capable of pursuing policy 
goals that emerge as the common denominator of many potentially conflicting 
interests and such goals will not necessarily coincide, in reach or priority, with the 
goals specifically relevant to creators. However, given that the COs studied in this 
research are also members of such alliances, this thesis will also refer to the activities 
of some umbrella organisations where relevant.    
3. Approach to research  
The scope of the research presented in this thesis is further defined by the 
methodological approach that I adopted. My research on creators’ organisations 
comprised a socio-legal study into the modalities of these organisations’ participation 
in copyright policy.25 In light of the objectives laid down above, the concern of this 
study was not with the body of law26 that regulates the operations of trade unions and 
collective management organisations, or with the way organisations’ behaviour fits 
within the legal instruments that set the remit, procedures and standards of operation 
of these bodies.  The focus was rather on the ‘raw law’ that these organisations 
                                                     
19 British Phonographic Industry (BPI) <http://www.bpi.co.uk/default.aspx> accessed 07 
February 2017.  
20 Music Managers Forum (MMF) <https://themmf.net/> accessed 07 February 2017.   
21 The Publishers Association (PA) <http://www.publishers.org.uk/about-us/> accessed 07 
February 2017.  
22 Publishers Licensing Society (PLS) <https://www.pls.org.uk/> accessed 07 February 2017.  
23 British Copyright Council (BCC) Members < http://www.britishcopyright.org/bcc-
members/member-list> accessed 07 February 2017.  
24 UK Music < http://www.ukmusic.org/about/> accessed 07 February 2017.  
25 For a description of socio-legal studies vis-à-vis doctrinal legal studies see Fiona Cownie 
and Anthony Bradley, ‘Chapter 2: Socio-legal studies: A challenge to the doctrinal approach’ 
in Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds) Research methods in Law (Routledge 2013) 34, 35. 
26 Primarily the Trade Union Act 2016, the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992, and the Companies Act 2006. 
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generate, i.e. on the plurality of activities through which they shape the process of 
law and policy development.27 Consequently, my research on COs comprised an 
empirical study of four organisations, the Musicians’ Union (MU), the Performing 
Right Society (PRS), the Society of Authors (SoA) and the Authors’ Licensing and 
Collecting Society (ALCS).28 The project was designed as two case studies, one 
looking into the activities of a trade union (the MU) and a collecting society (PRS) in 
the music sector, and another looking at a trade union (SoA) and a collecting society 
(ALCS) in the publishing sector. Music and publishing were chosen as two of the most 
successful traditional UK creative industries. As such, the needs and concerns of these 
industries regularly inform copyright policy debates. While I will elaborate on my 
choice of these industries in chapter 2, in essence, I selected these creative industries 
on the basis of some key commonalities and differences that, taken together, rendered 
both sectors comparable while also promising an intriguing insight into cross-
industry dynamics in the copyright policy space. Music and publishing are similar in 
their importance for the UK economy, as well as in terms of their need to embrace 
and adapt to digital technologies. At the same time, differences exist with regard to 
the copyright issues that organisations from these industries appeared to be primarily 
invested in. 
The analyses and findings from my study into COs emerged from a combination of 
primary data generated through semi-structured interviews with CO operatives29 and 
                                                     
27 The term ‘raw law’ is used by Neil MacCormick in his contribution ‘Four Quadrants of 
Jurisprudence’ in Werner Krawietz, Neil MacCormick and Georg Henrik von Wright (eds), 
Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal Systems: Festschrift for Robert S 
Summers (Duncker and Humbot 1994) to describe ‘the unexamined substratum of brute fact 
that gives theorised, scholarly law-constructs whatever anchoring they have in the real 
world’, see pp 53, 55.  
28 Musicians’ Union (MU) < http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/>, Performing Rights Society 
(PRS) < https://www.prsformusic.com/Pages/default.aspx>, The Society of Authors (SoA) < 
http://www.societyofauthors.org/>, Authors’ Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS) < 
http://www.alcs.co.uk/> all accessed 07 February 2017.  
29 Among the 24 interviews, one was conducted with a representative of the Writers’ Guild 
of Great Britain (WGGB) < https://writersguild.org.uk/> accessed 07 February 2017, and 
another with representatives from the British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and 




documentary data, including consultation responses, policy briefings, reports, online 
news publications, academic studies, and other. Within the two case studies, my 
exploration of the behaviour of the MU, PRS, ALCS and SoA was structured around 
these COs’ activities on three copyright issues of contemporary or recent relevance: 
the contractual terms for authors and performers, the UK private copying exception, 
and the implementation of the EU collective rights management Directive (CRM 
Directive).30  
Furthermore, as indicated above, my research was conceptualised and conducted as 
a socio-legal study of the selected two trade unions and collective management 
organisations. Therefore, this thesis will not present an in-depth exploration of these 
organisations on the basis of the legal norms that underpin their existence and frame 
their activities on an abstract, theoretical level.31 Rather, the emphasis is on the law in 
action, which is better apt at offering insight into the way actors and decision-makers 
actually behave.32 Nevertheless, chapter 3 will provide a detailed account of the 
differences in the functions and historical development of trade unions and collecting 
societies, in order to inform our understanding and expectations of these 
organisations’ participation in copyright policy. I will also deal with the scope of COs’ 
activities that formed part of my enquiry and the limitations of the work presented in 
this thesis in more detail in Chapter 2.33 
4. Overview of the thesis 
The next chapter will present a detailed account of the methods used in this research 
and chapter 3 will subsequently review the literature on which this research is built. 
Following this, chapter 4, which looks at COs in the publishing industry and their 
fight for fair contract terms, will begin to identify how differences in COs’ mandate, 
                                                     
30 For a detailed account of my methods, including selection of organisations, industries, 
copyright issues, methods and data analysis approach, see chapter 2.   
31 S 116 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988, as well as the Trade Union Act 
2016, the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 and the Companies 
Act 2006, to name a few. 
32 MacCormick, ‘Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence’ (n 27) 58. 
33 See Chapter 2, sections 1 and 5. 
10 
 
resources and self-concept shape the varying ways in which individual COs engage 
in policy.  This chapter will also consider factors affecting the policy proactivity of 
COs. Furthermore, it will begin to shed light on the complex dynamics and 
interdependence that characterise the relationships between individual 
organisational actors, as well as the existence of colliding interests on particular policy 
issues.  
Subsequently, chapter 5 will consider how COs from the music sector dealt with the 
problem of creators’ and performers’ contract terms. The chapter will expose how the 
policy behaviour of COs is also shaped by the composition of their membership. It 
will demonstrate differences in the approaches and priorities of individual COs even 
when it comes to functionally similar organisations, like the MU and SoA, both of 
which are trade unions. Chapter 5 will also consider the significance of industry 
networks and umbrella organisations, like the British Copyright Council and UK 
Music for the furtherance of a particular policy. In this context, it will expose power 
dynamics and imbalances between different stakeholders.  
Against the background of the preceding chapters, chapter 6 on private copying will 
once again thematise the sheer granularity of COs’ policy positions, priorities and 
preferences, based on nuances in their input regarding the private copying exception. 
The chapter will also consider the historical development of legislative initiatives on 
this issue and thereby reveal how stakeholder dynamics directly influence, and in a 
way limit, policy outcomes. It will show how, often, copyright policy outcomes in fact 
embody compromises. Furthermore, based on an analysis of the private copying 
judicial review, the chapter will argue that organisational actors are more likely to 
exercise influence over copyright law and policy when they act in unison. In this 
context, it will become clear that the interest constellations that form in the copyright 
landscape, i.e. the way organisational actors group together, are dynamic and issue-
dependent. This renders the policy process and its outcomes more unpredictable.  
11 
 
Chapter 7 will consider the studied CMOs’ behaviour with regard to the 
implementation of the CRM Directive.34 It will expound on why collecting societies 
are potentially particularly powerful players in copyright policy, thus adding a 
further dimension to the emerging theme of power imbalances. At the same time, the 
chapter will demonstrate the existence of behavioural differences also between 
individual CMOs and consider the origin and implications of such differences.  
Finally, chapter 8 will conclude the thesis. It will present a very recent development 
in EU copyright policy related to the so-called ‘value gap’. This case will tie together 
and exemplify many of the findings and observations made across the preceding 
chapters of the thesis. Subsequently, the chapter will formulate the main conclusions 
that emerge from this research, as well as their implications for researchers, 
policymakers, the media, and for COs themselves. Based on the presented findings, 
and bearing in mind the scope and limitations of this research,35 the thesis will draw 
several key conclusions as follows:  
• COs are important and valuable actors in copyright law and policymaking 
and should therefore continue to participate in these activities.  
They perform numerous indispensable roles in the policymaking process. To 
name a few, they raise awareness of the existence of shortcomings in the 
practical application of copyright law and its effects on creators. They monitor 
and react to legal and policy developments, and thereby play a role in 
safeguarding the interests of the stakeholders that they represent. COs also 
play a role in the practical implementation of certain aspects of copyright.  
 
• However, the behaviour of these actors is far from uniform.  
Considerable differences exist in the way different COs approach and act, or 
choose not to act, on a particular copyright issue, as well as in the issues that 
                                                     
34 Directive 2014/26/EU of 20 March 2014 on collective management of copyright and related 
rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online use in the internal 
market [2014] OJ L 84/72 (CRM Directive). 
35 See Chapter 2, section 5. 
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they prioritise. These differences stem from a range of factors, including 
organisational mandate, resources and resource allocation, membership 
composition, political power, and self-concept. The combination of these 
factors also influences and creates disparities in the level of policy proactivity 
that individual COs demonstrate. This means that some actors may be more 
concerned with actually influencing the copyright policy agenda itself, while 
others ‘merely’ seek to shape its outcomes.  
 
• Complex dynamics and power imbalances exist between individual actors.  
The copyright policy environment is populated by a large multiplicity of 
actors with varying interests, priorities, approaches, and concerns. In this 
space, numerous issues and policy causes coexist and compete for 
policymakers’ attention. Some actors are in a better position to exercise 
influence over the direction and substance of policy than others. As a 
consequence of the multiplicity of actors, of colliding interests, and of power 
dynamics, organisations form coalitions and networks based on mutual 
interests and interdependence in order to further a particular issue. However, 
the positions advanced through such groupings are not accurate 
representations of the needs and priorities of individual participating actors. 
 
• Differences in the behaviour and power of individual actors, and in the 
dynamics that govern their interactions are not fully understood by 
policymakers.  
Policymakers, as well as IP reviewers and some academics, do not sufficiently 
distinguish between individual actors. They make rather sweeping and 
generalising statements in relation to right holder representations or CMOs, 
which do not take account of variations in the extent of influence exercised by 




• As a result of complex stakeholder dynamics, power imbalances, and 
policymakers’ insufficient understanding of these phenomena, certain 
creators’ issues will not surface onto copyright policy agendas and will thus 
remain unaddressed by copyright law.  
Relatively weaker, resource-poorer organisations, or organisations acting 
alone and without support from important industry networks will struggle to 
assert their voice and advance their cause over other competing issues. As a 
consequence of this, and of wider stakeholder dynamics and power 
imbalances, policymakers will get uneven exposure to different issues. In this 
process, some matters may remain unheard by lawmakers and thus 
unaddressed by the law. Among the issues considered in this thesis, one 
example of this could be the UK lawmaker’s lack of engagement with the 
problem of creators’ and performers’ contract terms, considered in Chapter 
4.36  
 
• Given the disparity of views and positions on many copyright law issues, 
policymakers often attempt to shape copyright law and policy outcomes as 
a compromise between different stakeholder interests. However, this does 
not always produce sound or appropriate results for copyright law.  
Considering the stakeholder antagonism that exists on many issues of 
copyright law as well as stakeholders’ active engagement in policy, decision-
makers are interested in developing laws that embody compromised 
positions in an attempt to keep more parties content. Yet, as evidenced in the 
current UK status quo on private copying, compromises do not always result 
in sound outcomes for copyright law. Moreover, compromises may not 
amount to a true balancing of interests in so far as the policy process from 
which they emerge may not offer an accurate picture of the full range of 
                                                     
36 Further examples of issues that fall outside the scope of this thesis are provided in Chapter 
8, section 2.3. 
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interests that require balancing, or of the actual extent to which particular 









This chapter explains the methods used in completing the research on creators’ 
organisations (COs). I will briefly re-visit the research approach indicated in chapter 
1 and then proceed with a detailed account of the research participants, which 
includes the decision to include certain collective management organisations (CMOs), 
as well as the selection of creative industries and COs. I will subsequently discuss the 
case study approach and specific methods of data collection. Following this, I will 
present an outline of my approach to data analysis and then consider the limitations 
of this methodology. 
1. Methodology 
As presented in the introductory chapter, I conducted the research into COs’ role in 
copyright policy as a socio-legal study.37 This approach was determined by my 
objective: to study COs as actors in copyright policymaking in order to understand 
the role that they play in defining the nature of the copyright policy environment and 
in the outcomes of the copyright policy process.  
From a doctrinal legal perspective, there is a range of different statutes and 
regulations that lay the basis for the existence of the studied organisations, and that 
frame their activities.38 These include the Trade Union Act 2016, the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, the Companies Act 2006, the Copyright, 
Designs and Patents Act 1988, and The Collective Management of Copyright (EU 
Directive) Regulations 2016. Provisions in copyright law, for instance, define licensing 
                                                     
37 See Chapter 1, section 3. 
38 Some scholars distinguish a number of ‘legal environments of organisations’, see Lauren B 
Edelman, Mark C Suchman, ‘The legal environments of organizations’ (1997) 23 Annual 
Review of Sociology 479. 
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bodies and licensing schemes,39 and set out the powers of the Copyright Tribunal, 
which may review licensing terms.40 Company law and trade union law, on the other 
hand, contain the provisions that determine the internal governance, function and 
general procedures within the studied organisations.41 However, while formal legal 
instruments like these provide COs and other organisations with their broad remit 
and a framework for activities, and even some of the standards to which they are 
held, they offer little insight into the day-to-day behaviour and agenda-setting of 
these organisations. 42  Similarly, they say nothing about the politico-legal processes 
in which they participate, or how that participation should be undertaken.  As such, 
to understand how these organisations, working within their statutory framework, 
actually influence the politico-legal process through priority-setting, evidence-
gathering, and lateral and vertical engagement, one must conduct empirical research 
on and with these organisations. This will additionally offer some insight into the 
operation of law in, and transformation of law by, society (or at least interested 
representatives thereof).   
Given the above, this thesis examines the behaviour and environment of the subject 
COs, focusing on their external displays of action and their own perceptions of their 
public roles.  This will allow us to understand ‘raw law’, which McCormick 
juxtaposed with ‘law as science’ and described as the ‘plurality of activities’ that 
                                                     
39 S 116 CDPA 1988.  
40 Ss 124 ff CDPA 1988.  
41 For instance, s 1 TULRCA 1992 defines the meaning and basic purpose of a trade union 
and ss 178 f regulate the content and form of collective agreements and collective bargaining. 
Similarly, ss 1- 6 Companies Act 2006 lay down the types of companies under company law 
and ss 281 f regulate the decision-making process (resolutions, meeting, voting rights) of 
companies.  
42 William T Gallagher, ‘What is a ‘Law and Society’ Perspective on Intellectual Property?’ in 
William T Gallagher (ed) Introduction to Intellectual Property: International Library of Essays in 
Law and Society (Ashgate Publishing 2007) available at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103681> accessed 20 June 2016 xi; 
MacCormick, ‘Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence’ (n 27) 58; Lawrence M Friedman, ‘The Law 
and Society Movement’ (1986) 38 Stanford Law Review 763; Michael Adler and Jonathan 
Simon, ‘Stepwise Progression: The Past, Present and Possible Future of Empirical Research 
on Law in the United States and the United Kingdom’ (2014) 41(2) Journal of Law and 
Society 173, 175. 
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enrich our understandings of actors and their contributions to the process of law.43 
Greater knowledge of this raw law or law in action can enrich our understanding of 
the social life of law (i.e. of the social, cultural and political context of law), and in this 
case copyright law. 
2. Research participants  
2.1 Selection of subject industries 
To begin, I will explain my choice to focus on the music and publishing industries. I 
chose two creative industries. To conduct an assessment of COs’ role, their 
environment and impact on copyright policy against the backdrop of just one creative 
industry would not have adequately accounted for the fact that law and policy in this 
area must attend to the needs and interests of numerous different creative fields 
representing extensive and diverse stakeholders, activities and protected works. I 
therefore decided to undertake case studies of both music and publishing for this 
project, whereby I narrowed down my focus of the publishing industry primarily to 
book publishing and in exclusion of journalism. I did so in recognition of the distinct 
working conditions, outputs, general structures, as well as different actors that 
operate within the journalistic field. 
As noted in chapter 1, the music and publishing industries were chosen for a number 
of reasons. The two creative industries share several commonalities that rendered 
both sectors comparable and at the same time also some key differences that promised 
an intriguing insight into cross-industry dynamics in the copyright policy landscape. 
In terms of similarities, music and publishing are both among the most successful 
traditional UK creative industries; as such they make a significant contribution to the 
UK economy in terms of jobs, sales and reach.44 These industries’ needs and concerns 
therefore regularly inform copyright policy debates and stakeholders from these 
businesses are generally regarded as exercising considerable influence over the 
                                                     
43 MacCormick, ‘Four Quadrants of Jurisprudence’ (n 27) 54. 
44 For key facts and figures on the UK creative industries, see ‘UK Creative Industries: Facts 
and Figures’ (Creative Industries Council) <http://www.thecreativeindustries.co.uk/uk-
creative-overview/facts-and-figures#> accessed 07 February 2017.   
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development of copyright law and policy. Furthermore, digital technologies and the 
internet are impacting both industries by presenting them with new markets and 
opportunities as well as the need to adapt their business models to new formats and 
new actors involved in the delivery, access and dissemination of creative works.45 
This suggested that these industries’ configuration may be in flux, with many issues 
challenging, as well as requiring the attention and work of COs. The idea that COs 
from these two sectors would be active in contemporary copyright policy was 
reinforced by the findings of several studies into authors’ and performers’ earnings 
and standing, according to which creator groups from these industries were not 
faring particularly well in the digital environment.46   
A further similarity between the music and publishing industries and another reason 
for selecting these two creative sectors lies in the fact that in both, COs sit within and 
navigate a complex environment of diverse stakeholders. These include publishers, 
agents, retailers, distributors, producers, managers, recording companies, 
information service providers, and others, who all contribute to and draw from the 
value chains that ultimately sustain the activities of creators. Music and publishing 
are also more mature industries in comparison to some other, like games, and as such 
present a better opportunity to study how stakeholder behaviour influences 
copyright policy and the environment within which policies are developed. 
Therefore, studying COs in these industries presented a possibility of gaining insight 
into the dynamics and relationships of different actors whose interests the copyright 
system seeks to balance, i.e. into the interest group environment of copyright law. 
                                                     
45 Nicola Searle, ‘Changing Business Models in the Creative Industries: The cases of 
Television, Computer Games and Music’ (2011) Report commissioned by the UK IPO 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/310293/ipr
esearch-creativeind-full-201110.pdf> accessed 23 June 2016 6. 
46 Séverine Dusollier, Caroline Ker, Maria Iglesias and Yolanda Smits, Contractual 
Arrangements applicable to creators: law and practice in selected Member States (European Union 
2014) (EU contracts study); Johanna Gibson, Phillip Johnson and Gaetano Dimita, ‘The 
Business of Being an Author: A Survey of Author’s Earnings and Contracts’ (Queen Mary 
University of London 2015).  
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My choice for the music and publishing industries was also motivated by some 
differences that characterise these sectors. Particularly relevant to my research was 
the fact that COs from both industries appeared to be primarily invested in different 
copyright issues. Such was the case with regard to the three substantive issues 
(contract terms, the private copying exception and the implementation of the 
collective rights management Directive) that were selected for their contemporary 
and relevant nature during the research period. The private copying exception was 
an issue of much greater significance for COs in the music industry than it was for 
COs in publishing. Individual contract terms, on the other hand, seemed to be an 
issue on which COs from publishing were more active than their counterparts in 
music. In publishing, contract terms between authors and publishers determine the 
revenue that authors can expect to get from the primary uses of their works (sales), 
whereas in music, a larger proportion of a creator’s income could flow from rights 
and uses managed collectively by a CMO. This also suggested that CMOs in both 
industries could have a different standing and influence over copyright policy. 
Against this background, I expected that an exploration of these issues from the 
perspective of COs belonging to the music and publishing industries could provide 
an appropriate canvas for capturing both the opportunities and challenges in steering 
copyright policy to the benefit of (all) creators across various industries. It would also 
allow me to explore the existence of cross-industry synergies or divisions that could 
further contribute to the outcomes of certain policy developments. 
2.2 Defining ‘creators’ organisations’ 
The starting point in selecting the organisations that this research would focus on was 
defining the term ‘creators’ organisations’. As described in the previous chapter, I use 
this term in the thesis to refer to organisations whose membership consists, wholly or 
in large part, of individual creators (writers, musicians, etc.) who also shape the 
organisation’s self-identity, and where the purpose of the organisation is to further 
the interests of those creators.47 I arrived at this definition by studying general 
                                                     
47 See Chapter 1, section 2. 
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concepts and classifications of organisations in organisational research.48 Specifically, 
I combined elements of two definitions presented by Eldridge and Crombie.49 The 
first describes organisations as social systems with a collective identity, an exact roster 
of members and a programme of activity and procedures, while the second 
emphasises that organisations are systems deliberately constructed to seek specific 
goals and values.50 In application of this definition, I focused my research on trade 
unions representing creators, as well as on certain collective management 
organisations (CMOs) that either exclusively or predominantly consist of, and 
represent, creators. 
While creator trade unions could easily be subsumed under the above definition of 
COs, the application of the definition to collecting societies like the Authors’ 
Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS), the Performing Right Society (PRS) and 
Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) is less straightforward. In the case of PRS 
and PPL, the organisations’ memberships consist not only of creators but also of 
music publishers and producers. Still, individual creators do make up the far greater 
proportion of members, and in the case of ALCS, authors are in fact the only 
represented stakeholder group in the membership. One could, however, question 
whether the goals pursued by collecting societies like PRS and PPL reflect, in 
importance, direct relevance and priority, the interests of creators. This may not be the 
case since such collecting societies must reconcile the interests of creators and 
exploiters of works. Yet, a strong argument in favour of subsuming these CMOs 
under the ‘creators’ organisations’ term came from the economic significance that 
these bodies have for creators. Organisations like ALCS and PRS serve as pipelines 
for value, and the money that they distribute to their members could constitute a 
considerable portion of these creators’ total copyright related revenue.      
                                                     
48 David Dunkerley, The Study of Organizations (Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972); Eldridge 
and Crombie (n 16); David A Buchanan and Alan Bryman (eds), The SAGE handbook of 
organizational research methods (SAGE 2009). 
49 Eldridge and Crombie (n 16).  
50 Ibid 22, 23 citing Theodore Caplow, Principles of Organisation (Brace & Court 1964) and 
Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (Free Press 1960).  
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CMOs like ALCS and PRS are not only economically important for creators. They are 
also important in light of the way they present themselves to copyright policymakers. 
In their public relations, these organisations explicitly claim to represent creators, 
either exclusively as in the case of ALCS, or among other stakeholders, as in the case 
of PRS. ALCS’ own mission statement includes campaigning and lobbying ‘on issues 
of importance to writers both at a national and international level, to ensure that 
writers’ rights are both recognised and rewarded.’51 Similarly, PRS describes itself as 
‘a society of songwriters, composers and music publishers’52 which represents the 
rights of its members. These self-identifiers may well influence the way the voice of 
these organisations is taken into account by copyright policymakers. Consequently, I 
contend that it is both reasonable and essential to subsume these CMOs under my 
definition of ‘creators’ organisations’ for the purpose of this research. Creators 
comprise a large proportion of these CMOs’ memberships, they are represented on 
the organisations’ management boards, and these organisations’ agendas are adopted 
and actions taken to benefit creators in some way. 
                                                     
51 ‘What we do’ (ALCS) <https://www.alcs.co.uk/What-we-do> accessed 29 November 2016.  
52 About us’ (PRS for Music) <https://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/Pages/default.aspx> 
and <https://www.prsformusic.com/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 29 November 2016.  
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2.3 Organisation selection  
The COs studied in this research were SoA,53 ALCS,54 the MU,55 and PRS56. These 
organisations were selected on the basis of their recognition and standing within their 
industries, as well as based on their function. All four organisations are well 
established; their foundations date back several decades, and in some cases over a 
century, and their voice and relevance are recognised both by other industry 
stakeholders as well as by copyright policymakers. This indicated a certain internal 
stability of the organisations and consequently a higher potential for coordinated and 
organised outward action. What made these organisations additionally suitable for 
the present study was also their continuous activity in public affairs, including 
copyright policy. While they may not be representative of every CO in the studied 
creative industries, representativeness was not one of my selection criteria. My aim 
was not to identify a random cross-section of COs and generalise findings based on 
an examination of their objectives and contributions to copyright law and policy. 
                                                     
53 SoA is a company limited by shares registered under the Companies Act 2006, ss 1, 3(1)(2), 
and a special register body pursuant to s 117 (1) Trade Union and Labour Relations 
(Consolidation) Act 1992. The object of SoA is laid down in Article 2 of its Articles of 
Association (Approved 21.10.2014) < 
http://www.societyofauthors.org/SOA/MediaLibrary/SOAWebsite/Governance/Articles-of-
Association-21-10-14-APPROVED-final.pdf> accessed 18 February 2017. It is discussed in 
Chapter 4, section 1.3.3.  
54 ALCS is a company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital, ss 1, 3(1)(3) 
Companies Act 2006. The objects of ALCS are laid down in Article 3 of the Memorandum of 
Association (November 2016). < 
http://www.alcs.co.uk/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?nodeguid=2dc7bbdd-e0e9-4c81-a46a-
7ccaf4d73289> accessed 18 February 2017. 
55 MU is registered on the list of Trade Unions maintained by the Certification Officer under 
s 3 TULRCA 1992, < https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-list-of-active-
trade-unions-official-list-and-schedule/trade-unions-the-current-list-and-schedule> accessed 
18 February 2017. Its objects are defined in Rule I.2 of the MU Rules. See n 430 for more 
information. 
56 PRS is a company limited by guarantee and not having a share capital, ss 1, 3(1)(3) 
Companies Act 2006. The objects of PRS are laid down in Article 3 of the Memorandum of 
Association < http://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/About%20MCPS-
PRS/prs-memorandum-articles.pdf> accessed 18 February 2017. PRS for Music is the brand 
name used by PRS and its operating company PRS for Music Limited, < 
http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/ourpeople/governance/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 
18 February 2017. 
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Rather, in recognition of the limitations to generalisability in qualitative research, my 
intention was to deliver findings on a number of organisations that do actively engage 
with other actors and that do seek to shape the law and its application on issues that 
matter to the members. With this in mind, this thesis primarily maps the activities, 
relationships and impact of four established, reputable and influential COs. 
In light of my research objectives, this thesis will only consider the studied 
organisations in their capacity as copyright policy actors. As such, the focus will fall 
on COs’ interactions with other industry stakeholders and policymakers in the 
context of existing or emerging copyright policy initiatives. Other aspects of COs’ 
roles, including their relationship with their membership, collective bargaining with 
employer representations, as well as the many individual services provided to 
members, including contract vetting, industry advice, and more, will not be 
considered in detail in this thesis. Reference to some of these other CO activities will 
only be made where it serves to enrich the context of COs’ policy oriented functions, 
and where such references are sufficiently supported by the project data. 
Aside from being suitable research subjects based on their active involvement in 
copyright matters, both individually and through memberships in larger groups and 
alliances, SoA, ALCS, MU and PRS also pool together and represent a considerable 
subset of creators. At the time of writing, SoA has more than 9000 author members, 
ALCS has around 90 000, the MU brings together around 30 000 musicians, and PRS 
administers the rights of 118 000 songwriters, composers and music publishers.57    
In addition to the above factors, I also chose these four COs on the basis of their 
function, as trade unions or CMOs, to suit the typology of organisations that I aimed 
to explore more closely. I specifically sought a trade union – CMO pair of COs from 
each of the two industry sectors selected for this research. In the end, SoA and ALCS 
                                                     
57 Membership figures for each organisation were obtained from the respective 
organisation’s website. The information reported reflects these sources as at 16 June 2016.  
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were the two COs from the publishing sector and MU and PRS were chosen from COs 
in the music business. Two issues merit a brief mention at this point.  
(1) In selecting COs from the music industry, MU was naturally approached as 
the only trade union dedicated to musicians. However, in terms of its CMO 
counterpart, I originally approached the Phonographic Performance Limited 
(PPL) as I considered it a better fit with regard to the MU. For one, it seemed 
that there was more liaison between these two organisations, possibly also as 
a result of John Smith, the MU General Secretary’s presence as Chairman of 
PPL’s Executive Management Team.58 Moreover, the MU is above all a union 
of music performers, although many of its members are also songwriters and 
composers. PPL is the UK collecting society that manages the copyright in 
sound recordings.59 As such, PPL is a valuable revenue bringer particularly 
for performers, who share returns from the public performance right60 and the 
communication to the public right with phonogram producers, i.e. the record 
labels.61 I therefore expected that there would be a larger overlap in the 
thematic focus of public affairs activities between the MU and PPL. However, 
access negotiations with PPL were stalling and in the interest of time, I 
approached the other major CMO in the music business – PRS. In contrast to 
PPL, PRS is the collecting society that manages the copyright in musical 
works62 and is therefore primarily relevant to songwriters, composers and 
their publishers. Nevertheless, as access negotiations ran smoothly and 
efficiently, it was decided that PRS would be the focus CMO from the music 
sector.   
 
                                                     
58 For a list of the PPL Executive Management Team see ‘Management and Boards’ (PPL) 
<http://www.ppluk.com/About-Us/Who-We-Are/Management-and-boards/> accessed 17 
June 2016.  
59 S 1 (1) (b) CDPA 1988.  
60 S 19 (1) CDPA 1988.  
61 S 20 (1) CDPA 1988.  
62 S 1 (1) (a) CDPA 1988.  
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(2) The second issue is relevant to the typology of the chosen organisations and 
concerns SoA. This CO is not a traditional trade union in the sense that it has 
a dual legal form.63 As I will elaborate in the following chapter 3, the CO was 
originally established as a private limited company, which adopted the 
additional status of an independent trade union several decades later in 
1978.64 However, as I discuss in the next chapter, this CO performs many trade 
union characteristic functions. Furthermore, it appeared a more suitable 
organisation to focus on than the Writers’ Guild of Great Britain (WGGB), the 
other trade union in publishing65 as the latter is a much smaller union of 
roughly 2000 members and specialises in the interests and needs of 
screenwriters.66  
3. Research methods 
The present research was designed as two case studies, one focussed on the activities 
of the MU and PRS in the music sector, and the other on SoA and ALCS in the 
publishing sector. The case study approach is a research strategy that involves an 
empirical investigation of a particular phenomenon within its real life context using 
multiple sources of data.67 This strategy allowed me to explore the actions and 
operations of four COs in the dynamic context of their work on several specific 
copyright law issues. The three issues that I chose to focus on were (1) contractual 
terms for creators and performers, (2) the UK private copying exception, and (3) the 
                                                     
63 See n 53. 
64 See chapter 3, section 2.2.1.  
65 Except for the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) <https://www.nuj.org.uk/home/> 
accessed 07 February 2017, which falls outside the scope of this thesis as I exclude journalism 
from my study of the publishing industry, see section 2.1 of the present chapter.  
66 See 2015 Annual Return for WGGB: ‘Corporate Report: Writers Guild of Great Britain: 
annual returns’ (UK Government, 11 July 2014) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/writers-guild-of-great-britain-annual-
returns> accessed 07 February 2017 and <https://writersguild.org.uk/> accessed 1 December 
2016. 
67 Colin Robson, Real World Research (3rd Edition, John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2011) 136; Robert K 
Yin, Case Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd Edition, SAGE Publications 1994) 13; John 
W Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among five approaches (2nd 
edition, SAGE Publications 2007) 73. 
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implementation of the EU collective rights management Directive. These topics were 
arrived at after numerous scoping telephone conversations with representatives of 
the respective COs’ management. These exchanges preceded the formal adoption of 
my research design. The idea behind this scoping exercise was to ensure that the focus 
of my research would capture issues of contemporary relevance to the work of the 
COs and the creative industries to which they belong. However, the 
contemporaneous nature of this research also meant that not all of these topics have 
come to a natural close in the timeframe of this project. The UK private copying 
exception, which entered into force in the fall of 2014 was repealed following a judicial 
review in the summer of 2015. The Regulations implementing the CRM Directive 
came into effect in April 2016. However, the issue of contract terms for creators is still 
live and evolving.  
The case studies relied on two main sources of data. Primary data were generated 
from 22 semi-structured interviews with mostly high-ranking representatives of the 
four COs. These data were complemented with document analysis. The latter drew 
upon the organisations’ own policy briefings, consultation submissions, press 
releases, website updates and reports, on the one hand, and external sources 
reporting on the actors’ activities, primarily documents from online news sites, blogs 
and trade press, on the other. This multi-method approach benefitted my research in 
several ways. The secondary data offered insight into organisations’ publicly 
declared policy positions and agendas as well as into the actors’ formal reflections on 
policy and industry developments.68 Through the interviews, on the other hand, I was 
able to capture the individual experiences, opinions and perceptions of important 
players within each of the organisations, specifically those who were responsible for 
the implementation of the organisation’s stated aims and agendas. These two 
methods therefore not only complemented one another but also contributed to the 
process of triangulation by providing a possibility for the cross-checking of themes 
                                                     
68 The value of document analysis is considered by Lisa Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to 
Empirical Legal Research’ in Peter Cane and Herber M Kritzer (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010) 926, 938 and Creswell (n 67) 204, 208.   
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and findings, thus helping ensure that internally valid and well-rounded conclusions 
were reached.69 
The fieldwork took place in the period January – May 2015. Interviews were carried 
out on the premises of each CO. The access that I was able to obtain varied across the 
four organisations.70 I was able to spend 10 days in the MU’s London headquarters, 
in order to interview a range of respondents. During this time, it was also possible to 
conduct some unstructured observations. Three days were spent with PRS, one and 
a half days with ALCS and just over an hour with SoA. All interviews were recorded 
and transcribed with the consent of the respondents. Participants were offered two 
levels of confidentiality in terms of the way their contribution would be presented in 
research outputs. These are outlined in the participant information leaflet (see Annex 
B). This leaflet was made available to key gatekeepers within the COs during access 
negotiations and once more to every individual respondent prior to the interview. In 
essence, respondents could choose between being identified by name or having both 
their name and designation within the organisation kept confidential. In the latter 
case, the leaflet explicitly clarified that participants’ affiliation with their respective 
organisation would not be confidential. As expected, both options were exercised 
without particular uniformity across each CO. Where a participant has agreed to be 
identified, their name is referenced in a footnote at the end of the quote (see Annex A 
for a list of named participants). To maintain consistency in reporting, all interview 
quotes have been attributed to participants following the same scheme (Respondent, 
Organisation’s name). In order to ensure the confidentiality of all remaining 
participants, respondents across organisations were not numbered. 
Differences in the degree of access that I obtained at each CO also led to an unequal 
number of interviews carried out with respondents from the studied organisations: 6 
interviews were conducted at ALCS, 10 at the MU, 5 at PRS and 1 at SoA (see Annex 
                                                     
69 Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical legal Research’ (n 68) 208; Robson, Real 
World Research (n 57) 158.  
70 I will elaborate on this in section 5 of the present chapter.  
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A). Capacity limitations were indicated by SoA as the reason why I was encouraged 
not to approach a wide range of people from that CO. To offset this somewhat, a 
follow-up interview was conducted with my sole SoA respondent. This also led me 
to seek an interview with a high-ranking respondent at WGGB, the other – much 
smaller –trade union in the publishing industry, which is dedicated primarily to 
screenwriters.71 This was done in order to gather more data on trade unions in the 
publishing sector with a view to obtain more depth and a possible means to 
triangulate some of the data generated with SoA. Richer data and a possibility of 
limited triangulation also motivated me to accept an opportunity to interview 
representatives of a professional association in music – the British Academy of 
Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA) during my fieldwork in London. This 
brought the total number of interviews carried out for this project to 24 (22+2). 
However, the data generated from WGGB and BASCA has not been used to draw any 
stand-alone findings. Instead, it has been consulted to corroborate or question 
emerging themes and findings from the data pertaining to the other four COs that 
remain the focus of this thesis. 
4. Data analysis approach  
The data gathered as part of this research was analysed with a thematic coding 
approach.72 I began reducing the raw interview data through the use of annotations 
as I transcribed the interview recordings and then re-read the transcripts. I organised 
and coded these transcripts with the help of NVivo – a special qualitative data 
analysis software.73 This software was also used, to a limited extent, for the document 
analysis. Codes and themes occurring in the data were determined inductively within 
the framework of the research questions. Many of the codes developed from the 
                                                     
71 As I explain in section 2.1, the thesis is only concerned with book publishing and excludes 
journalism. The National Union of Journalists was therefore not a viable option for a trade 
union.  
72 For a detailed account of the steps involved in thematic coding analysis see Robson, Real 
World Research (n 67) 474 ff and M B Miles and A M Huberman, Qualitative Data Analysis: An 
Expanded Sourcebook (2nd edition) (Sage 1994) 9.  
73 For more information on NVivo see <http://www.qsrinternational.com/what-is-nvivo> 
accessed 1 December 2016.  
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issues discussed during the interviews and included labels, such as ‘contractual 
terms’, ‘private copying’, ‘licensing’, ‘technology driven change’, ‘creators’ 
organisations’ concerns’, ‘creators’ organisations and other stakeholders’ and ‘current 
priorities’. To focus the emerging themes, memos were developed in two ways. On 
the one hand, memos were drafted to reflect on the body of data under individual 
codes. Additionally, memos were also developed by CO – to consider differences in 
the data generated from each of the four organisations studied. The themes that 
emerged from the fieldwork data, as a result of this process, ultimately served to focus 
the collection of additional documentary data that was subsequently analysed. 
Overall, the process of thematic coding analysis was carried out until internal 
consistency was reached in the themes and theory emerging from the data.   
5. Methodological challenges and limitations 
The methodological approach adopted for this research on COs was characterised by 
a number of challenges and limitations. To begin with, the contemporaneous nature 
of the policy issues that were used to study the activities and environment of COs 
meant that at the time of analysis and writing, the outcomes on certain issues, like 
contractual terms, were (and to an extent remain) unknown. This meant that, at times, 
my ongoing observations and analysis needed to be revised or cross-checked against 
more recent industry and policy developments. It further meant that for practical 
purposes, it was necessary to determine a cut-off date for further documentary data 
collection. The date chosen was 31 July 2016, though some post-July policy 
developments of significance, particularly draft EU Directives published in 
September 2016, have also been taken into account.74 Other more recent developments 
are identified in some of the footnotes.  
Furthermore, as mentioned above, the levels of access that I was able to secure with 
each CO differed. This affected, in particular, the breadth of data generated for each 
                                                     
74 ‘Modernisation of the EU copyright rules’ (European Commission) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/modernisation-eu-copyright-rules> accessed 
07 February 2017. 
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CO from interviews. In particular, with regard to SoA, it was more difficult to gain a 
sense of this CO’s culture having only spoken with one respondent. At the same time, 
my respondent made available to me a range of SoA consultation submissions and 
other policy briefings prepared by SoA, most of which are also available on the 
organisation’s website.75 Therefore, where possible, unevenness in interview data was 
addressed through particular scrutiny of documentary sources.   
With regard to my use of documentary data, generally when data which originated 
from one of the studied COs (for instance, a press release on a CO website) was 
consulted and incorporated into my analysis, I attempted to verify the content of data 
through triangulation, in particular by consulting other independent, or third-party 
sources. However, this was not possible in every instance. I have identified key 
instances, where I considered this problematic, in the relevant chapters.  
Finally, as I indicated in Chapter 1, it is important to note a few delimitations that 
apply to the work presented in this thesis. Firstly, while the thesis refers, where 
appropriate, to the legal instruments that govern the remit, structure, and procedures 
of the studied organisations, the focus of this research was not on the way 
organisations’ behaviour relates to these legal provisions. Rather, the presented 
research was concerned with uncovering COs’ role in and effect on copyright law and 
policy. Moreover, although every effort was made to ensure that the findings 
reported and discussed in this thesis are internally valid, there are limitations on the 
generalisability of my research outcomes. Through this research, I intended to map 
out the way creators’ organisations participate in the process of copyright 
policymaking, the environment in which they do so and the effects that this 
environment and these actors’ behaviour produce on the nature of copyright law and 
policy. However, I did not select the MU, PRS, ALCS and SoA for their 
representativeness of all such organisations. Rather, I chose them, among other 
things, because they are particularly active and relevant in public affairs. Furthermore, 
                                                     
75 ‘Submissions’ (The Society of Authors) <http://www.societyofauthors.org/Where-We-
Stand/Submissions> accessed 01 February 2017. 
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given my chosen methodology, the perspective through which the copyright policy 
environment is depicted is also the perspective of these creators’ organisations and it 
may differ from that of other creative industries stakeholders. Moreover, even with 
regard to these four organisations, the extent and type of access that I was able to 
secure, in terms of the number of interviews obtained from each organisation, the 
time spent on the premises of each, and the supplementary documents I was given 
access to, varied across the studied COs. It is also important to bear in mind that while 
music and publishing are two central components of the creative industries, this 
study has not considered the actors or environment pertaining to the audio-visual, 
crafts, visual arts, design and other creative industries.76 Last but not least, the 
copyright issues around which I structured my observations of the COs’ activities are 
a product of the timing of this research and, in line with one of my main conclusions, 
it is possible that even the studied four COs may behave or act differently in the 
context of other policy issues. 
6. Summary 
This chapter offered an account of the approach taken and methods used in 
researching COs’ behaviour, environment and impact on copyright policy. After 
discussing the socio-legal nature of this research, I elaborated on the reasons behind 
the selection of music and publishing as the two creative sectors at the focus of this 
thesis. I also justified the selection of SoA, ALCS, MU and PRS as the focus COs. 
Following this, I presented the methods involved in this research: a case study 
approach involving 22+2 semi-structured interviews with respondents from the 
selected COs (+2 interviews with WGGB and BASCA), coupled with documentary 
analysis. I discussed the thematic coding approach used to interpret the data and 
concluded by describing some of the methodological challenges and limitations 
                                                     
76 See ‘UK Creative Overview’ (Creative Industries Council) 
<http://www.thecreativeindustries.co.uk/industries> accessed 28 November 2016 for one 
overview of the respective creative industries. 
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pertaining to access, validity and generalisability. In the next chapter, I will review 







Literature Review  
 
There is ample evidence that organisations, including COs, actively participate in the 
making of copyright law and policy. Yet, the process by which they do so and how 
their participation impacts on, and characterises, the copyright policy framework 
have rarely been the specific focus of empirical research in IP. Publications of 
consultation responses on the UK Intellectual Property Office’s (IPO) website 
evidence that the bulk of input into public consultations on different copyright (and 
other IP) issues, which inform IP policies, generally come from organisations, not 
individuals.77 Similarly, in 2015, it was two COs and a music industry alliance of 
organisations (the MU, BASCA and UK Music) that launched a judicial review of the 
regulations that introduced a private copying exception into copyright law, and this 
judicial challenge ultimately led to the repeal of the copyright exception thus directly 
shaping the substance of the law.78 Freedom of Information requests by technology 
writer Glyn Moody have also led to the disclosure of meetings schedules and a 
number of e-mail exchanges between representatives of creative industries 
organisations and policymakers in the run-up to the adoption of various copyright 
exceptions in 2014.79 Some of the released correspondence illustrates how in 2013 the 
                                                     
77 See, for instance, ‘Consultation outcome: Copyright: UK orphan works licensing scheme’ 
(UK IPO) <https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/copyright-uk-orphan-works-
licensing-scheme> accessed 07 February 2017. 
78 The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal Copies for Private Use) Regulations 
2014, SI 2014/2361 were quashed by R (On the Application of British Academy of Songwriters, 
Composers and Authors) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (No. 2) [2015] 
EWHC 2041 (Admin).  
79 ‘Copyright exceptions’ (Freedom of Information request made by Glyn Moody to the 
Intellectual Property Office, 3 April 2014) 
<https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/copyright_exceptions#outgoing-346168> 
accessed 07 February 2017; ‘Meetings between IPO and copyright industries (3rd Jan- 3rd 




Alliance for IP, a major industry umbrella organisation, went as far as to make specific 
language recommendations on the text of the proposed exceptions for private 
copying and caricature, parody or pastiche80, to name a few, in a letter to the Minister 
for IP.81 These are just a few examples of industry organisations’ active role in 
copyright law and policy, none of which have been researched with a focus on these 
actors’ behaviour.  
As outlined in chapter 1, the purpose of this research was to study COs as participants 
and shapers of copyright policy, and to understand, in this context, how these actors 
behave, what landscape they operate in, and what effects this landscape and 
organisations’ workings produce on the nature and substance of copyright law and 
policy.82 
In this chapter, I situate my research. The chapter is structured into 3 main sections 
and a conclusion.  In section 1, I will consider the social movements, recent IP reviews, 
and legal and policy developments that characterise the contemporary copyright 
policy landscape, thereby offering a sense of the players, currents and perceived 
shortcomings of the policy field. I will discuss how organisations’ participation in 
policy has implicitly been assumed by academics and policymakers and how 
stakeholders have even been criticised for steering the course of the law through 
lobbying. I will review the portrayal of industry organisations, particularly trade 
unions and collecting societies in the media and following this focus on the limited 
existing research into the intersections of organisational behaviour and certain 
features of copyright policy. I will thereby consider how organisations have been 
                                                     
20of%20meetings.pdf> accessed 07 February 2017; E-mail from Richard Mollet (The 
Publishers Association) to UK IPO (26 February 2014) 
<https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/205465/response/532815/attach/2/FOI%20reque
st%20REDACTED%20emails%20PA%20re.copyright%20exceptions.pdf> accessed 07 
February 2017. 
80 Now s 30A CDPA 1988. 
81 Letter from Susie Winter, Director General, Alliance for IP, to Viscount Younger of Leckie, 
Minister for Intellectual Property (13 December 2013) < 
https://www.whatdotheyknow.com/request/205465/response/520020/attach/2/FOI%20attach.
IP%20Alliance.pdf> accessed 07 February 2017. 
82 See Chapter 1, section 1.  
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shown to impact policy. Subsequently, I will look at the interaction between policy 
and organisations in the other direction, i.e. the way the existing institutional 
environment of the copyright system influences the behaviour of organisations.  
Section 2 of this chapter will specifically consider trade unions and CMOs as two 
types of industry organisations. I will discuss the various functions of these actors 
and how they have been exercised by the MU, SoA, PRS and ALCS in the copyright 
field in order to inform our understanding and expectations of these organisations’ 
participation in copyright policy. By emphasising the differences in the origin, 
purpose and functions of these bodies, I will suggest that the way they engage in the 
policy process is also different. In addition, I will highlight some areas where 
understanding these differences bears relevance on our understanding of the 
copyright policy landscape.  
In section 3, I will briefly identify and outline the three copyright issues around which 
I structure my analyses and findings of the selected COs’ role in copyright policy in 
the present thesis. These are the contractual terms for authors and performers, the UK 
private copying exception, and the implementation of the EU collective rights 
management Directive (CRM Directive).   
1. The contemporary copyright policy landscape   
1.1 Technological advancements and shifting attitudes towards copyright and IP 
generally 
The last decade of developments in copyright law and policy could be described as a 
series of attempts on the part of policymakers and industry stakeholders to react to 
the challenges and opportunities presented by the advancement of the internet and 
digital technologies. Some of the most notable technological changes that have 
affected the IP system and the music and publishing industries in particular, relate to 
the digitisation of information and the possibility of electronic storage, both of which 
have made the acts of copying and distribution fully straightforward.83 This, in turn, 
                                                     
83 Charlotte Waelde and Hector MacQueen, ‘From entertainment to education: the scope of 
copyright?’ (2004) IPQ 259, 262. 
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has given rise to new infringing activities, such as illegal file-sharing of musical and 
audio-visual works, as well as of e-books.84 Digitisation and the internet have also 
provided a breeding ground for new actors and new ways of accessing and enjoying 
creative works, for instance through video-on-demand, webcasts, podcasts, 
streaming, and more. 
The stakeholder dynamics brought about through technological change have been 
described as a battle between digital millennialists and copyright fundamentalists.85 
As access to knowledge became easier, cheaper, and more widely accessible, the 
content industries started facing growing opposition from hackers, cyber-anarchists, 
and legal experts who were part of a movement for open access, an expansion of the 
public domain and digital rights.86 Indeed, the early 2000s saw the formation of the 
UK’s Open Rights Group,87 an organisation fighting for freedom in the digital age, 
including free speech, and thus for restrictions on the scope of copyright. Similar 
organisations and alliances have also come into existence across Europe and the US.88  
In the UK, the growing debate over the scope of IP law and its fitness in the digital 
age, fuelled on the one hand by the established industry organisations that sought to 
maintain their positions of power and by open access and digital liberalists on the 
other, was ultimately reflected in IP policy. Successive governments launched a 
number of reviews into the IP framework and its fitness to serve the new digital times. 
A parallel process has also unfolded on an EU level and the entailing reform package 
is, at the time of writing, still being finalised.89  
                                                     
84 Ibid 262-263. 
85 Peter Baldwin, The Copyright Wars (Princeton University Press 2014) 318.  
86Ibid, at 319. 
87 Open Rights Group <https://www.openrightsgroup.org/about/> accessed 07 February 
2017.  
88 The Open Rights Group is a member of European Digital Rights <https://edri.org/about/> 
accessed 07 February 2017, a network of 36 organisations pursuing similar aims across 21 
European Countries. In the US, the pendant to the Open Rights Group is the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation <https://www.eff.org/> accessed 07 February 2017, founded as early as 
1990.  
89 To date, this package includes legislative proposals for two Directives and two 
Regulations: ‘Modernisation of the EU copyright rules’ (European Commission) 
37 
 
1.2. Copyright policy developments and (perceptions of) organisations’ role within them 
In the UK, in 2006, Andrew Gowers published his review of the IP system.90 The 
review aimed to rebalance the way UK’s IP laws catered to the interests of right 
holders, commercial users, research institutions, consumers and other stakeholders. 
In the area of copyright, Gowers specifically examined the infringement framework, 
whether ‘fair use’ provisions for citizens were reasonable, and whether the 
complexity of copyright licensing was manageable by businesses.91 It was clear that 
many of Gowers’ recommendations were aimed at reducing the growing public 
perception that copyright law was serving as a hindrance to the world of 
opportunities created by new technologies.92 Such perceptions were being amplified 
by the open rights movement.93 As a result, Gowers made a number of 
recommendations. These included the development of an orphan works scheme to 
allow the re-use of protected works where the author could not be found or identified; 
a limited private copying exception for format shifting; a clearer research exception 
providing greater scope for research by universities; and new copyright exceptions 
for creative, transformative and derivative works, as well as for caricature, parody 
and pastiche.94  
In 2007, the Labour Government decided to take forward a few of Gowers’ 
recommendations, mainly those pertaining to copyright exceptions, and consulted on 
a number of proposals.95 The implicitness of industry organisations’ importance and 
participation in copyright policy shone through in the way the government chose to 
undertake the consultation. Unlike more recent copyright consultations, rather than 
                                                     
<https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/modernisation-eu-copyright-rules> accessed 
07 February 2017. Primarily relevant for this thesis is Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive 
on copyright in the Digital Single Market’ COM (2016) 593 final.  
90 Andrew Gowers, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (The Stationary Office 2006). 
91 Ibid para E.5.  
92 Ibid paras 3.28f and para E.9. 
93 ‘Open Rights Group welcomes Gowers Review’ (ORG, 6 December 2006) 
<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/press/releases/open-rights-group-welcomes-gowers-
review> accessed 07 February 2017.  
94 Gowers (n 90) 6-9.  
95 UK IPO, ‘Taking forward the Gowers Review’ (n 3).  
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make the document open and available to the public, the IPO at the time sent a copy 
of the consultation to a list of industry organisations (including ALCS, the MU and 
PRS, but excluding SoA),96 and merely indicated that further copies could be 
requested from the IPO.97 The IPO itself, it was clear, considered industry 
organisations to be primary contributors and actors in copyright policy. Yet, the main 
focus of academic study was not the workings of these organisations but the 
substance of Gowers’ recommendations, despite occasional reference that ‘industry 
pressures’ were moving ahead of sound theorizing.98  
Rather than implicitly assuming the existence and operations of industry 
organisations like Gowers had, Ian Hargreaves, who produced the subsequent review 
of the UK’s IP system in 2011, made several explicit and negative references to the 
impact of right holder organisations on IP policy generally and on copyright policy 
specifically.99 He did so in order to emphasise one of the review’s key messages – that 
IP policy should be evidence-based. In the document’s Foreword, Hargreaves 
suggested that in the past, IP policy had been driven by weight of lobbying and 
therefore urged the government to ensure that future policies would be grounded in 
evidence.100 In relation to copyright, the review claimed that ’lobbying on behalf of 
rights owners has been more persuasive to Ministers than economic impact 
assessments’101 and that ‘persuasive powers of celebrities and important UK creative 
companies have distorted policy outcomes.’102 However, while Hargreaves criticised 
                                                     
96 Ibid 37-38.  
97 Ibid 5, para 24.  
98 Wendy J Gordon, ‘Intellectual Property’ in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds) The Oxford 
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the impact of stakeholder behaviour, his statements were rather sweeping. In 
particular, they did not consider possible variations in the extent of influence 
exercised by different actors (representing different stakeholders, or performing 
different functions), or even by different creative industries altogether. Yet, this thesis 
will show that such distinctions are in fact necessary in light of differences and power-
imbalances between actors, and potentially between industries.103  
Hargreaves further criticised that much of the necessary data for the development of 
empirical evidence on copyright was held privately and therefore entered the public 
domain mainly as ‘evidence’, or ‘lobbynomics’, in support of arguments put forward 
by lobbyists.104 Following the IP review, the government embraced Hargreaves’ call 
for evidence-based policy and issued a ‘Guide to Evidence for Policy’ laying out and 
elaborating on three main criteria (clarity, verifiability and peer review) for the type 
of evidence that the government wished to receive from stakeholders; the IPO has 
since updated this guide on several occasions.105   
Thematically, Hargreaves’ Review, like Gowers’, was characterised by the idea that 
copyright law was acting as a barrier to innovation, specifically with regard to the 
creation of new internet-based businesses.106 Consequently, many of the reviewer’s 
recommendations, including a series of copyright exceptions, an orphan works 
licensing framework, and the establishment of a Digital Copyright Exchange to ease 
the process of rights clearance, were aimed at making copyright law more user and 
consumer friendly.107 A juxtaposition of Hargreaves’ initial observations of the 
lobbying on behalf of rights holders and his identification of a need to ‘fix’ copyright 
                                                     
103 Chapter 8, sections 2.1, 2.4.1 and 2.4.3.  
104 Hargreaves (n 4) para 2.13. 
105 UK IPO, ‘Guide to Evidence for Policy’ (2013) 
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so that it could facilitate innovation indicate that the scholar had a somewhat negative 
perception of the way rights holder organisations had influenced copyright policy. 
This sentiment has also been echoed by other scholars, including Horten,108 
Williamson and Cloonan,109 Baldwin,110 and Harker.111  
The key idea of facilitating the opportunities presented by new technologies for all 
market players and citizens was also at the heart of the EU copyright reform, which 
is part of the EU’s Digital Single Market Strategy.112 Similar to the UK, the European 
Commission undertook an extensive public consultation between December 2013 and 
March 2014, which elicited more than 9500 responses from ‘a wide range of 
stakeholders including users, consumers, right holders, industry, collective 
management organisations and governments.’113 The Commission’s choice to list 
CMOs as distinct stakeholders in its stakeholder enumeration, and to offer ‘CMOs’ as 
a separate category for respondents to select in order to indicate their position within 
the industry, is notable.114 Arguably, CMOs represent a collection of right holders and 
could, therefore, also have been subsumed under the author/performer and 
publisher/producer categories offered in the consultation document. At the same 
time, CMOs could also fall under ‘industry’ as industry organisations. Therefore, the 
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representative of author/performer; publisher/producer/broadcaster or their representative; 
intermediary/distributor/other service provider or their representative; CMO or their 




Commission’s decision to separate CMOs out into a discrete stakeholder category 
could indicate that these actors tend to behave differently or to have discrete interests 
from the other listed stakeholders; it could also reflect the different function 
performed by CMOs. Alternatively, the Commission’s move could also be a reflection 
of these actors’ particular influence over copyright policy. The latter hypothesis was 
suggested in the EU consultation response submitted by the UK national copyright 
research hub CREATe (Centre for Copyright and New Business Models in the 
Creative Economy).115 The academics authoring the consultation response suggested 
that the design of the survey questions in the document was more accessible and 
technically graspable by experts who were typically trained as lobbyists.116 
Consequently, the authors argued, there was a likelihood that the consultation would 
not illuminate empirically observable facts but rather what, CMO representatives (the 
authors’ illustrative example) saw or wished to see, whereas ‘artists, consumers, non-
profit institutions and digital innovators' were less likely to be able to contribute 
meaningfully.117 These academics suggested that CMOs’ views and interests differ 
from those of the other enumerated stakeholders and that CMOs may be the ones 
more effectively shaping policy because of the structure of the policy process. In light 
of this, the need to study the policy engagement of CMOs and compare it with that 
of other industry organisations is evident. The thesis will discuss how based on their 
role and functions, CMOs may wield particular policy influence compared to other 
actors.118 Furthermore, it will provide evidence that a mixed membership composition 
of creators and publishers can cause a CMO to take different policy positions from 
those adopted by organisations representing just one of the two stakeholder 
                                                     
115 Martin Kretschmer, Ronan Deazley, Lilian Edwards, Kristofer Erickson, Burkhard Schafer 
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groups.119 Moreover, the thesis will reveal differences in the policy behaviour, 
positions, and pursued influence between individual CMOs.120    
After its public consultation, the EU Commission published a Communication 
highlighting four pillars that it would seek to develop and strengthen through its 
future legislative package: (1) widening online access to content across the EU; (2) 
adapting copyright exceptions to the digital environment; (3) creating a fair 
marketplace; and (4) strengthening the enforcement system.121 To date, the 
Commission has rolled out a number of legislative proposals, including a Directive 
on copyright in the Digital Single Market, which addresses numerous issues, 
including the role of online intermediaries in the distribution of copyright-protected 
works and the remuneration system for authors and performers.122 Where relevant, 
reference to some of the proposals put forward by the Commission will be made in 
the respective thesis chapters, which substantively engage with the corresponding 
issues. Given the contemporaneous nature of this topic, more recent policy 
developments may only be referred to in the thesis footnotes. 
1.3. Creative industry organisations in the media 
Similar to the academic and policy treatment of industry organisations discussed in 
the previous subsection, online media representations of organisations’ role in 
copyright policy have also been largely negative and generalising.123 Following the 
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outcome of the private copying exception judicial review, for instance, a news report 
appeared on Ars Technica which carried the title ‘Thanks to the music industry, it is 
illegal to make private copies of music – again’.124 The piece merely named the three 
organisations, MU, BASCA, and UK Music, which had launched the judicial review 
and then summarised that ‘the music industry’ had shown itself to be indifferent to 
what its customers want. With no elaboration on the claimants’ arguments or 
motives, the piece effectively suggested that (a) these arguments and motives were 
the same for all claimants and (b) that the three claimants represented the entire music 
industry. As my thesis will show, there are certainly doubts as to the former, while 
the latter is evidently incorrect. Similarly, in reporting on the private copying judicial 
review, the BBC and the Guardian also merely named the three claimants, without 
offering any further contextualisation as to who these organisations are, what 
functions they perform and how they differ from one another.125   
There has been no conscious effort by online commentators to critically distinguish 
between the views and actions of trade unions and CMOs as two different types of 
industry organisations, although, collecting societies have generally been viewed by 
media reporters with particular distrust and scepticism.126 The main arguments 
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advanced against these actors relate to excessively high administration fees depriving 
members of larger revenues, CMOs’ alleged aggression when it comes to licensing 
copyright users, and a lack of appropriate oversight in the context of various 
corruption scandals. Such news reports have painted an overall negative picture of 
CMOs and also spread an uncorroborated assumption that these types of allegations 
generally apply to all collecting societies, and that all collecting societies act in similar 
ways. My thesis will substantively challenge the notion that all CMOs are easily 
comparable. In fact, it will flesh out the factors that play a role in the way an 
organisation behaves in policy and thereby highlight the need to clearly distinguish 
between individual CMOs, between trade unions and CMOs, and more widely, 
between individual industry actors altogether.127   
1.4. Creative industry organisations in copyright research  
At the beginning of this chapter I indicated that, with a few exceptions, creative 
industry organisations have not been the specific focus of research in copyright law 
and that the intersection of organisational behaviour and the features of copyright 
policy has generally been underexplored.128 In this subsection, I will consider some 
notable exceptions to this in the work of Horten, Williamson, Cloonan and Harker.129 
These researchers have all considered organisational behaviour in relation to specific 
issues, including the adoption of a particular legislative act (Horten), organisations’ 
self-portrayal to policymakers, the media, and the general public (Williamson and 
Cloonan), and organisations’ compilation and publication of ‘evidence’ (Harker). 
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These scholars’ research also presents how the studied organisational behaviour has 
affected and could potentially affect the copyright policy space. 
In her book, Copyright Masquerade: How Copyright Lobbying Threatens Online Freedoms, 
Horten examined whether power exercised by the international entertainment 
industries (music and film) resulted in a bypassing of democratic accountability. She 
studied how the entertainment industries exercise power to gain political influence 
and further their own economic interests and, in a second step, how policymakers 
respond to these stakeholders’ attempts to influence the political process. Horten 
looked at three case studies from different jurisdictions. The UK case centred around 
the adoption of the Digital Economy Act 2010. In this context, Horten documented 
how pressure had been exercised by entertainment industry organisations like the 
BPI – The British Recorded Music Industry trade body, on the UK government to 
enable the blocking of internet access as a means of protecting the commercial 
interests of right holders. Horten’s findings – that procedural rules had been 
compromised in order to expedite the passing of the Bill as a result of such industry 
pressure – were drawn from an examination of the individual stages of the political 
process in conjunction with the stakeholder activity.130 The author observed that the 
creative industries are well funded and ‘highly advanced in putting forward their 
cause.’131 Indeed, her research presented a strong case for the existence of interplay 
between entertainment industry organisations and policymakers and also showed 
how this interplay had impacted both the content and procedure applied to the 
specific piece of legislation that was studied.  
Williamson and Cloonan’s article, ‘Rethinking the Music Industry’, focussed on the 
discrepancy between the organisational structure of the global music economy and 
its portrayal in academic, media, and policy literature. Their key argument was that 
a complex, heterogeneous music landscape comprised of a large multiplicity of actors 
with different views and interests was inaccurately being referred to as ‘the music 
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industry’, in singular form, across academic, media and policy papers. The authors 
argued that a shift to the plural term ‘music industries’ was necessary as a more 
appropriate model for understanding and analysing the economics and politics 
surrounding music.132 Williamson and Cloonan found that notions of ‘the music 
industry’ were being formulated by, among other actors, representatives of umbrella 
organisations which purposefully frequently used the term synonymously with the 
recording industry. The intended aim, the researchers concluded, was to paint a 
picture of simplicity where there was in fact complexity, and homogeneity in place of 
diversity. One reason that the researchers put forward for the use of the term ‘the 
music industry’ by recording industry organisations like the BPI and the International 
Federation of Phonographic Industries (IFPI) was to overstate their case. The 
researchers drew three conclusions with implications for copyright policy from this 
organisational behaviour:  
(1) The studied organisations tend to present themselves as representative of a 
greater section of the music industries than they actually are and this makes 
them seem more influential and thus attractive to prospective members; 
(2) The studied organisations mask their concerns and vested interests as being 
those of ‘the music industry’ as a whole, which leads to misrepresentation and 
misinformation about the nature and state of the industries;  
(3) The notion is created that there is such a thing as a single music industry, 
which aids these organisations in giving the impression of speaking on behalf 
of the widest possible range of interests when lobbying the government and 
other parties.133 
Williamson and Cloonan analysed various instances in which the IFPI, the BPI, the 
Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), but also PRS, the Music 
Publishers Association (MPA), and the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society 
(MCPS) had conflated different sectors of the music industries in their statements. 
                                                     
132 Williamson and Cloonan, ‘Rethinking the music industry’ (n 8) 305.  
133 Ibid 307. 
47 
 
They concluded that single interest or industry representative organisations were 
presenting themselves as representing ‘the music industry’ in order to elicit public 
and political support for campaigns which were potentially only in the interest of 
parts of those industries.134  
Finally, Harker’s research into organisational behaviour focussed on the music sector 
and recording industry organisations’ actions. In his article, ‘The wonderful world of 
IFPI: music industry rhetoric, the critics and the classical Marxist critique’, he 
explored the effects of what Hargreaves described as ‘lobbynomics’, or the problem 
related to the fact that most industry data which enters IP policy debates originates 
from stakeholder organisations.135 The author analysed a number of IFPI publications 
on world record sales data between 1969 and the mid-1990s and found 
methodological inconsistencies, for instance in the way the ‘world’, ‘developed’ and 
‘mature’ markets were defined. As an example, he indicated IFPI’s unproblematic 
treatment of continents as though they were, at the time, well-defined, when Turks 
may have been less certain about whether they were European or Asians, just as 
Canadians or Chileans may not have wanted to be generally labelled ‘American’.136 
Through these and many numerical examples, Harker showed that the IFPI’s 
publications were not accurate representations of facts but rather representations of 
mediated, patchy and often inconsistent information, which served to strengthen 
certain ideological rhetoric that was of importance to the IFPI.137 In particular, Harker 
alluded to the idea that showing consistent growth was crucial to the IFPI,138 possibly 
in order to preserve a certain legal or political status quo when it came to music policy.  
The above three studies demonstrate how influential the behaviour of industry 
organisations can be on the policy process in terms of the way creative industries are 
presented, policy problems defined and substantiated with ‘evidence’, and laws 
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ultimately drafted and passed. Like the tip of an iceberg, this research gives a sense 
of the vast amount of existing but unexplored links between the operations of 
industry organisations and the nature and shape of copyright policies. As such, it 
offers a desperately incomplete picture.  For example, all three studies focussed on 
the music industry, and on organisations representing the same stakeholder group – 
the phonogram producers, although Williamson and Cloonan did analyse a wider 
circle of organisations in the music sector, including PRS. Consequently, gaps in the 
literature on organisations in copyright law exist, first, within the music sector in 
relation to organisations representing other stakeholder groups like creators, but also 
in relation to other creative sectors, like the publishing or the visual arts sector, to 
name two examples. Moreover, there is a gap in comparative research considering 
organisational behaviour across different creative sectors but also across different 
types of organisations, distinguishing, for instance, between relatively resource-
richer and resource-poorer organisations, or between trade unions and CMOs as two 
functionally different types of organisations. A richer understanding of the workings 
of these different organisations is necessary in order to better grasp how copyright 
policymaking, policies, and ultimately laws are affected by the behaviour of the actors 
who shape them.          
The present thesis provides evidence and analyses that support Horten’s findings that 
organisations from the music sector, in particular, exercise effective advocacy and 
influence over the shape of copyright law and policy. It also corroborates Williamson 
and Cloonan’s observations on the strategies that certain music industry actors use 
and provides evidence suggesting that such tactics are effective. Furthermore, it 
confirms Harker’s argument that the evidence submitted by industry actors is often 
intertwined with targeted advocacy, which poses a challenge for the development of 
evidence-based policy. However, in addition to this, the thesis also offers insight into 
the way actors with different resources, functions and sizes, to name a few 
distinguishing features, engage in policy work, both in the music, as well as in the 
publishing sector. Consequently, the thesis offers cross-industry comparisons, based 
on which it maps potential differences in the extent to which individual creative 
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industries wield policy influence. It sheds light on differences in organisational 
behaviour and policy proactivity among individual actors and identifies power 
imbalances, which suggest that different actors have varying capacities to influence 
policy agendas and outcomes. Moreover, the thesis offers insight into how and why 
organisations group together and collaborate on policy issues, as well as how such 
collaborations influence policy outcomes.  
1.5. The policy environment and its effect on organisations’ behaviour  
The preceding subsections discussed ways in which organisations have engaged in 
recent policy developments in the UK and Europe, examples of how their behaviour 
has impacted the policy process, as well as how organisations’ engagement has been 
viewed by policymakers, academics and the media. It became clear that 
organisations, including COs have actively participated in shaping copyright policy, 
that their behaviour does affect the landscape within which copyright policies are 
developed, and that organisations’ impact has generally been viewed negatively 
despite the lack of sufficient research into their behaviour and environment. 
Furthermore, there has been little, if any, deliberate effort to distinguish between the 
views or operations of different types of organisations.  Differences could stem from 
the specific stakeholder that is being represented. They could also lie in the creative 
sector within which given organisations are active: music, publishing, audio-visual 
or other.139 Such differences could also be based on the type of organisation, a CMO 
or a trade union, to name the two types that this thesis will look at more closely. 
However, while the preceding examination had as its starting point the idea that 
organisations actively shape their environments, it has also been shown that 
organisations are both producers and receivers of their politico-legal environments 
and that, to this effect, the institutional characteristics of a particular legal 
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environment can also influence the behaviour of organisations.140 In the following 
subsection, I will therefore define the copyright policy environment as a multi-level 
system and consider, on the basis of sociological and political science literature, some 
of the effects that such systems produce on organisations.      
1.5.1 Copyright policymaking as a multi-level system and the effects of such systems on 
organisations 
An important recognition in relation to copyright policymaking is the fact that it 
occurs across a range of levels – national, European Union, and International. The 
existence of an interplay between higher and lower level policies and legal 
instruments, for instance through the signing and ratification of international 
agreements, EU regulations or the transposition of EU Directives, is well established 
and will therefore not be elaborated on further. However, it is important to observe 
that even on the lowest, national level, different overarching policy aims may be 
exercising influence over the nature and substance of IP policies. For instance, when 
the UK government broadly adopted Hargreaves’ recommendations, it clearly 
expressed that it would place economic growth at the heart of its IP policy.141 This 
statement demonstrates that on the domestic level, copyright policy does not develop 
in isolation, merely taking into account different creative industry stakeholders’ 
evidentiary input. Rather, it is perceived as a subdivision of economic policy and an 
enabler of economic growth142; to this end, domestic copyright policy is to some extent 
                                                     
140 W Richard Scott and John W Meyer, ‘The Organization of Societal Sectors: Propositions 
and Early Evidence’ in Paul DiMaggio and Walter W Powell (eds) The New Institutionalism in 
organizational Analysis (The University of Chicago Press 1991) 108; Lauren B Edelman, ‘The 
Legal Lives of Private Organisations’ in Austin Sarat (ed) The Blackwell Companion to Law and 
Society (Blackwell Publishing 2004) 231, 238; Edelman and Suchman, ‘The legal 
environments of organizations’ (n 38) 479; Lauren B Edelman, ‘Legal Ambiguity and 
Symbolic Structures: Organizational Mediation of Civil Rights Law’ (1992) 97 (6) American 
Journal of Sociology 1531, 1532. 
141 HM Government, ‘The Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual 
Property and Growth’ (August 2011) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32448/11-
1199-government-response-to-hargreaves-review.pdf> accessed 07 February 2017 1-3. 
142 Schlesinger and Waelde also argue that IP policy is increasingly considered an important 
tool for stimulating economic growth, see Philip Schlesinger and Charlotte Waelde, 
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dependent upon, and influenced by, the government’s overarching policy objectives 
in these areas.143 In fact, the IPO’s summary of responses to Hargreaves’ consultation 
even noted the concern of some respondents that copyright reform had been linked 
to the government’s regulatory reform agenda.144 This shows that interdependence 
exists not only between different levels of policymaking, but also between different 
policy domains on the same level.  
On the national level, the interplay between copyright policy and other overarching 
policies could affect industry organisations by bestowing more power or importance 
upon some actors compared to others, if their contribution is perceived as also 
furthering the respective overarching policy objectives. In this sense, the UK 
government explained that it saw collecting societies as an important part of UK’s 
future success and it therefore declared its intention to reinforce these organisations’ 
status.145 Indeed, there have been a number of legislative instruments dedicated to the 
functioning and operations of CMOs.146 Collecting societies, as I will discuss in the 
next section of this chapter, are not only constituent parts of the copyright system as 
administrators and licensors of vast amounts of rights, but also large and powerful 
                                                     
‘Copyright and cultural work: an exploration’ (2012) 25 (1) The European Journal of Social 
Science Research 11, 12. 
143 Department for Business Innovation & Skills, HM Treasury, UK Export Finance, ‘2010 to 
2015 government policy: UK economic growth’ (Policy paper) (8 May 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-policy-uk-
economic-growth/2010-to-2015-government-policy-uk-economic-growth#issue> accessed 07 
February 2017; ‘Policy Area: UK economy’ (UK Government) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/topics/uk-economy> accessed 07 February 2017.  
144 HM Government, ‘Consultation on Copyright, Summary of Responses June 2012’ (June 
2012) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/320223/cop
yright-consultation-summary-of-responses.pdf> accessed 07 February 2017 5.   
145 HM Government, ‘The Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual 
Property and Growth’ (n 141) 7.  
146 The Copyright (Regulation of Relevant Licensing Bodies) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/898, 
now repealed and replaced by The Collective Management of Copyright (EU Directive) 
Regulations 2016, SI 2016/221; The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Extended 
Collective Licensing) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2588.  
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businesses, which directly contribute to economic growth through their own 
considerable turnovers.   
Copyright policymaking on the EU level is also governed by wider policy 
considerations, not dissimilar to the ones existing in the UK. A key objective pursued 
through copyright policy has been the strengthening and growth of the common 
market.147 EU harmonisation initiatives in this area have generally been underpinned 
by the argument that differences across national copyright laws could produce 
barriers to trade within the internal market. The most recent Directive in this area was 
the 2014 Directive on Collective Rights Management (CRM Directive), which 
substantively dealt with two separate issues: the regulation of CMOs and other 
organisations that manage copyrights collectively and the facilitation of multi-
territorial licensing of music for online use in the internal market.148 As on the 
domestic level, on an EU level much organisational activity flows into the policy cycle 
before the adoption of any copyright legal instrument. In the years leading up to the 
adoption of the CRM Directive, the European Commission formally consulted 
various organisational stakeholders in public hearings and ‘calls for comments’.149 
1.5.2 A plurality of industry actors: a precursor for coalition building and uncertainty?  
A feature of the EU level of copyright policymaking is the even greater plurality 
(compared to the national level) of organisational entities that regularly engages with 
the policy process. This plurality on the one hand reflects the multiple levels of the 
copyright policy framework and on the other hand adds to the complexity150 of this 
very framework. For instance, in the context of the CRM Directive, when the UK 
consulted on the implementation of this instrument, the types of entities that 
                                                     
147 The very justification for the EU’s legislative competence in this area rests on the idea that 
harmonisation of copyright law in certain areas is necessary for the establishment and 
functioning of the internal market, Art. 114 (1) Consolidated version of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. 
148 CRM Directive (n 34). 
149 A list of consultative measures undertaken by the European Commission is available at 
‘Management of Copyright and Related Rights’ (European Commission) (n 2).  
150 Bakardjieva Engelbrekt (n 8) 65. 
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responded to the consultation were UK-based CMOs and other professional 
associations like the Music Publishers’ Association, or BASCA, UK industry alliances 
like the British Copyright Council and UK Music, as well as corporate organisations 
like Sky. In contrast, when the EU conducted a call for comments on collective cross-
border management of copyright and related rights for online music services in 2007, 
contributions came in from a much wider range of actors. These included individual 
CMOs, author/performer rights societies, and associations from different Member 
States. They also included large corporations like the BBC and Google, as well as 
European and International Alliances of stakeholders, like GESAC - the European 
Grouping of Societies of Authors and Composers, the IFPI - International Federation 
of the Phonographic Industry, IFFRO – International Federation of Reproduction 
Rights Organisations, and AEPO-ARTIS – the Association of European Performers’ 
Organisations.151 These types of alliances or federations effectively band together 
those organisations that represent the same type of stakeholder on a lower (national) 
policy level in order to lobby and represent this stakeholder’s interest more effectively 
on a higher level of policy.  
Following notions in institutional theory that the institutional framework shapes the 
means by which interests are pursued,152 the above example of the plurality of 
industry alliances and coalitions shows that creative industries stakeholders have 
responded to the institutional copyright environment by creating organisational 
entities to represent them across all levels of policymaking. This enables venue 
shopping in terms of pitching a given issue to the most receptive forum, as every 
                                                     
151 Individual contributions to the 2007 call for comments are available at Communication 
and Information Resource Centre for Administrators, Businesses and Citizens (CIRCABC, 
European Commission), ‘Results of the monitoring of the Commission Recommendation’ < 
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February 2017.  
152 W Richard Scott, ‘Unpacking Institutional Arguments’ in Walter W Powell and Paul J 
DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis (The University of Chicago 
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decision-making body or forum harbours its own particular bias.153  Furthermore, it 
facilitates the process of coalition building.154 This thesis will discuss the particular 
power and significance of such industry alliances and networks for the furtherance 
of copyright policy issues.155      
Although this has not been observed particularly in relation to COs or other 
organisations in the copyright system, political science literature suggests that the 
presence of a large number of actors generally affects policymaking and legal 
outcomes by rendering them more fluid and unpredictable.156  Interest group activity 
begets more interest group activity thus increasing uncertainty as the number of 
stakeholders increases.157 And the stakeholder numbers are bound to increase because 
the plurality of actors leads to the building of further networks and coalitions.158 This 
thesis will build on this literature and demonstrate that the link between the plurality 
of actors and the unpredictability of policymaking also applies to the copyright policy 
space.159 Moreover, the thesis will examine more precisely, what other features of the 
stakeholder environment and of the policy process bring about unpredictability in 
legal and policy outcomes.160  
1.5.3 Emergence, nature, and effects of networks and coalitions 
Emphasis has also been placed on understanding what holds networks and coalitions 
together, why organisations sometimes act in coalitions and sometimes 
                                                     
153 Frank R Baumgartner, ‘EU Lobbying: A view from the US’ (2007) 14 (3) Journal of 
European Public Policy 482, 483; Laurence R Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement 
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking (2004) 29 The Yale 
Journal of International Law 1, 7; Peter K Yu, ‘Current and Crosscurrents in the International 
Intellectual Property Regime’ (2004) MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 02-12 56ff. 
154 Jeremy Richardson, ‘Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change’ (2000) 48 Political 
Studies 1006, 1021. 
155 See Chapter 8, section 2.2. See also Chapter 4, section 2.3.3 and Chapter 5, section 3.2.3.  
156 Richardson (n 154) 1008. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Chris Ansell, ‘Network Institutionalism’ in Sarah A Binder et al (eds) The Oxford Handbook 
of Political Institutions (OUP 2008) 75, 81f.; Christine Mahoney, ‘Networking vs. allying: the 
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159 See Chapter 8, sections 2.2 and 2.3.  
160 See for instance Chapter 6, section 4.3. 
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independently, and what role coalitions play in policymaking. Ansell observed that 
actors in a certain network tend to link together around mutual interests, although 
they could also be brought together due to different forms of interdependence (on 
certain information, ideas or resources).161 Rhodes, on the other hand, has focussed 
specifically on power-dependence as a reason for the formation of networks.162 
Networks and coalitions are generally considered beneficial by organisations because 
they can signal to policy-makers that a policy position has the support of a large and 
varied group of interests, but also because coalitions can provide a framework for 
more efficient use of resources.163 However, although the latter benefit of coalitions 
would suggest that resource-poorer organisations would be more likely to seek to act 
together, Mahoney’s study of 149 lobbyists active across 47 different policy issues in 
the US and EU found that it is in fact not the poorer organisations that join coalitions 
but rather the wealthier ones that use coalitions as a lobbying strategy.164 On the basis 
of her findings, Mahoney suggested that the participation in coalitions and networks 
may be more cost-intensive than is generally assumed.165  
This thesis studies the nature and effects of coalitions and networks in the copyright 
policy space across all of the remaining chapters. It demonstrates the applicability of 
Ansell’s and Rhode’s arguments to the copyright space by showing that coalitions 
and other forms of collaborative action form both on the basis of common interests 
and interdependence, but also as a consequence of power dynamics between different 
stakeholders.166 By looking at CMOs and trade unions, the former generally being 
resource-richer than the latter, I also discuss Mahoney’s hypothesis about the varying 
ability of different actors to participate in coalitions, and conclude that resources are 
                                                     
161 Ansell (n 158) 77, 81. 
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164 Ibid 378. 
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166 See Chapter 8, section 2.2.  
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an important but not the sole factor that determines COs’ behaviour with other 
industry actors.167  
Trade unions and CMOs, the two types of organisations considered in this thesis, 
could not only be expected to operate differently in copyright policy because of 
differences in the amount of resources they may allocate or have at their disposal but 
also because of their distinct functions and goals. In the following section, I will 
therefore consider, in turn, the roles and functions that trade unions and CMOs have 
generally been found to fulfil. I will also specifically focus on the four organisations 
researched in this thesis and consider their historical evolution as well as, where 
available, studies which have focussed on some of these actors, in order to outline the 
specific roles that these organisations appear to play in the copyright landscape.  
2. Trade unions and collective management organisations  
Trade unions and CMOs are very different in terms of their origin, purpose and 
function. Trade unions originated in Great Britain during the 18th century Industrial 
Revolution as associations of wage earners for the purpose of maintaining or 
improving the conditions of their employment.168 The basic idea behind the formation 
of such associations is that the organising group recognises a sufficiently enduring 
and distinct common interest, which it could further through collective action, 
provided this interest prevails over members’ differences with regard to other 
issues.169 Traditionally, trade unions mobilise the collective interests of employees 
and negotiate conditions on the applicable rates of pay and terms of work. To this 
end, they may employ various strategies, including collective bargaining with 
                                                     
167 See Chapter 8, sections 2.1 and 2.2.  
168 Sidney Webb and Beatrice P Webb, The history of trade unionism, 1666 – 1920 (Printed by 
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employers,170 threats of industrial action,171 such as striking, or banning overtime.172 
CMOs, on the other hand, undertake the exercise of certain copyrights and related 
rights on behalf of their members – the rights owners.173 As such, unlike trade unions, 
collecting societies are entities specific to the copyright arena within which they serve 
a distinct systemic purpose. Their existence is enshrined in s 116(2) CDPA 1988 which 
envisages the existence of licensing bodies. CMOs do what copyright owners cannot 
economically and practically do for themselves;174 they are agencies that act on behalf 
of their members, the copyright holders, to negotiate licenses with users, collect 
license fees and then distribute royalties to their members, as well as to monitor the 
use of works.175 Given these differences in the general purpose and function of the 
two types of organisations considered in this thesis – trade unions and CMOs –a 
separate analysis of the literature studying these actors’ roles and functions is 
warranted.  
2.1. Trade unions 
As outlined above, the fundamental role of trade unions is to protect and improve the 
working lives and terms and conditions of employment of their members. This 
includes the pursuit of legislation favourable to the union’s members.176 In this 
respect, s 11 TULRCA 1992 enables a trade union to engage in its affairs lawfully 
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without fear of breaching the common law rules on restraint of trade. S 219 TULRCA 
1992, on the other hand, provides protection from certain tort liabilities in the context 
of industrial action.  
Ewing distinguished between five principal functions that trade unions serve: a 
representation function, a service function, a regulatory function, a government 
function, and a public administration function.177 The service function includes the 
provision of services and benefits to members. According to Olson, this function is 
essential for the survival of trade unions because it incentivises individual workers to 
join or remain members. Absent the provision of individual services, workers would 
be disincentivised from participating in unions because they would prefer to ‘free-
ride’ on the fruits of unions’ representative and regulatory efforts, which they could 
also do without being members themselves.178 The representative function of unions, 
as defined by Ewing, refers to unions’ individual and collective representation of 
workers in the workplace.179 In its individual dimension it may be an extension of the 
union’s service function, for instance if the union provides a member with 
professional support or a companion for handling individual disputes. In its 
collective dimension, on the other hand, the representation function is close to the 
regulatory function and may take different forms, including consultation and 
collective bargaining.180 The TULRCA 1992 defines collective agreements in s 178(1) 
and imposes certain obligations on employers in relation to the process of collective 
bargaining, such as the disclosure of certain information in s 181 (1) TULRCA 1992. 
The regulatory function of trade unions, on the other hand, recognises that trade 
unions participate in a process of rule-making which extends beyond their members, 
for instance because collective bargaining outcomes typically apply to all workers, 
irrespective of their union membership; the regulatory function also includes efforts 
in securing legislation which would benefit the union and its members.181 Lastly, the 
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governmental and public administration functions emphasise unions as being 
engaged in the process of government, as well as being instruments for the delivery 
of certain policies. Following this classification of functions, it appears that the 
functions most closely related to the policymaking process are those of regulation, 
collective representation and government. Equally, the service function, depending 
on the amount of resources a given union chooses to allocate to it, could potentially 
detract from, in particular, a small union’s ability to sufficiently engage with policy. 
The present thesis considers this in chapters 4 and 5.182  
2.2. SoA and MU, and the British trade union environment  
2.2.1 A historical look at the formation, early priorities, and functions of these unions 
Both the MU and SoA have aimed to perform a wide range of the above functions for 
their members in the IP landscape since their establishment. Regulation and 
representation, both collective and individual, were in fact written into the prospectus 
of the future SoA as objectives that the new body would have to pursue. Specifically, 
the prospectus listed three causes for the creation of a society for authors in 1884: (a) 
the need for an international copyright convention with the USA; (b) the introduction 
of a Bill for the registration of titles; and (c) the maintenance of friendly relations 
between authors and publishers, by means of properly drawn agreements.183 Given 
authors’ great sense of grievance over the raw deals that they were getting from 
publishers in the late 19th century, SoA’s main business in its early years revolved 
around the agreements between authors and publishers, along with the reform of 
copyright.184  
It is notable, however, that although SoA was effectively fulfilling trade union 
functions from the outset, it was initially not founded as a trade union but rather as a 
company limited by shares. While prominent figures in the society’s early 
management, like Bernard Shaw, had advocated for the adoption of trade union 
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status, saying that ’without union and collective action we are helpless‘, the majority 
of members in the early 1900s were averse to trade unionism’s displays of industrial 
action and felt that to regiment writers amounted to dictatorship over the mind.185 
Nevertheless, following legislative changes in 1974 and 1976, which made the closed 
shop legal in British industry and encouraged the formation of trade unions to 
facilitate collective bargaining, SoA eventually decided to retain its company status 
but to also become a union. It did so in 1978 in order to strengthen its position in the 
changing political climate, for instance by receiving access to the government’s 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service.186 
SoA performed regulatory and representative functions by lobbying Parliament on 
copyright issues, engaging in collective bargaining with publishers and helping 
individual members with the negotiation of their contracts; the society also provided 
services to its members, such as contract vetting and industry advice. Scholars who 
have studied the history of SoA have observed that the organisation often 
experienced disappointment with government action. For example, when the 
government responded to the 1977 Whitford Report on copyright reform, it dismissed 
the idea of a levy on tapes and tape recording equipment, which SoA had advanced 
alongside the British Copyright Council.187 In an article written by Marc Le Fanu, 
General Secretary of SoA between 1982 and 2011, the perception was expressed that 
despite the society’s active efforts, ‘to a large extent authors are – and will probably 
remain bewildered spectators of the book trade’.188 This suggests that even from the 
perspective of SoA operatives, the organisation’s efforts to exercise a regulatory and 
representative function, were often unsuccessful in their outcomes. In the more recent 
past, SoA objected to the introduction of a copyright exception for parody and laid 
out its position to the government in the copyright consultation implementing 
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Hargreaves’ proposals. However, here too, the ultimate legal outcome was contrary 
to SoA’s policy position.189   
Ideas of improving the working lives and terms and conditions of employment of 
musicians were also behind the formation of the Manchester Musicians’ Union, which 
became, first, the Amalgamated Musicians’ Union and ultimately the MU of today.190 
The leading figure behind the initial collective action movement, Joseph B Williams, 
is reported to have circulated an anonymous message, outlining that:  
The union we require is a Protecting Union, and one that will protect 
us from Amateurs, protect us from unscrupulous employers and 
protect us from ourselves. A Union that will guarantee our receiving 
a fair wage for engagements. A society that will keep the Amateur in 
his right place, and prevent his going under prices. A Union that will 
see you are paid for extra rehearsals, and in time raise salaries to what 
they ought to be.191 (original emphasis provided) 
 
The above quote shows that, aside from regulating the relationship with musicians’ 
employers, a musicians’ union was also necessary to manage potential tensions 
between (amateur and professional) musicians themselves. In its early years of 
existence, the MU dedicated most of its time to collective representation by 
negotiating standard terms and conditions of employment with various employment 
groups.192 Unlike SoA, it also reached out to the wider labour movement and was 
affiliated with the Trades Union Congress from the beginning.193 Historically, the MU 
has also exercised its collective representation role through strike action aimed at 
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protecting its members’ jobs.194 Alongside representation, since its early days the 
union has been offering various services to its members (e.g., through a benevolent 
fund for those members who were experiencing hardship).195 
In contrast with SoA, copyright issues did not constitute a primary focus of MU’s 
activities in its early history. The union only started exercising a regulatory function 
in the IP landscape when it intensively lobbied for performers’ rights between 1952 
and 1956.196 Despite its late start, the MU is recognised as having played a major part 
in the formal recognition of the performer in UK law.197 This late start is mainly due 
to the fact that, while copyright was critical to the authors’ profession from early on, 
the MU has traditionally been, and still is today, mainly a union for performing 
musicians. The laws of copyright and related rights only gained direct relevance to 
the activities of performers with the introduction of more comprehensive performers’ 
rights in the UK.198 This ultimately became the case in 1996 with the implementation 
of the EC Rental and Lending Rights Directive through the Copyright and Related 
Rights Regulations 1996.199 However, there remain issues of importance to the union, 
which it has sought to raise in a policy context but without any tangible outcome.200  
With regard to the MU’s capacity to perform its representative and regulatory 
functions, Williamson recognised that historically, the MU’s membership 
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composition has made the exercise of these functions more difficult.201 Specifically, 
Williamson’s work highlights that internal dynamics posed a considerable challenge 
to the union’s activities. Given the fragmented, largely freelance workforce that the 
MU housed, with differences among members in their employment status and 
musical proficiency, it was exceedingly difficult for the union to represent the entire 
membership collectively, particularly in light of the diverse demands that different 
types of members would voice.202 Similar points have also been made in relation to 
SoA’s activities; Bonham-Carter’s historical account of SoA in particular describes 
challenges relating to internal membership dynamics as at times having stood in the 
way of the society’s ability to effectively exercise its representative function.203 The 
present thesis considers how membership affects the policy work of both unions and 
CMOs, in particular with regard to the composition of the membership, members’ 
incentives to join these organisations, as well as members’ level of political 
engagement.204  
2.2.2 Factors affecting the unions’ exercise of a regulatory and representative function 
It is important to recognise that in the copyright landscape, both the MU and SoA are 
organisations that represent the interests of right owners. Yet, as we have seen, these 
organisations have struggled, both in the distant and more recent past, to produce 
successful outcomes out of the exercise of their regulatory function in the copyright 
policy landscape. This stands in contradiction to Hargreaves’ general statement that 
right owner organisations have exercised pressure and thus shaped copyright 
policy.205 It also contradicts Horten’s general observation that the entertainment 
industries are well funded and highly advanced in putting forward their cause.206 At 
the very least, it appears that there may be differences among active organisations 
representing right owners in the creative industries, and that, copyright policy may, 
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in fact, be primarily shaped by a mere subset of organisations. In line with Williamson 
and Cloonan’s article on the music industry, the interests of a subset of actors may 
not be representative of the needs of the entire industries.  
2.2.2.1 Membership 
Two factors may be affecting the ability of the MU and SoA, as trade unions, to 
effectively regulate the industry within which they operate. The first factor, which 
appears to particularly characterise the activities of cultural trade unions, relates to 
these organisations’ membership composition. By definition, trade unions rely 
heavily on their members’ participation through activism, much more so than other 
organisations. Yet, both Shane and David-Guillou, who have studied cultural unions, 
observed that, historically, the very establishment of such unions for the purpose of 
collective action had been a particularly difficult endeavour.207 Challenges in this 
respect were due to a range of what Shane described as ‘idiosyncratic circumstances’, 
including the (impermanent) nature of employment in creative sectors, the mobility 
of potential members, the varying employment status of performing artists, the large 
variety of musicians, actors, and other creators, and other factors.208 This point 
directly relates to Bonham-Carter’s and Williamson’s observation on internal 
dynamics hindering the external work of SoA and the MU.  
2.2.2.2 Regulation 
The second factor which could affect MU’s and SoA’s ability to effectively engage in 
copyright policy is the regulatory landscape within which British trade unions must 
operate in general. Over time, successive governments undermined the traditional 
role and power of trade unions through a series of reforms in UK employment law. 
These reforms, on the one hand, disincentivised collective action and negatively 
influenced the general levels of activism among trade union members, and on the 
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other hand, complicated the way trade unions can avail themselves of their traditional 
instruments of collective bargaining and strike action. Ackers, Smith and Smith,209 
Wrigley,210 Taylor,211 Cabrelli,212 and Simpson,213, to name a few, have all considered 
these legal and political developments and how they have diminished unions’ 
strength, influence and role as representative institutions. Legislation designed to 
constrain the power of trade unions was introduced in line with the political 
persuasions of various governments that considered trade unions’ actions as a 
hindrance to their wider policy objectives.214 The 1980s, for instance, were 
characterised by the beginning of the government’s commitment to free market ideas 
and solutions. In this context, trade unions were seen as organisations that could 
interfere with the natural pricing mechanism by imposing charges above the market 
rate; higher labour costs would lead to reductions in profit, which would cause 
unemployment.215 Trade unions therefore needed to be weakened. This was done 
through a number of measures, which removed administrative supports for collective 
bargaining, hampered the freedom to take industrial action, and made unions’ funds 
liable for damages actionable by employers and other companies.216  
The trend of restricting trade unions’ abilities to exercise power and influence has 
been continued by the current Conservative-led UK Government. Most recently, the 
Trade Union Act 2016 gave the Certification Officer, the trade union regulatory 
agency, more powers to investigate union affairs.217 It introduced further restrictions 
on picketing218, as well as considerably higher voting thresholds and turnouts for 
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industrial action.219 The new Act also added further procedural requirements for the 
exercise of industrial action, such as a doubling of the length of the notice period for 
action.220  
2.2.3 The changing role of trade unions 
Some scholars have observed that the very role of British unions has shifted as a result 
of union regulation. Ewing argued that various governments’ regulatory 
interventions have been designed to produce a ‘supply side trade unionism’, and that, 
as a result, the service function of trade unions has grown in importance while the 
representative and regulatory functions have been diluted.221 Bacon and Storey have 
also generally reported growth in trade unions’ service function222  
It can certainly be observed that today, both the MU and SoA offer their members a 
very wide palette of services.223  With regard to the MU, an emphasis on the service 
function was recognised by Williamson. He observed that the union has shifted away 
from the collective context of unionism towards the provision of services for its 
members, such as low-cost instrument and public liability insurance; he suggested 
that this pragmatism is what has in fact allowed the MU to maintain its relevance and 
membership numbers within the music sector.224 It is unclear how this shift in unions’ 
role and relevance influences the way MU and SoA engage in copyright policy. It is 
conceivable that a greater emphasis on the provision of services, also in order to gain 
new and maintain existing members, may influence the internal resource allocation 
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of these organisations and as a result lead to a weakening of their participation and 
engagement in policy. Furthermore, changes in the status and power of trade unions 
may also influence the way MU and SoA interact with other industry actors. On the 
one hand, Ansell’s and Mahoney’s research on networks and coalitions suggests that 
MU and SoA may be more reliant on their relationships with industry partners to 
further their own policy causes. This could be due to a power dependence, as 
suggested by Rhodes, or simply the capacity of networks and coalitions to manage 
resources more efficiently, and to send important signals of industry consensus to 
policymakers.225 Yet, if this is indeed the case, then it is equally important to bear in 
mind the points advanced by these authors that network and coalition participation 
is both a resource and constraint on an actor’s behaviour.226 If the unions do rely on 
networks and on sponsorship from other organisations, including employer 
organisations, as suggested by Bacon and Storey,227 to make the needs of their 
members heard, then it is likely that their own specific positions may be compromised 
and adapted to the liking of the other participating actors. The present thesis will 
pursue these considerations over the next chapters. In particular, chapters 4 and 5 will 
consider the relationship of SoA and MU with other industry actors, like ALCS, as 
well as with industry alliances, like UK Music and the British Copyright Council. 
These chapters will also shed light on the effects of resource (allocation) constraints 
and the unions’ membership. Moreover, chapters 5 and 6 will consider differences in 
the specific priorities and positions of unions vis-à-vis CMOs and other industry 
organisations and how individual organisations’ positions are potentially 
compromised as a result of their participation in networks and coalitions.   
2.3. Collective management organisations 
2.3.1 Emphasis on CMOs’ economic functions 
As noted above, and unlike trade unions, CMOs are organisations specific to the 
copyright system. They specialise in the administration of copyrights held by a large 
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number of owners. Economic literature on copyright consistently highlights CMOs’ 
fundamental role in the copyright system and how without such organisations, 
copyright law could be ineffective in some markets for copyright works, where rights 
holders cannot practically contract directly with users.228 The key economic functions 
performed by CMOs are the negotiation of license fees, the collection and distribution 
of royalties and the monitoring of the use of copyright works. By performing these 
functions, CMOs reduce transaction costs in the form of search costs, bargaining costs 
and enforcement costs.229 However, not all CMOs perform all of these functions. For 
instance, of the two studied collecting societies, ALCS is not involved in the direct 
negotiation of license fees; it primarily focuses on the collection and distribution of 
royalties to its members. PRS, on the other hand, performs both of these functions, 
and also has an anti-piracy unit which tracks the use of protected works.  
Given that this is the primary purpose of CMOs, it is not surprising that most 
literature on these organisations has focussed on issues relating to the way they 
perform their economic functions. To this effect, popular themes in the study of 
CMOs have included their monopolistic nature and the entailing need for CMO 
regulation,230 the role of competition law in controlling these organisations’ market 
power,231 and the need for multi-territorial licensing to facilitate content consumption 
and distribution, as well as how it can best be achieved.232 Other research has looked 
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at the internal governance of CMOs, particularly with regard to the appropriate scope 
of the assignment of rights by members in favour of the CMO, the distribution of 
income, as well as a member’s ability to have recourse to courts to decide on disputes 
with their CMO.233  
2.3.2 CMOs as participants in copyright policy 
Yet, as we have seen in the context of recent IP reviews in the UK and the EU, as well 
as from media representations, CMOs are clearly more than mere enablers of the 
functioning of copyright dependent markets. As organisations, they are also active 
participants in copyright law and policy. Despite this fact, research into CMOs has 
rarely actually focussed on these actors as contributors to the policy process although 
they are particularly interesting given their generally mixed membership 
composition, consisting of both creators and exploiters.234 Despite not studying 
collecting societies in depth, some scholars have in fact observed that the emergence 
of collecting societies has not only facilitated the collective management of copyright 
but also served as a platform for interest mobilisation, articulation, and political 
pressuring.235 Yet, the question remains what particular interests CMOs mobilise, 
especially when interests within their mixed memberships collide, and how they may 
be shaping copyright policy. 
Over time, CMOs have grown into powerful economic entities with considerable staff 
and expenses, broad membership coverage and with a substantial own interest in 
influencing the legislative copyright framework.236 The latter was also indicated in the 
EU consultation response submitted by CREATe, which suggested that CMOs were 
especially capable of making meaningful contributions to copyright consultations. 
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Olson’s ‘by-product’ theory, developed in his seminal work The Logic of Collective 
Action, could also support the idea that CMOs are not mere participants in the 
political process of copyright, but influential and well-organised participants at that. 
Olson argued that among different large economic groups, those that are significant 
lobbying powers are also those that have organised for some other purpose; the 
lobbying function of these actors, he suggested, is in fact the by-product of 
organisations that obtain their strength and influence through the performance of 
some other function, aside from lobbying.237  
One example that Olson gave of such powerful organisations that are not pure 
political actors were in fact trade unions.238 However, it is important to bear in mind 
that his work predated the changes in the regulatory landscape of unions and that it 
was also generally not set in the UK socio-political context. In the copyright system, 
Olson’s ‘by-product’ theory undoubtedly applies to CMOs. As discussed, these 
organisations serve an indispensable role in the creative industries. Consequently, 
they should gain political influence and strength as a by-product of this role. In fact, 
it could be argued that, given today’s reality of British trade unions, and particularly 
with regard to the two unions that this thesis focuses on, both of which are relatively 
small, in the copyright policy context Olson’s ’by-product‘ theory may apply more 
widely to CMOs than to the unions. This is considered in chapter 7.239  
Hargreaves asserted that rights owner representations have in the past effectively 
lobbied and shaped copyright law in the UK.240 His claim presumably extended to 
CMOs as they too, like trade unions, are organisations that represent different right 
owners. What is more, the influence they wield in policy may be greater than that of 
trade unions considering that their economic functions are more directly aligned with 
some of the government’s overarching policy considerations on economic growth, as 
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discussed above.241 However, here too, the questions that arise are, on the one hand, 
whether all CMOs wield equal policy influence, and on the other hand, in what 
direction such influence may steer copyright policy, i.e. how the views and interests 
put forward by CMOs may differ from those of other organisational actors and 
stakeholders. Some scholars, like Bakardjieva Engelbrekt and Kretschmer have 
argued that, by allowing for the membership of publishers and producers under the 
same roof with authors, CMOs have largely sided with the agenda of respective 
industries, although tensions between authors and producers have also found their 
way to the legislative debate.242 Pursuant to this view, it is likely that within CMOs 
that represent multiple groups (creators and marketers), the interests of one group 
may be emphasised at the expense of the other. The thesis will pursue this issue by 
studying PRS’ behaviour on the topic of contract terms in chapter 5, as well as the 
way it developed a policy position on the issue of members’ voting rights in the 
context of the CRM Directive in chapter 7.243  
On the question of whether all CMOs wield equal policy influence, this chapter 
demonstrated on several occasions that IP reviewers, online news media, as well as 
academics have tended to generalise about the nature and power of CMOs. Yet, the 
two CMOs considered in this thesis have very different beginnings, historical 
priorities and developments, as the following subsection will show. In light of this, 
the next chapters, and in particular chapter 7, will closely attend to the similarities 
and differences in the policy input of PRS and ALCS on the chosen copyright issues, 
in order to assess to what extent CMOs can in fact be considered to produce a certain 
uniform effect on the direction and agenda for copyright policy.244  
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2.4. PRS and ALCS as collective management organisations 
Earlier in this chapter, I outlined an important difference between ALCS and PRS 
based on the functions they perform in the collective administration of copyright. 
Unlike ALCS, which deals with the collection and distribution of royalties to its 
members, PRS also engages in the front-end licensing of its repertoire to users. It also 
carries out some copyright enforcement through its anti-piracy unit. This subsection 
will show that a further difference between ALCS and PRS lies in the motives and 
forces behind the formation of these two collecting societies. I will also consider how 
these differences might affect organisations’ behaviour in copyright policy. 
A first notable difference in the history of ALCS and PRS lies in the age of both 
organisations, as well as in the movements and groups that propelled their 
establishment. PRS, the older of the two bodies, was established in 1914 by a group 
of music publishers. In contrast, ALCS was incorporated in 1977 through the efforts 
of a group of authors. The movement behind the birth of ALCS was characterised by 
active campaigning efforts on the part of a handful of authors operating as the 
Writers’ Action Group, who fought for a loans-based, flat-rate, government-funded 
Public Lending Right (PLR) that would be paid to authors, not publishers.245 What 
had induced the collective action of authors was a proposal to amend the 1956 
Copyright Act to facilitate the introduction of a publisher dominated PLR scheme to 
be administered by a private company; the Authors’ Lending Rights Society, the 
initial name of ALCS, was created to challenge this move.246 At the heart of the new 
organisation was the idea that authors should take control of their own affairs.247 
Consequently, the objectives of ALCS were to extract existing value generated 
through various uses of authors’ works and thereby ensure that authors would 
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benefit from their rights under copyright, from new technological innovations, and 
from foreign markets for their works.248  
The priority for ALCS in its early days was to ensure that otherwise uncollectable 
money could reach the authors to whom it was due. However, there was equal 
emphasis on the organisation’s campaigning element and in this respect, ALCS’ 
participation in copyright policy began with the CMO’s very inception. Since then, it 
has continuously underlined its role as a collecting society run by writers, for writers, 
with a commitment to protecting and promoting authors’ rights.249 In the past, this 
CMO has sought to influence copyright policy on the reprography question as ALCS 
had recognised that photocopying could pose a threat to authors’ income and was at 
the same time a potential revenue stream that could realistically only be managed 
collectively.250 It is reported that in this context, ALCS had realised its need for the 
publishers’ support and persuaded this group to set up a parallel Publishers 
Licensing Society.251 Together with ALCS, these two organisations established the 
Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) whose function it became to issue licenses to 
copyright users and pay over the received royalties to ALCS and the Publishers 
Licensing Society for the two groups of copyright owners. Today, ALCS remains a 
CMO which only houses authors among its members.252  
In contrast, PRS is a collecting society for both authors (songwriters) and composers 
on the one hand, and music publishers on the other. As mentioned at the start, it was 
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not the creators who were behind the formation of PRS, but rather the publishers.253 
The impetus for such collective action on the part of publishers was also dissimilar 
from the motives of the authors who were behind the set-up of ALCS. Music 
publishers were mainly driven by pragmatic and opportunistic considerations. In the 
early 20th century, music publishing in England generally depended on the sales of 
sheet music rather than on music performance; in fact, the performing right was 
regarded as an ‘impediment to business’ that could negatively affect publishers’ 
primary source of revenue.254 The idea of a performing right ‘association’ was 
advanced in 1912 by an influential publisher, Booth, who suggested to a group of 
fellow publishers that through an association they would be able to tap into new 
revenue opportunities, related for instance, to the growing number of cinemas that 
were being opened across the country.255 However, Booth equally made the case that 
any such organisation would only succeed if it would serve authors and composers, 
alongside publishers, as was the case in France with the French collecting society 
SACEM.  
Considering the motives underpinning the establishment of PRS, it is not surprising 
that for many years, the collecting society was primarily concerned not with 
campaigning or other public affairs work, but with asserting itself on the market, 
through advocacy, legal action and other means, since music users were initially 
reluctant to pay for something that had previously been free.256 In this respect, PRS’ 
influence over copyright law was less through the political process and more through 
the courts. Ehrlich reported that PRS took a rather aggressive and litigious approach 
to expanding its scope for licensing. An example of this is PRS v Hammonds Bradford 
Brewery Ltd.¸ where the CMO sought to establish that radio use to entertain one’s 
customers was a ‘performance’ and thus required a PRS license.257 The court agreed 
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with PRS. What eventually spurred PRS’ engagement with policy were developments 
in the 1950s that threatened to affect the welfare of PRS’ members and, ultimately, the 
standing of PRS itself. In the run up to the 1956 Copyright Act, the Board of Trade’s 
Copyright Committee had published a report in 1952 in the context of the upcoming 
copyright reform. The resulting Bill included a number of proposals which PRS 
fought against, including the allowance of exemptions from performance fees for a 
loosely defined group of organisations, which according to Ehrlich, could have been 
interpreted as including the BBC.258   
These condensed accounts of ALCS’ and PRS’ history illustrate how different the 
paths, motives and even self-identities of these two CMOs have been. ALCS was set 
up by authors and the organisation understood itself as a CMO existing to ensure that 
writers can retain more control over the revenue generated from the use of their 
works. Consequently, the policy causes that the organisation fought related to issues 
at the intersection of authors’ rights and collective management. PRS, on the other 
hand, was established by publishers who only extended the organisation’s 
membership to authors in order to guarantee its long-term recognition. The driving 
force behind PRS was mainly to tap into as wide a range of markets for licensing as 
possible. Since this was spearheaded by the publishers, it was underpinned less by 
moral reasoning about ensuring that authors get their dues and more by publishers’ 
self-interest.  
In essence, ALCS and PRS represent two models for how collective administration 
can be organised. In the publishing sector, where ALCS operates, there exists a CMO 
that solely represents authors, a further separate entity doing the same for publishers, 
and a joint body, the Copyright Licensing Agency which deals with the front-end 
licensing. In the music sector, on the other hand, there is PRS, which collectively 
represents both songwriters and composers, as well as music publishers and deals 
with both licensing and distribution. On this basis, one could in fact expect differences 
in the way that ALCS and PRS would engage with copyright policy, as well as with 
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other organisational actors within their industries.  The organisational set-up of 
CMOs in the publishing industry would enable more nuanced positions on authors’ 
and publishers’ interests on questions relating to collective management to enter 
policy debates, due to the existence of several different organisational entities. In 
music, on the other hand, PRS would speak on behalf of a larger subset of 
stakeholders; its policy positions would therefore possibly need to take account of 
both author and publisher interests. This could lead to differences in the extent to 
which ALCS and PRS can cooperate with unions, which, as I discussed above, may 
affect unions’ representative function.  It could be difficult for PRS to side with unions 
on an issue that furthers the interests of creators but adversely affects publishers. 
ALCS, on the other hand, could be a more reliable partner for author unions, as both 
ALCS and SoA solely represent writers. Consequently, the types of issues that receive 
amplification across music and publishing policies may differ. The thesis will provide 
insight on the practical effects of these structural and organisational differences 
between ALCS and PRS on the views and positions fed to policymakers, but also on 
the force, with which these CMOs carry forward their respective industries’ agendas. 
Chapters 4 and 5 will consider these issues in relation to contract terms, whereas 
chapter 7 will do so in the context of the implementation of the CRM Directive. A 
brief overview of these issues will follow in the next section of this chapter.   
3.   Selected issues for exploring COs’ engagement with copyright policy  
This thesis’ exploration of the selected COs’ role in copyright policy in the following 
chapters will be structured around three key issues: (1) authors’ and musicians’ 
contractual terms; (2) the UK private copying exception; and (3) the implementation 
of the Collective Rights Management Directive. These issues relate to contemporary 
and ongoing policy debates, and, as such, were frequently dwelled on in my 
interviews with respondents from the MU, SoA, PRS and ALCS. They will therefore 
guide my analysis of the studied organisations’ engagement with copyright policy.  
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3.1. Contract terms between creators and copyright exploiters  
As the preceding review of trade unions’ functions generally, and of MU’s and SoA’s 
past efforts in copyright policy specifically suggests, the issue of fair contract terms 
for authors and musicians is of greater priority and significance to the unions than to 
the studied CMOs. Ensuring that creators conduct their work under a fair and 
balanced contractual framework is fundamental to improving the general working 
conditions of authors and musicians; it was recorded as one of the three objectives 
that the SoA was set up to achieve, and was also a cause for the establishment of the 
MU. The Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, however, contains no provisions 
restricting the transfer of rights in terms of scope, duration or geographical territory. 
Furthermore, the Act does not prohibit the transfer of rights for future forms of 
exploitation and also explicitly allows for the transfer of rights in future works.259 The 
Act contains no provisions regulating the amount of remuneration payable to authors 
or performers, and is generally considered to create a copyright law regime that is 
particularly devoid of creator-friendly and creator-protective rules.260 In this context, 
many of the contracts entered into by creators include disproportionate and 
unreasonable clauses that negatively affect creators’ ability to extract appropriate 
value from their work.261  
By focussing on this issue in Chapters 4 and 5, I will explore how trade unions 
advance their interests in copyright policy, where they face challenges and what the 
possible underlying reasons for these challenges are. I will also examine what 
networks and alliances they participate in and where they seek support for their 
causes. Moreover, I will consider the extent to which ALCS and PRS engaged with 
this more union-specific issue, which will allow me to draw comparisons of actor 
dynamics across the publishing and music sectors. It will also offer insight into how 
the structural and functional differences in the two CMOs discussed above, influence 
                                                     
259 Ss 91 (1), 191C (1) CDPA 1988. 
260 EU contracts study (n 46); Bently and Sherman (n 229) 313. 
261 Giuseppina D’Agostino, Copyright, Contracts, Creators: New Media, New Rules, (Edward 
Elgar Publishing 2010); Gibson, Johnson and Dimita (n 46). 
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the way they position themselves in policy. Finally, a discussion of the approach 
taken by SoA and the MU on the issue of fair contract terms will also illustrate how 
some of the complexity of the copyright policy space originates from the existence of 
multiple policy alternatives. It will also reveal the lack of uniformity in the way 
different actors representing the same stakeholder group approach a given issue.  
3.2. Private copying exception 
The private copying exception is an issue that fell into both the unions’ and CMOs’ 
spheres of activities and touched the interests of both organisation types. The 
government introduced a private copying exception in October 2014 following a 
recommendation made by Hargreaves, which was later repealed as a result of R (On 
the Application of British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors) v Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills (No. 2.)262 The judgment came out of a judicial 
challenge launched by the MU, the music sector alliance UK Music, and the British 
Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA). Consequently, in 
considering the policy developments around the UK private copying exception in 
chapter 6, I will explore a case where different types of organisations took effective 
joint action. At the same time, I will bring into focus the granularity of positions, 
priorities and preferences of individual copyright actors, and also explore differences 
between the two creative sectors – publishing and music – that this thesis studies. In 
the context of the private copying exception, I will also discuss the dynamics between 
COs, policymakers, and other stakeholders as they relate to the copyright policy 
process and its outcomes. 
3.3. Collective Rights Management Directive    
The final issue, in relation to which the present thesis considers the policy activities 
of COs, is the implementation of the CRM Directive. This issue, dealt with in chapter 
7, is of main concern to the activities and functions of CMOs. Therefore, like the 
problem of contractual terms will do for the unions, the study of this particular issue 
                                                     
262 R (On the Application of British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors) v Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills (No. 2) [2015] EWHC 2041 (Admin) [21]. 
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will allow me to focus my analyses on the behaviour of ALCS and PRS. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter,263 the CRM Directive dealt with two separate issues, multi-
territorial licensing of music online and the regulation of CMOs. Only the 
implementation of provisions relating to the latter will be considered in Chapter 7. 
Through my examination of CMOs’ policy engagement on the CRM Directive 
implementation, I will explore commonalities and differences in the self-concepts of 
PRS and ALCS and how these influence the way both actors participate in policy. I 
will also consider how the different membership compositions of ALCS and PRS, in 
terms of different stakeholder groups and types of creators represented, impact the 
way both CMOs form their policy positions on certain issues.   
4. Conclusion 
This chapter considered the contemporary copyright policy landscape and reflected 
on how IP reviews, the media, and researchers have described the role that 
organisations have played in shaping this environment. In this context, the chapter 
showed that remarks about stakeholder influence have been sweeping with little 
consideration as to possible differences between individual actors and their effects on 
policy, as well as potential variations in the extent of influence exercised by different 
actors and creative industries.  
The chapter also showed that while some research from the copyright domain has 
focussed on the interface of organisational behaviour and features of copyright 
policy, gaps remain in the literature in relation to music industry organisations 
representing creators, performers, and other stakeholders, but also in relation to 
organisations from other creative industries more generally.  
Moreover, while there is a body of literature that considers how environmental 
factors, such as the plurality of actors, or the existence of networks and coalitions, can 
itself influence the behaviour of individual actors, this research and its implications 
have until now not been considered in relation to copyright law and policy. Similarly, 
                                                     
263 See section 1.5.1.  
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the chapter identified a gap in comparative research considering the behaviour of 
organisations across different creative sectors, which could deliver insight into inter-
industry dynamics in copyright policymaking, as well as research comparing actors 
that perform different functions and roles, in order to assess how such differences too, 
may play out in the way copyright issues are advanced to policymakers. In this 
respect, the present chapter specifically considered literature on trade unions and 
CMOs, which demonstrated clear differences between these two types of 
organisations in terms of their origin, purpose, and functions. Moreover, against the 
backdrop of differences in the historical beginnings of SoA, MU, PRS and ALCS, in 
their self-identities, as well as changes in the political climate, which have, in 
particular, shaped the roles of unions, the way these individual organisations behave 
in copyright policy, the roles they play and the priorities that guide their own agendas 
appear less straightforward.  
The research gaps identified above will be explored in the following chapters of this 
thesis in the context of the copyright issues outlined in section 3 of this chapter. These 
are contract terms for creators and performers (chapters 4 and 5), the private copying 
exception (chapter 6), and the implementation of the CRM Directive (chapter 7). A 
deeper understanding of the workings of different organisations is necessary in order 
to better grasp how copyright policymaking, policies, and ultimately laws are affected 







Fair Contract Terms Campaign in the Publishing 
Industry 
 
The problem of unfair contract terms for creators, in this case authors, is not new to 
creators’ organisations (COs) in the publishing industry. In fact, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, one of the main objectives behind the formation of the Society of 
Authors (SoA) was to use the new representative body to form and maintain better 
relations with publishers by means of properly drawn agreements.264 In the past, SoA 
had primarily sought to improve the contractual dealings of authors vis-à-vis 
publishers through minimum terms agreements with publishers’ trade bodies, 
through negotiations with individual publishing houses, as well as through the 
provision of individual contract advice to its members.265 In other words, SoA had 
attempted to establish an industry standard in order to address contractual problems 
such as the division of profit, unclear royalty statements, overly wide scope and 
duration of rights licensing, as well as the lack of proper accounting and transparency. 
In 2014, however, these problems were still widespread and additional ones were 
emerging in the context of the internet, print-on-demand technologies, e-book 
formats, online sales and other aspects of the new digital world of publishing.266 In 
light of this, SoA decided to pursue another route: to seek the improvement of 
authors’ contract terms as a matter of copyright policy. To this end, SoA, supported 
by the Authors Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS) and others, actively engaged 
in the policy process and advocated change in contractual practices through 
legislative intervention. 
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This chapter will consider how SoA and ALCS approached the problem of creators’ 
contract terms in policy. The chapter is organised in three main sections. Section 1 
develops several themes in relation to the way COs behave and participate in the 
copyright policy process. I will study the measures taken by SoA and ALCS and the 
recommendations proposed by these COs to policymakers in the context of 
concurring legislative and policy developments. This will reveal that, on the matter 
of fair contract terms, the policy engagement of SoA and ALCS was more reactive 
than proactive. I will link organisations’ reactive behaviour to a number of factors, 
including their self-concept and resources. This section will further identify notable 
differences in the nature and level of engagement demonstrated by SoA and ALCS 
and relate these to the distinct mandates and functions that the two COs perform as 
a trade union and a collective management organisation (CMO).  
Section 2 will map stakeholder dynamics that characterise the environment within 
which SoA and ALCS operate. I will discuss how SoA and ALCS sought to bring the 
issue of contract terms to the attention of policymakers and thereby show that COs 
generally engage in copyright policy both independently, as well as through 
coalitions and larger umbrella organisations. In this context, I will elaborate on the 
dynamics between SoA and ALCS, illustrating how their collaboration on the issue 
of contract terms resulted from the pursuit of mutual interests, as well as a degree of 
dependence by SoA on ALCS. The latter will be linked to the existence of power 
imbalances between the studied actors.  Furthermore, I will explore the interplay 
between the two COs and other industry stakeholders like the Publishers Association, 
as well as multi-stakeholder organisations such as the British Copyright Council. By 
doing so, I will identify several key features of the copyright policy environment: the 
conflictual nature of issues, the colliding interests of various stakeholders, and the 
inconclusive messages emerging from evidence presented by different stakeholders.  
Section 3 of this chapter will discuss what the preceding analyses suggest about the 
role of COs in copyright policy, the nature of copyright policy outcomes, and the 
process by which copyright policies develop. I will illustrate the contribution of these 
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organisations in bringing to policymakers’ attention problems and shortcomings in 
the way copyright law impacts creators in practice. I will also trace the results of 
authors’ organisations’ campaigning efforts in terms of legislation on contract terms 
in both the UK and the EU. Moreover, the section will consider some of the 
implications of the identified power imbalances between actors in terms of the way 
they are placed to participate in policy, as well as the consequences of advancing 
policy desires through coalitions and alliances. It will conclude with a consideration 
of how the existence of antagonistic views and inconclusive evidence may shape the 
substance of copyright policy outcomes.  
1. COs’ policy engagement on the issue of fair contract terms for creators  
1.1 The problem with creators’ contract terms: Legal background and changes post-
digitisation 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the problem of creators’ contractual 
standing is not a new one. To a degree, it can be traced back to the principle of 
freedom of contract, coupled with creators’ weaker bargaining position vis-à-vis 
publishers.267 Chapter 3 observed that UK copyright law does not include statutory 
provisions which restrict the transfer of rights in terms of scope, duration or 
geographical territory.268 Furthermore, the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
(CDPA 1988) does not prohibit the transfer of rights for future forms of exploitation. 
It also explicitly allows for rights to be transferred in future works.269 There are no 
provisions regulating the amount of remuneration payable to authors or performers. 
As a result, the CDPA 1988 is generally considered as having created a copyright law 
regime that lacks creator-friendly and creator-protective rules.270  
The principle of freedom of contract, however, does not apply without restrictions. 
Common law doctrines of undue influence and restraint of trade can be and have 
                                                     
267 Ray Corrigan and Mark Rogers, ‘The Economics of Copyright’ (2005) 6 (3) World 
Economics 153, 161; EU contracts study (n 46) 16. 
268 See Chapter 3, section 3.1.  
269 Ss 91 (1), 191C (1) CDPA 1988. 
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been used to regulate contracts where authors have been particularly vulnerable.271 
Nevertheless, these mechanisms are generally considered insufficient to protect 
creators from disadvantageous or unfair contracts. Other legislation, like the new 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 or the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 also fail to make up 
for the lack of protection afforded to creators in their contractual dealings under 
copyright law and contract law. In the case of the Consumer Rights Act 2015, the 
definition of consumer only extends to an individual acting for purposes that are 
wholly or mainly outside that individual’s trade, business, craft or profession.272 As 
such, creators typically fall outside this narrow ambit. On the other hand, the Unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 explicitly excludes contracts relating to the creation or 
transfer of IP rights from its scope of application.273  
Despite an already unfavourable status quo ante, as presented above, data from SoA 
and ALCS respondents indicates a further deterioration in creators’ contractual 
standing post-digitisation. One ALCS respondent noted:  
I think one of the dangers of digital is that it creates uncertainty. Out 
of that comes anxiety. And from anxiety comes a need to control what 
you can. And I think that manifests itself sometimes in the way that 
publishers will say to an author, ‘I need all your rights, in perpetuity, 
throughout the universe. I don’t know what I need them for yet but I 
need them.’ And I think, you know, how often are authors genuinely 
empowered to say, ‘Well, no, I’m not, I’ll license this to you’ and ‘You 
can’t have that; unless you can explain why you need it, I’m not going 
to agree’, because many times authors will feel [that], well, ‘I’m going 
to lose this contract’ […]. So, that inequality of bargaining, I think, is a 
long-standing issue. But [it matters] particularly when people are 
trying to acquire as many rights as possible and bank them for the 
                                                     
271 Charlotte Waelde, Graeme Laurie, Abbe Brown, Smita Kheria and Jane Cornwell, 
Contemporary Intellectual Property Law and Policy (3rd edition, OUP 2014) para 7.17; Bently and 
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272 s 2 (3) Consumer Rights Act 2015. 
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future because of possible new digital business models [that] they 
haven’t yet created.274 
The SoA respondent who participated in my research expressed a similar sentiment:  
I think it’s fair to say that with straight analogue publishing, although 
we were always arguing over terms, the kind of parameters were 
basically there. Of course, we saw some terrible contracts, of course, 
we saw some very good contracts. But we did, everyone understood 
what they were granting, what they were granting it for and the kind 
of rate. And now we’re in a bit of a, you know, digital is a bit of a wild 
west. Everything is up for grabs. The rates that are being paid for 
things aren’t settled so negotiation has become increasingly important. 
And what’s become clear from the digital world is, I feel very strongly, 
and publishers would disagree, but I feel very strongly that authors 
have done very badly after this. They are not being treated fairly, they 
are getting a smaller percentage and they are not getting a percentage 
which fairly relates to the amount of effort and value that they put into 
the chain.275 
Interview data, coupled with some policy briefings produced by SoA offered insight 
into how changes brought about by new technologies and digitisation have found 
expression in the contract terms offered to authors. SoA was considered a reliable 
source on this matter because of its contract vetting and legal advice services, through 
which it has gained insight into a wide range of publishing contracts that are offered 
to its members. The key issue outlined by SoA was authors’ difficulty in obtaining a 
proper return for their professional work.276 According to SoA and ALCS, authors are 
presented with contracts that demand the assignment of their rights or excessively 
wide licenses with very limited reciprocal obligations on publishers to print, publish, 
sell or otherwise exploit the work and thus generate revenue. This idea of publishers 
‘banking’ rights for the future is also reflected in the interview quotes above. The 
situation for authors today is contractually worse, the COs argue, because many 
authors are offered print-on-demand or e-book contracts only, where the size of a 
                                                     
274 Interview with Richard Combes, Head of Rights and Licensing, ALCS.  
275 Interview with Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive, SoA.  
276 SoA and ALCS, ‘Briefing Paper: Unfair Contract Terms: February 2014’ (February 2014). 
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print run is not stipulated. At the same time, reversion of rights clauses, which were 
previously typically tied to the case that a book would run out of print, are no longer 
applicable precisely because of the existence of print-on-demand technologies and the 
result that books are never out of print. This means that authors are unable to regain 
control of and exploit ‘unused rights’, for instance through self-publishing. There is a 
growing body of academic and policy literature on creators’ contractual dealings that 
corroborates the claims made by these COs.277 In a policy paper issued by SoA and 
ALCS, the two COs noted: ‘[w]hile unions and professional associations have sought 
to address this imbalance by providing advice to their members and engaging in 
collective bargaining, the situation remains unsatisfactory for the majority of 
creators.’278 Consequently, SoA, ALCS and other organisations took this problem to 
policymakers with a number of proposals for statutory change.  
1.2. COs’ action in the context of concurrent legislative and policy developments  
The first important insight gleaned from studying SoA’s and ALCS’ approach to 
tackling the problem of creators’ contract terms through legislative change was that, 
both in terms of timing and substance, these COs’ actions were contingent on other 
concurrent legal and policy developments.  To this extent, SoA and ALCS acted in a 
more reactive, rather than proactive manner as they attempted to shape policy on this 
issue. I drew this conclusion by analysing (a) the timing of SoA’s first policy briefings 
on the problem, (b) the substance of the organisation’s proposals, and (c) the general 
emphasis that SoA itself placed on the timing of its action, as well as the temporal 
interplay between SoA’s subsequent policy moves and the progress of concurrent 
legislative initiatives. Last but not least, interview data also corroborated this 
conclusion.      
                                                     
277 EU contracts study (n 46) 10ff; P Bernt Hugenholtz, ‘The Great Copyright Robbery: Rights 
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(a) The Timing of SoA’s 2014 policy briefings and recommendations for legislative action  
SoA published two briefings on the problem of creators’ unfair contract terms in 
February 2014, which were both formally supported by ALCS, and another briefing 
in December 2014.279 My SoA respondent made these documents available to me 
following our interview as part of my fieldwork. The February briefings appeared 
just a month after the publication of a study titled ‘Contractual Arrangements 
applicable to creators: Law and Practice of Selected Member States’, which had been 
commissioned by the European Parliament.280 This study looked at eight Member 
States, including the UK, and compared the national rules that could protect creators 
in their contractual dealings under the copyright and contract laws of these countries. 
In comparison, the UK appeared to have a particularly poor and inadequate 
framework for the protection of creators for the reasons outlined at the beginning of 
this chapter.281 However, as other national frameworks also showed considerable 
weaknesses, the study made a number of recommendations aimed at restoring the 
negotiating power of authors and the overall fairness of contracts. Among other 
things, it recommended the introduction of an unfair terms model in copyright law, 
similar to the one in existence under consumer rights law, as well as specific 
conditions under which the transfer of rights for unknown forms of exploitation 
would be justified.282  
In order to ascertain whether SoA or ALCS had previously brought the issue of unfair 
contract terms to the attention of policymakers and campaigned for legislative change 
on this matter, I conducted an online search for documents (press releases, policy 
                                                     
279 SoA and ALCS, ‘Briefing Paper: Unfair Contract Terms: February 2014’ (n 276); SoA and 
ALCS, ‘Unfair contracts: A blueprint for change’ (February 2014), and SoA, ‘Consumer 
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statements, briefings, website updates, reports, etc.) originating between 1 January 
2000 and 31 December 2013.283 My search revealed no evidence that either 
organisation had publicly lobbied or campaigned on this issue in the many years 
preceding 2014, although there was evidence that these COs had indeed been aware 
of the problems facing authors much earlier than 2014, not least through SoA’s 
contract vetting service, mentioned above.284 The finding that SoA had not prioritised 
the issue of fair contracts in its dealings with policymakers in the period leading up 
to the publication of the EU study was further supported by the substance of an SoA 
briefing note from January 2013, i.e. just one year earlier. This note, which I received 
from my SoA respondent, had been prepared by the SoA for a House of Lords debate 
on the value of the publishing industry. The document covered a wide range of issues, 
but did not address the contractual situation of creators.285  
(b) SoA’s policy recommendations in the context of concurrent legislative initiatives 
The fact that the EU study on creators’ contractual arrangements had driven SoA and 
ALCS into policy action on this matter was clear from the references that these 
organisations had made to its findings and recommendations in their own policy 
briefings.286 Interview data also corroborated SoA’s reliance on the EU study for its 
subsequent policy action. My SoA respondent noted:  
                                                     
283 This period was chosen as it immediately preceded the year 2014 and spanned a sufficient 
number of years during which digitisation and new business models would have been 
reflected in the contractual practices adopted by publishers, thus producing the 
contemporary problems faced by authors that SoA and ALCS raised with policymakers in 
2014.  
284 Among the search results were a few newspaper articles reporting on SoA’s criticism of 
publishers with regard to the terms they offered to authors, for instance Alison Flood, 
‘Ebook deals “note remotely fair” on authors’ (The Guardian, 12 July 2010) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2010/jul/12/ebooks-publishing-deals-fair> accessed 08 
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285 SoA, ‘Briefing Note: House of Lords Debate: Value of the Publishing Industry, 
Wednesday 6 February, Moses Room, 5PM’ (January 2013). A copy of this briefing note was 
obtained directly from SoA and lies with the author. The issues covered included VAT for 
ebooks, the scope of the Public Lending Right, the need to promote a reading culture, and 
provisions in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill that was being debated at the time. 
286 SoA and ALCS, ‘Unfair contracts: A blueprint for change’ (n 279). 
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[…] when the EU did its policy paper also on fair terms, which we 
think is a very, very good document, we’ve been publicising that a lot 
and lobbying people here in relation to it. […] It’s a fabulous 
document, which talks about fair terms for creators; […] it really says 
everything that we feel very strongly [about] and we would love to see 
that taken further. And some ...some law coming out of it.287 
The specific recommendations that SoA, supported by ALCS, made in its briefings 
can be placed in the context of legal developments and initiatives that were already 
underway. In particular, SoA urged for the following four measures:  
(1)  An amendment to the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 through the removal 
of s 1(c) of Schedule 1 which provides that ss 2 to 4 (negligence liability, 
liability arising in contract and unreasonable indemnity clauses) do not extend 
to intellectual property contracts;  
(2) A widening of the definition of ‘consumer’ in the (at the time debated) 
Consumer Rights Bill in order to protect creators and others who operate in 
an unfair environment;  
(3) A review of creator contracts by the government so as to ensure that the UK 
has legal frameworks which protect creators, like those in other EU countries, 
and to ensure that creators receive a fair share of the reward for their 
creativity; 
(4) A comprehensive review of the laws applicable to business-to-business 
contracts to ensure that they are fit for purpose in a digital world.288    
When SoA communicated these recommendations to UK policymakers, the 
government was already reviewing the UCTA 1977 with the intention of replacing the 
Act’s provisions on business to consumer contracts with the Consumer Rights Bill, 
which was itself an ongoing statutory initiative.289 Evidently, SoA and ALCS were 
                                                     
287 Interview with Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive, SoA.  
288 SoA, ‘Consumer Rights Bill and Creator Contracts’ (n 279) 1; SoA and ALCS, ‘Briefing 
Paper: Unfair Contract Terms: February 2014’ (n 276) 1; SoA and ALCS, ‘Unfair contracts: A 
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289 The idea behind the Consumer Rights Bill was to consolidate consumer rights legislation. 
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attempting to fit their recommendations on tackling the unfair contract terms 
problem into pre-existing legislative and policy developments and to thus take 
advantage of the government’s, at the time, already determined agenda.  
In brief, according to SoA and ALCS, there was no justifiable reason why under the 
UCTA 1977 creators were being denied the legal protection afforded to other 
businesses. Furthermore, the definition of ‘consumer’ in consumer protection 
legislation was too narrow and thus excluded authors. To this effect, anyone acting 
for purposes that were wholly or mainly within that individual’s trade, business, 
craft, or profession would be excluded from the provisions of the Consumer Rights 
Bill. Yet, like consumers, authors too were often dealing on standard terms of business 
and in that respect had an equally weak bargaining position when it came to 
negotiating with large multinational companies. The idea that the government should 
ensure that the UK legal framework protected creators in their contractual dealings 
had come from the EU study.290 Finally, with regard to the last recommendation (a 
review of laws applicable to business-to-business contracts), SoA explained in its 
December 2014 policy briefing: ‘We understand that Government will be considering 
business-to-business and consumer-consumer contracts in due course following the 
adoption of the Consumer Rights Bill. […] This would be an excellent opportunity to 
extend the remaining parts of UCTA to creators and to consider how best to protect 
creators and those who operate in an unfair negotiating environment.’291   
(c) The emphasis on timing 
The above quote from a SoA policy paper indicated how the organisation linked its 
fourth recommendation to the timing of other policy events. Indeed, SoA appeared 
to present the timing, the fact that the government was acting on these specific pieces 
of legislation anyway as one of its selling points when drafting briefings and 
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submissions for policymakers. SoA continuously contextualised its demands in 
relation to other separate initiatives.292  
In fact, even after the government passed the Creators’ Rights Act 2015 retaining a 
narrow definition of ‘consumer’ in s 2(3) of the Act, and although it also did not 
extend the scope of the UCTA 1977 as per SoA’s recommendations, the CO continued 
to tie its calls for action to this, now adopted, legislation. As such, a year after the 
commencement of the CRA 2015, in March 2016, SoA published a website update on 
its campaign for fair contract terms which it had formally launched in July 2015, 
stating: ‘This is the time to address this issue, with the Consumer Rights Act passed 
only last year.’293  
1.3. Factors affecting the reactivity of SoA and ALCS 
SoA and ALCS had been aware of the problems facing creators in their contractual 
arrangements but had not attempted to place this issue on the copyright policy 
agenda prior to the 2014 EU study. This begs the question of why, rather than 
proactively raise this matter earlier, they had waited and subsequently tied their 
proposals to statutory initiatives already underway in relation to consumer rights. 
Recall that, irrespective of the government’s initiatives in consumer law, SoA had 
knowledge of the contracts being offered to its members, and there existed academic 
work and policy studies that could have supported SoA and ALCS in making a case 
                                                     
292 SoA even set up a separate webpage titled: ‘C.R.E.A.T.O.R.: why now?’ (SoA) < 
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<http://www.societyofauthors.org/News/News/2016/Mar/CREATOR-update> accessed 08 
February 2017. SoA named its campaign ‘C.R.E.A.T.O.R.’. This acronym stands for Clearer, 
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Campaign-for-Fair-Contracts> accessed 08 February 2017. SoA’s specific demands are 
discussed in more detail in section 2.1 of the present Chapter.  
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to the government that the bargaining power imbalance between creators and 
copyright exploiters needed to be addressed.294  
A combination of interview and documentary data, as well as notes from 
unstructured observations made during my fieldwork led me to conclude that the 
reactivity of SoA and ALCS on this matter hinged to a large extent on these 
organisations’ resource capacities and self-concepts. Neither organisation seemed to 
perceive its role in the copyright policy landscape as that of an agenda-setter. SoA’s 
and ALCS’ respective mandates also influenced, in different ways, how the two COs 
engaged with policy on the matter of contract terms.  
1.3.1 Resources and mandate  
Based on the timing and policy context of SoA’s action on contract terms, I established 
a link between resource disposability and proactivity in two respects.  
(1) The ability to generate momentum and initiate awareness on an issue from 
scratch is certainly more resource-heavy than stepping on and amplifying pre-
existing movements or campaigns around a given issue. The same applies to 
the recommendations that an organisation advances: it is more difficult to 
convince policymakers to undertake a new, specific legislative initiative than 
it is to weave recommendations into initiatives that are already underway, 
especially because for the policymakers themselves, the former is more 
resource-consuming than the latter.  
                                                     
294 The studies and academic work referred to here include: D’Agostino (n 261), Martin 
Kretschmer, Estelle Derclaye, Marcella Favale and Richard Watt, ‘The Relationship Between 
Copyright and Contract Law’ (IPO 2012) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/ipresear
ch-relation-201007.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017; Martin Kretschmer, ‘Copyright and 
Contract Law: Regulating Creator Contracts: The State of the Art and a research Agenda’ 
(2010) 18 (1) Journal of Intellectual Property Law 141; P B Hugenholtz and L Guibault, 
‘Copyright Contract Law: Towards a Statutory Regulation?’ (Institute for Information Law 
Amsterdam 2004) 
<https://iuccommonsproject.wikispaces.com/file/view/STUDY+of+Copyright+in+Netherland
s.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017.    
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(2) Furthermore, especially in the aftermath of the Hargreaves Review, there is a 
call by the UK government toward IP policy developing out of clear, verifiable 
and peer-reviewed evidence.295 However, the ability to prepare (in-house or 
commissioned) and present such evidence is also contingent on resource 
availability and resource allocation.  
1.3.2 Comparing SoA’s and ALCS’ financial and human resources 
When comparing the financial resources of SoA and ALCS, I found, as expected, that 
SoA has fewer resources at its command than ALCS.296 At a basic level (excluding 
income from investments and other assets), both trade unions and collective 
management organisations rely on their members to sustain their operations. Trade 
unions charge set membership fees, which may vary by membership category (e.g. 
student or concessionary membership). CMOs on the other hand, apply a 
commission, or administration, rate (generally around 10%)297 on their members’ 
royalty income, which is sometimes in addition to a joining fee.298 In the case of 
CMOs, the actual amount of this admin fee can vary widely as these organisations 
house both low-earning as well as high-earning, ‘superstar’ members.299 Moreover, 
                                                     
295 See Chapter 3, section 1.2 and UK IPO, ‘Guide to Evidence for Policy’ (n 105).  
296 According to the financial statements filed by SoA with the Certification Officer for the 
year ended 31 December 2015, the total income of the union (from members and 
investments) was £ 1,124,771, whereas ALCS’ financial statements for the year ended 31 
March 2016 show that from a licence income of £ 30,675,294, the commission receivable was 
£ 2,861,106. ALCS’ cash and cash equivalents at the end of the financial year were also 
reported at £ 17,238,546. See SoA, ‘Form AR21: Annual Return for a Trade Union: The 
Society of Authors, Year ended: 31 December 2015’ 17 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/570506/577
T_2015.pdf> accessed 20 August 2017, and ALCS, ‘Directors’ Report, Strategic Report and 
Financial Statements for the year ended 31 March 2016’ 7, 9 < 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/01310636/filing-history> accessed 20 August 
2017.  
297 This applies to the two CMOs studied in this thesis.  
298 At the time of writing, lifetime membership of ALCS costs £36 and the organisation 
applies a commission rate of 9.5% on incoming royalties: ‘Join’ (ALCS) < 
http://www.alcs.co.uk/Join> and ‘Commission/deductions and tax’ (ALCS) < 
http://www.alcs.co.uk/What-we-do/Membership-of-ALCS/Payments-to-
writers/Commission-deductions> accessed 08 February 2017.  
299 The ‘superstar’ phenomenon of creators’ earnings distribution has been documented 
widely. See, for instance, Martin Kretschmer and Philip Hardwick, ‘Authors’ earnings from 
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the sheer size of CMO memberships far exceeds that of trade unions, especially in the 
case of the four COs considered in the current thesis.300 Therefore, although the 
distribution and licensing operations of CMOs are themselves costly, these 
organisations tend to generally have an overall greater resource availability than the 
trade unions.301 In terms of human resources, too, ALCS has a greater number of staff 
than SoA, but far fewer compared to the bigger CMO that is PRS.302  
1.3.3 SoA’s resource and mandate-related constraints 
The fact that resource constraints were an issue for SoA not only became clear from a 
comparative review of the organisations’ financial accounts, but was also reflected in 
my interview data, in the access negotiation process that preceded my fieldwork, as 
well as in observations emerging from this fieldwork. As discussed in chapter 2, my 
primary contact at SoA referred to limited resources (primarily in terms of space and 
staff members’ time) as the reason why I could not spend a longer period of time on 
                                                     
copyright and non-copyright sources: A survey of 25 000 British and German writers’ (2007) 
11, 21; Ruth Towse, ‘Copyright and the Cultural Industries: Incentives and Earnings’ (2000) 
Paper for presentation to the Korea Infomedia Lawyers Association 2; Corrigan and Rogers 
(n 267) 161.  
300 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.  
301 For the financial year ended 31 December 2015, PRS’ cash and cash equivalents were 
£141,290,000 and for the financial year ended 31 March 2016, ALCS’ cash and cash 
equivalents were £ 17,238,546, see PRS, ‘Annual Report and Financial Statements for the 
Year Ended 31 December 2015’ 15 < 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/00134396/filing-history> accessed 20 August 
2017 and ALCS, ‘Directors’ Report, Strategic Report and Financial Statements for the year 
ended 31 March 2016’ (n 296) 9. These figures are in stark contrast to SoA, which only had 
net assets of £ 1,152,528 for the year ended 31 December 2015, see SoA, ‘Form AR21: Annual 
Return for a Trade Union: The Society of Authors, Year ended: 31 December 2015’ (n 296) 7. 
MU, on the other hand, is comparable to ALCS with net assets of £ 17,523,527 for the same 
financial year, see MU, ‘Form AR21: Annual Return for a Trade Union: Musicians’ Union, 
Year ended 31 December 2015’ 17 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/603800/154
T_2015.pdf> accessed 20 August 2017.    
302 For the year ended 31 March 2016, the number of staff working for ALCS was 30, see 
ALCS, ‘Directors’ Report, Strategic Report and Financial Statements for the year ended 31 
March 2016’ (n 296) 2. The average number of employees during the financial year ended 31 
December 2015 at SoA was 17. See ‘Form AR21: Annual Return for a Trade Union: The 
Society of Authors, Year ended: 31 December 2015’ (n 296) 8. For the same year, the average 
monthly number of persons employed by PRS and its subsidiaries was 611. See PRS, 
‘Annual Report and Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2015’ (n 301) 25. 
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the SoA premises and interview a wider range of respondents.303 Indeed, in 
comparison with ALCS’, PRS’ and even MU’s headquarters, SoA’s building was 
significantly smaller and had an older feel compared to the more modern and 
spacious premises of the other three COs. Limitations in resource allocation were also 
brought up in the interview conducted with the SoA respondent. On the extent to 
which SoA was generally able to be politically active my respondent noted:  
I mean, you know, we’re a small organisation and our real duties are 
to our members so we can’t spend a massive amount of time on these 
areas. But, and I don’t spend a massive amount of my time lobbying 
[…]304 
The SoA respondent further stated: ‘I probably don’t do as much EU lobbying as I’d 
like to simply because I can’t.’305 
The allocation of resources into various activities is not only restrained by the amount 
of resources in existence but also by the organisation’s mandate. Pursuant to Article 
2.1 of SoA’s Articles of Association, the objectives of the society are to protect the 
rights and further the interests of authors of every kind of works and publications 
including literary, dramatic, artistic, scientific, technical, educational and musical.306 
This is an exceptionally wide mandate. In fact, a report on the status of artists in 
Europe from 2006 identified five distinct policy areas that needed to be addressed in 
order to improve the working conditions of creators: legal and organisational 
frameworks, social security, taxation, mobility of artists, and collective bargaining.307 
Aligned with the report’s findings, SoA does not channel all of its available resources 
into lobbying for copyright policy issues. It also campaigns for the preservation of 
                                                     
303 See Chapter 2, section 3.  
304 Interview with Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive, SoA.  
305 Interview with Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive, SoA.  
306 SoA, ‘Articles of Association of The Society of Authors’ (Approved 21 October 2014) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/SOA/MediaLibrary/SOAWebsite/Governance/Articles-of-
Association-21-10-14-APPROVED-final.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017. 
307 European Institute for Comparative Cultural Research, Suzanne Capiau, Andreas 
Johannes Wiesand, ‘The Status of Artists in Europe’ (Study) (European Parliament 2006) < 
https://www.andea.fr/doc_root/ressources/enquetes-et-
rapports/51b5afb01bb8d_The_status_of_artists_in_EU.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017 iii-iv.  
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public libraries to promote a reading culture, for authors’ moral right of attribution308, 
for changes in libel law, changes in the VAT system, particularly in relation to e-
books, as well as other issues.309 Moreover, as we are reminded by Ewing’s work, the 
representative function of unions, implemented through lobbying and other public 
affairs work, is just one of five functions that SoA as a trade union generally 
performs.310  
Given that SoA’s membership consists primarily of self-employed or ‘independent 
workers’, as they are referred to under employment law, these members are deprived 
of many common law and statutory employment rights. Most industrial safety 
legislation, as well as important social security rights, including those that relate to 
disability or unemployment do not apply to independent workers but only to 
employed persons.311 Consequently, in order to act in accordance with its mandate, 
SoA needs to invest more resources into its service function, by offering its members 
specialist insurance, contract vetting services, other professional advice, and more.312 
This invariably impacts the extent to which SoA can also devote financial, human and 
other resources to copyright policy, i.e. to its regulatory and representative functions.  
Considering these resource and mandate constraints, it becomes clear why SoA relied 
on the EU study to launch its policy work and why it sought to advance proposals 
that could easily be accommodated into the government’s existing legislative agenda.  
1.3.4 ALCS’ resource-driven advantage and mandate-related constraint 
With regard to resources and mandates, ALCS’ case is somewhat different. I 
discussed above that ALCS presides over a greater amount of both human and 
                                                     
308 S 77 CDPA 1988. 
309 For details on the individual campaigns and areas of involvement of SoA see ‘Where we 
stand’ (SoA) < http://www.societyofauthors.org/Where-We-Stand> accessed 08 February 
2017.  
310 See Chapter 3, section 2.1. 
311 Ian Smith and Aaron Baker, Smith & Wood’s Employment Law (11th Edition, Oxford 
University Press 2013) 37; Cabrelli (n 212) 61. 
312 ‘Exclusive discounts and offers’ (SoA) <http://www.societyofauthors.org/Join/Discounts> 
accessed 08 February 2017. 
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financial resources. This is an important factor behind the potential ability of this 
organisation to commission research and to thereby participate in the making of 
evidence-based policy with greater independence from other organisations or pre-
existing publications compared to SoA. For example, ALCS commissioned research 
on the economic effects of education exceptions, as well as an economic analysis of 
copyright, secondary copyright and collective licensing in the context of the 
Hargreaves Review in order to make the case against a wide copyright exception for 
education and for the importance of secondary rights licensing.313 ALCS has also been 
commissioning research into authors’ earnings, much of which was being used by 
SoA to substantiate its claim that authors were not faring well in their present 
working environment.314  
In terms of resources, ALCS is in a better position to contribute to the making of 
evidence-based copyright policy than SoA. However, whilst ALCS does allocate 
resources to the commissioning and production of evidence,315 the organisation 
decided against being proactive in calling for legislation on creators’ contract terms. 
The reason for this lies in ALCS’ mandate and particularly the fact that the 
organisation is a CMO, whose primary function is collecting and distributing money 
from secondary rights licensing.316 One ALCS respondent described this in the 
following terms:  
[O]ur mandate is for secondary use of a work and for ALCS to see 
something as a politically urgent situation it would probably have to 
                                                     
313 See PWC, ‘An economic analysis of education exceptions in copyright’ (March 2012) 
<https://www.pwc.co.uk/assets/pdf/an-economic-analysis-of-education-exceptions-in-
copyright.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017 and PWC, ‘An economic analysis of copyright, 
secondary copyright and collective licensing’ (March 2011) < 
https://www.cla.co.uk/data/corporate_material/submissions/2011_pwc_final_report.pdf> 
accessed 08 February 2017. 
314 The studies commissioned by ALCS are Kretschmer and Hardwick (n 299) and Gibson, 
Johnson and Dimita (n 46). 
315 For all the research findings, as summarised by ALCS, see ‘ALCS Research’ (ALCS) 
<http://www.alcs.co.uk/Resources/Research> accessed 08 February 2017.  
316 See Chapter 3, section 2.3.  
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affect that world because first and foremost our role is to make sure 
that our members get these payments.317 
As a CMO, ALCS is mandated by its members to permit or forbid the exercise of 
certain rights, to grant licenses, collect fees for use and to defend and protect those 
rights.318 Consequently, ALCS is, by mandate and function, further removed from the 
issue of contract terms compared to SoA. For SoA as a trade union, on the other hand, 
the problem of contract terms directly falls into its core sphere of activity: to ensure 
the improvement of authors’ working conditions. 
1.3.5 Different types of engagement by SoA and ALCS   
Ultimately, differences in the organisations’ functions and mandates led to the 
different roles that both COs adopted in relation to the fair contract terms campaign. 
SoA took the lead in raising awareness, campaigning and lobbying for legislative 
action, while ALCS adopted a more facilitative and supportive role. It was SoA that 
prepared the February 2014 briefings to policymakers, which ALCS ‘merely’ 
supported. SoA is also the organisation that launched the C.R.E.A.T.O.R.319 campaign 
for fair contract terms, which called for a review of laws applicable to creator contracts 
and the introduction of legislation to address the problem of unfair terms.320 Trade 
press such as The Bookseller, as well as general newspapers like the Guardian also 
recognised SoA as being the organisation that spearheaded policy action on this 
issue.321   
                                                     
317 Interview with Richard Combes, Head of Rights and Licensing, ALCS. 
318 ‘The ALCS Mandate: a comprehensive guide’ (ALCS) 
<http://www.alcs.co.uk/Documents/The-ALCS-Mandate-a-comprehensive-guide.aspx> 
accessed 08 February 2017.  
319 See n 293. See also ‘C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign for fair contracts’ (SoA) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/Where-We-Stand/C-R-E-A-T-O-R-Campaign-for-Fair-
Contracts> accessed 08 February 2017. 
320 Ibid.  
321 Alison Flood, ‘Philip Pullman: professional writers set to become “an endangered 
species”’ (the Guardian, 6 January 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/2016/jan/06/philip-pullman-society-of-authors-open-
letter-fairer-terms-for-writers> accessed 08 February 2017; Katherine Cowdrey, ‘SoA seeks 
new law to protect authors’ (The Bookseller, 7 March 2016) 
<http://www.thebookseller.com/news/soa-seeks-new-law-protect-authors-323847> accessed 
08 February 2017. 
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In fact, ALCS’ decision to be less outwardly active was also reflected in my interview 
data. One respondent noted: ‘[T]he unions will take the lead on something like that 
because it’s to do with primary rights […].’322  
1.3.6 Self-concept  
Resource allocation and capacities and different mandates were not the only factors 
at play that influenced the way ALCS and SoA engaged in policy on contract terms. 
Relying on interview data, I found that an additional factor, which likely also 
contributed to the reactive nature of SoA’s and ALCS’ policy input, was the 
organisations’ self-concept. More specifically, the interviews with ALCS and SoA 
respondents revealed a recurring notion that the organisations’ own priority setting 
was reactive. This was underlined by the perception that it was not within the 
organisations’ power and control to set the policy agenda, or to strongly influence the 
way this agenda was set on copyright matters. My SoA respondent explained:  
Now, of course, priority setting is reactive to an extent. There’s no 
point in us saying, you know, we’re going to be writing loads of papers 
on copyright if that’s not anything the EU is examining at the 
moment.323 
A similar sentiment was shared by an ALCS respondent:  
So our role, our strapline is ‘protecting and promoting authors’ rights’. 
So as part of that what we’ve got to do is make parliamentarians aware 
of what’s happening out here. And also, where possible, what they can 
do to help. Now, obviously, we can only ask them to help when 
there’s specific legislation going through but we also have a regular 
campaign to meet with as many parliamentarians as possible to make 
them aware of current issues around authors.324 (emphasis added) 
The idea that, to a large extent, agenda setting was outside the control of these 
organisations was expressed by another ALCS respondent, when asked what would 
make it easier for ALCS to get certain messages across to policymakers:  
                                                     
322 Interview with Barbara Hayes, Deputy Chief Executive, ALCS. 
323 Interview with Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive, SoA.  
324 Interview with Barbara Hayes, Deputy Chief Executive, ALCS. 
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to be perfectly honest, what makes it easier is probably a politically 
urgent issue and those are few and far between in the world of 
writers.325 (emphasis added)  
This respondent elaborated on their idea by distinguishing between the general 
functions of Ministers and the IPO in the policy process: 
I mean, we’ve identified things that we think are not on the legislative 
agenda that should happen – immediately takes you outside of the 
immediate remit of the IPO. So those are difficult conversations to 
have because their job [of the civil servants] is to implement agreed 
policies and if it isn’t within that then you can see why they might be 
sympathetic to it but they don’t actually have too much of a 
prerogative to do anything about it. So there your kind of recourse is 
to people who do make decisions about directing policy, so you’re 
talking about Ministers there really. […] the idea of a fair contract that 
deals with things under a guiding set of principles […]. That is not 
something that is on the political agenda and I wouldn’t say it had a 
political urgency about it because even though we produced evidence 
of pretty dramatic falling incomes for writers […] if you are reacting 
to something that’s on the table, then yeah, you’re in a conversation 
there with the IPO. And that sort of people will engage you because 
it’s their policy they’re trying to form. If you’re going to these higher 
level issues of principle, it’s very difficult to create that sense of 
urgency […].326 
If ALCS and SoA primarily identify their role in copyright policy, at least when it 
comes to advocating for certain legislative initiatives, as being more reactive rather 
than proactive, then it is likely that these organisations are defining their scope of 
action more narrowly than others and acting in accordance with this self-concept. 
Even in my sample of four COs, I identified distinctions in organisations’ self-concept, 
which led to differences in the extent to which organisations were proactive in trying 
to influence the copyright policy agenda itself. I will re-visit this idea in chapter 7, 
where I discuss how PRS’ self-concept in particular stood out as being distinct from 
that of SoA and ALCS.327 Chapter 8 will offer a further recent example which 
corroborates this point. I will also consider how such differences may impact the way 
                                                     
325 Interview with Richard Combes, Head of Rights and Licensing, ALCS.  
326 Interview with Richard Combes, Head of Rights and Licensing, ALCS. 
327 See Chapter 7, section 2. 
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policy agendas are set and, ultimately, the issues that are reflected in the substance of 
copyright law.328    
1.4. Conclusion  
This section dealt with the approach, substance and timing of SoA’s and ALCS’ policy 
input on the issue of creators’ contract terms. In the context of concurrent policy 
developments, publications and statutory initiatives, I showed that SoA’s calls for 
legislative action, which were supported by ALCS, were reactive rather than 
proactive in the sense that both their timing and scope were contingent on other pre-
existing circumstances and movements. The degree of proactivity demonstrated by 
SoA and ALCS was contingent upon the organisations’ varying resource capacities 
and self-concepts, as well as upon their different mandates. SoA had fewer resources 
available than ALCS, which hindered its ability to be proactive. At the same time, 
both organisations appeared driven by an understanding that copyright policy 
agenda-setting was not something they had particular influence over. That, too, 
played a role in the manner (and timing), in which they engaged with policymakers. 
Distinctions in the functions and mandates of SoA and ALCS also accounted for the 
varying extents, to which each organisation was outwardly active in campaigning 
and lobbying for action on creators’ contractual terms.  
2. COs and their wider environment  
In the preceding section, I explored reactivity as a feature of the publishing industry 
COs’ policy activity by considering how thematic and temporal aspects of SoA’s and 
ALCS’ behaviour fit within the context of the wider policy landscape. I also discussed 
COs’ resource allocation and capacity, mandate and self-concept as factors that shape 
the way these organisations behave in copyright policy. This section will focus more 
closely on mapping the landscape within which the studied COs operate and their 
relationships with other relevant actors. I will show that actors form coalitions on the 
basis of mutual interests and dependencies, which are the result of power imbalances. 
I will also consider how this behaviour and COs’ actions fit into and are influenced 
                                                     
328 See Chapter 8, sections 1.5 and 2.3. 
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by their environment, in particular by the existence of a large number of actors and 
interest constellations. Before exploring COs’ relations with other organisational 
actors, such as the Publishers’ Association, the Creators’ Rights Alliance, and the 
British Copyright Council, the next subsection will begin by considering the 
dynamics that characterised the collaboration between SoA and ALCS.   
2.1. SoA and ALCS: Collaboration based on mutual interests and dependence 
In the publishing industry, SoA and ALCS are established industry partners. They 
undertake joint action on various issues of policy in the form of joint briefings and 
joint papers.329 They also reference and promote each other’s work through website 
updates and press releases.330 Furthermore, based on mutual agreement, one of the 
benefits of an SoA membership is an additional free membership with ALCS.331 
Underlying this partnership is a mutual interest in the furtherance of authors’ 
interests and, as my exploration of the organisations’ work on creators’ contract terms 
illuminated, a degree of dependence by SoA on ALCS. The latter is indicative of the 
existence of power imbalances in the copyright landscape of organisational actors.   
                                                     
329 See n 279 for examples of joint briefings in the context of creators’ contract terms. Further 
examples include: ALCS and SoA, ‘Response to Draft Report on the Implementation of 
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information society’ 
(2015) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/SOA/MediaLibrary/SOAWebsite/Submissions/Joint-
statement-with-ALCS-on-EU-Copyright-Harmonisation-2015.pdf> accessed 08 February 
2017; ALCS and SoA, ‘Joint Briefing on the Digital Economy Bill’ (September 2016) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/SOA/MediaLibrary/SOAWebsite/Submissions/20160927-
Society-of-Authors-ALCS-digital-economy-bill-briefing.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017. 
330 See, for instance, ‘Shortlist for 2016 ALCS Educational Writers’ Award’ (SoA, 14 
November 2016) <http://www.societyofauthors.org/News/News/2016/November/ALCS-
Educational-Writers-Award-Shortlist> accessed 08 February 2017; ‘ALCS Report: The 
Business of Being a Writer’ (SoA, 21 April 2015) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/News/News/2015/April/The-Business-of-Being-a-Writer-
ALCS-Report> accessed 08 February 2017; and ALCS’ press release ‘Save the Author! Join 
the Fairer Contracts Campaign’ (ALCS, 21 January 2016) 
<http://www.alcs.co.uk/getdoc/d7216ab5-5ee7-4054-9d41-cae2209d7d74/.aspx> accessed 08 
February 2017.  
331 ‘Exclusive Discounts and Offers’ (The Society of Authors) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/Join/Discounts> accessed 07 February 2017.  
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The brief historical account of SoA and ALCS provided in chapter 3 illustrated that 
both organisations emerged from the collective efforts of groups of active authors 
with the primary aim of furthering the rights and interests of authors at large. In light 
of the different mandates and functions of these two organisations, SoA and ALCS 
complement one another in representing the interests of creators by performing 
different tasks and prioritising action on those issues that are more relevant to their 
individual sphere of activities. Consequently, SoA took the lead on the issue of 
contract terms as discussed above.   
However, an additional factor that propelled the collaboration between the two COs 
on this matter was a certain degree of dependence by SoA on the networks, access, 
and resources of ALCS. Specifically, on the basis of documentary data, some of which 
I had been referred to in my interviews with ALCS and SoA respondents, I identified 
three main ways in which SoA had relied on and benefitted from ALCS’ input with 
regard to its C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign.  
(1) SoA gained from ALCS’ resources and ability to commission several studies 
into authors’ earnings by using the findings within these studies as evidence 
to corroborate its own lobbying and awareness-raising activities. The first 
research commissioned by ALCS was published in 2007 – a survey of 25 000 
British and German writers. It showed that both mean and median earnings 
of writers were well below subsistence levels and that only 40% of those who 
undertook writing on a full-time basis, i.e. ‘professional writers’, could make 
a living from this profession.332 ALCS commissioned subsequent research into 
this topic in 2013.333 This successive study showed, among other things, that 
in 2013 the percentage of professional writers, who could make a living from 
writing alone, had decreased to 11.5%. Additionally, writers’ median income 
had dropped by 29% in real terms. SoA referred to these studies, quoting their 
                                                     
332 Kretschmer and Hardwick (n 299) 3, 5. 
333 Gibson, Johnson and Dimita (n 46). 
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findings in briefings to policymakers,334 at industry events (which received 
press coverage335), in articles written directly for newspapers,336 as well as in 
an open letter drafted to members of the Publishers Association.337   
 
(2) Thanks to ALCS’ network and clout, SoA could gain a platform to promote 
and publicise its policy demands directly to policymakers through the All-
Party Parliamentary Writers’ Group.338 This group exists in order to inform 
MPs and Lords from the whole political party spectrum on specific policy 
issues through input both within and outside Parliament. The group’s 
administrator is ALCS.339 One ALCS respondent explained what this entailed:  
 
So that effectively means that we arrange meetings and run the 
website and have a sort of hand in bringing together 
organisations with an interest in authors and authors’ rights to 
say what needs to be on the agenda of this group […]340    
 
Therefore, it was ALCS’ role in this forum that enabled SoA’s Chief Executive, 
Nicola Solomon, to launch and present the Society’s C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign 
                                                     
334 SoA and ALCS, ‘Unfair contracts: A blueprint for change’ (n 279) 4. 
335 Benedicte Page, ‘‘Solomon: “once well-known authors now struggling”’ (The Bookseller, 30 
November 2015) <http://www.thebookseller.com/news/solomon-once-well-known-authors-
now-struggling-317464> accessed 08 February 2017.  
336 James McConnachie, ‘Publishers should pay authors as much as their other employees’ 
(the Guardian, 11 February 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2016/feb/11/publishers-should-pay-
authors-as-much-as-their-other-employees> accessed 20 December 2016. 
337 Open Letter from The Society of Authors, supported by the Authors’ Licensing and 
Collecting Society, the Writers’ Guild of Great Britain, and the Royal Society of Literature to 
the Members of the Publishers Association and the Independent Publishers Guild (05 
January 2016) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/SOA/MediaLibrary/SOAWebsite/Submissions/Open-
Letter-to-Publishers-from-the-SoA-5-January-2016.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017.  
338 This group was established in 2007. According to its website, it currently has 68 members. 
For more information, see All-Party Parliamentary Writers’ Group (APPWG) < 
http://www.allpartywritersgroup.co.uk/> accessed 21 December 2016.  
339 Barbara Hayes, ALCS’ Deputy Chief Executive of ALCS is the official administrator 
according to the APPWG website, <http://www.allpartywritersgroup.co.uk/Contact-us> 
accessed 21 December 2016.  
340 Interview with Richard Combes, Head of Rights and Licensing, ALCS. 
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during the group’s summer reception in July 2015. This occurred in the 
presence of the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, MPs, Lords 
and industry professionals. ALCS subsequently published Solomon’s speech 
in full in its online ‘ALCS News’ column thereby further raising awareness of 
SoA’s key messages.341 The C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign calls for legislation to 
ensure that:  
- contracts become clearer, particularly in terms of scope; 
- contracts include equitable and unwaivable remuneration for all forms of 
exploitation; 
- there is an obligation of exploitation for each mode of exploitation; 
- contracts include understandable and proper accounting clauses; 
- the duration of contracts is reasonable and limited, taking into account 
new forms of exploitation; 
- authors’ moral rights, particularly to identification, are made unwaivable 
and respected, and 
- all other contractual clauses are subject to a test of reasonableness.  
 
(3) Finally, SoA’s campaign was further reinforced by the simultaneous 
developments that took place on the subject of creators’ contract terms 
through the International Authors Forum (IAF). The IAF is a very young 
organisation, incorporated in April 2013, which was formed to lobby and 
represent authors on the international level of IP policymaking.342 Both SoA 
and ALCS are member organisations of the IAF, but ALCS is also the 
organisation’s administrator.343 As such, ALCS played an important 
                                                     
341 ‘Fairer Contracts at the All Party Writers Group Summer Reception’ (ALCS, 30 July 2015) 
<http://www.alcs.co.uk/ALCS-News/2015/July-2015/Author-Contracts-are-the-story-of-the-
2015-APWG-Su> 08 February 2017. 
342 International Authors Forum (IAF) <http://internationalauthors.org/iaf/> accessed 20 
December 2016.  
343 I obtained this information from several ALCS respondents and cross-checked it against 
the IAF website which lists its registered office and postal address as being the same as that 
of ALCS.  
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organisational role in the preparation and dissemination of IAF’s ‘Ten 
Principles for Fair Contracts’, which effectively added more weight to SoA’s 
own policy demands, and which SoA referred to in its awareness raising 
activities on social media.344  
The above account shows that SoA and ALCS collaborated on the issue of contract 
terms both on the basis of mutual interests, as well as power-dependence. This aligns 
with Ansell’s network concept and his, as well as Rhodes’, observations about why 
networks are formed and how they operate, which were discussed in chapter 3.345 The 
above account further exemplifies the existence of a power imbalance between 
various actors’ ability to effectively engage in the policymaking process. In the next 
subsections, I will discuss why it was important for the COs to act together and form 
alliances in response to the characteristics of the wider stakeholder environment.  
2.2. COs’ act independently and in coalitions 
Aside from collaborating with ALCS, SoA also solicited support for its policy 
campaign from the Writers’ Guild of Great Britain (WGGB) and from the Creators’ 
Rights Alliance (CRA). WGGB formally lent its backing to SoA by adding its name 
and logo to the open letter that SoA published to the members of the Publishers 
Association in January 2016.346 This letter intended to publicly put pressure on 
publishers by outlining the problems that authors were facing and linking them to 
the contracts offered by publishers. The letter’s authors emphasised their wide base 
of support with the following concluding message: ‘We don’t stand alone in our 
commitment to fairer book contracts. The C.R.E.A.T.O.R. initiative is supported by 
the Creators’ Rights Alliance. […] The International Authors Forum has agreed the 
                                                     
344 ‘Ten Principles for Fair Contracts’ (International Authors Forum) 
<http://internationalauthors.org/wp-content/uploads/IAFs-Ten-Principles-for-Fair-
Contracts.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017. SoA employed Twitter hashtags #fairterms and 
#betterbookcontracts to disseminate its campaign and these IAF principles. 
345 See Chapter 3, section 1.5.3.  
346 Open Letter from the Society of Authors (n 337). 
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attached principles which we fully support. Between them these organisations 
represent hundreds of thousands of individual creators.’347  
CRA is a cross-industry alliance that brings together the major organisations 
representing copyright creators.348 It took a number of steps to back SoA’s calls for 
action.349 For one, the alliance had written a letter to Edward Vaizey MP, at the time 
Minister of State for Culture and the Digital Economy, addressing the problem of 
unfair contracts.350 The letter referred to a meeting which had apparently taken place 
between CRA and the Minister where the latter had inquired about the policies CRA 
was advancing with regard to creators’ unfair contracts. Consequently, CRA’s letter 
went on to elaborate on SoA’s C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign. CRA also coordinated the 
launch of an online website dedicated to the issue of improving creators’ contracts.351 
These accounts illustrate that the COs in question do not act alone when they attempt 
to influence copyright policy but rather through partnerships, coalitions and 
alliances. More precisely, COs appear to take unilateral action while at the same time 
acting together with other industry organisations. This is evidenced by the fact that 
on several occasions, ALCS and SoA put forward joint policy documents, while still 
taking unilateral action on the same issue.352 One such example is their joint action 
                                                     
347 Ibid.  
348 ‘Member organisations and observers’ (Creators’ Rights Alliance) 
<http://www.creatorsrights.org.uk/index.php?user=1&section=About+us&subsect=&page=M
embers&media=0> accessed 08 February 2017.  
349 In a website news release from March 2016, SoA reported that CRA had adopted SoA’s 
C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign, which was also noted in the Bookseller, see ‘C.R.E.A.T.O.R. 
Campaign for Fair Contracts – Update’ (SoA, 15 March 2016) (n 279); Katherine Cowdrey, 
‘SoA seeks new law to protect authors’ (The Bookseller, 7 March 2016) 
<http://www.thebookseller.com/news/soa-seeks-new-law-protect-authors-323847> accessed 
08 February 2017. 
350 Letter from the Creators’ Rights Alliance to Edward Vaizey MP (16 November 2015) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/SOA/MediaLibrary/SOAWebsite/Submissions/CRA-
Contracts-letter-to-Ed-Vaizey-MP-2015.pdf> accessed 08 February 2017.  
351 ‘Fair Terms for Creators’ <www.fairtermsforcreators.org> accessed 20 February 2017. 
352 A recent example of this are two briefings produced with regard to the Digital Economy 
Bill: ALCS and SoA, ‘Digital Economy Bill’ (Briefing) (September 2016) 
<http://www.alcs.co.uk/Documents/Submissions/e-lending-and-the-digital-economy-bill-
final.aspx> accessed 09 February 2017 and ALCS and SoA, ‘Joint Briefing on the Digital 
Economy Bill’ (September 2016) <http://www.alcs.co.uk/Documents/Submissions/20160927-
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through the open letter to The Publishers Association. This occurred alongside SoA’s 
own campaigning efforts and SoA’s and ALCS’ joint submission to the draft report 
on the implementation of the Information Society Directive (2001/29/EC). Interview 
data also substantiated this feature of COs’ behaviour in policy. In this regard, my 
SoA respondent noted:  
Governments count numbers very, very irritatingly. If you put in 
something which is from 100 000 writers, they’ll give it exactly equal 
weight to something from one writer. They’ll say: ‘We’ve had two 
responses.’ They say that they don’t but I think that they do. So we 
tend to try and send in separate responses, as well as an overarching 
response with all the detail. Of course, they’re more likely to read mine 
in detail but they also look at weight of numbers.353   
Along similar lines, a respondent from ALCS also explained:  
I always think that it’s better if organisations can get together but they 
should do two things in my opinion. One is, we should do joint 
statements, and the other one is, we should still send our own in […] 
because, you know, the one thing that, as far as I understand, is if an 
MP or an MEP receives one piece of paper, they kind of look at it and 
put it on the side, whereas if they receive a number of them, it’s like: 
‘Oh, we might have an issue here, let’s have a look into it.’354 
What becomes clear is that the motives pursued by COs in taking both independent 
and joint policy action are the same as those documented by Mahoney in her 
exploration of coalition building, which I discussed in chapter 3.355 COs rely on 
coalitions for generating volume, weight in numbers, and wider support. By 
collaborating and forming coalitions, they aim to signal to policymakers that their 
cause and position enjoys the support of a large and varied group of actors. In other 
words, they seek to send policymakers cues about the desirability of a certain policy 
option.356  
                                                     
Society-of-Authors-ALCS-digital-economy-b.aspx> accessed 09 February 2017. Both are 
signed by ALCS and SoA but one is explicitly disseminated as a ‘joint’ briefing while the 
other appears to have been prepared by ALCS.   
353 Interview with Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive, SoA.  
354 Interview with Barbara Hayes, Deputy Chief Executive, ALCS. 
355 See Chapter 3, section 1.5.3. 
356 Ibid; Mahoney (n 158) 368-369, 375. 
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This CO behaviour is in reaction to the environment within which these COs operate, 
as well as to internal challenges that individual organisations face. The characteristics 
that evoke the need to join with others, to amplify a given policy desire and to 
compensate individual resource shortages relate to inter-stakeholder dynamics.  
Specifically, they relate to the conflictual nature of issues in copyright policy, the 
existence of opposing interests and countervailing evidence, as well as to the need to 
be heard among a multiplicity of actors who compete for the attention of 
policymakers. The internal challenges facing organisations, on the other hand, are 
generally more specific to trade unions than to CMOs, and contribute to the power 
imbalance of the actors involved in copyright policy. Essentially, trade unions unite 
with other industry players to compensate for their own challenges and limitations 
in taking policy action. Such challenges may arise due to smaller resource allocations 
for policy participation and mandate constraints, as discussed above.  
The following subsections will focus on the noted aspects of inter-stakeholder 
dynamics.  
2.3. The stakeholder environment   
To begin with, there appears to be a link between actors’ formation of ad-hoc 
coalitions and the extent to which certain policy issues are contested.357 In the context 
of creators’ contract terms, the policy debate was marked by opposing views from 
other stakeholders who were challenging the cause advanced by the COs. 
Contradictory evidence about the state of the publishing industry was being fed to 
policymakers. This rendered the potential evidence-base for policy development 
inconclusive and the eventual policy outcomes unclear and unpredictable. Finally, 
COs shared a policy environment with many other important and influential interest 
                                                     
357 Such a link has previously been considered by a number of scholars, including Mahoney 
(n 158) 371; Marie Hojnacki, ‘Interest Groups’ Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone’ 
(1997) 41 (1) American Journal of Political Science 61; William P Browne, ‘Organized 
Interests and Their Issue Niches: A Search for Pluralism in a Policy Domain’ (1990) 52 (2) 
The Journal of Politics 477, 496. 
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groupings, whose silence on the contract terms issue possibly diluted COs’ policy 
demands and weakened their prospect of success.  
2.3.1 Opposing views and interests 
The Publishers Associations’ (PA) response to the open letter issued by SoA illustrates 
the existence of opposing views on the matter of creators’ contract terms. PA’s at the 
time chief executive, Richard Mollet, commented: 
Publishers share the frustration of the author community that it is 
increasingly difficult for authors to make a decent living from their 
writing.  However, we locate the principal source of this problem not 
in the contractual relations between publisher and author but in 
deeper market factors.358 
The Publishers Association denied the existence of a connection between the 
contractual terms governing the relationship of authors and publishers and the 
deteriorating situation of authors. Instead, the PA referred to factors, such as margins 
being squeezed across the whole supply chain, the competition books were facing 
from other entertainment media, and the presence of more writers overall as reasons 
for authors’ struggles. These points were rebutted by James McConnachie, editor of 
SoA’s journal The Author and board member of ALCS, in an article he wrote for the 
Guardian.359 He argued that publishers’ margins had not decreased by 29% like 
authors’ and that irrespective of there being more writers, quality had always been 
hard to find, even in a buyers’ market.  
2.3.2 Countervailing evidence 
The diverging views among stakeholders in the publishing industry could also be 
seen in the evidence that was communicated to policymakers. On the one hand, SoA 
pointed to the EU study and the ALCS commissioned research into authors’ earnings. 
It made the case that the deteriorating situation of authors had a negative impact on 
the industry altogether. In particular, SoA’s policy briefings described authors’ 
                                                     
358 ‘The PA responds to SoA open letter on author contracts’ (The Publishers Association, 07 
January 2016) <http://www.publishers.org.uk/policy-and-news/news-releases/2016/the-pa-
responds-to-soa-open-letter-on-author-contracts/> accessed 09 February 2017. 
359 McConnachie, ‘Publishers should pay authors as much as their other employees’ (n 336). 
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difficulty in obtaining a proper return for their professional work as a ‘barrier to 
growth’.360 Onerous contract terms could ‘stifle creativity and growth’ and a fairer 
environment for creators was necessary in order to ‘stimulate the creative economy’. 
In contrast, the PA drew policymakers’ attention to evidence that the state of the 
publishing industry was healthy and thriving. In May 2016, the association published 
a press release according to which 2015 had been a strong year for the publishing 
industry, which had grown to £ 4.4bn.361 The website statement reported growth in 
relation to physical books, academic journal publishing, school books, and audiobook 
downloads.  
Unlike the evidence relied on by SoA, which had been conducted by independent 
academics and was freely available, the figures cited by the PA were taken from the 
organisation’s own Statistics Yearbook which, according to the association itself, was 
‘the industry’s annual authoritative analysis of the performance of the publishing 
sector.’362 A copy of the yearbook was not freely available online but could only be 
purchased from the PA website, which is why I did not engage with this data source 
for my research. Without reviewing the data or methodology that led to the reported 
findings, it is not possible to draw any conclusion on the extent to which such 
evidence meets IPO’s general criteria of being clear, verifiable or peer-reviewed.363 
Nevertheless, PA’s reliance on such evidence is evocative of the problems that 
Hargreaves and Harker have previously alerted to.364 Much of the existing empirical 
evidence in IP is held privately and presented to policymakers as ‘lobbynomics’, i.e. 
in a form that supports the interests of the respective stakeholders who bring such 
evidence to the fore. Yet, according to a journal publication by an economist within 
the IPO, despite the problems associated with such ‘grey literature’ or ‘lobbynomics’, 
                                                     
360 SoA and ALCS, ‘Briefing Paper: Unfair Contract Terms: February 2014’ (n 276) 1. 
361 ‘Strong year for UK publishing industry as it grows to £4.4bn’ (The Publishers 
Association, 13 May 2016) <http://www.publishers.org.uk/policy-and-news/news-
releases/2016/strong-year-for-uk-publishing-industry-as-it-grows-to-44bn/> accessed 09 
February 2017.  
362 Ibid Notes to Editors 2. 
363 UK IPO, ‘Guide to Evidence for Policy’ (2014) (n 105).  
364 See Chapter 3, sections 1.2 and 1.4. See also Hargreaves (n 4) para 2.13; Harker (n 8) 45-46. 
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the estimates and figures that are presented to policymakers in such ways are widely 
believed.365 Indeed, two days after the publication of PA’s statement on the 
publishing industry, Edward Vaizey MP, who at the time was Minister of State for 
Culture and the Digital Economy, linked to PA’s press release with the following 
tweet: ‘Strong year for UK #publishing industry as it grows to £4.4bn’.366 
The above example shows that the copyright policy landscape within which COs 
operate and seek to further their causes is not only characterised by opposing views 
but also by contradictory evidence in support of these views. In such an environment, 
it is certainly possible that the existence of countervailing messages and evidence 
could detract weight from the claims made by COs. One ALCS respondent expressed 
concern that this was indeed the case:  
BBC have the sort of figure for the contribution of say, you know, the 
publishing and TV sectors to the economy – they are as healthy as they 
ever were really. So politically, you’re thinking, well one organisation 
is telling me writers are struggling and they’re critical to the creative 
economy, my stats are telling me that the sector they are contributing 
to is doing really well.367 
With this in mind, the outcomes of copyright policy can be as unclear and 
unpredictable as the pool of evidence that feeds into the policy process. Arguably, the 
more inconclusive the evidence base itself is, the more scope there may ultimately be 
for industry organisations to exercise influence over policymakers. This is where the 
ability to organise and act through coalitions and wider alliances comes into play as 
a strategy to amplify specific policy desires. 
2.3.3 Silent powers    
Alongside the ad-hoc coalition that formed around creators’ contract terms between 
SoA, CRA, ALCS and WGGB, the copyright policy landscape is also characterised by 
                                                     
365 Benjamin H Mitra-Kahn, ‘Copyright, Evidence and Lobbynomics: The World after the 
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67, 77, 83. 
366 Twitter Post by Edward Vaizey (10:56AM, 15 May 2016) 
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the existence of formally established networks such as the Alliance for IP or the British 
Copyright Council (BCC).368 Neither of these two influential actors formally backed 
the cause advanced by the COs or actively contributed to policy on this issue. Rather, 
both BCC and the Alliance for IP remained silent on the matter, despite the fact that 
both ALCS and SoA are, at least, member organisations of the BCC. Given the wide 
range of stakeholders represented by both umbrella organisations, including 
organisations representing the interests of publishers, neither organisation could 
formally take a side, either way, on whether legislating for fairer contract terms for 
creators was necessary.  
It is possible that the silence of these big players could have weakened and diluted 
the cause advanced by the COs or, at the very least, put its urgency and importance 
for the industry into question. Ultimately, the UK government has not taken decisive 
steps that would indicate its intention to legislate on the matter of creators’ contract 
terms although this is a matter of national law, rather than EU law, as is evidenced by 
the differences in various Member States’ copyright and contract frameworks that the 
EU contract study documented. 
Causality between this lack of legislative action and the lack of support from actors 
like the BCC could not be established. However, it is reasonable to argue that, for a 
number of reasons, the behaviour of such umbrella organisations and the positions 
that they advance in policy could send particularly strong signals to policymakers. 
For one, the participation of these networks in policy can indicate to policymakers 
that stakeholders represented within these networks have worked out their 
differences in viewpoints before approaching policy officials. Consequently, the 
position advanced through the network is one that has the backing of the whole 
industry and could thus be supported by the legislature.369 Furthermore, given the 
extensive membership lists of both BCC and the Alliance for IP, as well as the way in 
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which they describe the interests that they represent, policymakers could easily be 
left with the impression that they are in fact listening to everyone in the creative 
industries when they speak to these actors. Policymakers may assume that these 
actors put forward the collective view of what matters most to these industries. To 
illustrate, BCC describes itself in policy submissions as follows:  
The BCC represents those who create, hold interests or manage rights 
in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, performances, films, 
sound recordings, broadcasts and other material in which there are 
rights of copyright and related rights.  
Our members include professional associations, industry bodies and 
trade unions which together represent hundreds of thousands of 
authors, creators, performers, publishers and producers. These 
include many individual freelancers, sole traders and SMEs as well as 
larger corporations within the creative and cultural industries. […] 
Some of our member organisations also represent amateur creators 
and performers. Our members also include collective rights 
management organisations which represent right-holders and which 
enable access to works of creativity.370   
Judging by this description, it seems that no part of the creative industries is left out 
from BCC’s membership. The Alliance for IP creates a similar impression in the way 
it presents the interests that it speaks for.371 Having actors like the BCC or the Alliance 
for IP be active on some copyright issues and passive on others, could raise doubts 
about the validity and importance of the latter, ultimately influencing policymaker 
focus and prioritisation. 372 The silence of the big players could ultimately influence 
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the issues that policymakers themselves choose to prioritise and focus on. In Chapter 
8, I will discuss how the participation of multi-stakeholder alliances possibly added 
momentum to another policy issue (the so-called ‘value gap’) that ultimately made 
its way onto policymakers’ legislative agenda.373 
2.4. Conclusion  
This section considered additional features of COs’ behaviour in policy, their 
relationships with other stakeholders, as well as some characteristics of the 
environment within which they operate. I showed that COs collaborate on policy 
issues and form coalitions with other actors based on mutual interests and 
dependence. They also do so in order to compensate for potentially weaker individual 
power in shaping policy. The need to form coalitions and ensure that a greater 
fraction of industry organisations backs a certain policy desire is also a consequence 
of the fact that COs operate in an environment populated by many actors and interest 
constellations. On the issue of contract terms, I evidenced the existence of antagonistic 
actors, opposing the views advanced by the COs, as well as of countervailing 
evidence. A further challenge to COs’ policy demands was the silence and non-
participation of influential formal alliances like the BCC and the Alliance for IP. Taken 
together, these factors render the potential policy outcomes unpredictable. In 
particular, the lack of a clear message that could emerge from the body of evidence 
also enables industry organisations to exercise a greater influence over policymakers. 
3. Discussion and conclusions  
3.1. COs’ involvement in policy  
3.1.1 Awareness raising of copyright law’s effects in practice  
The preceding analyses of COs’ engagement in policy on the issue of creators’ 
contract terms have shown that COs perform an important role in raising 
policymakers’ awareness of problems and shortcomings in the way copyright law 
impacts creators in practice. They also advance possible solutions to address the 
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identified problems. On the UK level of policymaking, COs’ calls for action did not 
move the government to legislate on the matter in accordance with SoA’s campaign. 
In its response to the 2013 EU consultation on modernising the copyright framework 
in 2013, the government addressed the EU’s question, whether action on an EU level 
was necessary to ensure the fair remuneration of creators, by commenting that the 
matter fell under national contract law and was thus beyond the scope of the EU’s 
consultation.374 However, SoA’s voice and policy work contributed to the calls for 
legislative action on creators’ contracts that were being echoed by the wider 
community of authors’ organisations on an EU level. In particular, the Authors’ 
Group, a network of authors’ organisations, issued a statement calling upon the EU 
Commission to act in order to ensure that better protection of authors against unfair 
contracts was guaranteed at EU level.375   
The collective efforts of various authors’ organisations on an EU and national level 
ultimately reached the European Commission, which issued a communication in 
December 2015, highlighting the importance of the issue of fair remuneration for 
authors and performers when they license or transfer their rights and how this may 
be affected by differences in bargaining power.376 The Commission also 
acknowledged organisations’ policy contributions: ‘Mechanisms which stakeholders 
raise in this context include the regulation of certain contractual practices, unwaivable 
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remuneration rights, collective bargaining and collective management of rights.’377 In 
the end, the Commission did include provisions regulating the contractual situation 
of creators in a proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market, 
which it issued in September 2016.378 Specifically, the Commission proposed the 
introduction of a transparency obligation on authors’ and performers’ contractual 
parties, as well as a contract adjustment mechanism to the benefit of authors and 
performers.  
3.1.2 Power through numbers and power imbalance 
The case of COs’ involvement on the issue of fair contract terms in the UK suggests 
that COs are more likely to succeed in their cause and maintain policymakers’ 
attention with respect to a particular policy desire if they represent a large fraction of 
the stakeholder environment. They would thereby signal to policymakers that their 
issue is both relevant and urgent to their respective industry sector. This is due to the 
fact that their environment is populated by a large number of stakeholders, who are 
driven by different interests and priorities which compete for policymakers’ attention 
and agenda. For this reason, COs approach policymakers both independently, as well 
as through coalitions, in order to add weight and importance to their cause.  
However, there are a number of intra- and extra-organisational factors, which define 
and impose limitations on the behaviour of COs in policy. Intra-organisational factors 
like an organisation’s resource allocation and resource capacity, mandate, or self-
concept can shape the degree to which a certain organisation is dependent on other 
industry actors to advance a given issue, as well as the extent to which it can 
proactively create political urgency around that issue. A comparison of the 
configuration of these factors within ALCS and SoA revealed that ALCS appears to 
be in a stronger position to take policy action on copyright law than SoA. It commands 
greater resources, more of which can potentially be allocated to policy activities in 
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this field as its mandate is narrower compared to that of SoA. It is able to tap into and 
mobilise various networks and fora for support thanks to its organisational role 
within them, in this case the All-Party Parliamentary Writers’ Group and the 
International Authors Forum. Finally, it also has the resources to commission 
evidence, which it can use to strengthen its policy position. 
3.2. Plurality of actors, antagonistic forces, and countervailing evidence: the impact on 
copyright policy 
The extra-organisational factors that inform COs’ policy behaviour and impose limits 
on the extent to which these COs’ policy desires may be heard and taken into account 
relate to the existence of opposing interests and countervailing evidence to those 
advanced by the COs. Furthermore, the stakeholder environment is made up of a 
large number of interest constellations. Some form ad hoc on specific issues, like the 
fair contract terms movement fuelled by SoA, ALCS, CRA and WGGB. Other 
networks exist irrespective of specific policy issues. Examples of these are the CRA, 
BCC, and the Alliance for IP. Given this plurality of actors and their varying interests, 
some may choose to support, oppose or abstain from acting on a certain issue. This 
induces a lack of clarity and overview of the relevance, importance, as well as 
justification for a specific policy desire. Moreover, the existence of evidence that both 
corroborates and potentially weakens a certain cause adds noise and confusion to the 
policy space. Consequently, policy outcomes become less predictable.  
The conflictual nature of issues and evidence that feed into the copyright policy 
process means that there is more scope for industry organisations to actively exercise 
influence over policymakers and to steer the direction and outcomes of copyright 
policy. In light of the power imbalances, as well as antagonistic relationships between 
different industry stakeholders, there are two implications for policies in this area.  
(1) On the one hand, more powerful, resource-richer and proactive organisations 
could have a greater influence over the way agendas for legislative action are set. 
Conversely, it also means that weaker and less powerful organisations may 
depend on the support of other partners in order to advance a certain issue. This 
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may mean that the needs of those represented by such organisations remain 
underrepresented in policy discussions and legislative action, particularly if 
weaker organisations cannot solicit sufficient support for their cause. It may also 
mean that weaker organisations face a need to modify or adapt their positions in 
order to accommodate the aims and interests of their coalition partners. Perhaps, 
the fact that policy participation is a risky and resource-heavy endeavour without 
certainty as to the eventual outcome may deter organisations, smaller than those 
studied, from participating in the policy process in the first place. I will explore 
some of these interrelated issues further in chapters 5 and 6. However, beyond 
the insights that can be gleaned from my own research into COs, more targeted 
research into the possible effects of these circumstances will be necessary to 
definitively establish how these factors correlate.379  
 
(2) The fact that the copyright policy environment is marked by antagonistic 
stakeholders and antithetic evidence could impact the very substance of 
legislative and policy outcomes. It is likely that whatever policy desires are 
ultimately acted upon by the lawmaker will be watered down as a result of 
advocacy and lobbying by the opposing side. Moreover, policymakers themselves 
may be interested in developing laws that embody a compromise between 
different positions in an attempt to keep all parties content. This has been 
observed by Bakardjieva-Engelbrekt, Litman and Horten, according to whom, 
lawmaking institutions seek to reconcile the interests of the wide variety of old 
and new stakeholders.380 Arguably, the European Commission’s proposal for 
tackling the problem of unfair contract terms is itself an example of the 
institution’s attempt to strike a compromise between the views of conflicting 
stakeholders. As I noted above, the proposal only addresses a number of existing 
contractual problems: the lack of transparency in relation to the exploitation of a 
                                                     
379 See Chapter 8, section 2.4.1. 
380 Bakardjieva Engelbrekt (n 8) 78; Litman (n 2) 278, 299, 311; Horten, A Copyright Masquerade 
(n 8) 28. 
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work and the lack of contract adjustment clauses allowing authors to request 
additional remuneration from their contractual party if a specific work does far 
better than expected. Other established contractual problems which COs have 
lobbied for, such as the need for an obligation to exploit each format and medium 
for which rights have been transferred or licensed, or the overly wide scope, or 
overly long duration of contracts, have not been addressed in the Commission’s 
proposal. In this manner, the Commission has ensured that it acts on the policy 
desire of one stakeholder group without impinging on the interests of another too 
extensively381 – in other words – it has sought to strike a compromise.  
 
3.3. Conclusion 
This chapter considered how COs from the publishing industry engaged with 
policymakers on the issue of creators’ contract terms in reaction to concurrent 
legislative and policy developments in the UK and in the EU. It identified differences 
in the roles played by SoA and ALCS in the context of the COs’ campaign for fair 
contract terms. These differences were ascribed to distinctions in the organisations’ 
mandates, functions, and resources. The chapter illustrated that these factors 
influence the way COs act in policy and that the actions of different COs are not 
uniform. The chapter also identified and discussed numerous features of the 
copyright policy environment and their effects on copyright policy. It shed light on 
existing power imbalances between individual actors, as well as on conflicting 
interests between different stakeholders. Furthermore, it studied the organisation of 
individual COs into networks and coalitions, and considered how the positioning of 
such entities on a given issue could likely influence the odds of that issue’s 
advancement in policy. The following chapter will consider and compare how the 
                                                     
381 While publishers’ organisations were not the focus of this research, it is conceivable that 
these also have and put forward valid arguments for some of the contractual practices 
sustained by publishers; such arguments may relate to publishers’ need for more certainty as 
they take the risk to market and sell the works of authors.  
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studied COs from the music industry tackled broadly the same copyright issue: that 






Chapter 5  
 
Unfair Contract Terms in the Music Business – A 
Different Approach 
 
Unreasonable content in the contractual terms between creators and copyright 
exploiters, which is associated with creators’ weaker bargaining power, does not only 
permeate the publishing industry. In fact, the contractual issues discussed in the 
previous chapter, such as the scope, duration, unfair remuneration and territorial 
application of contracts, apply across a number of creative industries, including 
music, as has been corroborated by recent studies on creators’ and performers’ 
contractual dealings and remuneration.382 In this chapter, I will consider how the 
creators’ organisations (COs) from the music sector – the Musicians’ Union (MU) and 
the Performing Right Society (PRS) – dealt with the issue of contract terms. I will 
demonstrate the difference in policy objectives and approaches of both of these 
organisations compared to those of the Society of Authors (SoA) and the Authors’ 
Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS) discussed in the preceding chapter. In this 
respect, the present chapter will advance the theme of diversity in approaches, 
positions, and priorities among the studied COs. It will also further expose the power 
dynamics and imbalances between different actors and the costs and benefits of 
taking policy action with other industry organisations.  
                                                     
382 The EU contracts study (n 46) was in fact focused on the contractual dealings of creators 
and publishers/producers in the fields of music, print and visual arts, as well as in relation to 
audio-visual works. However, the study excluded contracts concluded by performers or 
other related rights holders (see p 6 and 19). Another study on the contractual framework of 
authors and performers in the music and audio-visual sectors is Europe Economics, Lucie 
Guibault, Olivia Salamanca and Stef van Gompel, Remuneration of authors and performers for 
the use of their works and fixations of their performances (Publications Office of the European 
Union 2015).  
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This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 1 will focus on the MU. It will 
explore how this organisation viewed the problem of contract terms and the action 
that it took to address this problem on a policy level. I will reveal a certain 
inconsistency between the CO’s account of the causes rendering performers to receive 
an unfair share from their work and the way the CO attempted to tackle this issue. In 
this context, I will consider the apparent disconnect between the work of the MU in 
the music industry and that of SoA in the publishing industry. I will argue that the 
distinction in approaches and priorities regarding creators’ and performers’ interests 
potentially weakened each of the two causes advanced by SoA and the MU, the 
statutory regulation of contract terms and a statutory modification of the making available 
right. The simultaneous lobbying by creator unions on these two issues with an 
overarching aim of improving the remuneration of creators and performers brought 
these distinct issues into competition as it likely led to them being perceived as policy 
alternatives.  
Section 2 will compare the policy positions of the MU and PRS on the issue of contract 
terms based on interview data and several copyright consultation responses by these 
two organisations. This will reveal distinct differences in the positions of the two COs. 
The MU openly condemned some of the terms being offered to its members by record 
labels while PRS adopted a neutral position, abstaining from policy contributions on 
this matter. I will link these differences to the interests represented within the 
memberships of the two organisations. In doing so, I will demonstrate that aside from 
mandate, self-concept and resources, which were considered in the previous chapter, 
the membership composition of an organisation is another important factor that 
influences the way a CO behaves on a given issue and how it engages in relevant 
policy work.  
Section 3 will shift the main focus back to the MU and consider intra-organisational 
challenges such as membership and mandate that posed limitations on the ability of 
this CO to effectively engage in policy. I will also discuss extra-organisational 
challenges, including antagonism between different stakeholders, wider inter-
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stakeholder dynamics, the existence of contradictory policy evidence, and the role of 
large multi-stakeholder organisations. In the context of contract terms, these 
challenges affected the MU more so than PRS, given the neutrality of PRS on the 
matter. However, while the problems considered were challenges from the 
perspective of the MU, they are at the same time important determinants that 
characterise the power dynamics and imbalances in existence in the copyright policy 
environment. To this end, they affect not only the MU but also PRS, as well as other 
industry organisations. 
Section 4 will present a broader discussion of the main insights into CO behaviour 
gleaned from this and the preceding chapter. In particular, I will discuss the need for 
more awareness and caution among scholars and IP reviewers of differences between 
similar stakeholders. Furthermore, I will consider the effect of power imbalances on 
the way a CO acts in policy. This section will also expound the problem of the costs 
and benefits associated with taking policy action with other industry partners or 
through multi-stakeholder alliances.  
1. Unfair contract terms and MU’s different priority for policy action 
1.1. Defining the problem  
Features of UK copyright law that created the prerequisites for the development of 
unbalanced contractual terms between creators and copyright exploiters were 
already discussed in chapters 3 and 4.383 In brief, the governing principle of freedom 
of contract, coupled with copyright law’s lack of provisions regulating the content of 
exploitation contracts and the level of remuneration payable to authors and 
performers, as well as creators’ and performers’ weaker negotiating position vis-à-vis 
publishers and producers led to the proliferation of unreasonable contractual terms 
that disadvantage individual creators and performers.384 
                                                     
383 See Chapter 3, section 3.1 and Chapter 4, section 1.1.  
384 Europe Economics, Guibault, Salamanca and van Gompel, Remuneration of authors and 
performers (n 382) 32f; D’Agostino (n 261) 121. 
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Before going into detail on some of the particular problems identified by the MU, it 
is important to note that unlike the previous chapter, which offered insight into the 
problems facing authors (i.e. creators) through an exploration of the work of SoA and 
ALCS, this chapter looks at contract terms from the perspective of the MU and PRS. 
Given that the MU is primarily a union of performing musicians, the issues raised by 
this organisation therefore relate to the contractual dealings of musical performers. 
PRS, on the other hand, generally referred to contract terms issues affecting 
composers and songwriters.  
Similar to creators who enjoy exclusive rights in their works under copyright, 
performers have exclusive rights in their live performances, which they can 
contractually license or transfer to producers or other third parties. These include a 
reproduction right, a distribution right, a rental and lending right, and a making 
available right (MA right).385 They also have equitable remuneration rights.386 In the 
case of such statutory remuneration rights, the use of a work can take place without 
the prior authorisation of the performer, provided that remuneration for the 
respective use is paid. Especially economically significant is the right to claim 
equitable remuneration from the owner of copyright in a sound recording of a 
qualifying performance387 where the sound recording has been played in public or 
communicated to the public, except by way of ‘making available’.388 
From interview data, a World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Magazine 
article, as well as one particular copyright consultation response by the MU, it became 
clear that MU’s main point of contention with regard to performers’ contract terms 
was that performers were not seeing fair returns from the exploitation of their works, 
especially from digital exploitations. Linking these two things is justified since the 
level of remuneration that a performer earns depends, among other things, on the 
                                                     
385 Ss 182A, 182B, 182C, 182CA CDPA 1988. For an overview of performers’ rights see 
Deming Liu, ‘Performers’ rights: muddled or mangled? Bungled or boggled?’ (2012) EIPR 
374. 
386 Ss 182 D (1), 191 G (1) CDPA 1988. 
387 S 181 CDPA 1988. 
388 S 182D CDPA 1988. 
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contract negotiated with the producer in exchange for a transfer of the performer’s 
exclusive rights.389  
Three contractual problems were particularly highlighted as causes for performers’ 
inequitable remuneration:  
(1) royalty deduction clauses which pre-dated digital modes of music production 
and distribution were being applied to digital forms of exploitation; 
(2) general issues, such as the scope, duration, and territorial application of 
contracts, were inappropriate;  
(3) record companies were assuming ownership over the MA right in relation to 
older contracts that pre-dated the very introduction of this right.  
1.1.1 Application of clauses designed for physical products in the digital environment 
The MU outlined three examples of how ‘outdated’ clauses had been applied to the 
digital context of music production and dissemination in its response to the European 
Commission’s Public Consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules from 
December 2013.390 Under title V on fair remuneration of authors and performers, 
question 73 of the consultation document asked: ‘Is there a need to act at the EU level 
(for instance to prohibit certain clauses in contracts)?’ Responding to this question, 
the MU highlighted the inappropriate application of contractual royalty deductions 
for (a) packaging, (b) breakages, and (c) distribution in the digital environment, 
noting that these should be outlawed. 
(a) Packaging deductions, the MU explained, were introduced in the late 1950’s 
to share the costs between performer and label for any packaging beyond a 
simple paper record sleeve; for instance, the recording company would take 
                                                     
389 Europe Economics, Guibault, Salamanca and van Gompel, Remuneration of authors and 
performers (n 382) 5. 
390 Commission, ‘Public Consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules’ (05 December 
2013) (Consultation Document) (n 374). All published responses are available from ‘Public 
Consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules’ (European Commission) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/index_en.htm> 
accessed 07 February 2017.  
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25% from the royalty rate if the artist391 wanted a photo or a gold embossed 
gatefold album sleeve. According to the MU, packaging deductions were later 
employed by the record industry to share the burden of the format shift from 
vinyl to CD. However, these deductions were still being widely applied to 
digital formats where there was no packaging.  
(b) Breakage clauses, on the other hand, introduced a flat reduced royalty rate 
which was applied by record companies to the artist’s share in order to 
provide for the eventuality of a broken vinyl. According to the MU, this 
deduction was also still widely applied to the artist’s share for digital formats.  
(c) Distribution clauses contained a flat deduction from the artist’s royalty rate so 
they would share the costs of transport of vinyl records / CDs to and from 
retailers. However, such deductions still applied to digital formats where a 
file was sent directly from the mastering engineers to the record label and then 
uploaded onto iTunes or another digital aggregator. 
1.1.2 Scope, duration, and territorial coverage of contracts 
In addition to the problem that record labels were taking a cut from performers’ 
royalties on digital exploitations for costs like manufacture, storage, transportation, 
and distribution, which they did not incur to the same extent as with physical CDs,392 
one MU respondent touched on other contractual problems:  
Then, of course, you’ve got deals that are too long because they tie the 
artist up for too long a period of time or they are looking for too much 
material from the artist. And then you’ve got deals that are for too 
great a territory, when, you know, if the record company is signing 
you for the world and all they’ve ever done is release records in the 
UK, then that’s not fair.393 
                                                     
391 The term ‘artist’ is used to describe a performer signed to a record label. Other performing 
musicians, who are not signed to a record label are known as session musicians. 
392 Horace Trubridge, ‘Safeguarding the income of musicians’ (2015) 2 WIPO Magazine 8, 10. 
393 Interview with Horace Trubridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU.  
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1.1.3 Assumption of ownership of the making available right  
In terms of the scope of rights transferred, the same MU respondent emphasised one 
particular practice as especially harmful to performers. This practice referred to the 
way producers had assumed ownership of the MA right in contracts that pre-dated 
the very introduction of this right through broad generic clauses prescribing the 
transfer of ‘all rights existing now or that come into existence in the future in all 
territories of the world, the universe and its satellites’ to the record company.394  
The MA right was introduced in the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty and the 1996 WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty in appreciation of the fact that new rights 
needed to be adopted in order to cover the emerging range of technologies.395 It is 
enshrined in s 182CA CDPA 1988 for the performer’s right in a qualifying 
performance. The significance of this exclusive right lies in the fact that it 
encompasses all forms of interactive internet distribution, video-on-demand, 
streaming, etc.396 In assuming ownership of this right, record labels could exploit 
performers’ works through new digital dissemination channels without having to re-
negotiate new terms or levels of remuneration with artists for the use of digital rights. 
The MU respondent, quoted above, condemned this practice and commented:  
I want to know how two contracting parties can enter into a contract 
and one of those parties could assume ownership later for something 
that didn’t actually exist at the time?397 
1.2. Emphasis on older contracts 
According to the MU, artists on contracts signed many years ago are more affected 
by the contract terms problem than newer artists. One MU respondent commented: 
Well, I think actually the issues aren’t so much with current deals.  I 
mean, obviously there still are issues, I mean you will still see record 
                                                     
394 Trubridge (n 392) 10. 
395 Article 8 WIPO Copyright Treaty and Articles 10, 14 WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty. 
396 Europe Economics, Guibault, Salamanca and van Gompel, Remuneration of authors and 
performers (n 382) 26. 
397 Interview with Horace Tribridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU. 
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contracts being offered that have got breakages and returns on 
digital.398 
It is possible that the MU emphasised the problems in older contracts because these 
are the ones that lack specific provisions for digital exploitations, with the result that 
clauses applicable to physical products are being unreasonably applied to the digital 
environment.399 One MU respondent also justified focussing on older contracts with 
the argument that older catalogue is still more widely enjoyed than works by newer 
artists. 
[…] the problem is that the record companies will only ever talk to you 
about the deals they’re doing now or the deals they did last week. They 
won’t talk about the deals they did 10 years ago or 15 years, 20 years 
ago, 25 years ago, 30 years ago. And that’s the bulk of material, still, 
that is being downloaded and streamed, you know. The hits of today, 
of course, they are very popular and there’s massive streaming and 
downloading going on there but actually when you look at, I mean for 
instance, Universal told our, the Swedish Union that over 50% of the 
material that was being streamed on Spotify in Sweden was old 
catalogue.400 
The idea that newer artists are less affected by record industry contract terms was 
also expressed in an interview with another MU respondent. However, overall, it 
seems that this distinction is not particularly helpful or necessary in light of the 
evidence that inappropriate terms permeate performers’ contracts across the board. 
For instance, a 2015 EU study into musical performers’ remuneration did not 
distinguish between old and new contracts but noted that many record contracts still 
lacked specific clauses on exploitation via online distribution channels. 401 This may 
either refer to the old contracts still in existence or to the lack of clarity and specificity 
in newer contracts.402 Irrespective of this, the study made a number of 
recommendations addressing issues that were identified as pertaining to all contracts 
                                                     
398 Interview with Horace Tribridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU. 
399 Trubridge (n 392) 10. 
400 Interview with Horace Trubridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU. 
401 Europe Economics, Guibault, Salamanca and van Gompel, Remuneration of authors and 




in general. These included limiting the scope for transferring rights for future works 
and future modes of exploitation and specifying remuneration for individual modes 
of exploitation.403 Moreover, I was not able to find data to validate whether over 50% 
of material streamed on Spotify in Sweden was indeed old catalogue. Such data is 
privately held and not publicly available. However, on the weekly list of most 
streamed songs on Spotify from 26th December 2015, out of 50 songs not one song was 
released before January 2012.404  
1.3. Summary 
While the MU recognised that both older and newer artists were affected by 
inappropriate contractual terms, the organisation accentuated the problems attached 
to older contracts, which lacked specific provisions on digital exploitations. In 
essence, the problems identified by this CO – the inappropriate application of 
outdated clauses in the digital environment, the scope of rights transfer, the duration 
and geographical scope of contracts, and the assumption of ownership of the making 
available right – relate to questions of reasonableness of contract terms and are all a 
consequence of the UK copyright law framework. Under this framework, the transfer 
of rights for future forms of exploitation is not prohibited. There are no provisions 
regulating the amount of remuneration payable to authors, or an in duo pro auctore 
interpretation rule that could be used to interpret the scope of certain clauses 
narrowly and, more reasonably, to the benefit of the performer.405 
                                                     
403 Ibid 142. 
404 ‘Spotify’s Most Played All-Time [Updated Weekly] | Most Streamed | Top Played | Major 
Lazer | Drake | Justin Bieber | 200Mil+’ (Spotify) 
<https://play.spotify.com/user/1221028518/playlist/2YRe7HRKNRvXdJBp9nXFza> accessed 
26 December 2016; ‘List of most streamed songs on Spotify’ (Wikipedia) 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_most_streamed_songs_on_Spotify> accessed 26 
December 2016. 
405 According to Europe Economics, Guibault, Salamanca, and van Gompel, Remuneration of 
authors and performers (n 382) 35-37, some Member States regulate the scope of rights transfer 
by requiring that future forms of exploitations are sufficiently detailed, others rely on case 
law, while others apply the ‘in dubio pro auctore’ principle to ensure a degree of reasonability 
in copyright contract law. In some Member States, rights relating to future forms of 
exploitation can only be transferred for uses that are either known or foreseeable at the time 
the contract is concluded. 
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1.4. MU’s approach: a different policy priority 
In light of the fact that the MU clearly recognised several problems associated with 
the contract terms between performers and record companies, it is somewhat 
surprising that the organisation did not take policy action to address those underlying 
factors (relating to the UK copyright framework) that allowed such contractual 
practices to exist. Instead, the MU focussed on and prioritised another issue for 
lobbying: the introduction of an equitable remuneration right attached to the 
performer’s exclusive right of making available. Specifically, the MU decided to join 
a Europe-wide campaign (Fair Internet for Performers Campaign) for the 
modification of the making available right through an addition of a performer’s 
unwaivable right to equitable remuneration in the event that the MA right was 
transferred to a phonogram producer.406 The remuneration would be payable by the 
user, i.e. the digital service (like Spotify) exploiting the MA right, and would be 
managed collectively by performers’ CMOs. One MU respondent explained:  
Well, what we’re pushing for at the moment with this Fair Internet 
campaign is for the making available right to remain an exclusive 
right, partly, but also to become an equitable remuneration right as 
well […] Now, the beauty of the equitable remuneration right, which 
I’ve written about in that paper I gave you [the WIPO Magazine 
article] is that it’s unassignable. And that’s what makes it the jewel in 
the crown for performers.407 
The change sought by the MU models the provision already in existence with regard 
to authors’ and performers’ rental right.408 While this policy desire is indeed aimed at 
raising the levels of remuneration of performers, the issue advanced by the MU does 
not address the root of the problem. Horace Trubridge, Assistant General Secretary 
of the MU argued in his article for the WIPO Magazine that exclusive rights, like the 
                                                     
406 The Fair Internet for Performers campaign is spearheaded by the International Federation 
of Musicians (FIM), of which the MU is a member, the Association of European Performers’ 
Organisations (AEPO-ARTIS), the International Federation of Actors (EuroFIA) and the 
International Artists Organisations (IAO): ‘Fair Internet for Performers: The issue’ (AEPO-
ARTIS, FIA, FIM, IAO) <https://www.fair-internet.eu/description/> accessed 30 December 
2016.  
407 Interview with Horace Trubridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU.  
408 S 93B (1), (2) CDPA 1988 and s 191G (1), (2) CDPA 1988. 
133 
 
MA right in its current form, are not as valuable to performers as statutory 
remuneration rights because they are assignable and thus subject to the terms of 
performers’ contracts with the record company. The desired equitable remuneration 
right, on the other hand, would remain with the performer.409 However, the problem 
is arguably not in the fact that the MA right is assignable but in the conditions under 
which it is assigned, as pertaining to the remuneration agreed, the duration of the 
contract, the ability to re-visit the terms of the contract in the case of new modes of 
exploitation, etc. Similarly, the policy desire of attaching an equitable remuneration 
right does not address the problem, highlighted by the MU, of phonogram producers 
assuming ownership of the MA right in the first place. That problem would arguably 
be better addressed through legislation that regulates the circumstances under which 
future rights or modes of exploitation, not yet in existence when a contract is being 
concluded, can be transferred.  
The MU presented detailed comments on the need to attach an equitable 
remuneration right to the MA right in various policy submissions.410 During this time 
it did not take significant policy action to address the bigger issues affecting 
performers’ remuneration relating to the substance of the contracts that performers 
conclude with phonogram producers. One exception to this is MU’s submission to 
the EU copyright consultation discussed above. On that occasion, the MU was 
prompted by the European Commission’s targeted question to comment on whether 
certain clauses in contracts should be prohibited. In that context, the organisation 
provided examples of such clauses and further stated that contracts needed to be 
                                                     
409 Trubridge (n 392) 9. 
410 MU expounded on this issue in MU, ‘MU response to the All Party Intellectual Property 
Group’s inquiry into “The Role of Government in Protecting and Promoting Intellectual 
Property’ (March 2012) paras 18-22. A copy of this submission is annexed to Musicians’ 
Union, ‘35th Delegate Conference, Midland Hotel, Manchester, 23-24 July 2013, Executive 
Committee’s Report and Agenda’ which was made available to me by the MU during my 
fieldwork. MU also presented its position with regard to the making available right in MU, 
‘A response to the Green Paper on the online distribution of audiovisual works in the 
European Union; opportunities and challenges towards a digital single market’ (2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/audiovisual/non-registered-
organisations/musicians-union_en.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017. 
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clear, transparent and accountable. However, I did not find evidence that the MU had 
proactively raised this point with policymakers in the UK within the scope of other 
consultations, or as a stand-alone initiative.  
Some interview data, along with an article in the Guardian411 indicated MU’s intention 
to test the validity of a record label’s assumption of ownership of the MA right 
through legal action. In this respect, the MU had considered following the example 
of the Finnish Musicians’ Union, which had provided one of its members with legal 
aid in a case against Universal Music Finland, where precisely this assumption and 
subsequent exploitation of digital rights by the record label had been successfully 
challenged.412 However, at the time of writing, there is no evidence suggesting that 
the MU has taken steps in this direction. At the same time, the union continues to 
campaign for changes to the MA right.413 
The most likely reason why the MU prioritised policy change on a niche issue such 
as the MA right, rather than the broader problem of shortcomings in the framework 
governing copyright exploitation contracts, is that it considered potential efforts to 
change the latter futile. I asked one MU respondent whether they felt strongly about 
extending the scope of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, which is something that 
the SoA had lobbied for. The MU official responded:  
Well, it’s not something that we pursue […] we operate […] in a sort 
of landscape whereby freedom of contract has always been the case, 
                                                     
411 Rhian Jones, ‘Musicians’ Union to sue major labels over veteran acts’ digital rights’ (the 
Guardian, 20 May 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/media/2015/may/20/musicians-
union-major-labels-digital-rights> accessed 09 February 2017.   
412 For details on the Finnish case, see ‘Finnish Musicians’ Union: Universal Loses Market 
Court Case over Internet Music Rights’ (Business Wire, 26 March 2015) < 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20150326005359/en/Finnish-Musicians%27-
Union-Universal-Loses-Market-Court#.VVXIKos-BmA> accessed 09 February 2017; Tim 
Ingham, ‘Universal loses digital artist rights case in Finland – more major lawsuits to 
follow?’ (MusicBusiness Worldwide, 27 March 2015) < 
http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/universal-loses-landmark-digital-rights-case-in-
finland/> accessed 09 February 2017. 
413‘Performers call on European legislators to ensure fair treatment of performers in the 
digital world’ (MU, 9 December 2016) (News publication) 
<http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Home/News/2016/Dec/Performers-call-on-European-
legislators-to-ensure> accessed 30 December 2016.  
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you know. I mean, […] one of the fundamental tenets, I suppose, of 
contract law in the UK, is [that] you’ve got two parties, [who] know 
exactly what they’re dealing with and if they sign – they sign, no 
matter how unfair it might be. If the court’s convinced that both parties 
knew what they were doing, then it doesn’t matter how unfair the 
terms are. The terms exist. We don’t have, we don’t have any kind of 
experience of the State intervening in contract law.414 
When I put the same question to another MU respondent, the answer on whether 
extending the UCTA 1977 was something the MU felt strongly about was: ‘Yeah, we’d 
like to strengthen copyright contract law in many ways and yeah, we’d support 
that.’415 Formally, however, the MU did not do so.  
1.5. Disconnect between unions in the music and publishing industries  
MU’s general view that policy action aimed at the regulation of copyright exploitation 
contracts is ineffective on a UK level, is perhaps understandable given the UK’s strong 
tradition of freedom of contract. However, this particular instance of the MU choosing 
another policy cause over the regulation of contracts is different in light of events and 
policy developments that were unfolding both in the UK and in the EU during the 
same time that the MU prioritised the MA right matter.  
The MU was advocating a proposal to restructure the MA right on an EU level 
through its international partners, The International Federation of Musicians (FIM), 
The Association of European Performers’ Organisations (AEPO-ARTIS), and other 
umbrella organisations. Yet, at the same time, in the UK SoA was spearheading a 
campaign precisely for the kind of legislative change that would have addressed the 
root causes of the problems that the MU too had identified in the context of 
performers’ contract terms.416 What is more, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
there were good reasons why COs in the publishing industry had begun to lobby for 
contract terms legislation at that particular time. For one, EU policymaking 
institutions had themselves shown interest in creators’ and performers’ contractual 
                                                     
414 Interview with Horace Trubridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU.  
415 Interview with John Smith, General Secretary, MU.  
416 See Chapter 4, section 2.1. 
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dealings as evidenced by the research they had commissioned into these issues, as 
well as by some of the questions posed in the European Commission copyright 
consultation document. Furthermore, the findings and policy recommendations of 
this EU research offered an authoritative and valid base upon which COs could lobby 
for the regulation of copyright exploitation contracts. Moreover, these publications 
occurred at a time when, on an EU level, the Commission was in the process of 
drafting legislative proposals to modernise the European copyright rules. On a UK 
level, the government was working on statutory initiatives, like the Consumer Rights 
Act 2015 and on revisiting the UCTA 1977, both of which could have been ‘tweaked’ 
to accommodate changes improving the contractual situation of creators and 
performers in the UK. In other words, if there was a time when the UK lawmaker was 
more likely to take regulatory action on contract terms for creators and performers, 
then that time was coinciding with MU’s choice to prioritise the MA right.  
In this context, MU’s decision to focus on the re-structuring of the MA right, rather 
than to add its voice to the parallel policy movement in the UK publishing industry 
and in the EU seems counterintuitive. Had individual COs in the music industries 
collaborated with those in publishing, then their policy cause would have stood out 
as a common cause and thus gained additional weight. The problem of unfair contract 
terms could have been elevated to one of relevance across multiple creative industries 
and been accompanied by a policy option that enjoyed wider cross-industry support. 
Certainly, this idea would have been communicated more strongly if individual 
unions had added their weight to the same cause, alongside the Creators’ Rights 
Alliance, of which they were members. Instead, perhaps unwittingly, unions in the 
music and publishing sectors were fragmenting the interests of creators and 
performers, creating an impression of dividedness and disagreement over what 
action merited priority among the greater copyright stakeholder group comprising 
creators and performers.  
It is, however, worth mentioning that it is in fact unclear whether SoA had itself 
reached out to individual unions from other creative sectors for support and 
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collaboration. Perhaps, it had decided to only work with partners from its own 
industry – out of habit, due to pre-existing partnerships and better channels of 
communication, or due to a lack of coordination. However, it can at least be assumed 
that unions, including the MU were aware of SoA’s campaign as they were, at least 
formally and collectively, backing the C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign as members of the 
Creators’ Rights Alliance, albeit not individually. My interactions with individual 
MU respondents, however, did leave questions open as to the extent to which the MU 
was actively informed and engaged in the activities of the CRA, at least on that 
particular issue. 
1.6. Conclusion  
The fact that organisations across several creative industries advanced different 
proposals in relation to the overarching problem of authors’ and performers’ 
inequitable remuneration was ultimately acknowledged by the European 
Commission. In its December 2015 communication, it outlined that mechanisms 
raised by stakeholders in the context of the issue of authors’ and performers’ fair 
remuneration included ‘the regulation of certain contractual practices, unwaivable 
remuneration rights, collective bargaining and collective management of rights.’417 It 
seemed unlikely that the Commission would act on all of these options, as it appeared 
to be considering them as alternative routes to addressing one particular problem. 
Moreover, given that all these issues were being lobbied for, it was equally unclear 
and uncertain how the Commission would go about the problem of contract terms 
and remuneration. Rather than presenting a unified front, COs seemed to be 
disagreeing on what the more urgent or important course of action was. The seeming 
lack of consultation and collaboration between COs in the music and publishing 
industries had led to the fact that two policy options, which in principle both had 
their merits and could further the interests of creators and performers in different 
ways, were now competing for policymakers’ attention. In fact, they were weakening 
                                                     
417 Commission, ‘Towards a modern, more European copyright framework’ (n 121) 10.  
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one another’s prospects of success in so far as they were being perceived as policy 
alternatives.  
2. Division in policy positions and engagement between the MU and PRS  
Studying COs’ engagement with the issue of unfair contract terms across two creative 
industries not only revealed differences in the policy approaches and 
recommendations prioritised by the trade unions in music and publishing but also 
between the way unions on the one hand and collective management organisations 
on the other (CMOs) approached this issue.  
In the preceding chapter, we saw differences between SoA and ALCS in the extent to 
which each of these organisations was publicly spearheading lobbying on legislation 
that would regulate contract terms. The differences observed were linked to the 
distinct functions and mandates underpinning SoA’s and ALCS’ activities. The 
analysis of MU’s and PRS’ policy positions and behaviour on contract terms, 
however, produced even more significant disparities in the way the two music 
industry COs positioned themselves on this issue. MU took a firm stand, as outlined 
in the previous section, whereas PRS maintained a decidedly neutral position. The 
factors at play causing this disparity were not only the different functions of the two 
COs but also the different composition of MU’s and PRS’ memberships.  
2.1. A comparison between the MU and PRS  
The positions of MU and PRS on the issue of creators and performers contract terms 
were mapped out on the basis of interview data and policy submissions made by the 
two organisations. Among the latter, I compared several consultation responses 
drafted by PRS and the MU. I particularly studied the COs’ submissions to the 
European Commission consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules from 
2013, as well as their submissions to the European Commission Green Paper on the 
online distribution of audiovisual works in the European Union from 2011.  
2.1.1 MU: taking a stand on contract terms 
MU’s position, as discussed in the previous section, was articulated clearly, both in 
interviews with key MU respondents, as well as in the organisation’s consultation 
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responses, and in the WIPO magazine article written by the organisation’s Assistant 
General Secretary. From these sources, it was clear that the MU recognised the 
existence of unfair contract terms as a cause for performers’ inequitable remuneration 
and traced this problem back to the way recording companies had drafted and 
interpreted the contracts that they concluded with performers. MU did not shy away 
from commenting on unfair contract terms, or giving examples of such terms, and 
openly accused phonogram producers of the terms and royalties that they offered to 
performers.   
2.1.2 PRS: neutrality as a way of handling conflicting interests  
In the case of PRS, the first indication that the organisation was being cautious around 
the subject of contract terms came from the way one PRS respondent approached my 
question on PRS’ involvement with the issue in an interview:  
[…] you would have to talk to representatives of composers or 
songwriters if you wanted to find out more about where difficult 
contractual practices lie. […] I just think you should talk to them 
because it’s not something that PRS is active on. We have to be a little 
bit neutral because we have publishers and writers in membership. 
And we also have broadcasting companies with publishing arms in 
membership. And I’m well aware that some groups of writers are 
active and concerned but it’s not something that PRS is directly, 
directly involved in.418  
PRS aimed to be neutral, to refrain from positioning itself in discussions around 
contract terms, due to the fact that it formally represents both music creators and 
publishers, i.e. the two stakeholder groups whose interests potentially collided on this 
particular issue.419 The PRS respondent recognised the possibility of a clash of 
                                                     
418 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS. 
419 Note that, as indicated earlier in this chapter, PRS manages rights in musical works, rather 
than in sound recordings. Its members are therefore (not necessarily) performing musicians, 
but rather songwriters and composers, as well as music publishers. In this respect, the 
relevant contractual relationship from the perspective of PRS is that between 




interests and attempted to outline the organisation’s internal approach to resolving 
such challenges.  
I mean, undoubtedly there will be examples of songwriters who don’t 
think their music publisher gave them the right deal but it’s not, it is 
actually not anything PRS can be involved in. […] So but, you know, 
for every story that there might be one who thinks that they’ve been-, 
they’ve had a bad treatment from the music publisher, there’ll be 
another writer who knows that they would never have success 
without their music publisher. Does it lead to differences of opinion 
on policy issues? We, we talk all the time to make sure that we have 
common positions.420 
In this particular case, having a common position meant not adopting a position at 
all. Neutrality seemed to be the compromise approach that respected the interests of 
both stakeholder groups represented within the PRS membership. This approach was 
consistently followed by PRS in its written policy submissions. For instance, in its 
response to the European Commission Green Paper on the Online Distribution of 
Audiovisual Works in the EU from 2011, PRS stated up front: ‘We have answered 
only the questions on which we can offer a view.’421 Consequently, PRS did not 
respond to questions 16 and 18, which asked whether an unwaivable right to 
remuneration for audio-visual authors or performers was necessary in order to 
guarantee proportional remuneration for online uses of their works after they had 
transferred their MA right. Similarly, PRS also did not engage with question 20 of the 
consultation, which asked whether there were other means to ensure the adequate 
remuneration of authors and performers. These were the most obvious questions 
under which the CMO could have addressed issues around contracts.  
Similarly, PRS offered an elaborate, yet indefinite response to question 72 of the 2013 
EU Consultation on the review of the EU copyright rules, which sought views on the 
                                                     
420 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS. 
421 PRS for Music, ‘EC Green Paper on the Online Distribution of Audiovisual Works in the 
EU, Comments to EU Commission’ (16 November 2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2011/audiovisual/non-registered-
organisations/prsformusic_en.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017.  
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best mechanism for ensuring that authors and performers would receive an adequate 
remuneration for the exploitation of their works and performances: 
The copyright framework has provided a stable basis for the EU’s 
creative industries which has, in turn, allowed the sector to grow and 
create jobs across the EU. However, as the manner in which rights are 
exploited is evolving it is pertinent for the EU authorities to investigate 
whether the current framework is continuing to ensure individual 
authors, composers and creators are rewarded adequately whenever 
and wherever their rights are used. The copyright framework must 
support a sustainable ecosystem for the creation of, and investment in, 
new works and in supporting services that supply and distribute new 
services to consumers.  
PRS for Music will not comment on the questions which concern 
contract but we are aware of Commission work in this area in support 
of composers, authors and performers.   
Finally, question 73 of the same consultation document asked whether there was a 
need to act at the EU level, for instance to prohibit certain clauses in contracts. On this 
question, PRS checked the box ‘no opinion’. It is worth recalling that this is the same 
question, in relation to which the MU had presented its three examples of clauses 
through which phonogram producers were reducing royalties for digital 
exploitations of performances. While it is understandable why PRS was unable to take 
a stand on this issue due to conflicting interests within its membership, this reason 
may not have been immediately obvious to policymakers.  
2.2. Conclusion 
The evidence considered above clearly shows that PRS’ position and approach to the 
contract terms problem was distinctly different from that of the MU, as well as of 
ALCS, which was discussed in the previous chapter. PRS’ need to remain neutral on 
this issue was mandated by the different interests represented within its membership, 
which can ultimately be traced back to the very composition of this membership. 
Differences among COs in the same industry, coupled with the cross-industry interest 
divides emerging from the analyses of this and the preceding chapter, reinforce the 
sense of complexity in copyright policy, resulting from such a granularity of interests 
and policy positions.  
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3. Challenges affecting COs’ policy work and defining features of the copyright 
policy environment  
The exploration of COs’ behaviour and approach to the contract terms problem in the 
music industry shed light on a number of intra-organisational and extra-
organisational factors that have an impact on the extent to which these organisations 
can effectively further their policy goals. From the perspective of the COs, these 
factors can be described as ‘challenges’. However, extra-organisational factors are 
also defining attributes of the copyright policy environment within which the studied 
organisations are a mere subset of all actors. This section will delve into the power 
dynamics and imbalances between different individual organisations, as well as 
between COs and large multi-stakeholder industry networks.  
3.1. Intra-organisational challenges 
Two intra-organisational factors that affect the strength and authority, and ultimately 
the power of the MU to advance a given policy position, as well as the extent, to which 
it can commit resources to this activity, are the organisation’s membership and 
mandate. These factors also influence PRS’ policy behaviour, albeit in different ways. 
Section 2 exemplified how PRS’ membership composition plays a decisive role in the 
way the organisation navigates certain issues in policy. I will consider this challenge 
in more detail in chapter 7 within the context of a CMO-specific issue regarding the 
implementation of the collective rights management Directive because it is an 
instance where PRS did in fact take a decisive stand.422 That chapter will also discuss 
the link between PRS’ political power and its pivotal function (related to its mandate) 
in the copyright system.423 In the following paragraphs, I will therefore primarily 
focus on membership and mandate-related issues as they affect MU’s ability to 
participate in policy. Ultimately, the issue of contract terms is inherently more central 
to the activities of a trade union than to those of a CMO.   
                                                     
422 See Chapter 7, section 2.3, in particular section 2.3.2.  
423 See Chapter 7, section 1. 
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3.1.1 Membership  
The membership-related challenge for the MU derives from members’ level of 
political involvement. Traditionally, unions were founded through the activism of 
groups of workers that came together in order to gain strength through unity and 
fight for more rights and better working conditions collectively.424 Consequently, 
much of these organisations’ leverage in exercising their regulatory and 
representative roles has usually come from the ability of the union’s management to 
organise the membership, for instance in strike action, and exert pressure through a 
wide base of support from within the organisation. However, the MU faces challenges 
in mobilising its members to support its campaigning and lobbying activities. 
Consequently, it struggles to add weight to the messages that it communicates to 
policymakers in this way. This is due to the fact that a large majority of the union’s 
members are not politically engaged, which is likely linked to the changing role of 
trade unions, discussed in chapter 3.425 Today, unions attract members primarily 
through the individual services that they offer, and not because of members’ activism 
or identification with the trade union movement.426 This idea was supported by one 
MU respondent:  
I think, and this is potentially not a view that’s shared by all my 
colleagues but - and it might sound a bit negative – but I think we have 
to be realistic about why a lot of our members are members. And that 
is because of the benefits and services; and they use us as an insurance 
service, so they want public liability insurance, the instrument 
insurance, or they want contract advice, or they want somebody to do 
the chasing when somebody breaks a contract or doesn’t pay them, or 
taking somebody to a small claims court, or whatever it might be. And 
so a lot of, a certain proportion of our members, I guess, are not 
activists. Well, a lot of them, most of them aren’t activists, they’re not. 
They’re potentially not unionists. They are using certain of our benefits 
and services and they might not be a member for ideological reasons.427 
                                                     
424 See Chapter 3, sections 2 and 2.1.  
425 See Chapter 3, sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3.  
426 See Chapter 3, section 2.2.3; Bacon and Storey (n 222) 43-44, 56; Ewing (n 177) 6-7. 
427 Ben Jones, Ben Jones, National Organiser for Recording and Broadcasting, MU. 
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A change in the motives leading musicians to join the MU was also documented by 
Cloonan, who emphasised that in recent years a key motivation has been the fact that 
membership gives access to certain services.428 The MU itself clearly aims to appeal 
to potential new members by highlighting its various services rather than trade union 
ideals of collectivism.429 Yet, the fact that lack of activism among the membership 
presents a challenge to the MU’s activities is visible in the fact that, as reported in the 
Autumn 2015 edition of the MU’s journal, The Musician, the union adopted a motion 
to encourage activism during its 36th MU Delegate Conference.430 Moreover, the quote 
chosen by the organisation to head the ‘campaigns’ section of its website reads: ‘I 
think the MU is a very positive force. I wish that more people would use it to its full 
potential.’431 
It seems that the disengagement of members with their unions, the greater emphasis 
on these organisations’ services rather than their regulatory and representative roles 
may indeed have led to a certain weakening of these roles. Certainly, more activism, 
more proactive engagement and support by the MU’s members on issues of policy 
could add weight and authority to the union’s representative role. The voice of a 
myriad of individual performers would be more difficult to miss or ignore than that 
of a union’s management. Moreover, this voice may be especially necessary to 
empower the MU on a policy issue like contract terms, where it is already 
representing the weaker of two parties and standing up against more powerful 
organisations whose members, the record companies, have an advantage in the 
current UK copyright framework. This intra-organisational factor therefore sets up 
                                                     
428 Cloonan, ‘Musicians as Workers’ (n 7) 14. 
429 The MU’s homepage <http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/> accessed 09 February 2017 
opens with a large headline reading ‘Join a bigger band and see the benefits’ and below lists 
numerous benefits, including insurance policies, legal advice, access to an online profile and 
teacher services. 
430 Musicians’ Union, ‘Motion 19: Encouraging Activism Guidance’ (Autumn 2015) The 
Musician 49 <http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Files/Publications/2015/Musician-
Journal/The-Musician-(Autumn-2015)> accessed 09 February 2017.  
431 Hannah Miller, Moulettes, see ‘Our current campaigns’ (MU) 
<http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Campaign> accessed 09 February 2017.  
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the MU with a less powerful starting point to influence policy than that enjoyed by 
other actors.  
3.1.2 Mandate 
In the context of MU’s changing role, as reflected in the reasons that drive members 
to join the organisation, the already broad mandate432 of the union needs to be re-
interpreted in light of the importance that members attach to each of the different 
functions that the union performs. Inevitably, this process is closely tied to the way 
the organisation will choose to allocate its available resources and energy. These 
considerations are not dissimilar to the ones contemplated in the previous chapter in 
relation to SoA.433  
Like SoA, the MU spreads the resources allocated to its regulatory and representative 
roles across a range of policy areas beyond copyright, while simultaneously also 
engaging with multiple issues relevant to performers in the copyright and 
neighbouring rights domain.434 Furthermore, in implementation of its mandate, it 
maintains a range of services for its members, organises skills and training 
workshops, negotiates collective bargaining agreements, and much more. The 
breadth of issues affecting performers’ working conditions on which the MU must 
take action in accordance with its mandate, from copyright and neighbouring rights, 
to arts funding cuts and music venues regulation, coupled with the union’s other 
areas of activity, inevitably impact the extent to which the organisation can invest 
itself in any one given issue of copyright policy.  
                                                     
432 Rule I.2 of the MU Rules (Revised 23 July 2015) 
<http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Files/Guides/MU-Rules> accessed 09 February 2017 
formally sets out the MU’s mandate. The list of objects includes the organisation of 
musicians and the regulation of their relations with employers and employers’ associations; 
improving members’ status and remuneration; advancing their knowledge and skills; 
offering financial assistance; promoting equality through various means, and more. 
433 See Chapter 4, section 1.3.3. 
434 See a list of issues that the MU engages with at ‘Our current campaigns’ (MU) 
<http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Campaign> accessed 09 February 2017. 
146 
 
3.2. Extra-organisational challenges 
In addition to the intra-organisational challenges identified above, COs’ participation 
and impact in copyright policy are also affected by the wider industry and policy 
environment. In the next subsections, I will focus on the antagonism between the MU 
and organisations representing the recording companies, in order to illustrate the 
existence of power dynamics between different copyright stakeholder groups. I will 
discuss the problem of the biased presentation of evidence and implicit contradiction 
of messages communicated to policymakers and then consider the role of multi-
stakeholder umbrella organisations like UK Music and the British Copyright Council 
(BCC).  
3.2.1 Inter-stakeholder dynamics 
Interview and documentary data delivered insight into key challenges that the MU 
would have faced if it had decided to lobby the government for the regulation of 
contract terms and to make the argument in policy circles that recording companies 
were treating performers unfairly and remunerating them disproportionately for the 
exploitation of their performances. For one, the union would have had a strong 
opponent in the face of the BPI, the trade body representing the interests of UK 
phonogram producers. Moreover, the MU would not have succeeded in securing the 
support of influential industry alliances, such as UK Music or the British Copyright 
Council. At the same time, in music, as in publishing, the ability to demonstrate to 
policymakers that a significant subset of industry stakeholders backs a certain policy 
option, was considered to increase that option’s prospect of success.  
3.2.1.1 Antagonism between the MU and record labels 
MU’s relationship with record companies on the topic of contract terms was difficult 
and antagonistic. This was evidenced by the way several MU respondents reflected 
on their interactions with record labels during the interviews. In the context of 
recording companies’ practice of reducing performers’ royalties from digital uses, one 
MU respondent noted:  
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So you then start to see that they’re really crooked, that it’s not a case of 
a little bit of, you know, bending the rules or clever accounting. It is 
downright high-way robbery, that’s what it is.435      
Another respondent said the following with regard to conversations between the MU 
and record labels on the reasonableness of contract terms:  
But there’s never been, as far as I know, they have never been 
particularly fruitful discussions. They have a stated position, we have 
a stated position […]436 
The divergence of interests and viewpoints on contract terms between the MU and 
organisations like the BPI is significant in several respects. First, it indicates that 
policymakers would potentially be exposed to contradictory messages and policy 
submissions on this issue. Furthermore, it makes it less likely that the MU would be 
able to present similarly impactful data to corroborate its own position, as there may 
be a bias towards the more positive data presented by the record industry. Such data 
may also enjoy wider publicity. Finally, antagonism between the MU and recording 
companies also has a bearing on the way other industry networks will position 
themselves on the contract terms issue. All of these factors may well have influenced 
MU’s decision to let the bigger and more contested issue of regulating contract terms 
rest and to instead lobby for a less radical change. The MA right matter would only 
indirectly affect the interests of phonogram producers since the proposed 
remuneration right would be payable by the services that exploit this right, such as 
Spotify, or Deezer.437  
3.2.1.2 Different messages and evidence communicated to policymakers 
The notion that policymakers may be subject to contradictory messages first 
presented itself in my interview data. According to several MU respondents, record 
                                                     
435 Interview with Horace Trubridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU. 
436 Interview with Isabelle Gutierrez, Head of Government Relations and Public Affairs, MU.  
437 ‘Fair Internet for Performers: The issue’ (n 406); Spotify <https://www.spotify.com/uk/> 




companies objected to MU’s assertions that the contracts they were offering to 
performers were unfair in conversations between the two sides. 
Now when you talk to the record labels about their deals, they will 
say: ‘we’re doing great deals, look at what we’re paying out. We’re 
actually paying out more to artists now than we’ve ever done before 
compared to the money we’re bringing in.’ And they’ve got the IFPI, 
[the] BPI who produces figures to show that.438   
Another MU respondent expressed the same idea:  
[…] they [record companies] say that artists get rewarded enough, that 
they don’t want to skew the market, they say it [the introduction of an 
equitable remuneration right attached to the transfer of the making 
available right] skews it the other way. So the artists will get a 
disproportionate reward. And I don’t accept any of these arguments. 
They say that it’s a new market still [for streaming], it’s developing, 
year on year, artists get paid better. They also say that new artists do 
particularly well. And, actually, I don’t dispute that, not particularly 
well, they do, it’s okay, because the new contracts deal with Spotify 
and with streaming services. […] they’ll tell you in that sense that 
everything’s fine. Everything’s good. Artists are earning more money. 
They’re getting more of a percentage of the income, why are you 
complaining?439 
Ironically, in the same issue of the WIPO magazine, at the same time as the Assistant 
General Secretary of the MU was trying to communicate the message that policy 
needed to address a problem pertaining to performers’ income streams from digital 
exploitation, IFPI’s440 Director of Licensing and Legal Policy was offering a positive 
recording industry perspective on streaming and copyright.441 According to the IFPI, 
local subscription streaming data collected between 2009 and 2013 from three major 
music companies across 18 territories relating to payments made to locally signed 
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artists indicated that artists’ share of revenue had increased by 13%.442 One of the 
conclusions drawn from this was that the present status quo of the business models 
underpinning streaming (which includes performers’ contracts) had the potential to 
support a ‘sustainable music industry where revenue and the benefits of growth 
are shared in a fair and balanced manner.’443 (emphasis added) Two important 
observations can be made on the basis of this conclusion, as well as on the general 
structure and content of the IFPI article:  
(1) IFPI’s view of the adequacy of the status quo is in stark contrast to that of the MU; 
yet, it has the ability to weaken MU’s position through the data that it presents, as 
well as the way this information is presented.  
(2) This article is evidence of Williamson and Cloonan’s finding that some 
stakeholders in the music sector purposefully conflate the terms ‘music industry’ and 
‘recording industry’ in order to overstate their case.444  
These observations, which I expand on below, not only illustrate a case of power 
imbalance between different industry actors but also bare strategies that powerful 
actors use to further play to their strength.   
(1) The message communicated by the IFPI is diametrically opposed to that 
presented by the MU and on which the union based its demand for policy 
action to ensure that more revenues reach performers. However, the IFPI has 
the ability to weaken the significance of the information communicated by the 
MU and call its veracity into question because its own figures present a story 
of an industry’s success and growth, which appears more appealing to 
policymakers. Moreover, this presentation may well come across as more 
authoritative given that it is substantiated by numerical data and analyses 
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which the MU did not, and could not, match through data of its own. The IFPI 
presents numbers on the trade value of the recording industry revenues, the 
millions of dollars generated from streaming services and percentages of 
growth in global industry revenues from subscription services and artists’ 
shares compared to previous years. The advantage that the IFPI and, in the 
UK, the BPI, as well as CMOs, have over organisations like the MU is precisely 
this access to valuable data, including sales and licensing data, which is used 
to measure value and the economic significance of industry sectors. This data 
is highly valuable to policymakers, particularly those looking to develop 
policies for economic growth.445  
Moreover, the way that the IFPI presents this data relates to what Mitra-Kahn 
describes as some stakeholders’ ‘rhetorical device’. 446 They set the stage for 
policymakers by presenting ‘big numbers’ and a big picture that answers the 
political question of how important and significant something is, in order to 
then advance one’s own cause on the basis that one’s activities are inherently 
linked to those numbers and the respectable status quo.447 The evidence 
presented in IFPI’s article is also consistent with Harker’s findings, discussed 
in chapter 3, that the organisation presents information to accentuate industry 
growth.448 It is therefore equally important to bear in mind the scholar’s 
critique that data privately held and provided by the IFPI may be mediated, 
patchy and inconsistent, as it essentially enters the policy space with an 
agenda: to further the interests of the body controlling the flow of this data.449  
According to Hargreaves, the presentation of ‘lobbynomics’ is not merely 
characteristic of the IFPI and BPI, but of copyright stakeholders in general.450 In an 
                                                     
445 Schlesinger and Waelde, ‘Copyright and cultural work’ (n 142) 12 argue that IP policy is 
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446 Mitra-Kahn (n 365) 77. 
447 Ibid. 
448 See Chapter 3, section 1.4. 
449 Harker (n 8) 45-46. 
450 Hargreaves (n 4) 6. 
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environment where policy should develop on the basis of evidence - information is 
power. And, indeed, in copyright policy, the presentation of information may contain 
an opportunity to influence. However, relevant and valuable industry information to 
policymakers is unevenly distributed across different industry stakeholders.  
   
(2) In the example of the IFPI article under consideration, the way the record 
industry trade body plays to its own strength is precisely what Williamson 
and Cloonan documented in their article ‘Rethinking the music industry’, 
which I discussed in chapter 3.451 The IFPI conflates the ‘recording industry’ 
and the ‘music industry’ and claims that the data and analyses it offers in fact 
bear significance and relevance for the whole ‘music industry’. This is 
especially visible in the conclusion that the IFPI draws, which I directly quoted 
above, but also in phrasing, such as ‘Over the past 15 years the music industry 
has changed radically. In most markets physical product sales have declined 
sharply, while revenues from digital services have grown rapidly.’452 In this 
sentence, the example of change characterises the recording music market. 
Neither the example provided, nor the data that follows to corroborate it 
apply to markets for music publishing, instrument and audio makers, music 
promotion, live performance, or music education and training; yet these are 
all part of the larger music industry. The effect that the IFPI produces by 
misrepresenting the music industry is that by overstating its own importance 
and contribution, it presents itself and its data as being definitive and 
representative of a greater industry section than is actually the case, thereby 
demanding more of policymakers’ attention.  
By intensifying the notion of one music industry, on behalf of which the IFPI reports, 
this organisation makes the work of organisations like the MU that appear to 
purposefully focus on more niche issues more difficult. The MU has a more 
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challenging case to make to policymakers of why these should engage with papers, 
campaigns and policy proposals that only address issues pertinent to one small aspect 
of the music industry – performing musicians, when other actors claim to put forward 
matters of importance to the industry at large.  
3.2.2 MU’s evidence and UK Music’s research: unevenness of media coverage and 
policymaker attention 
Incidentally, in 2012 the MU had actually commissioned research into musicians’ 
earnings, which it reported on in a paper titled ‘The Working Musician’.453 The 
research comprised a UK-wide survey which received almost 2000 responses from 
MU members, coupled with semi-structured interviews and other documentary data. 
The report revealed that musicians’ earnings were low, with 56% of those surveyed 
earning less than £20 000 per year and 60% reporting to have worked for free over the 
preceding 12 months.454 However, apart from an online news piece revealing the 
research findings on the MU website and a reflection piece on a largely unfamiliar 
website, I found no evidence that this research had been communicated to or taken 
up by mainstream news media, or that it had indeed stirred a discussion among 
policymakers.455  It is indeed unclear whether and to what extent the MU had 
disseminated this research to policy officials.  
It may be that the MU tried to disseminate the research findings to policymakers but 
these findings were not met with interest. It may be that a lack of access to online 
media prevented the research from gaining more publicity. Or it may simply be a 
missed opportunity by the MU to generate more debate on the remuneration and 
contracts of performers. However, it is also possible that messages like the ones 
                                                     
453 DHA Communications, ‘The Working Musician’ (2012) (Study) 
<http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Files/Reports/Industry/The-Working-Musician-report> 
accessed 09 February 2017. 
454 Ibid 5. 
455 ‘Low levels of pay for musicians revealed’ (MU, 11 December 2012) 
<http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Home/News/2012/Dec/Low-levels-of-pay-for-
musicians-revealed> accessed 09 February 2017; Louderthanwar, ‘The Working Musician’ 
(Louderthanwar, 12 December 2012) <http://louderthanwar.com/the-working-musician/> 
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communicated by the MU were simply being overshadowed by more positive 
sounding evidence delivered and emphasised, not only from the record companies, 
but also from other parts of the music sector. For example, UK Music, the largest 
formally established network of music sector stakeholders in the UK, an umbrella 
organisation whose members include organisations representing record labels, music 
publishers, songwriters, composers, promoters, music venues and CMOs, published 
a study in 2015, called ‘Measuring Music’, with data collected from several of its 
members.456 The very objective of the study was to highlight the economic 
significance of the music industry to the UK economy. Therefore, although it reported 
that a UK Music survey of musicians had revealed that 35% of musicians were not 
paying into pension schemes and that 21% had undertaken work for free during the 
previous year, these findings were not highlighted on page 2 of the report, which 
summarised its ‘key findings’.457 Instead, the report, and the report’s opening, made 
by the then Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport John Whittingdale, 
focussed on the contribution of the UK music industry to the UK economy, on the 
jobs it created, and on the fact that this sector had outperformed the rest of the British 
economy by generating 5% growth.  
This affinity of policymakers towards positive messages and figures of growth is also 
evidenced by the words of Matt Hancock MP, the Minister for Digital and Culture in 
his address to the BPI AGM: ‘It is a huge pleasure to be here as the champion of music 
in Government. It’s a great task […] made easier by the incredible talent that makes 
the sector such a great success story for the UK.’ (emphasis added)458 The Minister 
referred to the figures published in the Measuring Music report. These were also 
widely reported by, among others, MusicBusiness Worldwide, MusicTank, and the 
                                                     
456 UK Music, ‘Measuring Music: 2015 Report’ (2015) 
<http://www.ukmusic.org/assets/general/Measuring_Music_2015.pdf> accessed 09 February 
2017. 
457 Ibid 2. 
458 ‘Matt Hancock praises the music industry and reaffirms government support’ 
(Department for Culture, Media & Sport, UK Government, 7 September 2016) (Speech) 
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BBC.459 In light of such positive findings, it is less likely that the UK government 
would be inclined to interfere in the status quo and legislate for changes in contract 
terms or other mechanisms relating to the internal flow of revenue in the music 
business, so as to not distort the already positive trends reported for the sector at 
large. 
The above example demonstrates the difference in the type of evidence produced by 
UK Music and the MU, as well as in the uneven media and policy attention given to 
evidence presented by these two actors. 
3.2.3 The role of formal industry networks like UK Music and the British Copyright Council 
The example offered in the previous subsection showed how several ministerial 
officials engaged with research produced by UK Music and chose to emphasise the 
positive messages that it conveyed, whereas MU’s research seemingly remained 
unnoticed. UK Music holds more political power and influence than the MU, precisely 
because it is an alliance of many different and important stakeholders across the 
music sector. As such, the positions of UK Music send important signals to 
policymakers about what matters or affects the sector at large. The above example 
also clearly demonstrates that this formally established network of stakeholders 
enjoys more attention by policymakers and more publicity because of the information 
that it holds and produces, which includes trends and indicators that are of relevance 
beyond the music sector. These same considerations apply to other cross-industry or 
multi-stakeholder organisations, like the British Copyright Council or the Alliance for 
IP, as I discussed in the previous chapter.460   
                                                     
459 Tim Ingham, ‘Labels generated 50% less money than live for UK economy last year’ 
(MusicBusiness Worldwide, 5 November 2015) < 
http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/labels-generated-50-less-money-than-live-for-uk-
economy-last-year/> accessed 09 February 2017; ‘Measuring Music 2015’ (MusicTank, 25 
April 2015) <http://www.musictank.co.uk/resources/industry-insight/measuring-music-
2015/> accessed 09 February 2017; Mark Savage, ‘British music industry boosts economy by 
£4.1bn’ (BBC, 5 November 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/entertainment-arts-34722928> 
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460 See Chapter 4, section 2.3.3.  
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The existence of umbrella organisations like UK Music or the BCC is a product of the 
plurality and diversity of stakeholders and organisations with vested interests that 
exist in the music industry and, generally, in the creative industries.461 The formation 
of such multi-stakeholder organisations is mandated by the need of individual 
stakeholders to develop formal communication channels with one another, but also 
in order to enable stakeholders to lobby more successfully, by presenting a unified 
front to policymakers on issues that are important to all the member organisations. In 
this respect, umbrella organisations formalise the practice that we already observed, 
in this as well as the previous chapter, of organisations acting in policy both 
independently and in coalitions. In the densely populated stakeholder environment 
of copyright policy, this is necessary in order to increase the impact, volume and 
weight of a certain policy demand. For such strategic reasons, the MU, for instance, 
acts both as a stand-alone organisation, but on a UK level also as a member of UK 
Music, the BCC, the Performers’ Alliance, the Federation of Entertainment Unions, 
and as a member of the Artists, Managers and Performers Alliance (AMP).462 
Similarly, on a UK level, PRS is a member of the Alliance for IP, the BCC and the 
Creative Coalition Campaign. 
The plurality described above adds to the complexity of the copyright policy 
environment and creates further prerequisites for the proliferation of issues, 
viewpoints, recommendations and calls for action that would compete for 
policymakers’ attention and agenda. This is explained by the fact that the issues 
advanced by coalitions and umbrella organisations can generally only be issues on 
which all individual member organisations can have a common position, which often 
includes individual organisations modifying or compromising on their own original 
position.463 Where this is not possible, as I discussed in the previous chapter, such 
organisations may refrain from adopting a position on a given issue in the first place. 
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In the same way that SoA could not solicit support from the BCC for its fair contract 
terms campaign, the MU could not avail itself of the support and backing of UK Music 
or the BCC for its making available right-related campaign and would similarly not 
have received support had it lobbied for statutory regulation of copyright 
exploitation contracts. Just as PRS could not position itself on the issue of contract 
terms because of its mixed membership, UK Music too would not have been able to 
put forward a definitive position on this matter, given that it houses both the MU and 
BPI, among many other actors.  
Yet, for the reasons discussed above relating to UK Music’s and BCC’s political power 
and significance, when these umbrella organisations cannot support issues of 
importance to smaller, or even just individual industry organisations, the odds of 
such issues being acted upon by policymakers may be tipped against the smaller 
actors or the lone players in copyright policy.  There is indeed a compelling case for 
reasoning that the power imbalances between individual organisations, especially 
smaller and politically weaker organisations like trade unions, and larger industry 
alliances are particularly substantial and that smaller organisations’ prospects of 
success with certain policy initiatives may depend on the extent to which these 
initiatives are adopted and backed by industry coalitions and alliances. This is 
especially so in light of the fact that if large alliances are not lending their voice in 
support of one particular issue, they may still concurrently be acting on another. In 
2015 and 2016, when COs in the publishing industry were lobbying for statutory 
regulation of creators’ contract terms and some COs in the music industry were 
lobbying for change in a statutory exclusive right, UK Music and the BCC were filing 
submissions to policymakers on ‘Safe harbours and Intermediaries’ and on 
‘Intermediaries, Aggregators, Safe Harbour and Transfer of Value’.464 In chapter 8, I 
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will discuss how these issues ended up taking the spotlight in mainstream media, as 
well as in policy debates.465 
Arguably, issues and positions advanced by alliances like UK Music would have an 
edge in the competition for policy attention and action. By describing itself as the 
body that ‘represents and promotes the interests of every part of the British music 
industry’, UK Music feeds the notion of one homogenous industry with shared goals 
and interests, which other organisations like the BPI also advance.466 Consequently, 
policymakers may find themselves under more pressure to engage with issues that 
are carried by a larger number of different stakeholders. Equally, decision-makers 
may assume that such issues are of greater importance and priority for all actors and 
would thus be easier to legislate on, since there would be less stakeholder opposition 
from within the respective industry.  
3.2.4 Perception of government bias in favour of some stakeholders 
Related to the above discussion of the role and power of multi-stakeholder networks 
in policy is also an observation that I came across in the interview data of respondents 
from the MU, ALCS and the Writers’ Guild of Great Britain. Respondents from these 
COs shared the perception that umbrella organisations like UK Music, the BCC and 
the Alliance for IP gain more access to high-ranking policy officials than the 
individual COs. The reasons for this that my respondents advanced were different 
but they all indicated a certain bias on the part of the government in its dealings with 
different industry organisations.  
The ALCS respondent reasoned that large industry alliances were better placed to 
engage with policymakers because they conveyed the impression upon decision-
makers that these were hearing the views of the whole sector:  
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The Ministers rarely want to see an ALCS. They want to see an Alliance 
for IP that covers the whole spectrum, they want to see the BCC that 
covers the whole spectrum […].467   
According to my respondent from the WGGB, the government’s bias was simply in 
favour of organisations representing business interests, which excluded COs.  
The whole British political system is all about pandering to business 
interests. It’s not about individual people. It’s not about the rights of 
creators or anything like that. They’re not the least bit interested in 
that. I think they’ve bought a political story which says that, actually, 
writers will always write.468 
Finally, according to respondents from the MU, the government’s bias was likely 
against unions as such. One respondent outlined the difficulty that the MU had had 
in gaining access to the ministerial level of policy officials:  
[…] in the last government we were never, we wrote to every Secretary 
of State for Culture, Media and Sport as they came in and none of 
them, they all refused to meet with us. […] The only person we met 
with- we did, Ed Vaizey who was Minister for Culture, was not quite 
that bad. We did have some meetings with him but [were] completely 
refused a meeting with Maria Miller and with Sajid Javid. And Jeremy 
Hunt. Jeremy Hunt, interestingly, we met him in opposition but when 
he got the job, he wasn’t interested.469 
Another MU respondent noted:  
It’s difficult, we’re a trade union, Conservative ministers don’t like us 
very much, they want, they see us as a threat, so we’ve had difficulty 
with ministers.470 
The same respondent also commented:  
[…] our influence at the IPO, such as it is, is more these days through 
UK Music and through BCC, I would say, than individually.471 
It is difficult to verify these statements and therefore important to treat them 
cautiously as reflecting above all a perception present among respondents within 
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these COs. Yet, it is equally noteworthy that this perception spans three COs, two 
unions and a CMO, the latter of which itself also only represents creators. Ultimately, 
perhaps this perception is in itself significant to the extent that it may shape a given 
CO’s self-concept, which, as I argued in the previous chapter, influences the way the 
organisation conducts itself in policy, and in particular, the extent to which it chooses 
to act proactively.472 
3.3. Conclusion 
In this section, by looking at the MU, I showed that the placement of an organisation 
to influence policy is in part contingent on intra-organisational factors, like 
membership and mandate. Specific to trade unions, my MU related findings suggest 
that with a stronger emphasis on the organisation’s service function, imposed both 
through the wider regulatory environment, as well as members’ expectations, comes 
a certain weakening of the organisation’s representative role, i.e. its capacity to 
effectively engage in policy. Through the analysis of extra-organisational factors 
affecting the COs, I demonstrated how the copyright policy environment is 
characterised by stakeholder tension and power dynamics with some actors being 
more powerful policy influencers than others, both because of their possession of 
important industry information but also because of presentation strategies that they 
use to overstate the significance of their own data and contribution. In this context, I 
also argued that large multi-stakeholder alliances are particularly well placed to exert 
influence over policymakers, which could disadvantage smaller, or individual actors 
pursuing issues that these umbrella organisations could not support. The attention 
dedicated to different evidence by the media as well as by policymakers appears 
uneven. Moreover, there is often disagreement among industry stakeholders on the 
factual basis underlying certain policy proposals. Finally, this section also considered 
a perception among some COs that power imbalances between organisations (in the 
extent to which their voice is taken into account by policy officials) also exist because 
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the government itself is not impartial to different stakeholders, instead engaging with 
some more than with others.  
4. Discussion and conclusions  
Taking the findings from this and the preceding chapter further, which together 
looked at the way COs from the publishing and music industries engaged with the 
issue of unfair contract terms for creators and performers, a number of insights can 
be gained into COs’ behaviour in policy and the effects of inter-stakeholder dynamics 
on the copyright policy process and environment. 
4.1. Diversity of priorities, approaches and positions  
To begin with, the analyses of the way SoA, ALCS, MU and PRS dealt with the 
problem of unfair contract terms, revealed significant differences in the approaches, 
priorities and positions of these four organisations. Between the two studied unions, 
both SoA and the MU identified similar problems associated with creators’ and 
performers’ contractual dealings. However, while SoA prioritised the battle for 
statutory regulation of copyright exploitation contracts, MU chose to advance a 
different policy recommendation and introduce a remuneration right in the event that 
the exclusive MA right was transferred. As for the two CMOs, while ALCS took a 
clear position on the issue of unfair contract terms and supported SoA in its campaign 
and policy work but refrained from taking the lead, PRS decided not to take a position 
on this issue at all and refrained from contributing to the contract terms debate. These 
findings indicate that it may be necessary for IP scholars and reviewers to pay closer 
attention to differences between stakeholders before generalising, in a spirit similar 
to Hargreaves, that ‘lobbying on behalf of rights owners has been more persuasive to 
Ministers than economic impact assessments.’473 In strict terms, all four COs studied 
in this thesis are organisations representing right owners. Yet, my analyses have 
shown that even organisations representing the same copyright stakeholder, and 
those that have identified the same problem relating to the way copyright law affects 
this stakeholder in practice, can present different views and courses of action on this 
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problem. In other words, there can potentially be considerable differences in the way 
presumptively similar organisations – with comparable representation units and 
comparable functions – conduct themselves in policy.  
4.2. Power dynamics and environmental factors  
Differences in COs’ behaviour are also predicated on the power imbalances and inter-
stakeholder dynamics that govern their environment. This and the preceding chapter 
showed that the way a CO positions itself and acts in policy will depend on a 
combination of intra- and extra-organisational factors. Relevant questions in this 
respect are what resources and information the organisation holds; what resources it 
allocates to policy activities; whether there are enough industry actors that can 
support and carry forward its policy demand; whether it can win the support of 
influential multi-stakeholder alliances; whether there are strong oppositional forces 
that could challenge or dispute the CO’s position and whether these have a power 
advantage emerging from their resources, their ability to influence the behaviour of 
larger networks, their political power with policymakers, or the information that they 
hold. This and the preceding chapter showed that power imbalances exist on the one 
hand between unions and CMOs474, and on the other hand between smaller 
organisations or groups of fewer organisations acting against larger and more 
influential industry alliances. 475 The discussion of the existing antagonism between 
the MU and the BPI also exemplified that self-portrayal strategies used by a given 
organisation can intensify policymakers’ perception that this organisation carries 
more weight and importance in the bigger picture of the common creative sector.  
4.3. Costs and benefits of acting together 
In light of the described power dynamics, as well as the sheer plurality of different 
stakeholders, my explorations of COs’ working on contract terms showed how 
individual organisations seek to collaborate with other industry bodies when 
participating in policy. As discussed in the context of SoA’s collaboration with ALCS, 
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CRA and WGGB, this has the benefit that a given policy issue would receive more 
exposure and would benefit from a greater weight in numbers and volume of policy-
submissions, which would increase the likelihood that the issue may be taken up by 
decision-makers. At the same time, PRS’ neutrality on contract terms, due to the 
different stakeholder interests that it represents, is an indicator of how collaborations 
with other stakeholders may alter, or perhaps dilute the substance of a policy measure 
desired by an individual stakeholder, in order to accommodate the potential 
differences of views among the others. While we did not see this in effect in the case 
of SoA’s C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign, I will discuss evidence of this in the next chapter 
on private copying. Working with other actors may be a necessity in terms of having 
one’s voice heard across the densely populated landscape of stakeholders and 
competing issues. However, it may come at the cost of having to give up on certain 
issues, or to modify one’s own position. This is indicated by the fact that on contract 
terms, neither UK Music (where MU is a member), nor BCC (where both MU and SoA 
are members) backed the unions in the problems that they identified, or in the 
remedies that they proposed. It follows that the views and priorities of individual 
COs in their clearest, most genuine and uncompromised form are unlikely to reach 
policymakers and be formally addressed.  
Another advantage of collaborative action that is implied in the findings of this and 
the preceding chapters, is that such action would minimise the existence of competing 
policy alternatives that could detract weight and attention from the particular cause 
that is being pursued. SoA’s and MU’s different routes to increasing remuneration for 
creators and performers meant that in a general sense, organisational actors 
representing creators and performers presented a divided front. Assuming that 
policymakers see their role in reconciling the interests and needs of different 
stakeholders within the copyright domain, as has been suggested by several scholars, 
then it is unlikely that policymakers will take action to implement several 
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recommendations advanced by creator and performer unions that all relate to one 
particular matter.476  
  
                                                     






Chapter 6  
 
The Rise and Fall of the UK Private Copying 
Exception 
 
Among the recommendations in the 2011 Hargreaves Review that the UK 
government decided to take forward in the area of copyright was the introduction of 
a limited private copying exception. This matter proved to be particularly 
controversial, both during the public consultation phase of the proposed measure, as 
well as after the adoption of a private copying exception. However, unlike the issue 
of contract terms considered in the preceding two chapters, the divide in positions on 
private copying was less between individual stakeholders within the studied creative 
industries, music and publishing, and more between these actors and the 
government, as well as organisations across different industry sectors altogether. In 
this respect, the primary oppositional forces stemmed from the music and technology 
industries, with the government’s own view on the matter being more closely aligned 
with that of the technology sector. Consequently, the final form and scope of the 
copyright exception prompted the Musicians’ Union (MU), UK Music, and the British 
Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors (BASCA) to launch a judicial 
review challenging the lawfulness of the implementing Regulations.477 As a result of 
the judicial challenge, the private copying exception was repealed ex nunc less than 
12 months after it came into effect.    
This chapter will discuss how all four of the studied creators’ organisations (COs) 
engaged with the issue of the private copying exception. The chapter is divided into 
four sections. Section 1 will trace COs’ policy input both before and after the adoption 
of the private copying exception on the basis of interview data, press releases, 
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consultation responses and the two judicial review judgments. This will illustrate 
some of the tensions existing between COs and the government on private copying, 
as well as the general controversy around private copying between the creative 
industries and actors external to these. In this context, I will demonstrate how 
stakeholder dynamics directly influence, and in a way limit, policy outcomes. I will 
also show that, perhaps as a consequence of these dynamics, COs’ engagement with 
policy on this matter was more reactive, rather than proactive, thus shedding light on 
a further – monitoring – role that COs play in copyright policy.  
In section 2, I will bring into focus the granularity of positions, priorities and 
preferences of individual copyright stakeholders as a further facet of the complexity 
of the copyright policy environment. To this end, I will explore subtle differences in 
the primary motives and in the emphasised arguments that were advanced by the 
four COs against the government’s specific proposal for a private copying exception. 
Despite general consensus on the need for post-legislative judicial action, different 
primary motives appeared to be fuelling individual organisations to take action 
against the new Regulations478. More pronounced differences existed in the general 
extent of engagement with this issue between COs in the music and COs in the 
publishing industries. This section will also consider the idea, alluded to in previous 
chapters, that particularly smaller, less powerful actors benefit from the support of 
larger umbrella organisations, and that copyright stakeholders in general appear 
more likely to effectively exercise influence over policymakers when acting in unison. 
However, I will also suggest that this form of joint action implies a need for individual 
actors to compromise on their most favourable outcome.  
Section 3 will focus on the dynamics between COs, policymakers, and other 
stakeholders as they relate to the copyright policy process and its outcomes. I will 
show that an added layer of complexity in the making of substantive copyright law 
stems from the fact that interest collisions exist not only between actors from within 
the creative industries, but also between creative industry actors, on the one hand, 




and other industry sectors, on the other. A subsequent discussion will illustrate how 
the existence of opposing interests, the abundance of evidence with discordant 
arguments, and a perception of the existence of intense lobbying undermine 
copyright actors’ trust in the fair and unbiased nature of the policymaking process. 
Finally, I will also demonstrate that stakeholder tension, historical ‘baggage’, and the 
government’s own wider policy aims influence the way copyright policies develop.  
As in previous chapters, the final section 4 will bring insights gleaned from this and 
from previous chapters together, and discuss the implications of these observations 
for COs’ role and impact on policy in broader terms. In this section, I will also discuss 
unpredictability and compromise as features that permeate the copyright 
policymaking process and its outcomes.  
1. COs’ involvement on the issue of private copying: before and after the coming 
into force of the copyright exception   
1.1. Background and wider legislative context 
The 2014 Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal Copies for Private Use) 
Regulations (2014 Regulations)479, which introduced the exception for private 
copying into the CDPA 1988 as s 28B, were adopted in exercise of s 2(2) of the 
European Communities Act 1972 since the provision being implemented into UK law 
was Article 5 (2) (b) of the InfoSoc Directive.480 This provision allows Member States 
to introduce a copyright exception to the reproduction right in respect of 
reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for private use and for non-
commercial ends, on condition that the right holders receive fair compensation. 
Recital 35 of the same Directive further provides that when determining the form, 
detailed arrangements and possible level of fair compensation, account should be 
taken of the particular circumstances of each case, whereby a valuable criterion is the 
possible harm to the right holders resulting from the act in question. Recital 35 
observes that where right holders have already received payment in some other form, 
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for example as part of a licence fee, no specific or separate payment may be due. It 
concludes with the sentence that in ‘certain situations where the prejudice to the right 
holder would be minimal, no obligation for payment may arise.’  
The majority of EU Member States that have implemented this exception provide for 
fair compensation through levy schemes on copying media and equipment, which 
are intended to compensate right holders for the harm caused by private copying.481 
With this in mind, the potential for conflicting interests between right holder 
organisations and technology producing companies, but also open rights groups, in 
the practical application of this exception is evident.482  In fact, the actual existence of 
stakeholder conflict in the area of private copying is evidenced by the recent surge of 
cases referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) on the application 
of Article 5 (2) (b) InfoSoc Directive. Among other things, the CJEU has engaged with 
the questions of what constitutes ‘harm’ suffered by right holders and under what 
circumstances such harm is ‘de minimis’ and thus does not require fair 
compensation.483 The Court has also considered who is responsible for discharging 
the obligation to pay fair compensation, as well as what kinds of devices may be 
subject to a private copying levy in the Stichting de Thuiskopie, Amazon.com 
International Sales and Others, and Copydan cases, among others.484  
                                                     
481 Martin Kretschmer, Private Copying and Fair Compensation: An empirical study of copyright 
levies in Europe (IPO 2011) 8. 
482 The contrasting positions of these actors were apparent in their responses to the IPO 
consultation implementing Hargreaves' recommendations, HM Government, ‘Consultation 
on Copyright’ (14 December 2011) (Consultation Document) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-
2011-copyright.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017 These will be considered in detail in section 
2.2. 
483 Case C-463/12 Copydan Båndkopi v Nokia Danmark A/S [2015] ECDR 9, paras 56-61 on the 
question of when harm is minimal; Case C-467/08 Padawan SL v Sociedad General de Autores y 
Editores de Espana [2011] ECDR 1 para 44 on what constitutes harm.    
484 Case C-462/09 Stichting de Thuiskopie v Opus Supplies Deutschland GmbH [2011] ECR I-5331 
para 23; Case C-521/11 Amazon.com International Sales Inc v Austro-Mechana Gesellschaft zur 
Wahrnehmung mechanisch-musikalischer Urheberrechte GmbH [2013] ECDR 217 para 20, and 
Copydan (n 483) para 29. 
169 
 
In the UK, stakeholder activity around private copying has also not been lacking. 
However, absent a respective exception under copyright law, this activity has 
manifested itself in the policy rather than judiciary context.  
1.2. Policy initiatives on private copying prior to the Hargreaves Review  
At the outset, it is important to note that although the option to legislate for a private 
copying exception was available to the UK at least since the implementation of the 
2001 InfoSoc Directive485, containing Article 5 (2) (b), I found no evidence of COs 
proactively and publicly taking initiative to lobby for the adoption of such an 
exception over the last 15 years. Rather, during this time COs’ input on this issue has 
been reactive and typically in response to different governments’ plans to introduce 
a private copying exception following several IP reviews’ recommendations. To this 
effect, the case of private copying reveals a different dimension of the role that COs 
play in copyright policy to the one considered in chapters 4 and 5. This case is 
indicative of COs assuming a monitoring and defensive role. On this occasion, rather 
than seeking change in the status quo, as some COs had done in the context of 
creators’ contract terms,  the studied organisations attempted to safeguard the status 
quo by reacting to policy initiatives that could undermine the rights and interests of 
their members. The reasons why these stakeholders did not proactively lobby for an 
exception that would introduce an additional revenue stream for creators through a 
compensation mechanism possibly relate to the complex dynamics and conflicting 
interests between the COs, other industry stakeholders, and the government.486  
1.2.1 Recommendation for a format shifting exception in the Gowers Review 
After the adoption of the 2001 InfoSoc Directive487, the government had first 
considered introducing a format shifting exception in 2007 when it consulted on ways 
                                                     
485 In section 3.3 of this chapter, I will discuss that a proposal to introduce a format shifting 
exception accompanied by a levy scheme had also been tabled and considered much earlier, 
within the Whitford Report of 1977. 
486 Section 3 of this chapter discusses these inter-stakeholder and inter-industry dynamics in 
detail. 




of taking forward the Gowers Review recommendations from 2006, which had 
included a proposal for the introduction of a format shifting exception.488 At that time, 
the government had proposed the adoption of an exception that would allow 
consumers to make a copy of a legally owned work so as to make that work accessible 
in another format for playback, without envisaging a compensation scheme for right 
holders. The lack of such a scheme was justified on the basis that no significant harm 
would be caused to right holders.  
At this stage, tension between music industry stakeholders and other interested 
parties could already be observed. On the one hand, the Music Business Group 
(MBG), UK Music’s forerunner and an informal cross-UK music industry body, which 
included PRS and the MU among its members, had submitted a collective 
consultation response opposing the government’s plan.489 The umbrella organisation 
made four key points in its policy document: 
(1) it recognised that consumers wanted and should be able to benefit from the ability 
to legally format shift their music; 
(2) it argued that the government’s recommendation ran contrary to established 
practice in Europe where creator compensatory mechanisms prevailed;  
(3) it maintained that value from format shifting was being derived by technology 
companies, and creators and right holders were legally entitled to share in this value, 
and 
                                                     
488 UK IPO, ‘Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ (n 3). See, in 
particular, paras 80ff of the consultation document.  
489 Music Business Group, ‘Response to UK IPO consultation on copyright exceptions’ (2007) 
<http://www.ukmusic.org/assets/general/The_Music_Business_Group_Response_to_the_UK
_IPO_Consultation_on_Copyright_Exceptions(1).pdf> accessed 02 Sept 2016;  ‘Music 
Business Group unveils collective submission on private copying and format shifting’ 
(Music Business Group, 8 April 2008) 
<http://musicbusinessgroup.blogspot.co.uk/2008/05/music-business-group-unveils-
collective.html> accessed 09 February 2017;  Jeremy, ‘Format shifting: the MBG responds’ 
(The IPKat, 13 April 2008) <http://ipkitten.blogspot.co.uk/2008/04/format-shifting-mbg-
responds.html> accessed 09 February 2017.   
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(4) it asserted that the better way forward was through an exception subject to licence.  
In contrast, the Open Rights Group, an organisation established to fight for freedom 
in the digital age, which generally perceives copyright law as too restrictive,490 had 
welcomed the government’s proposal. It explicitly argued that there was a lack of 
evidence that consumer practice around format shifting did in fact have a negative 
impact on sales of recorded music and thereby made a case against the introduction 
of a compensation scheme.491 Intel, a technology manufacturer, called for the 
introduction of a private ‘fair use’ exception, which would cover private non-
commercial copying in its own evidence submission to Gowers and also argued 
against copyright levies as a form of compensation, stating, instead, that certain uses 
should be included in the price at the point of sale.492 
In the end, Gowers’ recommendation for a format shifting exception was not 
implemented, or even carried into the second stage consultation on copyright 
exceptions in 2009. For one, Gowers’ own deadline for implementation of his findings 
had been 2008.493 Moreover, in the period between the publication of the review in 
2006 and that set deadline, there had been a change of government and leadership, 
which may have influenced the policy priorities and the general pace of policymaking 
during that period.494 Most of all, it is clear from the IPO’s second stage consultation 
document itself that the question of format shifting was taken off the agenda due to 
                                                     
490 See Chapter 3, section 1.1. 
491 Open Rights Group, ‘Taking forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: 
proposed changes to copyright exceptions, Response of the Open Rights Group’ (2007) 3 
<https://www.openrightsgroup.org/uploads/080408_ukipo_gowers_exceptions.pdf> 
accessed 12 January 2017. 
492 Intel Corporation, ‘Comments of Intel Corporation submitted in connection with the 
Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ (21 April 2006) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130129110402/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/intel_204_193kb.pdf> accessed 15 January 2017. Views against the 
introduction of levies were also expressed by British Telecom, and others.  
493 Gowers (n 90) 6, Recommendation 8; Hargreaves (n 4) para 10.5.  
494 For a Prime Ministers and Politics Timeline see ‘History: Past Prime Ministers’ (UK 
Government) <https://www.gov.uk/government/history/past-prime-ministers> accessed 09 
February 2017 and ‘Prime Ministers and Politics Timeline’ (BBC) 




stakeholder dynamics and irreconcilable differences in views. Specifically, the 
executive summary to the second consultation referred to ‘the polarised nature of 
responses’ and the existence of ‘little consensus as to how the proposal could be 
implemented.’495  The main points of contention that the IPO indicated related to the 
scope of the exception and the question of whether right holders would suffer 
significant harm as a result of private copying, so as to require the introduction of a 
fair compensation scheme. According to the document, it had become apparent that 
the proposed exception would not meet the needs and expectations of both 
consumers and right holders, particularly in relation to the issue of fair 
compensation.496  
The lack of implementation of the format shifting exception following Gowers is an 
example of a deadlock between competing stakeholder interests. It illustrates the 
influence that these actors had over policymakers, and the limitations that inter-
stakeholder dynamics appeared to be imposing on the possible policy outcomes.  
1.2.2 The Hargreaves call for evidence and review 
Just as in the years between the implementation of the InfoSoc Directive and the 
Gowers Review, in the period leading up to the Hargreaves review there was no 
evidence of COs publicly and proactively lobbying the government for a private 
copying exception. In fact, as I will discuss below, even during Hargreaves’ call for 
evidence, which preceded the drafting and publication of the IP review, none of the 
four studied COs took the opportunity to urge for the adoption of an exception with 
compensation. This can likely be explained by the fact that these actors were 
cognizant of the strong opposition that such a proposal would be subject to by other 
stakeholders, having only recently experienced the clash of positions and interests 
under Gowers. Consequently, it could be argued that COs’ decision to adopt a 
                                                     
495 IPO, ‘Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property: Second Stage 
Consultation on Copyright Exceptions’ (December 2009) paras 7-8 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/consult-
gowers2.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017. 
496 Ibid para 8. 
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monitoring, a defensive role on the issue of private copying, i.e. to define their aim as 
safeguarding the status quo of lack of exception, rather than to lobby for an exception 
with compensation, was a consequence of wider inter-stakeholder dynamics.  
Hargreaves issued a Call for Evidence in December 2010 with the purpose of ensuring 
that the widest possible range of interests could be heard and that emerging policy 
would be securely grounded in evidence.497 According to the list of published 
responses498, among the studied COs, only ALCS and PRS responded to the call, 
whereas the MU and SoA did not make individual submissions of evidence and only 
collectively gave their input through the submissions of UK Music and the British 
Copyright Council (BCC). The unions’ lack of submissions were possibly due to a 
smaller resource allocation for such policy participation. In the case of SoA this could 
certainly have been based on the organisation’s generally more limited resource 
capacity.499 This could thus be further evidence of power imbalances between 
individual stakeholders, and of some stakeholders’ greater ability to engage in policy 
than others. Chapter 4 presented interview data which indicated SoA’s perception of 
not being able to engage in policy as much as it would like.500 With regard specifically 
to public consultations, my respondent from the Writers’ Guild of Great Britain 
(WGGB) explicitly stated: ‘We are a very small organisation. It’s a drain on resources 
to actually even write a response for a consultation.’501  
                                                     
497 ‘Review of Intellectual Property and Growth: Call for Evidence’ (IPO, 2011) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/iprevie
w/ipreview-c4e.htm> accessed 09 February 2017.  
498 Ibid.  
499 See n 296 and 301 for a comparison of the financial accounts of the studied organisations. 
Unlike SoA which concluded the financial year ended 31 December 2015 with a deficit of 
£47,080 (see p 6 of its financial statement, n 296), the MU was able to conclude the same 
financial year with a surplus of £ 849,748. In that year, the music industry trade union also 
had net assets worth £ 17,868,493. Nevertheless, the analysis of the organisations’ 
administrative expenses for that year suggests that this CO generally allocated fewer 
resources to policy participation and public affairs. The reasons for this are not fully clear.   
500 See Chapter 4, section 1.3.3.  
501 Interview with Bernie Corbett, General Secretary of the WGGB.   
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Of the two CMOs that contributed to the call for evidence, neither individually took 
a firm stand to urge for an exception with compensation. ALCS, on the one hand, took 
a matter-of-fact approach to the issue. The organisation framed its private copying 
comments in relation to the question whether there was evidence of areas where the 
UK copyright framework was not delivering optimal outcomes. ALCS reasoned that 
the illegality of private copying presented a non-optimal outcome to the extent that it 
was a commonplace activity undertaken by millions of individuals daily and thus 
practically unenforceable by right holders. However, rather than advocating for a 
copyright exception with compensation, ALCS suggested two preliminary steps: to 
define ‘private copying’ in terms of its scope and to gather more evidence on its 
effects.502 The latter was deemed necessary given the contentious nature of the debate 
surrounding the need for fair compensation and the way compensation was 
measured through the harm caused to the right holder. ALCS suggested that useful 
evidence could look at how the ability to make private copies added value to digital 
products and services.  
PRS, on the other hand, did not make any comment in relation to private copying in 
the individual submission that it made to Hargreaves’ call for evidence. Rather, its 
position could merely be inferred from UK Music’s response to the call for evidence, 
which essentially maintained the position of its forerunner MBG that licensing offered 
a preferred solution in the area of format-shifting.503 UK Music took a clear stand on 
the matter of private copying as the organisation representing the collective interests 
of the music industry. However, PRS’ silence on the matter within its individual 
submission is still indicative of a more passive, monitoring position on private 
copying. In many other instances, as we will also see later in this chapter, collective 
                                                     
502 ALCS, ‘Independent Review of Intellectual Property and Growth’ (Evidence submission) 
22-24 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/iprevie
w-c4e-sub-alcs.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017.  
503 UK Music, ‘UK Music response to the Call for Evidence of the Independent Review of 
Intellectual Property and Growth’ (March 2011) paras 67 – 71            
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/iprevie
w-c4e-sub-ukmusic.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017.  
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responses by umbrella organisations like UK Music and the British Copyright Council 
(BCC) are not a substitute for their individual members’ own input in policy.504   
1.2.3 2012 IPO consultation on proposals to change the UK’s copyright system 
The researched COs had not expended time and resources to proactively and publicly 
advocate for the adoption of a private copying exception with a compensation 
mechanism, as envisaged by Article 5 (2) (b) InfoSoc Directive, outside of the context 
of IP reviews. However, they considerably stepped up their efforts to influence the 
course of policy once it became clear that the government had generally adopted 
Hargreaves’ recommendations505 and after the IPO had launched a consultation on 
proposals to change the UK’s copyright system. This change in behaviour aligns with 
my observation that the organisations had opted for a more defensive and reactive 
role.  
Hargreaves had proposed a limited private copying exception without a 
compensation scheme reasoning that right holders would not suffer any harm since 
the benefits of private copying had already been factored into the price that they were 
charging.506 The consultation document drafted by the IPO also clearly demonstrated 
the government’s strong inclination towards adopting a technology-neutral private 
copying exception that would apply to every type of copyright work and medium, 
without right holder compensation.507  
From the perspective of the COs, these new policy developments threatened to 
undermine the interests of their members. The established status quo could tip 
against their interests and give a greater advantage to their opponents in the 
technology sector. This catalysed the COs to react. Consequently, SoA, ALCS, the MU 
                                                     
504 For instance, in the framework of the copyright consultation implementing Hargreaves, 
PRS, SoA, ALCS and the MU all made individual consultation submissions, despite also 
being represented through the submissions made by various umbrella organisations, like the 
CRA, or UK Music.  
505 HM Government, ‘The Government Response to the Hargreaves Review of Intellectual 
Property and Growth’ (n 141).  
506 Hargreaves (n 4) paras 5.30-5.31. 
507 HM Government, ‘Consultation on Copyright’ (n 482) paras 7.23ff and 7.39. 
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and PRS all made individual contributions to the 2012 IPO consultation. All COs, with 
the exception of ALCS, expressed strong and definite positions in relation to the 
questions put forward on private copying. ALCS, in contrast, maintained a more 
moderate stance and re-asserted its view that further evidence gathering needed to 
precede any legislative activity on this issue.  
The policy positions of the studied COs, as presented in their consultation responses, 
did not appear entirely uniform, but rather indicated some degree of divergence in 
the primary considerations that fuelled each CO to take a firm stand. I will explore 
these differences more closely in section 2 of this chapter.  
In relation to private copying, the government was consulting on five questions:  
Q. 67: whether respondents agreed that, the exception should not permit copying of 
content that the copier did not own;  
Q. 68: whether the exception should allow for copying of legally-owned content for 
use within a domestic circle, such as a family or household;  
Q. 69: whether the exception should only allow copying of legally-owned content for 
personal use, and whether limiting the exception in this way was sufficient to ensure 
that only minimal harm would be caused to copyright owners; 
Q. 70: whether the exception should be explicitly limited to only apply in cases when 
harm caused by copying is minimal;  
Q. 71: whether existing mechanisms allowing beneficiaries of exceptions to access 
works protected by technological measures should be extended to cover a private 
copying exception. 
There was general agreement among ALCS, SoA, and PRS on the questions relating 
to the scope of the envisaged exception (questions 67-69)508 to the effect that the 
                                                     
508 SoA and ALCS did not provide an answer to question 69. ALCS instead laid out its view 
that independent research analysing harm, costs and benefits associated with the operation 
of such an exception was necessary.  
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exception should only apply to copies made from legally owned content and that it 
should not extend to copies made within a domestic circle or household. ALCS had 
further noted the significance of the distinction between family and household. MU, 
on the other hand, had decided against answering these questions and instead 
focused its own response on challenging the notion, put forward in question 70, that 
harm caused to right holders could be minimal.  
What SoA, PRS and the MU explicitly agreed on was the need for a compensation 
mechanism on the basis that the absence of such a mechanism would be in breach of 
EU law. Some COs quoted Padawan where the CJEU had reasoned that ‘Copying by 
natural persons acting in a private capacity must be regarded as an act likely to cause 
harm to the author of the work concerned.’509 As noted above, the private copying 
exception had been subject to a large number of referrals to the CJEU and, while the 
UK was developing its policy and future legislation on private copying, the European 
Court had established a number of principles pertinent to the controversy existing 
between the views of different stakeholders in the UK. For instance, the CJEU had 
found that ‘harm’ referred to in Recital 35 of the InfoSoc Directive, and ‘fair 
compensation’ were autonomous concepts of EU law,510 and that copying by natural 
persons acting in a private capacity needed to be regarded as an act likely to cause 
harm to the right holder, as quoted above. It had also established the general 
obligation on Member States implementing the exception under Article 5 (2) (b) 
InfoSoc Directive to provide for fair compensation pursuant to that provision,511 
asserting that Member States enjoyed broad discretion in determining the form and 
level of such compensation.512   
                                                     
509 See, for instance, PRS for Music, ‘Response to the Consultation on Copyright’ (21 March 
2012) 32  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/respons
e-2011-copyright-prs.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017; Padawan (n 483) para 44.  
510 Padawan (n 483) paras 31-33. 
511 Ibid para 30. 
512 Stichting de Thuiskopie (n 484) para 23; Amazon.com International Sales Inc (n 484) para 20. 
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During this pre-legislative stage, the researched COs remained engaged with the 
private copying issue through all steps of the consultation process, consistently 
attempting to influence and effect a change in the way the exception was being 
drafted. To this end, they engaged with policymakers in a number of ways. In the first 
instance, the COs actively submitted responses to government consultation 
documents at various stages of the legislative process, from the initial consultation, 
as shown above, to the technical review of the draft Statutory Instruments in 2013.513 
What is more, COs had deliberately sought to provide, and had also commissioned, 
evidence supporting their positions514 and, especially in the case of the COs from the 
music industry, to present a unified front to the policymakers. The latter was evident 
in the way that both the MU and PRS had explicitly endorsed and referred to the 
common UK Music consultation submission in their own individual submissions. It 
was also visible in the joint press release published by the MU and BASCA at the end 
of 2012, when the government had announced its plan to adopt a private copying 
exception without compensation.515  
It was UK Music that extensively challenged the government’s economic theory, 
expounded on in the Impact Assessment, according to which private copying was 
already priced into the market value of the products.516 UK Music is also the actor that 
                                                     
513 See, for instance, SoA, ‘Society of Authors’ response to Technical Review: draft Statutory 
Instruments. Part 2’ (July 2013) 
<http://www.societyofauthors.org/SOA/MediaLibrary/SOAWebsite/Submissions/Copyright-
exceptions-july-2013-pt-2-education-and-libraries.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017, and 
ALCS, ‘ALCS Response to the Intellectual Property Office Technical Review of Draft 
Legislation on Copyright Exceptions’ (2013) 
<https://www.alcs.co.uk/Documents/Submissions/IPO-technical-review-note-_6-13_.aspx> 
accessed 09 February 2017.   
514 ALCS’ research in the context of the Gowers review, as well as UK Music’s research are 
discussed in this subsection, further below. Further research commissioned by UK Music is 
discussed in subsection 3.1 of this chapter. 
515 ‘MU and BASCA challenge exception’ (MU, 20 December 2012) 
<http://www.musiciansunion.org.uk/Home/News/2012/Dec/MU-and-BASCA-challenge-
exception?feed=801abc79-dc9c-471a-85ff-4a3a36bf8a3b> accessed 09 February 2017.  
516 UK Music, ‘HM Government: Consultation on Copyright’ (Consultation Response) 




commissioned and reported on research into the value attributed by consumers to the 
ability to play music copied from CDs onto MP3 players, phones and tablets, as well 
as on the value ascribed to locker-based cloud storage of music.517 This is not 
surprising considering UK Music’s political power and ability to send important 
signals to policymakers as an organisation speaking on behalf of the whole music 
industry,518 as well as its ability to pool together and make efficient use of the 
resources of its members.519  
Incidentally, the approach of attempting to influence policy by substantiating one’s 
position with evidence had already been pursued by some of the studied COs in the 
context of the Gowers Review. During my fieldwork for this project, respondents 
from ALCS had pointed me to research that their organisation had commissioned in 
2008 on consumer attitudes towards digital downloads.520 54% of survey respondents 
in that research had affirmed that they would be prepared to pay a reasonable sum 
added to the price of digital recording equipment to compensate creators for their 
loss of income. In that context, one ALCS respondent’s comment expressed 
incomprehension as to what was necessary, if not evidence, in order to convey a 
certain message:  
They’ve [consumers] told us that they’d be willing to pay and also how 
much. And yet the government wouldn’t listen. So, I don’t really know 
what to say other than – it seems to be a very un-British thing to put a 
levy on this. So no private copying levy for us. We are benefitting 
                                                     
policy/consult/consult-closed/consult-closed-2011/consult-2011-copyright/response-2011-
copyright-ukmusic.pdf-link> accessed 09 February 2017 paras 27-38. 
517 Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates, ‘The UK Music Consumer: A presentation for UK Music 
prepared by Oliver & Ohlbaum Associates’ (2012) < 
http://www.impalamusic.org/sites/default/files/pictures/attachedfiles/UK%20Music%20-%20
OO%20Copyright%20Research%20Presentation%20Copy.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017; 
See UK Music, ‘HM Government: Consultation on Copyright’ (Consultation Response) (n 
516) paras 68ff and 98ff reporting on the commissioned research.    
518 See Chapter 5, sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.  
519 Mahoney (n 158) 368; Chapter 3, section 1.5.3.  
520 A survey with a sample base of 1223 was conducted by Tickbox.net in January 2008 and 
the results were disseminated, among others, through the All Party Parliamentary Writers 
Group: Tickbox.net, ‘Digital Downloads: for ALCS’ (survey) (2008) 
<http://www.allpartywritersgroup.co.uk/Documents/PDF/Final_Report.aspx> accessed 09 
February 2017.  
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[from levies across other EU countries] but we have research here and 
I mean, that was 2008, maybe things have changed now, I don’t know. 
But, you know, at the time it was an argument that we didn’t win.521 
Apart from written submissions challenging the government’s arguments and 
advancing a different position on private copying, supported by research, there were 
further ways in which the COs were trying to influence the course of policy on private 
copying. Specifically, an MU respondent explained that the MU had also sought to 
influence debates on private copying through the Performers’ Alliance All-Party 
Parliamentary Group that works alongside the trade unions of the Performers’ 
Alliance consisting of Equity522, the MU and WGGB.523    
So, over the private copying exception, for example, when those [draft 
Regulations] were going through Parliament there were several 
debates. So we were kind of briefing MPs to intervene in those debates 
and ask the questions that were being ignored by the government. […] 
And, of course, sometimes it’s not so much questions, we’re just trying 
to influence the way they think.524 
The above account demonstrates that CO policy activity dramatically increased after 
the organisations identified a threat in the government’s intention to introduce a 
private copying exception in the form outlined during the pre-legislative process, i.e. 
with a technology neutral application, extending to cloud services, and without fair 
compensation for right holders and creators. However, COs’ efforts at this stage were 
unsuccessful for reasons that I will discuss in section 3, and the 2014 Regulations came 
into effect on 1 October 2014.  
1.3. The judicial review 
The case of COs’ activities on the issue of private copying is a particularly tangible 
example not only of the tensions between COs and other stakeholders that influence 
the way COs themselves choose to act on a given policy matter, or in this case to react. 
                                                     
521 Interview with Barbara Hayes, Deputy Chief Executive, ALCS.  
522 Equity <https://www.equity.org.uk/home/> accessed 09 February 2017.  
523 ‘Register of All-Party Groups [as at 30 July 2015]’ (UK Parliament, 4 August 2015) 
<https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm/cmallparty/register/performers-
alliance.htm> accessed 09 February 2017.   
524 Interview with Isabelle Gutierrez, Head of Government Relations and Public Affairs, MU.  
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This case, particularly the judicial review launched by the MU, BASCA, and UK 
Music is also an example of the impact that stakeholder action can have on the 
substance of copyright law and policy. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, 
following the coming into force of the new s 28B CDPA 1988, MU, UK Music, and 
BASCA challenged the lawfulness of the implementing 2014 Regulations through a 
successful judicial review. In R (On the Application of British Academy of Songwriters, 
Composers and Authors) v Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (No. 2), 
Green J quashed the 2014 Regulations in their entirety with prospective effect.525 This 
reinstated the illegality of private copying in the UK.    
In the context of the judicial review, the claimants challenged the government’s 
assumption that a compensation scheme was not necessary as legally and factually 
flawed; they attacked the inferences and conclusions that the government had drawn 
from the evidence collected, as well as the procedure adopted for the consultation. 
The claimants also submitted that the consultation had been predetermined to the 
extent that the Secretary of State had been so determined to introduce an exception 
without any compensation scheme that he had closed his mind to the evidence and 
generally acted unfairly in the consultative process.526 Consequently, Green J 
identified six issues on which a ruling was necessary. These included the meaning of 
‘harm’ (II), the alleged irrationality and/or inapplicability of the pricing-in principle, 
i.e. the argument pursued by the government that private copying was already priced 
into the final products (III), the submission that the government’s decision with 
regard to the form of the exception was flawed because the evidence relied upon to 
justify the lack of a compensation scheme was inadequate (IV), and whether the 
outcome of the consultation had been predetermined (V).527 The claimants’ 
application was granted in relation to issue IV.  
                                                     
525 R (On the Application of British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors) v Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills (No. 2) [2015] EWHC 2041 (Admin) [21]. 
526 R (On the Application of British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors) v Secretary of 
State for Business, Innovation and Skills [2015] EWHC 1723 (Admin) [16].  
527 iBid at [18].  
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Green J reasoned that the evidence that the Secretary of State had to collect and the 
inferences which could be drawn had to be sufficient to answer the question as to 
whether harm was minimal or zero.528 However, according to the Judge, that had not 
been the case and, in addition, there had been no articulation of what was to be 
understood by the concept of de minimis in relation to harm.529 In light of this, the 
Judge ruled that the decision to introduce s 28B in the absence of a compensation 
mechanism was unlawful.530 On the question of whether the outcome of the 
consultation had been predetermined, the Judge opined that the Secretary of State 
was entitled to have a strong predisposition and that such a predisposition, which 
was accepted as having persisted, was not inimical to a fair consultation, provided 
the decision maker was prepared to keep an open mind and be persuaded in light of 
the available evidence.531 No evidence of predetermination was found and the end 
result could in itself not be taken as an indicator of predetermination.532 
The final outcome of the judicial review, a return to the previous status quo of private 
copying being an illicit act, was not considered optimal by the COs but rather a 
compromise in light of the opposing interests of the technology sector, and of the 
open rights movement.533  Nevertheless, through the judicial review, the music 
industry organisations succeeded in attaining important objectives – to avert a 
precedent that could have eroded the established principle of fair compensation, and 
to prevent a measure that could have hindered the development of new licensing 
schemes (in relation to cloud services). These, respectively, were trade union and 
CMO COs’ primary concerns, as I will illustrate in the next section of this chapter.534  
                                                     
528 Ibid at [249]-[250], [271]-[272]. 
529 Ibid at [269], [271(i)] 
530 Ibid at [233], [268]-[269], [270]-[274]. 
531 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [274]-[281]. 
532 Ibid. 
533 This is discussed in more detail in section 4.2. 




This section presented how COs engaged with copyright policy, and with the law, on 
the issue of private copying. The analysis of COs’ activities demonstrated that, prior 
to the adoption of the private copying exception, COs were taking a reactive and 
defensive stand, rather than proactively and publicly seeking to change the status quo 
through the introduction of an exception with fair compensation. COs’ primary aim 
had been to prevent the introduction of an exception, applying to the cloud and 
without compensation, rather than to propel the introduction of a more appropriately 
scoped exception with fair compensation. I linked this to COs’ cognizance of the 
strong opposing interests from the technology sector (favouring an exception without 
compensation), which had resulted in policy deadlocks in the past. In this context, 
stakeholder dynamics directly influence and, in a way, limit policy outcomes. 
Furthermore, the successful judicial review was used as an example of the impact that 
stakeholder action can have in shaping the substance of copyright law and policy. At 
the same time, I indicated that the ultimate outcome of the review was not considered 
optimal by the actors, who had effected it, as it represented a compromise between 
opposing interests across the creative industries and the technology sector. To this 
effect, as I will discuss in section 4, as well as in chapter 8, the result for UK copyright 
law on private copying – a compromise brought about by the existence of polarised 
positions and the policy engagement of many different actors, is perhaps a common 
example of how stakeholder dynamics influence copyright policy outcomes.  
2. Differences between individual stakeholders and creative industries 
This section will illustrate that there is a granularity of preferences, priorities and 
considerations, between individual copyright actors, as well as between different 
creative industries, and that individual preferences and priorities may be 
compromised in the final outcomes of copyright policy. This occurs not only as a 
result of opposing stakeholder forces, as depicted in the previous section, but also 
when actors who share a common overarching aim join forces to act together. I will 
also argue that in light of power imbalances between individual actors, joint action 
may particularly benefit smaller organisations that could otherwise struggle to 
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advance their policy goals. Conversely, this could suggest that absent mutual 
interests among players holding different power, copyright policy agendas may be 
influenced more strongly by those actors with a greater capability of effectively acting 
alone, or by those who enjoy greater industry support. 
The above insights emerged from a comparative analysis of COs’ policy submissions 
on two occasions –in relation to the 2012 UK implementation of the Hargreaves 
review, and in relation to the 2013 European Commission consultation on the review 
of the EU copyright rules. Equally, they also emerged in my exploration of the semi-
structured interviews.   
2.1. Differences by creative industry 
Generally, the evidence suggested differences in the extent of engagement between 
COs from the publishing and COs from the music industry. A major difference 
manifested itself in the fact that it was organisations from the music industry alone 
that launched a judicial review of the Secretary of State’s decision to implement a 
private copying exception. Furthermore, as illustrated in the previous section, ALCS’ 
approach to the private copying issue in its submission to Hargreaves’ call for 
evidence had been matter-of-fact. In this respect, there was an absence of indicators 
that ALCS had a specific interest or predisposition in relation to private copying. This 
neutrality suggested that the publishing industry CO was less invested in the private 
copying matter compared to MU and PRS from the music sector. This was possibly 
due to the fact that the music industry had felt a greater impact of developments in 
personal use technologies than publishing. In its submission to the UK IPO’s 
consultation on implementing Hargreaves, ALCS accurately pointed out that both the 
consultation document and the supporting Impact Assessments had mainly focused 
on music when discussing private copying as the industry having felt the greatest 
effect of developments in personal use technologies.535 This may go some way 
                                                     
535 ALCS, ‘A response from the Authors’ Licensing & Collecting Society: HM Government 
Consultation on Copyright’ (March 2012) 20  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/respons
e-2011-copyright-alcs.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017. 
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towards explaining the relative detachment of the publishing sector on this issue. 
Even SoA, while taking a firmer stance on private copying in writing than ALCS, had 
noted in its 2012 consultation submission that e-books and digital access were 
relatively new and there was therefore insufficient data to know the effect of even the 
narrowest exception.536 
The idea that the private copying issue was considered to be of greater significance 
for the music industry than for publishing also manifested itself in interview data. To 
this effect, one ALCS respondent noted:  
Well, I’m not surprised that there’s a judicial review, we were fully 
expecting it because I don’t think that [the] music industry, in fairness, 
standing up for their musicians and writers and all that good stuff 
could have done anything else.537  
Similarly, my SoA respondent also remarked: 
We were so thrilled with the Musicians’ Union; I think they’re right. I 
mean there’s no doubt about it. It’s more of an issue for them than it is 
for us but we’re very, very pleased about the judicial review […].538 
The reason why private copying as an issue was taken up more actively by the music 
industry COs compared to publishing may also have a historical dimension. While it 
is true that even as recently as the Hargreaves implementation process, the 
government had framed the topic primarily around the consumption of music, 
during the Gowers review the issue of private copying was referred to as ‘format-
shifting’ and was even more narrowly focused on music, and secondarily, on films. 
The 2007 IPO consultation document taking forward the Gowers review 
recommendations introduced the ‘Background’ section on format shifting with the 
following sentence: ‘It is now commonplace for consumers to copy recorded music, 
and more recently films, to allow playback on different devices, such as from a CD to 
                                                     
536 SoA, ‘The Society of Authors: Response to HM Government’s Consultation on Copyright’ 
(March 2012) 13 < 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/response
-2011-copyright-soa.pdf> accessed 09 February 2017.  
537 Interview with Barbara Hayes, Deputy Chief Executive, ALCS.  
538 Interview with Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive, SoA. 
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a MP3 player.’539 The most frequent example of a portable device given in that 
document was the mp3 player, applying only to music files, and a justification for the 
proposal to introduce an exception was that many consumers ‘simply do not 
understand why the act of transferring music from CDs they own to their MP3 players 
is illegal’.540 And while the consultation document explicitly stated that the Gowers 
recommendation was not limited to musical works, it also pointed out that it was not 
entirely clear exactly what activities consumers undertook in relation to other works, 
such as artistic or literary works.541 It therefore seems that the difference in the level 
of engagement between COs from music and publishing on the issue of private 
copying stemmed from a mixture of historical policy focus on music in relation to this 
matter and a lack of data and evidence on private copying effects across literary 
works. 
Since my research only focussed on COs in the music and publishing industries, the 
extent of policy engagement from similar organisations in the audio-visual industry 
fell outside the scope of this thesis and was therefore not explored. However, the 
analysis of policy documents in the context of Gowers’ and Hargreaves’ review 
suggests that stakeholders from the AV industry should have had similarly strong 
objections to the proposed private copying exception as the ones expressed by COs 
in the music industry. In the context of both IP reviews, films were recognised as 
another category of works, in relation to which consumers were undertaking private 
copying.542 In fact, one of the options proposed by the government in taking forward 
Gowers’ recommendation was that the format shifting exception should only apply 
to sound recordings and films.543 Audio-visual works are also arguably more 
comparable to music than books when it comes to the value obtainable through 
private copying in the sense that such works may be consumed with a higher rate of 
repetition compared to literary works. In this respect, it is unclear how stakeholders 
                                                     
539 UK IPO, ‘Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ (n 3) 15 para 80.  
540 Ibid para 81. 
541 Ibid para 89. 
542 Ibid; HM Government, ‘Consultation on Copyright’ (n 482) paras 7.28-7.29. 
543 UK IPO, ‘Taking Forward the Gowers Review of Intellectual Property’ (n 3) para 90. 
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in the audio-visual industry reacted to the introduction of the private copying 
exception and why there was no cross-industry action between the music and AV 
industries in challenging the adopted legislation judicially. Research specifically into 
COs’ actions on private copying within the AV industry could supplement the 
findings of this thesis and offer a perspective on whether actors in one creative sector 
are perhaps better organised than actors in another, and are as a result able to exert 
more influence over copyright law and policy, also when it comes to agenda-
setting.544   
2.2. Differences between individual COs 
Both by studying the individual consultation responses of SoA, ALCS, PRS and MU, 
as well as from the interviews conducted with respondents from these organisations, 
I perceived that, even among the three COs that took a firm stand on the private 
copying exception, SoA, PRS, and the MU, there were subtle differences in the 
primary considerations and motives that each CO put forward in objecting to the 
government’s concrete legislative proposal.  
There appeared to be two main priorities that directed the way the researched COs 
approached the drafting of their consultation submissions. One focused on 
emphasising the incompatibility of the proposed exception with EU law and thereby 
highlighting the need to respect the principle of fair compensation and the Berne 
three-step-test545, while the other stressed the implications of the exception for 
licensing practices. ALCS’ position, as discussed above, seemed to follow a different 
path altogether.  
SoA and the MU, appeared to be primarily led by the impetus to safeguard the 
established principle of fair compensation as such. They wanted to deter the 
establishment of a precedent that could weaken this principle and be in breach of EU 
law. In fact, the MU did not mention licensing, or the fact that the proposed exception 
would be technology neutral and include copying through cloud services at all in its 
                                                     
544 See Chapter 8, section 2.4.1.  
545 Article 9(2) Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886). 
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consultation submissions. My SoA respondent also emphasised the importance of the 
principle:      
I think we have to hold Government to account, you can’t do things 
which are outside the Berne three-step-test and you can’t do things 
which, if, if the rule is, you have to give equitable remuneration, then 
you have to give equitable remuneration! And there’s a very important 
principle there about creators being paid for their work […].546 
Unlike the MU, SoA did also argue for an exception limited to copying from physical 
products, which would not extend to copying through online cloud services in its UK 
IPO consultation response.547 MU’s main concern, however, was with emphasising 
the importance of fair compensation as an additional revenue stream for creators and 
performers. Such an additional micropayment could make a positive difference to the 
overall viability of creators’ and performers’ careers.548 In this respect, the MU 
advanced a fairness argument that musicians should benefit financially from the 
value contained in the copy-ability of their work, since device manufacturers were 
benefiting through the sale of their portable devices.549 In a subsequent, wider 
consultation on copyright in the EU in 2014, the MU also clearly stated, among other 
things, that ‘The payment of fair compensation to right holders is an essential 
requirement for the legitimacy of the implementation of private copying exceptions 
in national law.’550 
ALCS approached the topic of private copying from a distinctly different angle 
compared not only to PRS, but also to the other two researched COs, as discussed 
earlier. It did not position itself clearly in favour of or in opposition to the way the 
government was planning to introduce an exception and instead focused its response 
                                                     
546 Interview with Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive, SoA.  
547 SoA, ‘The Society of Authors: Response to HM Government’s Consultation on Copyright’ 
(n 536) 13-14.  
548 Musicians’ Union, ‘MU response to the IPO’s Consultation on proposals to change the 
UK’s copyright system’ (n 200) paras 23 – 28. 
549 Ibid para 30.  
550 MU, ‘British Musicians’ Union response to the Public Consultation on the review of the 
EU copyright rules’ (February 2014) 4 (response to Question 65) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/consultations/2013/copyright-rules/index_en.htm> 
accessed 09 February 2017.  
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on the idea that the planned exception would fall short of producing a future-proof 
system that would work equally well for all copyright works, on all platforms.551  
PRS, on the other hand, did take a clear stand in relation to private copying. The issue 
that it emphasised most strongly in its UK IPO consultation response was not the 
possibility that the UK government would violate EU law and the principle of fair 
remuneration. Rather, PRS stressed that the planned exception could compromise its 
online licences for cloud services, as the exception was intended to be technology 
neutral and to thus also apply to copying to the cloud.  
Our conservative estimates project that the reduction in online 
revenues from exceptions applied to cloud services over the next five 
years could amount to a loss of at least £40m in revenues for composers 
and music publishers alone. Since cloud services can be licensed and 
represent the future business model for technology and rights, there is 
no justifiable case for an exception.552 
The fact that the scope of the exception, rather than the lack of fair compensation was 
at the heart of the issue for PRS was also indicated in the way a key PRS respondent 
introduced the subject-matter in our interview:  
[…] one of the policy issues that we had in the course of the last year 
was the new exception for private copying from the UK government 
because that is technology neutral, which means that it not only 
impacts format shifting in the traditional way, which is consumers 
making copies, but it will also impact copies made in a remote 
technology storage system. So then the question came up, does that 
impact licenses that PRS already issues to other, you know, to 
services?553 
This is not to say that PRS agreed to the fact that a more narrowly drawn exception 
could be introduced without fair compensation. It made explicit reference for the 
need that this condition is met in accordance with EU law within its IPO consultation 
response. However, I did not perceive that to be the main issue for the CMO. Rather, 
PRS’ primary concern in relation to private copying seemed to be preventing the 
                                                     
551 S 70 CDPA 1988 regulates the case of time-shifting.  
552 PRS for Music, ‘Response to the Consultation on Copyright’ (n 509) 2-3.  
553 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS.  
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potential loss of licensing flexibility. In fact, the organisation’s headline position on 
the government’s proposal for a private copying exception, as worded in its IPO 
consultation response, concluded with the sentence: ‘Exceptions for private copying 
should only apply if licensing is not feasible.’554 To that extent, the CMO was 
furthering the idea once advanced by Music Business Group and then by UK Music, 
that with regard to private copying, licensing provided a better solution than an 
exception.555  
There was, of course, overlap in the positions advanced by the trade unions and by 
PRS. As noted above, SoA had itself referred to the scope of the exception urging that 
it should not apply to cloud services. Moreover, the Berne three-step-test, also 
enshrined in Article 5 (5) of the InfoSoc Directive, which was referred to by SoA, 
includes the qualification that exceptions may only apply where they do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. These interests 
logically include the possibility of extracting value from the licensing of certain uses 
of works. The argument made, therefore, is that differences appeared to exist in 
relation to the main issue of concern for each organisation. I mapped these nuances 
against interview data, and the content of their consultation submissions, but they 
were also reflected in the length and space dedicated to a particular argument in each 
CO’s consultation response.  
The subtle differences in the primary points advanced by the individual COs can 
likely be explained by the different functions performed by the MU and SoA on the 
one hand, and by PRS on the other.556 As a CMO, PRS’ main activity and purpose 
centre around the licensing of works. Therefore, it is of little surprise that the 
organisation emphasised a potential licensing problem pertaining to the 
government’s proposal for a private copying exception as that was the aspect that 
directly concerned the CMO’s own raison d'être, as well as its responsibility towards 
                                                     
554 PRS for Music, ‘Response to the Consultation on Copyright’ (n 509) 4. 
555 Ibid 2.  
556 See Chapter 3, section 2, in particular sections 2.1 and 2.3. 
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its members in managing and safeguarding the value of their rights. Equally, trade 
union COs were not involved in licensing activities, on which the exception could 
have any impact. It is therefore not surprising that they focussed their policy 
submissions on the more general arguments that the creator, or rather, right holder 
protective principle of fair remuneration should be defended, that EU law to this end 
should be respected, and that the internationally established Berne three-step-test 
should be applied. 
2.3. Implications of taking joint action    
Interestingly, there was some indication in the judicial review judgment itself that 
despite an intended appearance of a unified front, the views of music industry 
organisations had generally not been all that consistent and uniform. At para 80, 
Green J described that a Deputy Director of Copyright Policy at the IPO had produced 
witness statement evidence in the proceedings observing, among other things, that 
the position adopted by UK Music was not wholly representative of the views 
expressed by its membership.557 According to Green J, the witness had reported that 
during meetings with HM Treasury, some members of UK Music had felt that they 
could accept a narrowly defined private copying exception without levy on the basis 
that it largely reflected current reality. This example is indicative of the way the 
messages and positions conveyed through coalitions or alliances are less nuanced, 
less granular compared to those of their constituting members. It also shows how 
individual organisations’ positions are ultimately modified when represented 
through larger, multi-stakeholder alliances. Perhaps, if PRS had acted alone rather 
than through UK Music and alongside the MU, it would have called for an exception 
subject to license, or merely lobbied for a further narrowing of the proposed scope to 
the exclusion of copying on the cloud. Similarly, if the MU had acted alone, it may 
not have challenged the actual scope of the exception, as much as the lack of fair 
compensation, and in that respect, it may have settled for a levy scheme, as in other 
                                                     
557 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [80]. 
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EU member states. These considerations further illustrate how joint action likely 
affects the priorities and preferences of individual organisations.  
At the same time, the judicial review case is an example of impact through unity, and 
of how smaller, less powerful actors can have a greater influence over copyright law 
and policy when their interests align with those of larger, more powerful 
stakeholders. Specifically, interview data suggested that considering the costs of the 
judicial review, such an endeavour may not have been feasible for the MU or BASCA 
to undertake on their own.558 One MU respondent offered insight into the way the 
financial burden of the judicial review had been shared across the initial559 claimants. 
PPL and PRS funded it. […] We paid, the Musicians’ Union paid for 
the communications part of it. […] We paid for all the coms. So, it’s 
quite a lot of money for us. I think we put 10 000 pounds to one side.560 
Perhaps, if less had been at stake for the collecting societies and for other music 
industry stakeholders, industry organisations would not have organised themselves 
to take joint action and the effect of the government’s legislation would not have been 
reversed. In this respect, it could be argued that copyright stakeholders are also 
generally more likely to effectively exercise influence over policymakers when they 
act in unison.  
                                                     
558 Indeed, comparing the financial statements filed by PRS and BASCA with the Companies 
House and by MU with the Certification Officer, it is evident that PRS is considerably 
resource-richer compared to the other two organisations. For the financial year ended 31 
December 2015 PRS’ total recognised gains were £ 13 939 000, see PRS, ‘Annual Report and 
Financial Statements for the Year Ended 31 December 2015’ (n 301) 10. In contrast, MU’s 
surplus for the same year was £ 849 748, see MU, ‘Form AR21: Annual Return for a Trade 
Union: Musicians’ Union, Year ended 31 December 2015’ (n 301) 3. For the same financial 
year, BASCA was entitled to exemption from audit under section 477 of the Companies Act 
2006 relating to small companies, see < 
https://beta.companieshouse.gov.uk/company/03643088/filing-history> accessed 19 July 
2017. 
559 After the judicial review application by MU, BASCA and UK Music had been launched, 
the Incorporated Society of Musicians applied to the court to become an intervener and 
sought to add an additional claim in relation to the issue of state aid to the judicial review.  
560 Interview with John Smith, General Secretary, MU.  
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2.4. Conclusion  
Through an analysis of all four COs’ positions on private copying, expressed both in 
the semi-structured interviews and in several copyright consultations, this section 
demonstrated differences based on the creative industry to which a respective CO 
belonged, as well as more general differences in the considerations prioritised by 
every CO. Furthermore, positions were shown to be subject to modification when 
COs take joint action. At the same time, I argued that the judicial review case 
exemplifies that copyright stakeholders can have a greater impact in shaping 
copyright law when they act in unison, and particularly how smaller, less powerful 
stakeholders can benefit when their interests are aligned with those of more powerful 
policy actors. 
3. The interplay of music industry stakeholders, the technology sector, and 
policymakers in the policy process  
Despite the fact that on this issue, more so than on the issue of contract terms explored 
previously, both trade union and CMO COs combined their efforts and were 
generally on the same side vis-à-vis the UK lawmaker, the COs still faced a number 
of challenges in their efforts to change the course of law and policy on private 
copying. 
This section discusses the dynamics and challenges that characterised COs’ attempts 
to effect change to the government’s policy on private copying, both before and after 
the adoption of the copyright exception. In doing so, it will further develop the 
analyses of section 1 on the tensions between COs and the government, as they related 
to the policymaking process, in particular the evidence gathering and evaluation, as 
well as the conduct of the consultation. The weight and influence of stakeholders that 
are external to the creative industries on copyright policy, and the government’s own 
wider policy objectives will also be considered.  
3.1. The evidence underpinning the private-copying exception  
The parameters within which the government could adopt a private copying 
exception were set by Article 5(2)(b) InfoSoc Directive, as discussed in section 1 of this 
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chapter. This provision gave the government considerable discretion. It neither 
dictated how harm should be measured, nor what constitutes minimal harm, both of 
which were relevant for deciding whether a fair compensation scheme would be 
necessary in implementing the exception. Such areas where the government enjoys a 
margin of discretion thanks to inbuilt flexibilities within legal norms generally 
present industry stakeholders with an opportunity to lobby and make their case. In 
this context, one could recall Hargreaves’ emphasis on the principle of evidence-
based policy.561 This principle could be interpreted as meaning that the government’s 
decision on how to exercise its discretion should follow from evidence.562    
The Explanatory Memorandum which accompanied the Statutory Instrument 
introducing the private copying exception, succinctly addressed the way the UK 
legislator had made use of this discretion.563 The government had argued that 
compensation was not necessary if right holders were receiving payment in some 
other form, suggesting that the ability to make private copies was already factored 
into the price of the content, and that compensation was not necessary in the event 
that only minimal harm was caused to right holders.564    
COs and umbrella organisations that had presented evidence to the government 
challenging the notion that private copying had been factored into the sale price of 
creative products565 felt that their evidence had not been duly taken into account. As 
a consequence, their trust in the whole consultation process preceding the adoption 
of the exception had been shaken, as I will show below.  
                                                     
561 Hargreaves (n 4) 1, 3, 7, 8.  
562 For a discussion on what constitutes evidence for policy, see Martin Kretschmer and Ruth 
Towse (eds), ‘What Constitutes Evidence for Copyright Policy?’ (2013) CREATe Working 
Paper 2013/1. 
563 Explanatory Memorandum to The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal 
Copies for Private Use) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2361 and The Copyright and Rights in 
Performances (Quotation and Parody) Regulations 2014, SI 2014/2356. 
564 Ibid paras 3.2.2 – 3.2.5. 
565 PRS for Music, ‘Response to the Consultation on Copyright’ (n 509) 33; UK Music, ‘HM 
Government: Consultation on Copyright’ (n 516) paras 27 – 37.   
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According to several respondents from the MU and PRS, the evidence relied on by 
the lawmaker had been flawed, incorrect inferences had been drawn therefrom, and 
their own opposing evidence had not been sufficiently considered.  One MU 
respondent noted:  
I think that Hargreaves used spurious economic evidence when he, the 
amount of money he said that would be made by an exception was… 
enormous.566  
A further MU respondent expressed the same sentiment with regard to the quality of 
the evidence:  
[…] I also think that the IPO, you know, their own impact assessments 
were utterly flawed, they even admitted themselves that they’ve got 
bits of them wrong. But, you know, it’s like they just didn’t want to 
back down.567 
A respondent from PRS implicitly criticised the lack of consideration given by the 
government to research supporting a form of compensation:   
There is some publicly available data from a consumer survey which 
we, which the UK Music commissioned from Compass Lexecon, which 
showed that consumers thought creators ought to be paid and showed 
they would pay more for their devices if there was a compensation 
payable on [to creators]. So we showed that public opinion supported 
rewarding creators.568   
The issue of the evidence relied on and ignored by the UK government in the 
adoption of the private copying exception also comprised one of the main points that 
Green J was asked to consider in the judicial review. The Judge studied the IPO’s 
Impact Assessments, which drew on the assumption that since private copying was 
widespread and yet infringements were not pursued, any costs to copyright owners 
and benefits to consumers had already been priced into the purchase price of 
content.569 Any additional costs, not already priced in, were therefore expected to be 
minimal or zero and capable of being compensated through the purchase price. In 
                                                     
566 Interview with John Smith, General Secretary, MU.  
567 Interview with Horace Trubridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU. 
568 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS.  
569 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [77]. 
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reference to this assumption, the IPO had stated that it would commission research 
to investigate the relationship between the prices charged for content and the 
permissions to copy which were included.570 In his judgment, Green J had found that 
this IPO Research Report was in fact what the government had placed predominant 
reliance upon in going forward with the exception.571  
From the conclusions of the IPO-commissioned research report, as well as from the 
Judge’s own reasoning, it appears that the COs were correct in perceiving the 
government’s handling and evaluation of research as problematic and as a hindrance 
to their arguments being appropriately taken into account. To begin with, as the Judge 
rightfully identified, the remit of the IPO research had not been specifically framed in 
terms of an evaluation of the actual extent of pricing-in and whether it satisfied the de 
minimis threshold.572 Moreover, with regard to music, the research had not shown 
evidence of pricing-in as between CDs and downloads, but rather the opposite effect; 
what constituted ‘de minimis’ harm was nowhere defined, nor was there evidence that 
this threshold was met.573 Although the final Impact Assessment from March 2014 
had claimed to rely on further evidence, Green J had discredited this assertion and 
found that rather than additional evidence, all the Impact Assessment had done was 
explain why certain pieces of evidence were not probative and why other research 
possibilities had not been pursued.574 Still, the updated Impact Assessment had 
maintained its position and explained why, contrary to the researchers’ conclusions, 
the research results had in fact been consistent with the government’s pricing in 
theory.575 
                                                     
570 Ibid at [77]-[78]. 
571 Ibid at [271(iii)]; Roberto Camerani, Nicola Grassano, Diego Chavarro, Puay Tang, 
‘Private Copying’ (Report) (IPO, 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/309681/ipr
esearch-private-150313.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017.   
572 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [115]. 
573 Ibid [268]-[271]. 
574 Ibid [271(vi)]. 
575 IPO, ‘The Copyright and Rights in Performances (Personal Copies for Private Use) 
Regulations 2014, Impact Assessment 2014/98’ (23 March 2014) 17 
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The Judge had also agreed with the claimants’ allegation that the government had 
ignored relevant evidence.576 What the COs had mainly referred to in this context, as 
the above interview quote indicates, is research commissioned by UK Music and 
conducted by Compass Lexecon/FTI estimating the harm caused by the private copying 
exception.577 In relation to this research, Green J had been particularly critical to the 
effect that the IPO itself had deemed a consumer survey on purchasing 
considerations, like the one commissioned by UK Music, as a way of investigating the 
pricing-in effect. Yet, the IPO had itself not undertaken such research and still 
essentially dismissed the evidence presented by UK Music on the basis that it 
appeared to have gaps and flaws in its methodology and analysis.578  
This case on the one hand shows how COs can in fact not only challenge the objective 
of developing evidence-based policy, but equally hold the government to this 
objective, especially when this aligns with organisations’ own interests. The case of 
the evidence for the private-copying exception further illustrates how 
unpredictability of policy outcomes is in some ways built into the copyright policy 
process, specifically in the step of evidence evaluation and interpretation by the 
government. This step may produce results that do not necessarily reflect, or follow 
from, the main messages of the evidence. This could result both from intense 
stakeholder activity that complements the evidence submitted to policymakers, as 
well as an existing policy predisposition on the part of the government. The latter 
point and its effects on the policy process are considered in the following subsection.  
                                                     
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2014/9780111112700/impacts> accessed 10 February 
2017.  
576 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [271(vi)-(vii)]. 
577 Letter from Jo Dipple, Chief Executive of UK Music to Lord Goodlad, Chair of the 
Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee (30 April 2014) 
<http://www.ukmusic.org/assets/general/SLSC_Copyright_Exceptions_Submission_April_20
14.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017. The research by Tim Battrick et al, ‘Estimation of the 
harm caused by private copying exception based on survey evidence’ (April 2014) is 
attached to the letter. 
578 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [100], [112]-[113], [254]. 
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3.2. Lack of trust in the consultation process as a result of the government’s 
predisposition 
A large amount of interview data evidenced different COs’ lack of trust in the 
copyright consultation process on private copying, with some comments questioning 
the general nature of consultations. In essence, COs had felt barred from 
communicating their views, arguments and evidence in an effective way as they had 
felt that the government was not open to any submissions that would challenge the 
lawmaker’s view. Music industry stakeholders’ lack of belief that they could influence 
the consultation was also evident in the fact that preparations for the judicial review 
were ongoing well before the adoption of the exception, as confirmed by a respondent 
from BASCA in a semi-structured interview: ‘We’ve spent two and a half years 
putting this legal case together.’ The judicial review was launched in November 2014, 
just one month after the private copying exception had entered into force because the 
MU, BASCA and UK Music had all anticipated the outcome of the consultation. One 
BASCA respondent noted:  
[…] at no point in the whole consultation process did Government give 
us any indication that they would change their mind. […] That was it, 
they were steam-running ahead. So even though we went through all 
the different stages with the IPO consultation and through the House 
of Commons, to the House of Lords, and the various Committees that 
it went through, that whole way, and even though – I mean – there 
were serious concerns raised in those Committee processes where 
many MPs and peers are on our side and they all, they [were] always 
concerned it was not enough to stop it [the legislation]. 
A respondent from the MU also noted:  
[…] as ever with government consultations, when they consulted on 
the issue they already had a view. And they, you know, the way they 
were putting forward the consultation it was very clear that they 
wanted to introduce an exception with no fair compensation. […] I 
mean, I spent a lot of time writing consultation responses and a lot of 
the time, you know what the government are aiming to do, and all of 
the responses can tell them they’re wrong and they can still go ahead. 
They don’t always.579  
                                                     
579 Interview with Isabelle Gutierrez, Head of Government Relations and Public Affairs, MU.  
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My respondent from WGGB expressed strong criticism about copyright consultations 
more generally: 
We are in a system in this country […] whereby consultation has 
replaced research. So Government now will no longer carry out 
research to inform its political proposals, it will come up with a 
political proposal […]and then they will consult to see what people say 
about it. […] But there’s so much political certainty in Westminster 
based on so little knowledge and research that, actually, it’s quite hard 
once they’ve [the decision makers] alighted on their latest brilliant 
idea, to actually divert them from it.580  
The issue of whether the government had predetermined the outcome of the 
consultation had also been put to the judiciary in the review. However, Green J 
reasoned that the government was entitled to have a strong predisposition and that 
this did not prevent the possibility of conducting a fair consultation, so long as the 
decision maker was prepared to keep an open mind.581 While the Judge explicitly 
stated that it was right to record that the government had a strong predisposition 
which it had set out in the consultation document, there was no evidence that the 
consultation outcome had been predetermined as this could not be inferred from the 
end result alone.582 Certainly, there is a general fundamental difficulty of proving 
before a court a causal link between a legislator’s predisposition and a legislative 
outcome, particularly where all procedural steps have been formally followed. 
3.3. The origin of the government’s predisposition  
Given that the Judgment itself recognised the existence of a strong predisposition by 
the government in the way it wished to legislate on private copying and that this was 
perceived as a challenge by the studied COs, I explored the interview data for 
explanations of where the COs saw the origin of this predisposition. The interview 
data-based themes were then triangulated with documentary evidence, including the 
government’s impact assessment and 2012 consultation document, the Hargreaves 
review, and some scholarly literature. The predisposition appeared to be a 
                                                     
580 Interview with Bernie Corbett, General Secretary (at the time of the interview) of WGGB. 
581 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [274]-[281]. 
582 Ibid [9], [281]. 
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consequence, on the one hand of the government’s own wider policy agenda, and on 
the other, of inter-industry dynamics, i.e. the policy input of the technology sector on 
private copying.  
Incompatibility of an “ipod tax” with a free market and deregulation  
The first theme that emerged from the interview data explained the substance and 
origin of the government’s predisposition with its unwillingness to interfere in the 
market’s price-setting mechanism through the introduction of a levy scheme. CO 
respondents explained that the government perceived a potential levy scheme as a 
tax and applying a tax on creative content, such as music, was not a measure that the 
government was willing to take.  
In this sense, one PRS respondent commented:  
The UK government have been absolutely, have been absolutely clear 
that they do not want to implement a compensation mechanism. And 
that comes from deep in the Treasury, that they think it’s a tax. So 
there’s a complete, there is a complete ban for them on implementing 
what they see as a tax […]583 
This was also corroborated by a respondent from the MU:  
First of all, they talked about it as an iPod tax. In fact, a civil servant 
said this to me in the House of Commons, I got really angry. It’s 
difficult with MPs there because you can’t – they are the ones who are 
supposed to do the talking. And I, and this guy said: ‘No way will we 
have an iPod tax’. I thought ‘You’re a civil servant, these people decide 
this, they’re MPs!’ And it’s not an iPod tax, this is quite clear.584 
Equally, implementing a compensation mechanism would have been against the 
government’s wider policy of pursuing deregulation.585  
CO respondents saw the government’s predisposition as one of the main challenges 
in influencing policy on private copying. I therefore considered whether, aside from 
                                                     
583 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS.  
584 Interview with John Smith, General Secretary, MU.  
585 The government’s aim to reduce burdens resulting from legislation for businesses, other 
organisations, or for individuals found expression in the Deregulation Act 2015, which came 
into force in March 2015.  
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the deadlock created by stakeholder tension, as discussed in section 1, a long-standing 
and unchanging predisposition of the UK lawmaker could have been an additional 
reason why for the last 15 years, and perhaps since 1988, COs had not actively, at least 
publicly, lobbied for a private copying exception with fair compensation.  
According to one PRS respondent, the music industry had made previous attempts, 
prior to the adoption of the 1988 CDPA to lobby the government for the adoption of 
an exception with compensation:  
The UK government, you can go back, in 1986 the UK music industry 
was lobbying for an exception with compensation and the government 
had drafted an exception with compensation in the 1988, the draft law 
for the 1988 Act. And they pulled it last minute. So they were going 
down the route of adopting what the European system is and then they 
decided not to. And then when they implemented the UK, I mean the 
EU Copyright Directive in 2001, they decided to implement nothing. 
But you can go back, the Whitford Committee recommended an 
exception for private copying with compensation, and that’s 1977.586 
This historical background was also provided in PRS’ IPO consultation response from 
March 2012.587 An article from a 1977 March issue of Billboard corroborated this 
respondent’s assertion. It described that the Whitford Committee report, which had 
recommended the introduction of a levy on tape recording equipment to compensate 
right holders, had referenced a 1975 record industry survey, which indicated a 
considerable amount of unauthorised recording.588 The record industry had indeed 
lobbied for a levy. Furthermore, scholars had reported that between the Whitford 
Report, three Green Papers, and a White Paper of 1986 titled ‘Intellectual Property 
and Innovation’, major changes had been made to the original Bill in its lengthy 
                                                     
586 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS. 
587 PRS for Music, ‘Response to the Consultation on Copyright’ (n 509) 34. 
588 Adam White, ‘U.K. Hardware Levy Urged: Compensate Copyright Owners In “Home 
Tape Piracy”’ (26 March 1977) Billboard 63; Patricia M Leopold, ‘The Whitford Committee 
Report on Copyright and Designs Law’ (1977) 40 The Modern Law Review 685, 698 also 
corroborates that a recommendation for the compensation of right holders through a levy 
had been introduced by the 1977 Whitford Committee. 
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progress through Parliament.589 There is also evidence that the government was 
intending to include a proposal for a compulsory levy on blank recording tape as 
payment for the right to make recordings of copyright material for private purposes 
in its Bill. Such evidence was found in the British Computer Society’s submission to 
the Copyright Committee objecting to this particular proposal.590 
Against this background, it seemed that while the record industry had indeed lobbied 
for fair compensation before 1988, a long-standing, unchanged predisposition of the 
UK legislator could not have been a reason why COs had not lobbied for an exception 
with fair compensation since then. After all, the fact that in 1977 an IP review had 
actually favoured and recommended a compensation mechanism for right holders, 
and the fact that the government had intended to legislate to this end in the 1988 Act 
does not prove the fixed nature of the government’s predisposition against 
introducing of a ‘tax’.  
The reason that policymakers gave in 1988 for the refusal to adopt a levy in relation 
to private copying was that according to the government, the lawmaker should not 
interfere in the enforcement of private rights. These were the words of Lord 
Beaverbrook in a House of Lords debate on the proposed amendments to the Bill from 
1988:  
With the amendments we are returning to the vexed question of 
private copying, on which we have had much debate already. For the 
reasons outlined in Committee by my noble friend the Secretary of 
State, we do not believe that a levy is the answer. I do not want to go 
over that ground again. But suffice it to say now that we rejected the 
levy because we did not believe that it was the Government's business 
to establish a cumbersome bureaucracy to enforce private rights. 
Copyright is a private right and must be enforced by the rights’ 
owners. They should not rely on government to do that job for them.591  
                                                     
589 Hazel Carty and Keith Hodkinson, ‘Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988’ (1989) 52 (3) 
The Modern Law Review 369.  
590 British Computer Society, ‘Response to the Government’s White paper entitled 
“Intellectual Property and Innovation”’ (Cmnd. 9712) (1987) 2 (5) Computer Law & Security 
Review 2. 
591 HL Deb 23 February 1988, vol 493, col 1139. 
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That stated consideration is reminiscent of the recent government’s position that it 
should be up to the market to set the price for creative works in such a way that it is 
inclusive of the value obtainable through private copying. In both cases, the 
government preferred a hands-off approach. However, it cannot be excluded that 
stakeholder influence from the technology sector, in particular hardware 
manufacturers, may have held sway over the government nearly two decades ago 
and thus been an underlying reason why the government had advanced the private 
rights enforcement argument. Certainly, the influence on the government by the 
technology sector emerged as a second theme in my interview data to explain the 
predisposition that the government had displayed in relation to the private copying 
exception in 2014.  
3.4. The opposing interests of the technology sector    
Ample interview data indicated COs’ perception that the lobbying of actors from the 
technology sector had played a large part in the course that copyright policy had 
taken on private copying. This was an interesting observation considering that in the 
context of contract terms, one of the identified challenges had related to inter-
stakeholder dynamics when there had been competing interests between different 
actors within the same (creative) industry. In contrast, the issue of private copying 
sheds light on the existence and possibly on the practical effects of inter-industry 
dynamics, thus revealing an added layer of difficulty and complexity when it comes 
to COs and their efforts to influence copyright policy. 
The government-proposed private copying exception was seen to mainly further the 
interests of technology companies. On this basis, respondents from several COs 
argued that advocacy work by such companies had been at the bottom of, or at least 
a contributing factor to the government’s predisposition and ultimate decision to 
implement the exception in the way that it did. 
One MU respondent noted:  
I think, I’m sure they [IPO officials] were pushed by the government 
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into making it easier for tech companies, I’m sure they were […]592  
The tension between the interests of the music industry on the one hand and the 
government together with technology manufacturers on the other was also 
emphasised by a PRS respondent: 
[…] the beneficiaries of, the people who make the most out of there 
being massive consumer copying are the people who make the 
technology devices. So if you are on the side of creators you believe, 
you think there should be compensation. So we just have a different 
opinion from the government, and from the technology device 
manufacturers.593 
Finally, a further MU respondent argued that power dynamics to the benefit of the 
technology sector had played a role in the consultation outcome:  
Well, I think that we’re pretty good at putting forward the views. I 
think the problem is that the legislators choose to ignore those views 
in preference to other people’s views. And again, I don’t know to what 
extent the companies who benefit from this exception to copyright, 
you know, the Apples and Samsungs and Nokias of this world, to 
what extent they have better lines of communication to Government 
but I should imagine they’re far better. I would imagine they’re far 
[better] because they have so much more money to throw at it.594 
I could not ascertain to what extent technology companies had actually held sway 
over the government in relation to the adoption of the private copying exception. 
However, there was certainly evidence that technology companies had held a 
different view with regard to private copying and fair compensation (1), that this 
view had been persuasive, at the very least to Hargreaves (2), and that the 
government had deemed technology companies to be among the key beneficiaries of 
the proposed legislation (3).  
With regard to (1), it is sufficient to review the evidence submission made by 
Microsoft to the Hargreaves review, where the company explicitly stated that in 
relation to private copying, ‘[f]or technology vendors, the priority issue here is 
                                                     
592 Interview with Isabelle Gutierrez, Head of Government Relations and Public Affairs, MU.  
593 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS.  
594 Interview with Horace Trubridge, Assistant General Secretary Music Industry, MU.  
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elimination of “private copy levies” among other EU countries, or at the very least 
harmonisation.’595 Similarly, in its consultation response to the UK IPO copyright 
consultation from 2012, Nokia had reasoned that the costs to right holders of a narrow 
exception were intended to be and would in fact be minimal at most since the copies in 
question were not copies that were substitutable for another purchased copy.596  
With regard to (2), Green J himself had considered that Professor Hargreaves was 
influenced by evidence provided to him by innovators, in particular by the 
submission of Mr Martin Brennan who had invented the Brennan J7 Music Player.597 
Brennan had claimed that out of date legislation and red tape could sabotage his 
growth as he had to expend costs in assuring customers that record labels would not 
sue them. In fact, not only Hargreaves, but the government itself had used the 
example of the Brennan J7 Music Player to make a case for a private copying 
exception.598 Furthermore, Hargreaves had also been influenced by a solution 
proposed by Nokia according to which there was a way that the exception would not 
give rise to a requirement for fair compensation.599  
With regard to (3), the government’s Impact Assessment had clearly identified that 
the intended legislative measure would primarily benefit, among others like 
consumers, also UK firms working in the development of new consumer technology 
and services in that area. The IA stated: ‘The measure will benefit technology firms 
(particularly SMEs) by removing barriers and costs and improving entry to 
technology markets which rely on consumers being able to make private copies.’600 
                                                     
595 Microsoft, ‘Response of Microsoft to the UK Independent Review of Intellectual Property 
and Growth Call for Evidence’ (4 March 2011) para 30.1 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/iprevie
w-c4e-sub-microsoft.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017. 
596 Nokia, ‘Response to Consultation on Copyright: Private Copying Exception’ (20 March 
2012) 2 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140603093549/http://www.ipo.gov.uk/respons
e-2011-copyright-nokia.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017. 
597 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [52]; Hargreaves (n 4) para 5.29. 
598 HM Government, ‘Consultation on Copyright’ (n 482) para 7.33. 
599 R v Secretary of State (n 526) [53]-[54]; Hargreaves (n 4) para 5.29.  
600 IPO Impact Assessment (n 575) 1, 2.  
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Taken together, this evidence confirms that technology companies’ interests differed 
from those of the studied COs and that the views and arguments advanced by some 
such companies were indeed taken up by Hargreaves, whose recommendation the 
government went on to implement. Indeed, as recognised by the government in its 
IA, the form of the adopted private copying exception would have primarily 
advanced the interests of the technology sector. To this extent, it was reasonable for 
COs to perceive a challenge to their private copying battle stemming from inter-
industry dynamics and the opposing interests of important stakeholders from the 
technology sector and to relate these to the government’s predisposition.   
As an aside, the comment made by an MU respondent that ‘the Apples and Samsungs 
and Nokias of this world’ possibly had better lines of communication to the 
government also indicates that the trade union considered its own resource capacity 
as a limitation to the extent that it could effectively contribute to and steer policy. 
While the CO did not provide evidence to corroborate this remark, the underlying 
idea that financially comparatively more powerful organisations may have the ability 
to allocate a greater portion of their resources to lobbying and advocacy is not 
deprived of reason and has already been advanced in this thesis in the context of 
power imbalances.601  
3.5. Conclusion 
This section considered the interplay of music industry COs, the technology sector, 
and policymakers in the policy process relating to the private copying exception. By 
discussing the way the government dealt with the available evidence, the potential 
predetermination of the consultation process, as well as the possible origins of the 
government’s predisposition, I showed that stakeholder tension, historical ‘baggage’, 
and the government’s own wider policy aims and principles, like deregulation and a 
free market, all influence the way substantive copyright law is made. I also argued 
that unpredictability of copyright policy outcomes is in some ways built into the 
                                                     




policy process precisely in the step of evidence evaluation to the extent that this step 
may produce results that are not necessarily conclusive from the evidence, and to the 
extent that the government, as a distinct stakeholder, may favour a particular 
outcome. Moreover, an examination of the opposing forces on private copying 
between the music and technology industries revealed that complexity in the 
copyright policy environment also derives from the fact that certain copyright issues 
are not only subject to inter-stakeholder dynamics from within the creative industries, 
but also to influence from stakeholders within other affected industry sectors.   
4. Discussion and conclusions   
The analyses in this chapter relating to CO’s policy involvement on the issue of 
private copying revealed important insights into the role of COs as actors in copyright 
policy, as well as into the way compromise and unpredictability permeate the 
copyright policymaking process and its outcomes. I will elaborate on these in turn in 
this section 4.    
4.1. COs’ role and contribution in copyright law and policy 
Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated that a key role played by COs in copyright law and policy 
is these organisations’ exercised capacity to bring to policymakers’ attention 
problems and shortcomings in the way copyright law impacts creators in practice. 
Typically, as shown in the previous two chapters, COs also advance and advocate for 
possible legislative (and other) measures to address the identified shortcomings. 
Their campaigning efforts could potentially trigger concrete legislative proposals, or, 
at the very least, an uptake of these issues by researchers for further investigation. 
The present chapter revealed an additional dimension to COs’ role as actors in 
copyright law and policy. It showed that alongside a more proactive role in alerting 
policymakers to potential areas requiring legislative intervention, COs’ role also 
includes a reactive component – to monitor, respond to and, where necessary, take 
further action to avert emerging policies that threaten to negatively affect the interests 
of creators, or to undermine legal principles established for creators’ and right 
holders’ benefit.  
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The chapter illustrated COs’ capacity to hold the government to account by testing 
the validity of Statutory Instruments before the judiciary. Ultimately, it is an example 
of the impact that stakeholder action can have in shaping the substance of copyright 
law and policy. Not only did music industry organisations effect a change in the 
status quo of UK copyright law with regard to private copying. Through the judicial 
review, they also drove developments in the way future policies are adopted as well 
as how existing legal norms are interpreted. Specifically, as a result of the judicial 
review, there is now more clarity and legal certainty on the general issues considered 
by the Judge, including the necessary qualitative standard for evidence in support of 
legislative measures, the potential interpretation of harm in relation to private 
copying, the interpretation of the fairness requirement for government consultations, 
and others. Similarly, the fact that the government was held to account through a 
judicial challenge which led to the repeal of legislation may also result in a greater 
scrutiny of evidence and policy inputs by the governmental decision-makers in future 
legislative initiatives.   
4.2. Power through unity and compromise due to conflict and diversity 
The reversal of the status quo on private copying through the quashing of the 2014 
exception is also an example of stakeholders’ power through unity. This chapter 
particularly discussed how through combined efforts between smaller trade union 
COs, and larger, financially more powerful CMOs and industry alliances, industry 
organisations can succeed in reaching important objectives vis-à-vis the lawmaker. In 
this context, I illustrated that even among the actors that collaborated, and among all 
four studied COs in general, there were some differences in the issues that were of 
primary concern to them. The fact that intricate differences exist between 
organisations that represent the same, or overlapping stakeholder groups 
(creators/right owners), as well as between creative industries, reveals the sheer 
granularity of priorities and considerations that characterise the copyright 
environment. This renders policymaking particularly complex. At the same time, the 
theme of power dynamics between individual actors also presented itself in this 
chapter. On the issue of private copying, unlike with contract terms, the trade union 
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COs benefited from the support of resource-richer and more influential CMOs and 
multi-stakeholder alliances and were thus also able to exercise more influence over 
the shape of copyright law. Conversely, matters important to less powerful actors that 
do not benefit from the support of CMOs or influential umbrella organisations may 
be less likely to result in impactful action and resolution on a policy level.     
However, while the successful judicial review represented a victory for the COs and 
the music industry more widely, the final result for UK copyright law arguably 
represents a compromise between conflicting stakeholder interests. Through the 
judicial review COs were able to uphold the principle of fair compensation and to 
safeguard potential emerging licensing schemes for online cloud services by 
preventing the application of the enacted private copying exception. Similarly, 
neither the government, nor technology manufacturers now have to deal with the 
prospect of a levy scheme. Yet, all parties were in fact in agreement that the act of 
private copying should be legalised. The government, however, expressed no 
intention of re-introducing a private copying exception with a compensation 
mechanism and instead put the matter to rest after the outcome of the judicial review. 
In this respect, the compromised outcome on this issue did not produce a sensible, or 
even desired, result for copyright law. Moreover, there is little doubt that today’s 
illegality of private copying, in defiance of widespread and common infringing 
consumer practice that will remain unenforced, brings copyright law into disrepute.  
Outcomes embodying compromises may well be a common example of how 
stakeholder dynamics, in particular the existence of polarised positions and the 
engagement of many different actors from various industries, influence copyright law 
and policy, and impose limits on what is achievable through policy. Such stakeholder 
dynamics, which lead to policy deadlocks, may also explain the observable cyclicality 
in the appearance of some policy issues, like private copying. As we have seen in this 
chapter, private copying was on policymakers’ agenda in 1977-1986, in 2006-2009 and, 
once again, in 2012-2015. While the status quo, as a compromise, may hold for some 
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time, it may be that, given its contested nature, this issue will be re-visited once more 
in the future.  
4.3. Unpredictability 
This chapter also delivered further insight on why copyright policy agendas and 
outcomes are often unpredictable. The process of evidence evaluation may in fact 
produce results that do not necessarily follow from the evidence considered, as the 
Judge found to be the case in the judicial review with regard to the inferences that the 
government had drawn from the available evidence.  
Moreover, reflecting on the stakeholder dynamics described in this chapter together 
with those considered in chapters 4 and 5, unpredictability as a feature of copyright 
policy can also be linked to the shifting nature of interest groupings (or constellations) 
that form within the music and publishing industries on a given policy issue. All three 
chapters have shown the tendency of copyright actors to form coalitions and 
partnerships in order to advance their policy positions and priorities. However, what 
becomes apparent is that different configurations of organisations may emerge 
depending on the issue at hand. Chapter 4 presented a case where a trade union CO 
and a CMO were able to join forces and act together, whereas the same formation was 
not possible between the studied CO and CMO from the music industry, as shown in 
chapter 5. Furthermore, in contrast to the dynamics presented in the contract terms 
chapters, the case of private copying is an example of an issue on which the umbrella 
organisations did in fact add their weight and power to a mutual cause that they 
shared with the unions. The way interests and majorities form in support of a certain 
cause will likely have implications for the agenda-setting process in copyright policy. 
Consequently, unpredictability manifests itself not only in the results of the copyright 






Implementing the Collective Rights Management 
Directive 
 
In chapters 4 and 5, I examined COs’ activities in law and policy movements relating 
to contract terms, which was an issue of primary relevance to the studied unions. 
Subsequently, chapter 6 considered COs’ role with regard to the private copying 
exception, which to a greater degree concerned and affected both trade unions and 
collective management organisations (CMOs). This chapter will focus on the studied 
CMOs in the context of the implementation of the collective rights management 
Directive (CRM Directive).602 As a preliminary point, it will be argued that, based on 
their pivotal role in facilitating the functioning of the copyright system, these 
organisations are potentially particularly powerful actors in copyright policy. 
Subsequently, in the context of the CRM Directive, I will identify and discuss 
differences in the extent to which individual CMOs appear to take advantage of their 
potential influence over policymakers. I will show that PRS in particular, 
demonstrates proactive, agenda-setting and momentum-creating behaviour, which 
distinguishes it from the other studied COs.  
The present chapter is organised in three sections. Section 1 will consider the factors 
that set up CMOs as particularly powerful policy actors. Interview data will be used 
to expound on the key functions performed by CMOs in the copyright system: 
licensing, royalty collection and distribution, and rights enforcement. This data will 
illustrate that a further facet of COs’ role in copyright law and policy is the 
implementation of copyright law in practice. Moreover, in applying Olson’s ‘by-
                                                     
602 CRM Directive (n 34). 
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product’ theory, I will argue that this role and the functions of CMOs elevate these 
organisations to particularly important and influential copyright policy actors.  
In section 2, I will use the implementation of the CRM Directive as an example to 
discuss differences in the policy contributions of ALCS and of PRS. Differences 
emerging from interview data and from a comparative analysis of these 
organisations’ responses to the implementation of the CRM Directive consultation 
will be related to the varying self-concepts, membership compositions, and perceived 
industry significance of PRS and ALCS. This section will also explore CMOs’ own 
perception of how they contribute to copyright policy and thereby discuss how 
stakeholders’ behaviour complicates the objective of developing evidence-based 
policy.  
Section 3 will consider how the findings with regard to CMOs’ policy behaviour relate 
to academics’ and the media’s portrayal of these actors, as discussed in chapter 3. In 
this section, I will also expose the problem for copyright policymaking that relates to 
the reconciliation of interests within organisations representing multiple copyright 
stakeholders.  
1. Applying Olson’s ‘by-product’ theory to CMOs: the significance of CMOs’ 
functions for the copyright system  
1.1. Background: importance of collective rights management for copyright law  
The contractual terms problem that this thesis considered in chapters 4 and 5 
illustrated how contract law is the legal vehicle through which copyright is effected 
in practice. At the same time, considering the nature of certain rights covered under 
copyright law and the practical ways in which creative works are put to use, there are 
instances where the individual licensing of works would not be economically 
practicable or practically feasible. For instance, it would be inconceivable for a higher 
education institution to negotiate individual licenses with every right holder, whose 
books an institution wishes to make available within its libraries for photocopying, 
just as it would be impracticable for a broadcaster to negotiate individually with 
every owner of rights in musical works for the public performance of such works. 
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Consequently, licensing bodies, defined in s 116 (2) CDPA 1988, exist in order to do 
what copyright owners cannot economically and practically do for themselves.603 
CMOs negotiate licenses with users, collect and distribute license fees to their 
members, and monitor the use of works. When these functions are performed 
collectively, individual right holders’ search, bargaining and enforcement costs are 
greatly reduced. In this respect, CMOs ensure a certain economic efficiency in the 
functioning of the copyright system.  
Of course, not all rights existing under copyright are managed collectively by CMOs. 
For instance, PRS manages its members’ ‘performing right’, which is defined in the 
PRS Articles of Association as including the right to perform the work in public, as 
well as the right to communicate the work to the public.604 The rights administered by 
ALCS include the lending, rental, and reproduction right.605  
As described earlier in this thesis, not all CMOs are the same in terms of the specific 
functions that they perform.606 In fact, the two CMOs considered in this thesis, ALCS 
and PRS, are different in several ways, aside from the respective creative industry to 
which they belong. ALCS does not engage with frontend licensing, but is primarily 
responsible for the backend collection and distribution of royalties from secondary 
uses of literary works. Furthermore, its membership is solely constituted of writers.607 
In contrast, PRS represents both songwriters and composers on the one hand, and 
music publishers on the other. It performs rights licensing, alongside royalty 
collection and distribution, as well as a limited degree of rights enforcement through 
its anti-piracy unit.  
                                                     
603 See Chapter 3, sections 2 and 2.3.1. 
604 Article 7 (b), 1 (xix) PRS, ‘Memorandum and Articles of Association of the Performing 
Right Society Limited’ (As amended 26 May 2016) < 
http://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/About%20MCPS-PRS/prs-
memorandum-articles.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017; ss 19 (1), 20 (1) CDPA 1988. 
605 Art. 7 (a) (c), 1 vi, xv, xvii PRS Articles of Association (n 604); ss 17(1), 18A (1) CDPA 1988.  
606 See Chapter 3, section 2.3.1. 
607 Art. 4 ALCS Articles of Association, see n 252. 
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1.2. Olson’s ‘by-product’ theory and CMOs  
The observation behind Olson’s ‘by-product’ theory, discussed in chapter 3, is that 
some large groups with common interests are not well organised to lobby and obtain 
a collective benefit, while others are.608 From this consideration, Olson developed his 
theory that a common characteristic among large economic groups that are well 
organised to act as significant lobbying organisations is that these groups are also 
organised for some other purpose.609 In fact, according to Olson, large and powerful 
economic lobbies are the by-products of organisations that obtain their strength and 
support because of some other function that they perform in addition to lobbying. 
Applying this theory to collecting societies, I argue that these particular organisations 
have the potential to be particularly powerful and effective actors in copyright policy 
precisely as a result of the systemic and pivotal functions that they perform within the 
copyright system. In the following subsections, with the aid of examples from 
interview data, I will offer insight into the intricacies associated with CMOs’ 
functions, in order to illustrate the scope that these organisations have, as well as the 
manner in which they in fact put copyright law into practice and facilitate the 
functioning of the copyright system.   
1.3. CMOs as implementers of copyright law  
Through the analysis of CMOs’ activities related to collective rights management, this 
chapter presents a further role that the studied organisations play in copyright law 
and policy. Aside from awareness raising, which includes identifying and 
highlighting to policymakers shortcomings or problems in the way copyright law 
affects creators in practice,610 and a monitoring and defensive, status-quo preserving 
role, which came to light in the private copying chapter, CMOs in particular are also 
directly responsible for putting copyright law into practice. This role itself can be 
broken down into two facets. On the one hand, CMOs facilitate copyright’s transition 
from legal norms into practice through the development and operation of licensing 
                                                     
608 See Chapter 3, section 2.3.2 and Olson (n 176) 132.  
609 Ibid. 
610 See Chapter 4, section 3.1.  
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and administration, by which copyrights are exploited and rights holders 
remunerated. This section of the chapter will focus on this facet. Furthermore, CMOs 
also directly shape copyright law by implementing legislation that pertains to their 
own governance and operations as copyright collecting societies. This latter aspect 
will come to the fore more clearly in section 2 where I discuss how ALCS and PRS 
engaged with the public consultation on the implementation of the CRM Directive.  
Interview data delivered insights into the workings behind licensing and royalty 
payments, on the one hand, and the preservation of the value in the rights managed 
through litigation and enforcement on the other. The data demonstrates the 
complexity inherent in the work of CMOs, as well as the level of resources, and the 
system and technological sophistication necessary to perform these functions. These 
features contribute to the power and relevance that CMOs enjoy in copyright law and 
policy. 
1.3.1 Licensing and Royalty Payments  
PRS 
With regard to the business of licensing, one aspect that became clear was that CMOs 
do not merely possess some leeway with respect to how they license but also in 
relation to whether they license in the first place, making them indispensable players 
within the creative industry value chains, as well as powerful gatekeepers of valuable 
rights. Respondents from PRS highlighted the existence of general differences in the 
approach that CMOs could take to licensing new users. Comparing PRS to the 
German collecting society GEMA611, PRS representatives emphasised their 
organisation’s willingness to support start-ups and new business models, rather than 
withhold licenses and litigate as a means of obtaining higher fees.612 One PRS 
respondent noted:  
                                                     
611 Gesellschaft für musikalische Aufführungs- und mechanische Vervielfältigungsrechte 
(GEMA) <https://www.gema.de/en/> accessed 10 February 2017.  
612 The case referred to in this context was the ongoing litigation between GEMA and 
YouTube, at the heart of which was a disagreement over the amount of royalties due to be 
paid by YouTube, see Benjamin Schuetze, ‘Germany: What do YouTube and GEMA have in 
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I think we have always wanted to be, we’ve always sought to license rather 
than to play really hardball.  
Another PRS respondent elaborated on this matter:  
I think one thing that PRS is known for is that it has been the first to 
license in many of these sort of new business kind of senses. We have 
taken a, an approach that is different from other parts of the music 
industry, especially abroad. […] If we look at GEMA for example, 
they’ve taken quite a different approach in that they’ve taken a 
litigation approach trying to extract as much value as possible out of 
the service YouTube. We have licensed YouTube for I think 6 years or 
more. So we do try to reach a licensing solution to support new 
businesses and start-ups and to find novel ways of extracting some 
value for our members’ repertoire that’s used by those services.  
To avoid the possibility of under-licensing certain services, an inherent danger when 
licensing emerging and still unestablished business models, respondents explained 
that PRS limits the duration of its licenses to one or two years.  Short-term licenses 
allow the organisation to regularly update the terms of the license, taking account of 
possible changes in the market, as well as in consumer consumption as indicators of 
the value and success of a given service and business model.613 This example shows 
that licensing CMOs, like PRS, have considerable leeway, subject to potential referrals 
to the Copyright Tribunal, in deciding on what conditions and for what duration to 
license the use of certain works.614  
                                                     
common?’ (Kluwer Copyright Blog, 8 February 2013) 
<http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2013/02/08/germany-what-do-youtube-and-gema-have-in-
common/> accessed 10 February 2017; Chris Cooke, ‘GEMA suffers another knockback in 
ongoing YouTube litigation’ (CMU, 1 February 2016) 
<http://www.completemusicupdate.com/article/gema-suffers-another-knockback-in-
ongoing-youtube-litigation/> accessed 10 February 2017. A deal between GEMA and 
YouTube was finally struck in late 2016, see Ingham T, ‘YouTube strikes deal with GEMA to 
host music videos in Germany’ (MusicBusiness Worldwide, 1 November 2016) 
<http://www.musicbusinessworldwide.com/youtube-strikes-deal-gema-host-music-videos-
germany/> accessed 10 February 2017. 
613 Amy Sandiford-Watts, ‘YouTube signs international licensing deal with PRS for Music’ 
(campaign, 22 August 2013) < http://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/1208564/youtube-signs-
international-licensing-deal-prs-music#> accessed 10 February 2017.  
614 Where a CMO and a potential licensee cannot agree on the terms of a license, these may 





Unlike PRS that conducts both direct licensing to users and data processing and 
distribution of payments to its members, ALCS is mainly active as a processing and 
distribution society. It distributes money to its members from secondary uses of 
works, which include photocopying, cable retransmission, digital reproduction, 
educational recording, and other.615 ALCS receives fees from other CMOs, such as the 
Copyright Licensing Agency (CLA) and the Educational Recording Agency (ERA). 
CLA and ERA are the bodies that directly negotiate licenses with other users, such as 
educational institutions, while ALCS’ strength lies in the administration of micro-
payments. According to ALCS respondents, this process itself is quite complex and 
requires that certain systems for data processing are in place.  
So, it’s quite a complex operation in terms of managing that data 
because you need to know who you are and to disambiguate people 
with similar names, that sort of thing. You need to know which works 
you wrote. You’ve also got to identify the correct works and make sure 
that’s all accurate…and then into that system the money flows in and 
has to then be apportioned between – you might be the co-author of a 
book with five other people. So, and then of course there’s the 
allocation, payment and dispatch to you and to your bank or to your 
agent, plus providing you with all the record keeping that you need 
for tax validity or whatever. So there’s quite a lot of work to be done 
in making sure that people…this huge chunk of money that comes in 
at the very top level then becomes these tiny fragments that are 
dispersed far and wide.616 
Albeit indirectly, ALCS is also involved in the business of licensing and as one ALCS 
respondent explained, the CMO generally participates in discussions concerning the 
future shape of certain licenses, which may require change subject to technological 
developments.  
So ALCS and PLS [Publishers Licensing Society], we are responsible 
for making sure that the CLA has mandates. So we provide the legal 
authority on behalf of authors, and publishers - PLS - do the same for 
the rights held by publishers. […] So in an established license sector 
                                                     
615 ‘What we do’ (ALCS) <http://www.alcs.co.uk/What-we-do> accessed 27 September 2016.  
616 Interview with Richard Combes, Head of Rights and Licensing, ALCS. 
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like HE [higher education], that is the normal run of what we do. But 
if the sector says: ‘Well look, something different is happening now, I 
want to use the work in a different way’, then there will be 
consultations. So the CLA will hear that from its customer effectively, 
they will pass that back to us and we can consult with our constituent 
parts and say, ‘Okay, well look, the license used to do this, it used to 
be able to photocopy a chapter. […] now people want to create a digital 
copy of a chapter and put it onto an internal resource within a 
university’s education network.’ So we consult on – are people happy 
with that and then we report that back to CLA who then negotiate with 
the licensee.617 
From the above examples, it follows that CMOs have several important advantages 
over other actors in copyright policy. For one, they enjoy power as gatekeepers to a 
large pool of rights. Furthermore, they have valuable knowledge of the way the 
collective exploitation and administration of certain rights under copyright works in 
practice. CMOs are the actors involved in the development of licensing and 
distribution schemes for various uses of works. As such, policymakers effectively rely 
on these actors for the provision of information and data on how these licensing 
markets operate in practice, so that future policy decisions can be based on an 
accurate understanding of the present status quo. These expertise, operational 
systems, and information consequently elevate CMOs’ importance as participants 
and contributors to copyright policymaking  
1.3.2 Protecting the value of the licenses – litigation and rights enforcement  
A further facet of CMOs’ function in the copyright system, as a by-product of which 
they gain power and importance as policy actors, involves CMOs’ role in preserving 
the value of the licenses that they grant. This includes, on the one hand ensuring that 
the negotiated licensing terms are being complied with and, on the other hand, that 
existing licenses are not being undermined altogether through the illegal use of 
works. This subsection, developed on the basis of interview data, only applies to PRS, 
since ALCS is, as stated above, mainly a distribution society. Some of the strategies 
                                                     
617 Interview with Richard Combes, Head of Rights and Licensing, ALCS. 
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employed by PRS to maintain the licenses’ value include litigation and the operations 
of the CMO’s anti-piracy unit.  
According to one PRS respondent, litigation, a term that the respondent used loosely 
to include general disputes as well as court proceedings, is often licensing-based. 
Debt, i.e. insufficient or non-payment, and reporting were regarded as the two main 
causes of disputes in connection with licenses, and as examples of non-compliance 
with the terms of a respective license:   
So under our online licenses we receive reporting either monthly or 
quarterly, there’s different reporting frequencies for different licensees 
and depending on the scheme but they [the licensees] report back to 
us the revenues they’ve been making because, for one, our royalties 
are calculated on a percentage of revenue, often, so we need to know 
how much they are earning so we can invoice the right amount. But 
also we need to know what music they’ve been using, so that kind of 
data. And we need to have it in a certain format so that it actually 
works with our system. […] Because we’re processing billions of lines 
of usage now at PRS and this doesn’t work unless there’s some order 
and format to it. Occasionally we have licensees who are either failing 
to meet the format criteria for data or they are just failing to meet the 
sort of deadlines and that’s important for us to have so that we can get 
the money distributed to the right place. It might be they are paying 
us but without the reporting to go with that we can’t actually use the 
money for anything. 
The importance of reporting by licensees for CMOs will be considered in more detail 
in section 2. Apart from engaging in disputes and litigation with licensees, in order to 
ensure that the licensing market works as intended, PRS also houses an anti-piracy 
unit.618 According to a PRS respondent, that unit primarily exists as a support 
structure for the core business of licensing, rather than to pursue a more general 
copyright enforcement agenda. ‘We come at this from a commercial perspective. So 
we have a small anti-piracy unit that’s made up of three full-time employees […] 
We’re looking to implement and use technology as much as we can to really get the 
                                                     
618 ‘Anti Piracy Unit’ (PRS) 
<http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/ourorganisation/antipiracyunit/pages/default.aspx> 
accessed 27 September 2016.  
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most efficient impact out of the resources that we have. […] there’s a process of notice 
and take down that you probably know a bit about which is the monitoring of online 
services that aren’t licensed.’ 
1.4. Conclusion 
The above accounts offer insight into the functions that PRS and ALCS primarily exist 
to perform. The importance of these activities for the functioning of copyright is 
evident. Through the negotiation of licenses, the safeguarding of their fulfilment 
through litigation, enforcement measures against unlicensed activities, as well as the 
general collection and distribution of payments based on comprehensive reporting 
and data processing, CMOs facilitate the exploitation of certain rights under 
copyright for specified uses. Following Olson’s ‘by-product’ theory, as a result of the 
valuable rights that CMOs hold and administer, of their role as copyright law 
implementers, as well as of the inside information that they hold on how licensing 
markets work, CMOs have the potential to be more powerful and influential 
copyright policy actors than other stakeholders, such as the studied unions. However, 
in the following section, I will demonstrate that the extent to which the two studied 
CMOs, ALCS and PRS, exercise this potential, for instance through proactive policy 
behaviour, varies, possibly as a consequence of differences in their self-concept, 
memberships, and perceived industry significance.       
2. Mapping differences between ALCS and PRS in the context of the 
implementation of the CRM Directive 
CMOs are generally in a better position to influence copyright policy compared to 
unions as a consequence of their indispensable role and functions for the copyright 
system. However, the context of CMOs’ policy input in relation to the implementation 
of the CRM Directive will demonstrate that despite commonalities between ALCS 
and PRS in the circumstances that render them potentially powerful actors, PRS 
presents a more proactive, self-starting and assertive behaviour in policy. It marks 
itself as a leader and an authoritative policy player, whereas ALCS, in contrast, 
appears more subdued, measured and reserved.  
221 
 
ALCS’ and PRS’ input will specifically be considered in relation to the 
implementation of two provisions of the CRM Directive. One relates to users’ 
obligations to provide CMOs with certain data (Article 17), which re-introduces the 
issue of reporting mentioned in section 1. The second issue relates to the 
implementation of Article 8 (9) in conjunction with Art. 6 (3) CRM Directive, which 
govern CMO members’ voting rights and their representation in these organisations’ 
decision-making processes. The latter issue in particular, will exemplify how PRS’ 
large and diverse membership challenges and influences the way the organisation 
frames its policy positions on certain matters. Following an analysis of interview data 
and PRS’ and ALCS’ consultation responses on these two specific themes, I will 
discuss, more generally, how ALCS and PRS approached their input both on the CRM 
Directive implementation and in policy more widely. This will broach the issue of the 
difficult practical delimitation between ‘awareness raising’ and ‘educating’ on the one 
hand, and ‘lobbying’ on the other, as descriptors used by CMO respondents to 
characterise their CMO’s policy output. In this context, I will illustrate how facts and 
advocacy are often intertwined when presented by copyright actors to policymakers 
and, as such, both permeate the policymaking process.  
2.1. Background: the CRM Directive  
The CRM Directive (Directive 2014/26/EU)619, as outlined in chapter 3, deals with two 
separate issues: the regulation of CMOs and the multi-territorial licensing of music 
online.620 The two specific issues that will be discussed in this section relate to the first 
arm of the Directive on the regulation of CMOs. According to Michel Barnier, at the 
time European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, cases of 
mismanagement of rights revenue and long-delayed payments had shown a need to 
improve the functioning of CMOs and thus set the wheels in motion for the drafting 
of the CRM Directive.621 Among the aims pursued through this Directive were to 
                                                     
619 See n 34. 
620 Chapter 3, section 3.3. 
621 Commission, ‘Commissioner Michel Barnier welcomes the European Parliament vote on 
the Directive on collective rights management’ MEMO/14/80 (4 February 2014).   
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improve the governance and transparency of CMOs, to enable greater involvement 
by right holders in the decision-making processes of CMOs, and to ensure timely and 
accurate payments of royalties to right holders.622 The UK policy process on the 
implementation of the CRM Directive was formally launched with a public 
consultation in February 2015. Of the studied four COs, only PRS and ALCS 
submitted responses to the consultation and generally engaged with policymakers on 
the topic, whereas SoA and the MU did not do so, likely because the Directive did not 
directly affect their own core sphere of activities or mandates and thus did not justify 
a respective allocation of time and resources. The transposition of the Directive 
concluded with the adoption of The Collective Management of Copyright (EU 
Directive) Regulations 2016, which took effect on 10 April 2016.623 
2.2. Article 17: Users’ Obligations 
The evidence on the way the government consulted on the implementation of Article 
17 CRM Directive shows the lawmaker’s dependence on CMOs for their information 
and knowledge input to inform policy. To that extent, it substantiates the point made 
in section 1 that CMOs gain their importance and power as copyright actors in part 
through the industry knowledge that they hold. The evidence further presents a 
contrast in the way ALCS and PRS engaged with the government’s consultation 
questions on this provision, which particularly demonstrates PRS’ proactive and 
leadership quality in seeking to be at the forefront of discussions and to participate in 
setting the direction of policy implementation. 
As noted above, Article 17 CRM Directive prescribes an obligation on users, i.e. 
licensees, to provide CMOs with certain data to facilitate CMOs’ function of collecting 
and appropriately distributing revenues. For ease of reference, the text of Article 17 
reads as follows:  
                                                     
622 Recitals 5, 6, 9 CRM Directive (n 34).  
623 The Collective Management of Copyright (EU Directive) Regulations 2016 SI 2016/221; 
‘Implementation of the Collective Rights Management Directive’ (IPO, 4 February 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/implementation-of-the-collective-rights-





Member States shall adopt provisions to ensure that users provide a 
collective management organisation, within an agreed or pre-
established time and in an agreed or pre-established format, with such 
relevant information at their disposal on the use of the rights 
represented by the collective management organisation as is necessary 
for the collection of rights revenue and for the distribution and 
payment of amounts due to rightholders. When deciding on the 
format for the provision of such information, collective management 
organisations and users shall take into account, as far as possible, 
voluntary industry standards.    
2.2.1 Power dynamics between the government and CMOs in the consultation process 
Once the EU adopted the Directive, the UK government launched a public 
consultation on its implementation. In relation to Article 17, it put forward the 
following question for consultation:  
Q. 28: What format do you think the user obligation should take and how might it be 
enforced? What is ‘relevant information’ for the purpose of user reporting?624 
On some other issues, like the management of rights revenue, the government had 
already indicated a certain inclination regarding the way it intended to transpose the 
Directive.625 However, this was not the case with regard to the questions arising in 
relation to Article 17. On this matter, it seemed that the lawmaker was waiting and 
relying on input from affected CMOs. The government was itself looking to gain a 
better understanding of the different ways in which such a user obligation may be 
implemented, as well as to gain a sense of the various existing categories of 
information that effectively played a role in the negotiation and compliance with 
licenses. While the government had indicated in the consultation document that it 
                                                     
624 IPO, ‘Collective rights management in the digital single market: Consultation on the 
implementation of the EU Directive on the collective management of copyright and multi-
territorial licensing of online music rights in the internal market’ (Consultation document) 
(January 2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/401225/coll
ective_rights.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017 (IPO, CRM Directive Consultation) 13.  
625 Ibid 12. 
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‘seeks views on the options for implementation’ and ‘welcomes evidence’, in practical 
terms, it was arguably dependent on the input of CMOs for the meaningful 
transposition of the Directive. CMOs were the vehicles facilitating the collective 
licensing of certain rights under copyright in the first place; they were thus the 
essential actors holding the information on what was necessary for the proper 
application of Article 17.  
The IPO’s reliance on CMOs’ participation and information in the process of the CRM 
Directive implementation was also reflected in the Impact Assessment that 
accompanied the consultation document. In many areas, the IA was left blank since a 
complete economic assessment could not be undertaken without information held by 
the CMOs. Moreover, several respondents from both ALCS and PRS commented in 
relation to the CRM Directive that the IPO had had several meetings with UK CMOs 
and was working closely with these organisations on the transposition of the 
Directive – something that the IPO itself affirmed in the government’s response to the 
CRM consultation.626 A respondent from ALCS stated: 
I mean we’re also working with [the] IPO at the moment, I say we, all 
the UK CMOs, on the implementation of the Collective Rights 
Management Directive. […] So, we’re at the stage now, the UK and the 
IPO are trying to implement the Directive, they are having, [have] just 
run a consultation that closed on Monday and, you know, we’re still 
having meetings with them to kind of talk about the impact of how are 
the regulations going to really work for all of our different 
organisations that do subtly different things under the same broad 
kind of umbrella CMO activity.627  
On the one hand, in the context of the CRM Directive, CMOs were the actors being 
subject to regulation. At the same time, the power dynamics between these actors and 
the lawmaker were less straightforward, considering that the government also relied 
                                                     
626 IPO, ‘Collective rights management in the Digital Single Market, Consultation on the 
implementation of the EU Directive on the collective management of copyright and multi-
territorial licensing of online music rights in the internal market: Government response’ (July 
2015) 9  < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/446772/resp
onse-crm-directive.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017.  
627 Interview with Richard Combes, Head of Rights and Licensing, ALCS.  
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on CMOs, on their industry knowledge and experience, to put flesh on the bones of 
the provisions adopted in Brussels.  
2.2.2 ALCS’ and PRS’ input in relation to the users’ obligation 
It became clear from the interview data considered in section 1 of this chapter that 
data reporting by licensees, especially in the area of online licensing, was a 
particularly hot topic for PRS and one of the most common triggers of disputes 
between the CMO and its licensees. PRS was therefore especially interested in the 
possibility of bringing in a statutory reporting duty on users through the Directive 
and, as I will show, ALCS, too, supported this initiative.  
Before the adoption of the Directive, PRS had called on the EU lawmaker to introduce 
an obligation upon licensees to provide good quality data to CMOs in a position 
paper that it had published, which included a section titled ‘Data is essential for the 
good functioning of collective management’.628 I did not find a similar position paper 
outlining ALCS’ views on the then still to be adopted Directive. The fact that PRS 
chose to draft and disseminate a ‘position paper’ outside of the direct context of a 
public consultation or a public hearing, the latter of which it had in fact taken part in 
in 2010, is already indicative of the fact that PRS’ self-identify, or self-concept, is 
characterised by confidence, authoritativeness, and leadership. PRS drafted this 
position paper because it believed that its voice would be heard and taken into 
consideration. It also drafted it because it wanted its view to influence the specific 
substance of the Directive.   
In their submission to the IPO consultation on the implementation of the CRM 
Directive, both PRS and ALCS engaged in detail with the IPO’s question on users’ 
obligations. ALCS dealt with the respective question 28 in its joint response with CLA 
                                                     
628 PRS, ‘Position Paper: Proposal for a Directive on Collective Management of Copyright 
and Related Rights and Multi-Territorial Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online 
Uses in the Internal Market (“CRM Directive”)’ (March 2013) 
<https://www.prsformusic.com/SiteCollectionDocuments/CRM%20Directive%20PRS%20for
%20Music%20Mar%202013%20English%20FINAL.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017. 
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(the Copyright Licensing Agency) and PLS (The Publishers Licensing Society).629 It 
outlined what ‘relevant information’ in Article 17 of the Directive meant in relation 
to the licensing undertaken by CLA. The organisations’ preferred approach to the 
transposition of this provision was the establishment of voluntary industry codes for 
data reporting by licensee, in consultation with the IPO, based on the view that a 
common industry standard for reporting obligations on users would unlikely be 
workable given the different requirements of individual CMOs across diverse 
sectors.630  
PRS also drafted an extensive answer to this question within its consultation 
response, detailing its information requirements in relation to musical works. For its 
part, the CMO urged for the direct copying out of Article 17 into the implementing 
regulations as an enforceable users’ obligation, suggesting that the provision could 
be supported with more practical information, such as best practice, minimum 
standards, codes of practice, etc., to help stakeholders comply with the 
requirements.631 To this point, both ALCS and PRS had substantively responded to 
the government’s question and offered their view on what an appropriate 
implementation of Article 17 CRM Directive would look like.  
However, PRS went even further and asked for a range of enforcement measures in 
relation to this obligation, including rights of complaint to the National Competent 
Authority, as well as full audit rights on data quality and accuracy. PRS’ 
implementation strategy also envisaged the existence of a Data Standards Working 
Group. Additionally, PRS suggested that the implementation of users’ obligations 
                                                     
629 CLA, ALCS and PLS, ‘Consultation on Collective Rights Management in the Digital Single 
Market’ (Joint Consultation Response) (2015) 12-13 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/implementation-of-the-collective-rights-
management-directive> accessed 10 February 2017 (CLA, ALCS, PLS Joint Response). 
630 Ibid.  
631 PRS, ‘Collective Rights Management in the Digital Single Market’ (Consultation 
Response) (30 March 2015) 19-20 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/implementation-of-the-collective-rights-




would necessitate the set-up of a working group and noted, in this respect, that it 
would wish to be part of such a group. These comparatively bold and extensive 
suggestions made by PRS could indicate the extent to which reporting problems 
hinder PRS’ own internal operations. They also demonstrate the organisation’s 
thorough engagement with the consultation, which benefits the decision-makers 
who, as a result, were ultimately presented with a wide range of proposals and 
options for consideration. However, the proposal to set up a working group that 
would guide the implementation of this provision, coupled with PRS’ request to be 
part of this group also demonstrate PRS’ willingness to lead and shape policy 
implementation, as well as a certain confidence in its own political power, which 
allowed it to make this request in the first place. 
Ultimately, based on the information received by ALCS, PRS and other CMOs, the 
government decided to copy out the Directive in Regulation 16 without including 
specific details on the type of information, format, or enforcement measures, leaving 
these subject to the negotiation between the parties to a license. Perhaps, a certain 
compromise can be seen in this decision. The government’s hands-off approach was 
possibly motivated by the insight gleaned through the consultation responses into the 
myriad of different format and data requirements that various CMOs had.  
2.3. Article 8 (9) and Article 6 (3) CRM Directive: CMO members’ voting rights and 
representation in CMOs’ decision-making process 
The evidence regarding the way ALCS and PRS engaged with the consultation 
questions pertaining to Articles 6(3) and 8(9) CRM Directive on members’ voting 
rights and representation in the CMOs’ decision-making process presents further 
differences between ALCS’ and PRS’ approaches in contributing to and influencing 
policy. In comparison, ALCS’ submission comes across as more moderate and modest 
in its manner, while PRS’ input appears more determined and assertive. Furthermore, 
interview data coupled with the written consultation response on the issue of 
members’ voting rights particularly reveals how PRS’ large and diverse membership 
challenges the organisation’s ability to develop policy positions on certain issues. At 
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the same time, it also becomes clear that this membership structure directly influences 
the positions that PRS takes. Moreover, the position adopted by PRS in relation to the 
implementation of Article 8(9) also exemplifies how the interests of some groups of 
members are possibly compromised in the ultimate position that the CMO adopts. 
This would suggest that the positions of such complexly composed copyright actors 
should not be taken to directly reflect the uncompromised interests of all of the actors’ 
constituents.  
2.3.1 Article 6(3) 
Article 6(3) CRM Directive reads as follows:  
The statute of a collective management organisation shall provide for 
appropriate and effective mechanisms for the participation of its 
members in the organisation’s decision- making process. The 
representation of the different categories of members in the decision-
making process shall be fair and balanced. 
In consulting on the appropriate transposition of this provision, the government 
asked in its consultation document under question 14: ‘What should “fair and 
balanced” representation in Article 6(3) look like in practice?’632 
PRS took the approach of relating this question to its own set-up and thereby 
confidently indicated that its own structure exemplified good practice and 
compliance. The organisation opened its response to question 14 with the following 
sentence: ‘Our view is that the representation of the different categories of members 
– i.e. writers and publishers – in the PRS decision-making process is “fair and 
balanced” as required by Article 6(3) of the Directive.’633 PRS subsequently outlined 
the equal representation of writer and publisher members on the PRS Board with 
reference to its Articles of Association and then briefly touched on its membership 
structure, which includes multiple categories of members with varying or no voting 
rights. Here, again, using the words of the Directive, PRS pointed out that promotion 
to a membership category with more voting rights was based on ‘fair and 
                                                     
632 IPO, CRM Directive Consultation (n 624) 11.  
633 PRS, CRM Directive Consultation Response (n 631) 9. 
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proportionate criteria’ and that the current system of voting rights allocation was 
generally considered fair. In taking this approach, PRS appeared authoritative. It also 
demonstrated confidence and leadership in its interpretation of ‘fair and balanced’ by 
subsuming these criteria directly under its pre-existing set-up, rather than attempting 
to define the terms in more abstract or general ways. One could argue that this in fact 
presents an example of good advocacy, as it effectively plants the idea into 
policymakers’ minds that PRS’ structures and workings stand for good practice.  
ALCS’ approach to the government’s consultation question, in contrast, came across 
as more modest and reserved. In particular, in its individual response to the CRM 
Directive consultation, which ALCS drafted alongside the joint response with CLA 
and PLS, ALCS began by recognising the potential existence of differing views and 
perspectives on the question put forward, as a result of different organisational and 
membership structures.634 It then outlined its own particular structure, where each 
member has equal voting rights and moved onto the next question, without offering 
its own perspective on whether this set-up in fact meets the criteria of ‘fair and 
balanced’ in the same way that PRS had done. Moreover, and again in contrast with 
PRS, ALCS’, CLA’s and PLS’ joint response actually endeavoured to propose, in more 
general and abstract terms, objective guidelines on what ‘fair and balanced’ 
representation could require, rather than directly subsume these criteria under their 
own structures. The joint response first positioned the way decision-making power 
was generally distributed within private companies limited by guarantee – the 
company form adopted by both ALCS and PRS. The response then sketched some 
guidelines, including that a fair and transparent mechanism for members’ voting 
should avoid weighted voting systems which unfairly favour one type or class of 
member and which are disproportionate to their contribution to the company.635  
                                                     
634 ALCS, ‘ALCS Response to the Consultation on the Implementation of the EU Directive on 
the Collective Management of Copyright and Multi-territorial Licensing of Online Music 
Rights in the Internal Market’ (2015) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/implementation-of-the-collective-rights-
management-directive> accessed 10 February 2017 (ALCS, CRM Consultation Response) 4.  
635 CLA, ALCS, PLS Joint Response (n 629) 8-9.  
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This comparison of approaches demonstrates the various ways in which different 
CMOs choose to engage and contribute to policy. The differences identified here, 
where PRS appeared slightly more imposing and assertive, while ALCS came across 
as more moderate, while still authoritative, may also be indicative of differences in 
the goals that these actors pursued through the consultation. It may be that on this 
occasion, ALCS was indeed primarily concerned with helping the government 
through its own information and expertise in transposing the Directive in the 
intended spirit. And perhaps, PRS’ approach in focussing on how its current structure 
was already compliant with the Directive’s requirements, rather than on attempting 
to present its own view on the meaning of this requirement more generally, suggests 
that PRS used the consultation to try and ensure that it would not need to implement 
too many changes within its organisation. Certainly, from the perspective of PRS, this 
is a sensible approach, as it would mean keeping its own compliance costs down. The 
latter would ultimately also benefit its members. 
Ultimately, the government implemented Article 6(3) through Regulation 6 (a) and 
(b) by copying out the relevant wording from the Directive. No concretising details 
of what ‘fair and balanced’ representation actually means were provided. This 
suggests that both of the studied CMOs will be able to maintain their established 
structures and that PRS in particular will have the scope to argue that its current 
arrangement meets the specified criteria.      
2.3.2 Article 8(9) 
Article 8(9) CRM Directive establishes the principle that all CMO members should 
have a right to vote at general assemblies of their organisations. The provision further 
stipulates that restrictions to members’ voting rights may apply under specified 
circumstances. The provision is worded as follows:  
All members of the collective management organisation shall have the 
right to participate in, and the right to vote at, the general assembly of 
members. However, Member States may allow for restrictions on the 
right of the members of the collective management organisation to 
participate in, and to exercise voting rights at, the general assembly of 
members, on the basis of one or both of the following criteria:  
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(a) duration of membership;  
(b) amounts received or due to a member,  
provided that such criteria are determined and applied in a manner 
that is fair and proportionate. (emphasis added) 
The corresponding consultation question put forward by the UK government was: 
‘Which of the discretionary provisions of Article 8 do you think should be adopted?’636 
The first indication that this was a particularly sensitive issue for PRS came from a 
semi-structured interview with one PRS respondent, where the respondent said:  
[…] okay, so one thing that we’re still lobbying Government on is 
around voting: AGMs and membership, different categories of 
membership and their voting rights at an AGM. 
This respondent explained, as I later verified in PRS’ Articles of Association, that the 
present structure of PRS consists of three membership categories: provisional 
members, associate members, and full members.637 A member’s category depends on 
their royalty earnings and on the extent to which these earnings meet or exceed 
certain thresholds over a given period of time.638 Crucially, according to PRS’ 
constitution, provisional members do not have voting rights and may not attend 
AGMs.639 On a poll or postal ballot, associate members have one vote, whereas full 
members have ten votes.640 There is also a further voting category, informally referred 
to as ‘supervoters’, where, subject to additional financial qualifying criteria, full 
members may avail themselves of additional 10 votes, making their total number of 
votes 20.641 Another PRS respondent commented that 75% of PRS’ large membership 
of over 118 000 members642 are provisional members and as such, have no voting (or 
                                                     
636 IPO, CRM Directive Consultation (n 624) Question 17, p 11.  
637 Article 5(c) PRS Articles of Association (n 604).  
638 See ‘PRS for Music membership categories’ (PRS) 
<http://www.prsformusic.com/aboutus/ourpeople/governance/pages/membership-
categories.aspx> accessed 10 February 2017.  
639 Article 6(b) PRS Articles of Association (n 604).  
640 Article 27(b) PRS Articles of Association (n 604). 
641 Article 27(c) PRS Articles of Association (n 604).  
642 This figure was obtained from PRS’ website on 06 October 2016 
<https://www.prsformusic.com/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 06 October 2016.  
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attendance) rights. This was corroborated by PRS’ written response to the CRM 
Directive consultation, which indicated in Table 1 that only ca. 25% of the 
membership was eligible to vote.643 Against this background, it is evident that the 
issue of voting rights and the way PRS should position itself on this issue in its 
consultation response had the potential of causing discord within the membership.  
One PRS respondent explained how the organisation dealt with this problem in order 
to ensure that the ultimate position communicated to policymakers was one that 
could be carried by the entire PRS membership:  
[…] one of our roles is to highlight issues early, develop positions, take 
them through the board so that we know we have the mandate of the 
board to lobby positions. What issues […] the recent Directive on the 
regulation of collective management because it’s quite possible that 
the members would have had a different view about what the 
appropriate level of regulation is. So, that’s one area where we talked 
through the issues and it probably does mean that the PRS position, 
I’m quite careful to structure our positions so that they are effectively 
positions in principle. So you could say, for example, on the Collective 
Rights Management Directive, one of our, our positions are that, in 
principle, that the members should govern the society and the 
members should decide how to structure the voting rights within the 
society. And that’s a point of principle. And, furthermore, that the 
government shouldn’t be imposing restrictions on how the members 
govern their society or determine the voting rights. So, that’s a point 
of principle. That doesn’t mean that we’ve gone further. What it 
doesn’t mean is that PRS’ management are saying, ‘oh actually, we’re 
defending the status quo of the current way the voting and the 
governance works’, because I don’t think that’s appropriate for us to 
do. That’s a membership issue. But because our position is as a matter 
of principle – It’s for the members to decide, not for Government – the 
members are very comfortable with us maintaining that position.644  
PRS’ consultation submission indeed put forward that PRS wished for the 
government to permit restrictions on voting rights because ‘[a]s a point of principle, 
we think that it should be up to the members of a CMO, who own the CMO and 
                                                     
643 PRS, CRM Directive Consultation Response (n 631) 11. 
644 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS.  
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assign their rights to it, to determine the way in which the CMO is organised.’645 
Incidentally, as outlined with regard to PRS’ response in relation to Article 6(3), the 
organisation did in fact argue that it considered its present system of voting rights a 
fairer way of allowing members to be represented. To this extent, it did defend the 
present status quo. This reveals some contradiction between the words of my PRS 
respondent and the content of the organisation’s written consultation submission. 
Perhaps my respondent was not fully at ease when speaking about this matter in 
awareness of the potential remaining tension between different PRS members 
regarding the way the organisation had positioned itself. After all, while the point 
made was that it was for the members to decide, in principle, on their own voting 
rights system, it seemed unlikely that the deciding, more powerful members would 
relinquish voting power to the benefit of the greater mass of the lower earning 75% 
of PRS members.  
The case of PRS’ positioning in relation to the issue of CMO members’ voting rights 
illustrates the inherent challenge facing copyright stakeholders with large and 
diversely composed memberships of developing policy positions that are 
representative of their membership. In chapters 5 and 6, I argued that the views 
expressed by umbrella organisations, like UK Music and BCC, are not fully 
representative of the individual views of their constituent member organisations.646 
The individual member organisations are faced with a need to compromise their 
positions in order to find common ground. It could be argued that the present case of 
PRS’ policy position on voting rights depicts the occurrence of the same effect but on 
a smaller scale, i.e. within one complexly composed organisation. The position 
advanced by PRS, phrased as a position in principle, could possibly be carried by the 
whole membership. Yet, as acknowledged by the PRS respondent quoted above, the 
fact remains that the views, and arguably interests, of different PRS members on this 
                                                     
645 PRS, CRM Directive Consultation Response (n 631) 10.  
646 See Chapter 5, sections 3.2.3 and 4.3. See also Chapter 6, section 2.3.  
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issue will vary and there may well be some lower earning members who would see 
it fit to have a right to participate in their organisation’s general assembly.      
The challenge identified above applies to both PRS and ALCS to the extent that both 
COs have large memberships and, within these, more and less successful and 
established creators: creators who work as full-time professionals and others for 
whom writing, or music may be one of several occupations. Naturally, the viewpoints 
and priorities of this wide pool of creators may well differ on certain issues and be 
influenced by the stakes they hold, on the one hand in their CMO, and on the other 
hand, in the respective creative industry more generally. PRS’ case is further 
complicated by the fact that it also represents music publishers. However, the 
question of whether restrictions on voting rights should be introduced was less of a 
sensitive issue for ALCS because under this CO’s governance structure, each member 
has equal voting rights.647 In the end, the government copied out the relevant wording 
of the Directive and introduced the possibility for CMOs to restrict members’ voting 
rights in Regulation 7(1)(f),(4). As Article 8(9) of the Directive, Regulation 7(4) 
stipulates that members’ voting rights may be restricted based on one or both of the 
two criteria laid out in the Directive: duration of membership and amounts received 
or due to a member, provided these criteria are determined and applied in a fair and 
proportionate manner and are included in the CMO’s statute or membership terms. 
In this respect, it is likely that neither of the studied CMOs will need to make changes 
to its current governance structure when it comes to members’ voting rights. 
2.4. General approach of ALCS and PRS to the CRM Directive consultation  
In the preceding analyses of PRS’ and ALCS’ policy input in relation to Articles 17, 
6(3) and 8(9) CRM Directive, I demonstrated differences in the positions advanced 
and in the presentation of these organisations’ submissions, arguing that, in 
comparison, PRS came across as being more determined, assertive, and confident in 
its power. This organisation also demonstrated a desire to lead and shape policy. 
ALCS on the other hand, appeared more matter-of-fact, more moderate and 
                                                     
647 Art. 26 ALCS Articles of Association (n 252). 
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unimposing. These differences highlight distinctions in both CMOs’ self-concept, i.e. 
in the way that each organisation perceives and identifies its role and place in 
copyright policy. Through effective advocacy, PRS establishes itself as a thought 
leader and an example of good practice, while ALCS seeks to play a more neutral role, 
as a contributing, rather than leading, participant in the policy process. This 
difference was also underlined by both organisations’ general position in relation to 
the consultation on the CRM Directive implementation.  
The position expressed both by PRS respondents in the semi-structured interviews, 
as well as in PRS’ consultation response was that the organisation considered itself to 
be generally compliant with the provisions of the Directive.648 In contrast, ALCS did 
not maintain that it was already largely compliant. Rather, it openly admitted early 
on in its consultation response that estimating costs for the overall implementation 
and ongoing compliance with the CRM Directive was challenging, ‘especially as we 
do not yet know the detail of UK implementation’.649 PRS’ position seems odd given 
that the very purpose of the consultation was to establish how specifically the Directive 
should be transposed. In this respect, it was not yet clear what changes would be 
necessary for organisations to undertake in order to be compliant with the Directive. 
In other words, it was not clear how the government would exercise its discretion. 
This was accurately acknowledged by ALCS. At the same time, PRS’ approach, again, 
demonstrates effective advocacy and confidence. It implied that PRS was already 
embodying the Directive’s prescriptions on good practice and thereby implicitly 
advocated for a certain reading of the Directive’s provisions. 
The differences in ALCS’ and PRS’ approaches to policy as exemplified through their 
responses to the CRM consultation, may not only be the result of differing self-
concepts. Membership composition may play a role in this as well to the extent that 
PRS may gain some of its confidence and political power from the fact that, unlike 
ALCS, it speaks for both creators and publishers, i.e. for a larger subset of copyright 
                                                     
648 PRS, CRM Directive Consultation Response (n 631) 2, 12, 13, 21. 
649 ALCS, CRM Consultation Response (n 634) 1.  
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stakeholders. Furthermore, PRS might derive reinforcement to be particularly 
assertive from the understanding that its economic significance as a music industry 
CMO is greater than that of CMOs in publishing. One PRS respondent expressed this 
as follows:  
the very big difference between us and the publishing industry is, of 
course, that publishers use collective management for what they call 
secondary uses and, therefore, it’s not very important, economically 
important. And most publishers would say: ‘Oh, collective licensing 
royalties are about 3-4 per cent of our income.’ Whereas you come into 
music and collective management is the primary source of income for 
most people in the industry – in[cluding] composers and songwriters. 
And music publishers.650  
It is perhaps a consequence of these varied factors that PRS appears to pursue a 
position of leadership when it comes to influencing and shaping copyright policy. In 
any event, another PRS respondent also emphasised the importance for PRS of being 
a thought leader, and of disseminating its policy positions widely and effectively:  
So, how do we react? How do we, how can we inform debates? How 
can we engineer, you know, opportunities for our senior people to be 
actually exposed to and provide opinions for leadership pieces […]. 
So, some of the things we will be doing is kind of liaising with contacts 
in the industry to get people on panels, get people at events […]. So, 
for example, Robert Ashcroft, our CEO, we’ve got him, he’s attending 
something called the Westminster Media Forum in a couple of weeks’ 
time. So […] that’s just by knowing a few contacts and speaking, you 
know, that we get the invite extended so Robert can go and then has a 
platform to talk about whatever issues we need to talk about. 
2.5. The nature of stakeholder policy input  
Section 1 of this chapter demonstrated the importance of CMOs for the functioning 
of the copyright system and linked this both to CMOs’ power and influence over 
copyright policy, as well as to their role as copyright law implementers and as 
valuable sources of policy-relevant information. The preceding subsections of this 
section 2, on the other hand, provided specific examples of both how the government 
                                                     
650 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal and Policy Affairs, PRS. The same point was 
made in PRS’ Position Paper on the Proposal for a CRM Directive (n 628).  
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relies on these actors’ input in policy, as well as of how these CMOs contribute to the 
policymaking process. The examples also showed that PRS’ and ALCS’ input is 
reflective not only of their own experience and expertise, but also of the interests that 
they represent within their membership, the goals that they potentially pursue 
through their input, as well as their own self-concept. These observations alone 
already point to the intertwined nature of the copyright policy process and 
stakeholders’ behaviour, which may in certain instances challenge the objective of 
developing purely evidence-based policy. To further substantiate this point, I will 
show that even from the perspective of respondents from PRS and ALCS, the lines 
between ‘raising awareness’, ‘educating’, and ‘lobbying’ policymakers are not 
entirely clear. 
In the context of the implementation of the CRM Directive, CMOs’ participation in 
policy was vital as a means of informing discussions and possibly also of laying the 
parameters within which policy measures were practically reasonable and achievable. 
At the same time, and particularly with regard to such a policy that would affect 
CMOs’ work or their internal organisation, these actors naturally also had their own 
stake in the final outcome. I therefore sought to understand through the interviews 
with ALCS and PRS respondents, how these actors defined and perceived their policy 
role in relation to this issue, as well as more generally.   
One PRS respondent emphasised that communicating the organisation’s views on all 
matters of copyright, including collective rights management, was part of the general 
‘flow of information’:  
PRS is very clear about its views on copyright: copyright policy 
development, international copyright issues… on anything to do with 
regulation of collective management […] then I also ensure that we 
communicate those views to the European Commission, to the UK 
government, to the Parliament, the European Parliament, to 
Westminster. So I run the public affairs programme to make sure that 
our views are communicated and that the intelligence is, you know, is 
just a flow of information.651 
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Other respondents from both ALCS and PRS described their role in policy as 
‘educational’, as ‘information sharing’ or ‘awareness raising’, as well as ‘lobbying’. 
However, it is notable that on several occasions respondents would distance 
themselves from the notion of lobbying, implicitly (and at times explicitly) assigning 
a negative connotation to this act. In this respect, one ALCS respondent, commenting 
on the organisation’s commissioned research into authors’ earnings652, noted:  
And again, I won’t use the word lobbying but in our communicative 
activity, our relationships with politicians and civil servants, we’ve 
been able to use that sort of research – it’s been quite helpful.653 
On the other hand, another ALCS respondent freely described their activity as 
lobbying but at the same time equated that with information sharing:  
[…] we also have a regular campaign to meet with as many 
parliamentarians as possible to make them aware of current issues 
around authors. So, it’s, whilst we call it lobbying, it’s actually more, 
information sharing and raising awareness […] lobbying to me is 
communicating, information sharing and sometimes making a 
point.654   
In relation to the CRM Directive transposition and PRS’ policy role on this topic, 
contradictory statements were made by different PRS respondents. Some spoke freely 
of ‘lobbying’ and ‘trying to influence’, particularly in relation to the Directive’s 
provisions on members’ voting rights, whereas others were much more cautious, or 
disinclined to use, such a characterisation. The following quote by a PRS respondent 
illustrates the latter case:  
I’ll give you a copy of our input. But it’s interesting you use the word 
lobbying because we were, you know, Government is consulting on 
the economic impact of the regulations so our response is a reply about 
the economic and, and kind of regulatory impact of this Directive. So, 
if I’m lobbying on one issue in that area it is, there’s one very 
interesting thing which the Directive opens up, which is that users are 
obliged to supply data to collecting societies. […] And that is one area 
where our costs go, increase if we can’t find, if we haven’t got good 
                                                     
652 See chapter 4, section 2.1. 
653 Benjamin Pearson, Policy Development Advisor, ALCS. 
654 Interview with Barbara Hayes, Deputy Chief Executive, ALCS. 
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data and we can’t pay accurately if we don’t have good data. And so, 
it’s an area of uncertainty but I don’t think Government knows how to 
implement this obligation and we’re very clear that this is now an 
opportunity for Government to help collecting societies and creators 
by increasing the, our ability to get better data from the licensees. So, I 
might count that as lobbying.655 
I followed up this respondent’s statement and asked if they could explain what 
‘lobbying’ actually meant.  
It’s a really interesting one. I mean, I just think, I think so much of what 
we do is educational. And I explained to you, you know, explaining 
how we license rights, how we license new markets. Some of that is 
just to inform people so that they know and they can take decisions 
about policy issues […] So much of what we do though is, although 
you might see it differently, but we are a business and we are subject 
to regulation. And so I don’t care about us lobbying when you are 
effectively explaining how regulation impacts a business.656 
All of the above accounts of ALCS and PRS respondents’ own perception of their role 
and purpose in copyright policy illustrate the inevitably intertwined nature of general 
facts and information, on the one hand, and advocacy, on the other. In fact, in oral, as 
well as in written evidence, submitted by copyright stakeholders, information 
generally serves a purpose beyond merely ‘informing’, or ‘educating’. This challenges 
the recipients of all such evidence, in the case of UK copyright policy, primarily the 
IPO, in assessing the evidence purely on the merits of its information content.  
2.6. Conclusion 
Through an analysis of ALCS’ and PRS’ approach and policy positions on the general 
implementation of the CRM Directive, as well as with regard specifically to the 
Directive’s provisions on users’ obligations and members’ representation and voting 
rights, this section demonstrated marked differences between the two CMOs’ policy 
contributions. PRS’ behaviour was characterised by assertiveness, confidence and a 
clear desire for leadership in shaping the substance and implementation of policy, 
whereas ALCS’ behaviour in contrast appeared more neutral, reserved and moderate, 
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while still authoritative. The identified differences were ascribed to a divergence in 
the way ALCS and PRS appeared to perceive and define their roles in policy, i.e. their 
self-concepts, to differences in their membership composition, as well as to perceived 
differences in their economic significance. From PRS’ approach to the issue of 
members’ voting rights, I further concluded that copyright stakeholders with large 
and diversely composed memberships face an inherent challenge in developing 
policy positions that are representative of their memberships. The final positions 
adopted are in fact not accurate representations of the interests of all groups covered 
in such an organisation’s membership and some interests are necessarily 
compromised.  
Another theme that emerged from the analyses of the government’s consultation 
documents and questions, as well as from the interview data is that there is a certain 
reliance by policymakers on the input and participation of CMOs in the policy 
process, in order to inform debates, offer practical proposals for the implementation 
of certain provisions and provide relevant policy information. At the same time, in 
considering how individual respondents from PRS and ALCS perceive and define 
their role in policy, I argued that the lines between facts, or information provision, 
and advocacy are fluid and the two are often intertwined, particularly because CMOs 
themselves, as copyright stakeholders, have vested interests.  
3. Discussion and conclusions  
The analyses in this chapter corroborate the broader theme emerging from the 
findings of the preceding chapters that not all actors who represent right owners are 
easily comparable in terms of their policy behaviour; there are, in fact, observable 
differences even between functionally similar organisations. A comparison of 
chapters 4 and 5 particularly demonstrated differences in the behaviour of the studied 
unions, SoA and MU, as it discussed the different priorities and approaches that the 
two organisations took in relation to the issue of creators’ and performers’ contract 
terms. Similarly, the present chapter evidenced differences in the policy behaviour 
and positions adopted by the two CMOs, ALCS and PRS, in relation to the 
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implementation of the CRM Directive. In fact, this chapter argued that distinctions 
exist not only with regard to the specific positions that individual COs adopt on a 
given matter, but also with regard to the role that they seek to play in the 
policymaking process overall.  
Chapter 3 pointed to policy submissions by academics, which had treated CMOs in 
general terms when arguing that they wield particular policy influence.657 However, 
contrary to the portrayals by these academics, by the media, and by IP reviewers, 
CMOs do not produce a uniform effect on copyright policy, as individual CMOs 
behave differently in the policy process. Moreover, based on differences in self-
concept and in general policy behaviour, some CMOs may wield more influence over 
policy than others. In light of this, there is a need for a more nuanced and less 
generalising treatment of individual copyright actors.   
Finally, this chapter’s analyses of PRS’ stance with regard to the issue of members’ 
voting rights, as well as of the way PRS abstained from taking a position on creators’ 
contract terms, as discussed in chapter 5, produce an important observation. The 
more diverse the membership of any given policy actor is, the more likely it is that 
some of the views and interests held by different contingents within this actor’s 
membership will not surface in the ultimate position that the actor adopts and 
advances. This applies particularly to actors like PRS, whose membership is large, 
representing various categories of creators, as well as publishers. It also applies, to an 
even greater extent, to more complex actors like the British Copyright Council, or UK 
Music. The greater the internal disparity between the individual positions held by 
different members within an organisational actor, the more nuances will become lost, 
and thus unrepresented, in the process of compromise and power dynamics that 
precede the publicly visible common position. As such, certain nuances and issues 
will be advanced less powerfully and vocally, and will have a smaller chance of being 
taken up by policymakers.   
                                                     











Like other fields of regulation, copyright policy is of course, and as demonstrated, 
constantly in flux. As the research for this thesis came to completion, the European 
Commission issued a proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single 
Market. 658 Article 13 of this proposed instrument tackles the so-called ‘value gap’ – 
an issue that was also raised by PRS respondents during the fieldwork for this thesis. 
This new policy development helpfully exemplifies some of the findings that I have 
articulated in the preceding chapters. As such, before moving to my overall 
conclusions, in section 1 I will briefly present the case of the so-called ‘value gap’ as a 
recent policy development that ties together and illustrates multiple observations 
made in this thesis. Section 2 will then offer an overview of the thesis, its main 
conclusions, as well as their implications for researchers, policymakers, the media, 
and for COs themselves.  
1. Recent development: The so-called ‘value gap’ 
The ‘value gap’ case will underline PRS’ particular policy proactivity and its effective 
and successful advocacy work. It will thus offer a stark contrast to the self-concepts 
of SoA and ALCS, presented in chapter 4.659 This will not only corroborate the relative 
power of certain CMOs over other actors but also the existence of important 
differences between individual actors representing right owners. Furthermore, the 
‘value gap’ case will exemplify power dynamics in action: it will show how some 
individual actors, in this case PRS, are capable of exercising particular influence 
within industry umbrella organisations, like the British Copyright Council and UK 
Music. Moreover, it will suggest that power imbalances exist not only between 
                                                     
658 See n 89.  
659 See Chapter 4, section 1.3.6. 
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individual actors, but also between different creative sectors. The ‘value gap’ as an 
issue was spearheaded by music industry organisations, and the private copying 
chapter itself already demonstrated the strength and efficacy of music industry 
stakeholders taking joint action. In the following, I will show how power dynamics 
and effective stakeholder behaviour mean that certain voices and issues in copyright 
policy benefit from greater media and policymaker attention compared to others, and 
are thus heard and acted on more. Finally, the ‘value gap’ matter will also exemplify 
the dynamic nature of interest constellations in copyright, as well as the idea that 
copyright actors succeed in their policy causes when they act in unison.  
1.1. Defining the so-called ‘value gap’ 
In the last 2-3 years, the term ‘value gap’ has been used by music industry 
organisations, such as the IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic 
Industry), to describe the discrepancy between the significant rise in music 
consumption through ad-supported user upload services and the considerably lower 
revenue returns from such consumption for right holders.660 References in the context 
of the ‘value gap’ have consistently been made to YouTube, which is seen as the 
primary culprit for this present status quo.661 Music industry organisations see the 
legal underpinnings of the ‘value gap’ in the liability exceptions for information 
service providers established under the E-Commerce Directive, the so-called ‘safe 
                                                     
660 Frances Moore, ‘The value gap – the missing beat at the heart of our industry’ (IFPI, 5 May 
2016) <http://www.ifpi.org/news/The-value-gap-the-missing-beat-at-the-heart-of-our-
industry> accessed 10 February 2017.  
661 Ibid; Helen Smith, Veronique Desbrosses, Frances Moore, ‘Value gap is crucial for the 
music sector’ (the Guardian (Letter), 24 July 2016) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/jul/24/valu-gap-music-sector-youtube> 
accessed 10 February 2017; Daniel Adrian Sanchez, ‘Is YouTube Really Shortchanging 
Artists? A Look at Some Actual Data’ (Digital Music News, 19 October 2017) 
<http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2016/10/19/uk-music-youtube-value-gap/> accessed 24 
January 2017; Matthew Garrahan, ‘Pop stars complain to Brussels over YouTube’ (Financial 
Times, 29 June 2016) < https://www.ft.com/content/efee9eec-3e15-11e6-9f2c-36b487ebd80a> 
accessed 10 February 2017; Chris Cooke, ‘Artist organisations says “value gap” not just 
about what YouTube pays the labels’ (CMU, 22 June 2016) 
<http://www.completemusicupdate.com/article/artist-organisations-says-value-gap-not-just-
about-what-youtube-pays-the-labels/> accessed 10 February 2017.  
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harbours’.662 In particular, pursuant to Article 14 E-Commerce Directive, which in the 
UK is implemented by Regulation 19 of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) 
Regulations 2002663, information society service providers are not liable for the 
information that they merely ‘host’ and are only obliged to remove or disable access 
to infringing content upon obtaining knowledge or awareness of its existence.  
According to music industry organisations, including PRS, the safe harbour defence 
for hosting is being inappropriately relied on by user upload services like YouTube 
because these services are not passive and neutral intermediaries but rather actively 
organise, promote and monetise the works that they host.664 The challenge arising 
from this for an organisation like PRS, which is directly involved in the frontend 
licensing of rights to such services, is that the service’s reliance on a liability exception 
hinders PRS from extracting the full monetary value of the rights that it administers. 
On its dedicated ‘Digital Focus’ webpage, PRS outlined the problems associated with 
the present status quo.665 It described that, on the one hand, video sharing platforms 
like YouTube generate vast amounts of revenue but by relying on the ‘safe harbours’ 
they seek to avoid obtaining a music license, or aim to limit their licenses to only that 
content which they directly monetise. At the same time, PRS maintained, these 
platforms undermine other legitimate subscription-based music services like Spotify 
Premium, by diverting user traffic from them, thus also decreasing right holder 
revenue streams from the subscription-based business model.  
                                                     
662 Directive 2000/32/EC of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society 
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market [2000] OJ L178/1 (E-
Commerce Directive); PRS describes the problem under the section ‘Working with 
Government’ at ‘Digital Focus: Our approach’ < 
https://www.prsformusic.com/digitalfocus/approach/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 10 
February 2017. 
663 The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 SI 2002/2013. 
664 Stuart Dredge, ‘Why is the music industry battling YouTube and what happens next?’ (the 
Guardian, 20 May 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/may/20/music-
industry-battling-google-youtube-what-happens-next> accessed 10 February 2017. 
665 ‘Digital Focus: Our approach’ < 
https://www.prsformusic.com/digitalfocus/approach/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 10 
February 2017.  
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1.2. Organised music industry action and policymakers’ response  
The ‘value gap’ issue demonstrates music industry stakeholders’ remarkable capacity 
to effectively organise, generate debate and to influence, in real-time, policymakers’ 
agenda and the shape of copyright policy outcomes. This observation was also made 
by Horten in her study of the impact that actors from the music and film industries 
had on the content and procedure applied to the passing of the Digital Economy Act 
2010.666 For one, in relation to the ‘value gap’ music industry organisations 
simultaneously took action across various levels of copyright law’s multi-level 
system:667 stakeholders in the US, primarily record label organisations, targeted the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which includes the corresponding safe harbours 
for intermediaries under US law. International music industry organisations like the 
IFPI disseminated publications on the issue both through their own websites, as well 
as through mainstream newspapers, like the Guardian, fuelling the perception that the 
‘value gap’ is a global problem.668 In the meantime, in the UK umbrella organisations 
like UK Music and the BCC were sending letters to MPs highlighting the need for 
legislative action and issuing policy papers on the problems relating to online 
platforms’ application of safe harbour provisions.669 On an EU level, IMPALA, the 
Independent Music Companies Association, had sent a letter to the European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and other relevant Commissioners, 
                                                     
666 See Chapter 3, section 1.4. See also Horten, A Copyright Masquerade (n 8) 169-170 and 211-
225.   
667 See Chapter 3, section 1.5.1 for a discussion of copyright policymaking as a multi-level 
system.  
668 Moore, ‘The value gap – the missing beat at the heart of our industry’ (n 660); Smith, 
Desbrosses and Moore, ‘Value gap is crucial for the music sector’ (n 661). 
669 Letter from UK Music to Mike Weatherley MP (19 January 2015) 
<http://www.ukmusic.org/assets/general/UK_Music_-_safe_harbours_-_19_1_15.pdf> 
accessed 10 February 2017; BCC, ‘Digital Single Market Strategy, Position paper from the 
British Copyright Council’ (19 August 2015) 




demanding legislative action to fill the ‘value gap’; this letter bore the signatures of 
over 1000 recording artists and songwriters.670   
No other creative industry was as concerned with the ‘value gap’ and the safe harbour 
provisions as the music industry. This was not only reflected in the extensive media 
coverage, which consistently only associated the problem with the music sector, but 
also in the European Commission’s report on the submissions received to a public 
consultation that it had held on the regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries and the collaborate economy.671 The latter, in particular, reported that 
on consultation questions regarding the relations between online platforms and 
digital content right holders, right holders from the music sector had been most vocal 
about the problems relating to the limited liability of intermediaries under the E-
Commerce Directive and had pointed to the ‘value gap’.672 
The described concerted efforts by music industry stakeholders resulted in the uptake 
of this issue by policymakers in the UK, as well as in Europe. Quoting the Minister of 
State for Digital and Culture, Matt Hancock MP, the website TorrentFreak reported 
that the UK government considered the issue of the value gap important and would 
                                                     
670 Letter from recording artists (coordinated by IFPI and IMPALA) to President Jean-Claude 
Juncker, European Commission (29 June 2016) 
<http://impalamusic.org/sites/default/files/pictures/attachedfiles/Recording%20Artists%20ca
lling%20for%20a%20Solution%20to%20the%20Value%20Gap%20-%2018%20July%202016.pd
f> accessed 10 February 2017. 
671 See, for instance, Ben Sisario, ‘Music World Bands Together Against YouTube, Seeking 
Change to Law’ (The New York Times, 31 May 2016) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/media/music-world-bands-together-against-
youtube-seeking-change-to-law.html?_r=1> accessed 10 February 2017; Andy, ‘UK Govt. will 
address music “value gap” as part of Brexit’ (TorrentFreak, 3 November 2016) 
<https://torrentfreak.com/uk-govt-will-address-music-value-gap-as-part-of-brexit-161103/> 
accessed 10 February 2017; Andrew Orlowski, ‘Music’s value gap? Follow the money trail 
back to Google’ (The Register, 14 April 2016) The Register 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/04/14/you_and_your_wellies/> accessed 10 February 
2017; Commission, ‘Synopsis Report on the Public Consultation on the Regulatory 
Environment for Platforms, Online Intermediaries and the Collaborative Economy’ (January 
2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/results-public-consultation-
regulatory-environment-platforms-online-intermediaries-data-and> accessed 10 February 
2017 (Commission, Synopsis Report).    
672 Commission, Synopsis Report (n 671) 11 para 3.6.1. 
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address it as the UK leaves the European Union.673 In Brussels, on the other hand, the 
European Commission addressed the issue through Article 13 of the proposed 
Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market, which at the time of writing is 
still under consideration. The proposed provision indicates that online platforms 
need to become licensed; it also places an obligation on service providers to monitor 
content uploaded to their platforms. This is prescribed in the proposed Article 13 (1) 
of the Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market, which reads as follows:  
Information society service providers that store and provide to the 
public access to large amounts of works or other subject-matter 
uploaded by their users shall, in cooperation with rightholders, take 
measures to ensure the functioning of agreements concluded with 
rightholders for the use of their works or other subject-matter or to 
prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject-
matter identified by rightholders through the cooperation with the 
service providers. Those measures, such as the use of effective content 
recognition technologies, shall be appropriate and proportionate. The 
service providers shall provide rightholders with adequate 
information on the functioning and the deployment of the measures, 
as well as, when relevant, adequate reporting on the recognition and 
use of the works and other subject-matter. 
1.3. PRS’ role in fuelling debate and triggering a response from policymakers  
Interview and documentary data both evidence that PRS played a proactive and 
important role in driving debate on the ‘value gap’ issue and in urging policymakers 
to take action. The data further documents PRS’ influence through UK umbrella 
organisations like UK Music and the BCC, and also shows how the organisation 
embraces the strategy of presenting a unified front and taking organised, joint action, 
which, as suggested above, was at the heart of the music industry’s success in shaping 
policymakers’ agenda and output.  
The ‘value gap’ problem first came up in my fieldwork during a semi-structured 
interview with a PRS respondent. The respondent underlined that it was one of the 
main priorities of PRS at the time:  
                                                     
673 Andy (n 671). 
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The second element which we are investigating and working quite a 
bit on is the extent to which the safe harbours in the e-Commerce 
Directive are being applied appropriately. We find that quite a few 
services claim the benefit of safe harbours when they are operating 
very commercial services to make music available and they rely on the 
fact that they aren’t putting the music up, that they are just pure ‘hosts’ 
under the Article 14 E-Commerce Directive.674 
In fact, before commencing my fieldwork in 2015, in June 2014, I attended an event 
organised by Westminster Media Forum in London on ‘Next steps for copyright 
policy: UK and European reform’ where PRS’ Head of Legal, Policy and Public 
Affairs, Frances Lowe, gave a speech as a member of the ‘Modernising the European 
copyright framework’ panel. Lowe concluded her speech by referring to the fact that 
the E-Commerce Directive intermediary liability provisions had not been reviewed 
although they were producing effects on the value of rights in the copyright field. The 
PRS operative therefore announced that she would be next on the door of Maria 
Martin-Prat’s office, Head of the Copyright Unit in the European Commission, to 
inform her that a review of the E-Commerce Directive was greatly needed. In the 
interview conducted with Ms Lowe for this research, she confirmed that PRS had had 
conversations with EU officials regarding the review of the E-Commerce Directive. 
She also referred to a paper that PRS’ CEO had co-written, which PRS was using as 
evidence for the unsustainability of a status quo in which intermediaries’ business 
models were benefitting from copyright exceptions and safe harbour liability 
limitations:  
So, we have an economics paper which we wrote, which our Chief 
Executive wrote with an academic, George Barker, last year: ‘Is 
copyright fit for purpose?’, which shows as a matter of academic 
theory that exceptions to copyright and any sort of limitation on the 
ability to consent to the use of rights will take away value from 
creators. And we are starting to apply that in the field of the hosting 
service providers because of the safe harbours. So it’s a really tangible 
piece of work now which is, as you said, when I said we’d be knocking 
on Maria Martin-Prat’s door... but we have! We have published this 
paper and we do talk about safe harbours […] that’s the most 
important thing. And why is it the most important thing? Because it 
                                                     
674 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS.  
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doesn’t seem to us that the online digital environment is offering a 
sustainable living career path for composers and songwriters.675      
The paper referred to by the PRS respondent is available on the organisation’s Digital 
Focus webpage under the section ‘thought leadership’.676 The document was also 
submitted as evidence to the Digital4EU website, which was set up by the European 
Commission in February 2015 to collect views and experiences on how to create a 
well-functioning digital single market.677  
This evidence illustrates PRS’ proactivity in raising this issue with policymakers, as 
well as its political power reflected in the seeming ease of access that the organisation 
has to high-ranking EU officials.678 The paper referred to also demonstrates a point 
made in chapter 7 about the intertwined nature of evidence, as verifiable information, 
and advocacy. While the respondent remarked during our interview that the paper 
was co-written by an academic and that it relied on academic theory, thus suggesting 
that the paper was an impartial, authoritative piece of evidence, in many ways, 
including through the specific language used, its structure, and in places rather scarce 
references, the paper reads more as a lobbying document. For instance, it drives home 
the message that copyright exceptions are harmful for the market and presents as an 
accepted fact that they ‘increase the costs of operating a market as they encourage 
                                                     
675 Interview with Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy and Public Affairs, PRS. 
676 ‘Digital Focus: Our approach’ < 
https://www.prsformusic.com/digitalfocus/approach/Pages/default.aspx> accessed 10 
February 2017. 
677 Robert Ashcroft and George Barker, ‘Is copyright law fit for purpose in the Internet era? 
An economic and legal perspective’ (2014) 
<https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/en/content/copyright-law-fit-purpose-internet-era> accessed 
10 February 2017. 
678 PRS acts not only on the national level of copyright policymaking through public 
consultation submissions, meetings with the IPO and various MPs, including through the 
All Party Parliamentary Group on Music, but also on the EU level, where PRS for Music 
features as an interested party on the EU’s Transparency Register. According to the EU 
Transparency Register, PRS for Music spent an estimated 50,000 Euro on activities covered 
by the register: ‘Profile of registrant: PRS for Music’ (EU Transparency Register, last 
modified 13 April 2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparencyregister/public/consultation/displaylobbyist.do?id=7980714
10461-65> accessed 10 February 2017. 
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opportunism in the form of parasitic behaviour, or free riding and market bypass.’679 
It could, however, be reasoned that overall economic benefits are produced not by 
copyright rights alone, but by the balance between rights and exceptions: exceptions 
may allow other markets or industries to grow.680 Moreover, the evaluation of 
copyright exceptions’ utility through a purely economic perspective is in any case 
flawed, as their primary purpose is to balance the rights of copyright owners with 
other rights, freedoms and interests.681 Nevertheless, PRS actively disseminated this 
paper as evidence to policymakers.  
PRS’ influence and power as an industry stakeholder further came to light through 
evidence of the way it had been able to avail itself of the support of industry alliances 
like UK Music and the BCC. As noted above, as well as in chapter 5, UK Music and 
BCC had both made policy submissions relating to the need to review the liability 
limitations of service providers in the E-Commerce Directive.682 Moreover, some of 
the wording of these alliances’ submissions clearly showed that they had been 
influenced by the PRS CEO’s paper. One of the key ideas developed in Ashcroft and 
Baker’s paper was that as an unintended consequence, safe harbour legislation had 
encouraged ‘parasitic growth’ of intermediaries’ businesses at the expense of right 
holders. In fact, these two words were used 14 times in that PRS paper to describe the 
problem. And, similarly, in its letter addressed to Mike Weatherley MP from January 
2015, UK Music noted that the result of safe harbours was ‘parasitic growth in which 
                                                     
679 Ashcroft and Barker (n 677) 16. 
680 Mitra-Kahn (n 365) 72; James Boyle, ‘Fantasy and reality in intellectual property policy’ 
(Financial Times, 1 December 2010) < https://www.ft.com/content/d08ebc8c-fce7-11df-ae2d-
00144feab49a> accessed 10 February 2017. 
681 Bently and Sherman (n 229) 221.  
682 Letter from UK Music to Mike Weatherley MP (n 668); UK Music, ‘Intermediaries, 
aggregators, safe harbour and transfer of value’ (Briefing) (27 November 2015) 
<http://www.ukmusic.org/assets/general/intermediaries_aggregators_safeharbour_transfero
fvalue.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017; BCC, ‘Regulatory environment for platforms, online 
intermediaries, data and cloud computing and the collaborative economy’ (consultation 
submission) (05 January 2016) 
<http://www.britishcopyright.org/files/5014/5216/8800/answer3436d744-13e4-400f-8fd0-
f17fbc6771b3.pdf> accessed 10 February 2017 (BCC, Regulatory environment for platforms 
consultation response).  
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the digital sector grows at the expense of right holders.’683 In the same way, BCC 
explained in a submission, how online platforms taking advantage of safe harbours 
had led to ‘parasitic growth’ and immediately thereafter referred to Ashcroft and 
Barker’s paper, which the BCC even went on to inaccurately describe as a ‘study’.684 
This clearly shows PRS’ strong influence both independently, as well as through, and 
within, these wider industry alliances.685 
Presenting a unified front and organising many music industry stakeholders around 
a given issue is an important strategy for PRS in its policy work, according to one PRS 
respondent:  
[…] we will join forces to make sure, in as much as we can, that we are 
presenting a unified front when it comes to, for example, [the] CRM 
Directive and what we’re saying to Government. We will, we will, 
Frances will be at pains to make sure that she’s speaking to the MPA 
[Music Publishers Association] and she’s speaking to BASCA and that, 
where we can, we’re saying, you know, we all agree with one another. 
This is the best way to go. And where there are divergences from that, 
those are explained. 
1.4. Reactions to the European Commission’s legislative proposal addressing the ‘value 
gap’ 
Since the Commission announced its intention to address the ‘value gap’ issue 
through sector-specific regulation in the area of copyright, 686 and especially after the 
publication of its proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market, 
the Commission’s plans and specific legislative proposal in Article 13 of that Directive 
have been subject to extensive criticism.687 Among the critics are Open Rights Groups, 
                                                     
683 Letter from UK Music to Mike Weatherley MP (n 668) 1. 
684 BCC, Regulatory environment for platforms (consultation response) (n 682) 5. 
685 In a letter from Janet Ibbotson, Chief Executive Officer BCC, to Damian Collins MP, acting 
Chair of the Culture, Media and Sport Select Committee (27 October 2016) 
<http://www.britishcopyright.org/files/1714/7766/2188/CMSBrinq271016fin.pdf> accessed 10 
February 2017 it is stated (at p 3) that the UK played a major role in setting out the economic 
harm being caused by the legal ambiguity in the current law covering the liability of 
platforms. 
686 Commission, ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Europe’ (Communication) COM (2016) 288 final 8.  
687 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market’ (n 89). 
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academics, Google, and many voices in the online community.688 Some of the most 
serious concerns expressed in relation to the proposed Article 13 are outlined in an 
open letter signed by 40 academics across Europe, which was sent to the European 
Commission.689 The letter’s authors warn that the proposed Article 13 will likely be 
in breach of Article 15 E-Commerce Directive, which prohibits general monitoring 
obligations on information service providers in order to prevent the transmission of 
unlawful content. However, Article 13 requires that services put measures in place to 
prevent the availability on their services of works or other subject matter identified 
by right holders, such as the use of ‘effective content recognition technologies’. 
Academics further warn that Article 13 may not be proportionate and also argue that 
the prohibition of general monitoring obligations should be maintained as it 
safeguards fundamental rights of internet users, such as the protection of their 
personal data, as well as freedom of expression and information.690 Other criticisms 
generally relate to the fact that this provision has essentially been drafted with 
YouTube in mind and the regulatory burden being imposed on service providers may 
                                                     
688 Alice O’Donkor, ‘Reactions to EU copyright proposals’ (Managing Intellectual Property, 20 
September 2016) < http://www.managingip.com/Article/3587213/Reactions-to-EU-copyright-
proposals.html> accessed 10 February 2017; Paul Sanders, ‘A fair way to close the value gap’ 
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Review <https://policyreview.info/articles/news/tale-two-industries-value-gap-dilemma-
music-distribution/421> accessed 25 January 2017; Mike Masnick, ‘The ridiculous concept of 
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Content Monitoring within the Information Society (30 September 2016) 
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689 Open letter from 40 academics (n 688). 
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be greater than smaller innovators and start-ups can cope with and could, as a 
consequence, stifle such players.691  
It remains to be seen whether pressure and organised lobbying from music industry 
stakeholders will lead the EU lawmaker to rush through with the adoption of this 
provision or whether other stakeholder voices and internal legal and policy analysts 
within the EU will bring about a revision of the published proposal.  
1.5. Discussion and conclusions 
The ‘value gap’ case demonstrates the strength of music industry actors in advocacy 
and in influencing the copyright policy agenda and its outcomes. It further underlines 
PRS’ proactivity, strength, and political power in reaching high-level policy officials, 
as well as its influence within important industry alliances like UK Music and the 
BCC. The success of the music industry actors in placing this issue on policymakers’ 
agenda could also be treated as evidence of the importance of taking unified action, 
as well as of having support from influential industry networks. At the same time, 
the fact that UK Music and BCC sided with the music industry actors on this issue, as 
in the case of private copying, but did not side with SoA or ALCS on creators’ contract 
terms further shows the shifting, dynamic nature of interest constellations in 
copyright.  
Two further considerations emerge in light of the ‘value gap’ case: (1) copyright 
policymakers get uneven exposure to different policy-relevant issues, and (2) 
copyright policy may be unevenly influenced from different creative sectors.  
1.5.1 Copyright policymakers get uneven exposure to different policy-relevant issues 
The ‘value gap’ case, in conjunction with chapters 4, 5 and 6 illustrates how at any 
given time, there are multiple issues, both within the same creative industry, as well 
as across different creative industries, that stakeholders advance to policymakers. The 
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ones considered in this thesis are the need for a legislative framework to govern 
creators’ contractual dealings, a change to the statutory right of making available 
through the introduction of an unwaivable right to equitable remuneration (briefly 
considered in chapter 5 as the alternative issue pursued by the MU), and legislative 
action to address the ‘value gap’ problem. However, my analyses also reveal that 
some issues benefit from far greater media attention and stakeholder advocacy than 
others, although there is not necessarily a correlation between the importance of a 
given issue and the amount of policy attention that it gets. The latter in fact depends 
to a greater degree on stakeholder activity, in particular on the extent of proactivity 
of different actors, on the political power and networks of the actors fuelling an issue, 
on the resources that they possess to participate in policy, and on their ability to 
organise and act effectively. 
Arguably, the ‘value gap’ problem presents an example of very successful advocacy 
by certain music industry organisations. In this respect, the ‘value gap’ substantiates 
links between industry pressure through the music industry and certain legislative 
outcomes, which were the subject of Horten’s work .692 However, it is important to 
remember that even in the music industry, which appears to be particularly skilled at 
organising itself and exerting influence over policymakers, some actors are more 
powerful policy players than others. The MU itself did not individually contribute to 
the ‘value gap’ discussion. Perhaps it assumed that enough powerful actors were 
already lobbying on it and it could therefore invest its energy elsewhere. Perhaps it 
deemed other issues of greater priority and in greater need of its own voice. In fact, 
the battles that were being fought by the unions, both in publishing and in music 
addressed important questions of how much contractual flexibility creators and 
performers should have in order to be able to benefit from new business models. They 
also addressed the issue of how revenues should be split between creators and 
performers, on the one hand, and publishers and producers, on the other. Arguably, 
these questions are at least as important for copyright policy as the ones fuelled by 
                                                     
692 See Chapter 3, section 1.4.  
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PRS and industry alliances like UK Music and BCC that ultimately seek to bring more 
money into the music industry (or creative industries) as a whole.  
Yet, my research on the different issues listed above suggests that by far the largest 
number of online publications (whether through individual blogs, online 
newspapers, news websites, industry trade press, or other) related to the so-called 
‘value gap’. Music industry organisations brought the UK government to declare its 
intention to address this issue post-Brexit and EU policymakers took specific 
legislative action to address the problem, which proved considerably more 
controversial than the Commission’s draft provision on creators’ contractual terms in 
the proposed Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market. 
1.5.2 Uneven influence over copyright policy  
The case of the ‘value gap’ problem defined and lobbied on predominantly by music 
industry organisations may also illustrate how, again, as a consequence of organised 
stakeholder behaviour, few, or even one creative industry, may sometimes set the 
direction and substance of copyright policy for all creative sectors.693 The ‘value gap’ 
problem had essentially been fuelled by music industry organisations. Even when 
policy input was coming from cross-industry alliances like the British Copyright 
Council, it was influenced by evidentiary input from organisations in music. Yet, 
when the European Commission drafted its proposal addressing the ‘value gap’ in 
Article 13 of the draft Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market, it worded 
the provision so that it would apply to information society service providers active 
across all industries who provide access to all categories of copyright protected 
works.    
                                                     
693 Incidentally, this observation does not contradict the argument advanced in previous 
chapters that policy outcomes are often the product of compromises. Even on the issue of the 
‘value gap’, policymakers decided against changing the liability regime for information 
service providers under the E-Commerce Directive, which was music industry stakeholders’ 
primary demand, and instead sought another way to address these stakeholders’ demands, 




Some scholars warn that it was wrong for legislators to use the law to essentially try 
and regulate the behaviour of one specific company, YouTube, and with a focus on 
one specific industry, music, as this type of legislation increases the risk of 
unforeseeable and potentially negative consequences in the wider online 
environment.694 Arguably, well-organised and proactive behaviour of stakeholders 
within one creative industry may not necessarily be to the detriment of another. For 
instance, in the context of private copying, it was music industry actors that brought 
down the enacted exception. Yet, this was arguably also to the benefit of the audio-
visual industry, which would also likely have preferred an exception that allowed for 
some form of monetisation for the act of private copying. Similarly, it is certainly 
possible that the ‘value gap’ may have presented a problem for other creative 
industries as well, whose stakeholders lacked the political power, resources, 
networks, access to policymakers, or organisation, to lobby on this issue. 
Consequently, such industries could now potentially benefit from the momentum 
generated by actors in music. The Centre of the Picture Industry (CEPIC), a European 
federation of picture agencies and photo libraries, for example, commented in an 
online publication that the ‘value gap’ also presented a problem for the picture 
industry and in fact welcomed the Commission’s proposed Article 13 as an 
‘encouraging first step’.695 According to this organisation, online platforms 
increasingly frame images instead of hosting them on their website and paying for a 
licence.696 However, CEPIC argued that Article 13 had been written for the music and 
audio-visual industries. It lamented that the proposal had not given due 
                                                     
694 Reyna (n 688).  
695 ‘European Parliament: Public Hearing on the “Value Gap”’ (CEPIC, 30 November 2016) 
<http://cepic.org/issues/european-parliament-public-hearing-on-the-value-gap-2> accessed 
10 February 2017. 
696 Framing incorporates an image into a website so that a website visitor perceives the image 
as appearing on that website, even though the image is technically hosted on a third party 
site. Framing allows the framing website to have the image appear on its website while not 
bearing the costs of hosting the image, of content licence fee, etc. See ‘Image Providers Call 
for a Better Protection of Images Online’ (CEPIC, 25 June 2015) 
<http://cepic.org/issues/image-providers-call-for-a-better-protection-of-images-online> 
accessed 10 February 2017, and ‘Not all Links are Equal…’ (CEPIC, 3 August 2016) 
<http://cepic.org/news/not-all-links-are-equal> accessed 10 February 2017.  
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consideration to the needs of other industries by describing how, in its present form, 
it did not address the interests of the image sector as the proposed Directive excludes 
aggregators and framing in Article 13 and all types of hyperlinks in Recital 33.697  
In conclusion, the fact that a certain copyright policy that would apply for all creative 
industries is brought to life predominantly through the lobbying of one creative sector 
alone, is not necessarily in itself problematic, as the lobbying stakeholders may be 
voicing concerns and needs beyond their own. However, the ‘value gap’ case shows 
that in such instances there is perhaps a greater onus on policymakers to gather more 
information, research and stakeholder input from all other creative sectors, in order 
to assess and contextualise the potential implications of its policy proposals more 
widely. In particular, policymakers need to adequately reflect on the needs of 
stakeholders who may have been less vocal in relation to a particular legislative 
proposal, if a proposed policy measure would also have an effect on such actors. 
2. Overview, main conclusions, and implications 
This thesis studied creators’ organisations (COs) as participants in, and shapers of, 
copyright law and policy with the objective of understanding how these actors 
engage in policy work, the environment they operate in, and how organisations’ 
behaviour and environment impact and characterise the nature and substance of 
copyright law and policy.  
My research comprised a socio-legal study of the Musicians’ Union (MU), the 
Performing Right Society (PRS), the Society of Authors (SoA) and the Authors’ 
Licensing and Collecting Society (ALCS): one trade union and one collective 
management organisation (CMO) from the music and publishing industries 
respectively. The evidence for this thesis emerged from a combination of primary 
data generated through empirical fieldwork698 and documentary data, including 
                                                     
697 CEPIC, ‘European Parliament: Public Hearing on the “Value Gap”’(n 695). 
698 24 semi-structured interviews were conducted with CO operatives. Among these, one 
interview was conducted with a representative of the Writers’ Guild of Great Britain and 
another with representatives from the British Academy of Songwriters, Composers and 
Authors, see Chapter 2, section 3.  
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consultation responses, policy briefings, reports, online news publications, IP 
reviews, academic studies, and other literature. The thesis was structured around the 
policy work of these four COs on three copyright issues of contemporary relevance: 
the contractual terms for authors and performers, the UK private copying exception, 
and the implementation of the EU collective rights management Directive (CRM 
Directive). Three questions guided my work:   
•  How do COs participate in copyright policy?     
• What, if any, differences exist in the nature of and motives for participation 
between trade unions and CMOs?  
• What challenges do creators’ organisations encounter in their efforts to 
participate in and shape copyright policy?  
My exploration of these questions in relation to the empirical examination of COs’ 
engagement in policy work, their environment and the effects of these organisations’ 
behaviour and environment on copyright law and policy support several conclusions, 
which are discussed below.  
2.1. COs as actors in copyright policy 
With regard to the first research question aimed at understanding COs’ roles as 
participants and shapers of copyright policy, as well as their behaviour in policy, the 
thesis concludes that  
COs are important and valuable actors in copyright law and policymaking and 
should therefore continue to participate in these activities.  
The exploration of COs’ input and activities in copyright policy on the different 
substantive issues covered in this thesis has shed light on the numerous roles that 
these organisations play in copyright law and policy. These actors are important for 
identifying and raising awareness on shortcomings in the way copyright law’s 
application in practice affects creators and performers.699 COs bring such issues, like 
                                                     
699 See Chapter 4, section 3.1.1.  
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the problematic contractual frameworks through which copyright is exploited, to the 
attention of policymakers and simultaneously advance proposals on how the 
identified problems could be addressed. This facet of stakeholder organisations’ role 
in policy was not considered in the work of Horten, Harker, or Williamson and 
Cloonen, who focussed on other aspects of how organisational behaviour affected the 
copyright policy space.700 Moreover, as exemplified through the private copying 
matter, COs also perform a monitoring role in policy. They follow industry and policy 
developments and take action to safeguard the interests of the stakeholders that they 
represent.701 The private copying case also evidenced COs’ capacity to challenge 
legislation judicially and thus to directly bring about change in copyright law. Finally, 
chapter 7 shed light on the role of CMOs in particular in putting the structures in 
place, like licensing schemes, collection and distribution of royalties, and rights 
enforcement, which facilitate the functioning of the copyright system.702  
This thesis mapped the proximity of COs to the policymaking process and 
exemplified the importance of the roles that they play for copyright law and policy. 
More fundamentally, it revealed that  
the behaviour of these actors in policy is far from uniform.  
In principle, SoA, MU, PRS and ALCS are all organisations that represent right 
owners. Apart from this commonality, SoA and MU also have in common the fact 
that they are trade unions, just as ALCS and PRS are both collective management 
organisations. Yet, this thesis has evidenced the existence of differences in the policy 
behaviour of these four organisations, many of which are regardless of trade union 
or CMO-specific features.703 In particular, the thesis showed a lack of uniformity in 
                                                     
700 See Chapter 3, section 1.4. 
701 See chapter 6, section 4.1. 
702 See Chapter 7, sections 1.3 and 1.4.  
703 The purpose and main function of the organisation, defined in its mandate, influences the 
types of issues that a CO prioritises. In this respect, Chapters 4 and 5 illustrated how unions 
were more invested in issues relating to creators’ and performers’ contracts and 
remuneration, whereas Chapter 7 described how only CMOs had participated in the public 
consultation on the implementation of the CRM Directive.  
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the degree of policy proactivity demonstrated by the studied organisations. This 
contradicts Horten’s observation that the entertainment industries as a whole are 
highly advanced in putting forward their cause704, suggesting instead that within 
these industries there are some more proactive organisations that play a greater part 
in shaping copyright policy agendas compared to others. Chapter 4 presented ALCS’ 
and SoA’s perspective that their own agenda-setting was to an extent reactive, that it 
was difficult to create political urgency around an issue which was not already on 
policymakers’ agenda, and that lobbying activities were generally tied to policy issues 
that were already under consideration.705 In contrast, chapter 7 presented PRS’ 
proactive and self-initiating behaviour in relation to the CRM Directive, and the 
‘value gap’ case considered in this chapter further underlined PRS’ own proactive 
advocacy work.706 It follows that some actors are more concerned with actually 
influencing the copyright policy agenda itself, whereas others ‘merely’ aim to 
participate in shaping the outcomes of this agenda.  
Aside from differences in the degree of proactivity of individual COs, the thesis 
further identified differences in these organisations’ priorities,707 as well as in the 
approaches that they took on particular issues. The latter came out particularly 
strongly in comparing the way SoA and the MU dealt with the problem of creators’ 
and performers’ unfair contract terms.708  
 Finally, there were also very clear disparities between the policy positons that COs 
adopted on certain issues. Recall the different positions of MU and PRS on the 
question of contract terms, or the way ALCS’ position on private copying deviated 
from the general stance adopted by the other three COs as examples of this. 709 These 
                                                     
704 Horten, A Copyright Masquerade (n 8) 8. 
705 See Chapter 4, section 1.3.6. 
706 See Chapter 7, sections 2.2.2, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.6. See also chapter 8, section 1.3. 
707 See n 703. Different priorities were also identified in relation to the private copying 
exception in Chapter 6, section 2.2.  
708 See Chapter 5, sections 1.4 and 1.5. 
709 See Chapter 5, section 2.1 and Chapter 6, section 2.2. As a further example, see chapter 7, 
section 2.3 where I discuss the positions of ALCS and PRS with regard to the question of 
members’ voting rights under the CRM Directive.  
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findings support Williamson and Cloonan’s observation in relation to the music 
industry that it represents a complex, heterogeneous and diverse landscape of actors 
with different views and interests;710 moreover, the thesis has demonstrated that such 
complexity, diversity and heterogeneity are also characteristic of the publishing 
industry. 
The differences described above stem from a range of common factors, which include 
organisational mandate,711 resources and resource allocation,712 membership 
composition,713 political power,714 and self-concept.715 The composition of these factors 
within each of the studied organisations varies. Moreover, the particular 
configuration of these factors appears to have a strong influence on an organisation’s 
respective level of policy proactivity, which, in turn, influences the amount of 
copyright policy influence it wields.716      
2.2. The copyright policy environment within which COs operate 
With regard to the second research question, which asked what landscape, or 
environment, COs operate in, the thesis found that  
                                                     
710 See Chapter 3, section 1.4. 
711 For discussions on the impact of organisational mandate on a CO’s policy behaviour see, 
Chapter 4, sections 1.3.3 and 1.3.4. See also Chapter 5, section 3.1.2. 
712 For discussions on the impact of resources and resource allocation on a CO’s policy 
behaviour, see Chapter 4, section 1.3, Chapter 5, sections 2.3 and 3.4.  
713 For discussions on the impact of the membership composition on a CO’s policy 
behaviour, see Chapter 5, section 2.1.2, and Chapter 7, section 2.3.2. 
714 Historical political power and influence were first considered in the context of the 
changing political climate for trade unions in chapter 3, sections 2.2.2 and 2.2.3. Chapter 5, 
section 3.1.1, in particular, also considered the effects of the shifting role of trade unions for 
the MU. Chapter 7, section 1, on the other hand, considered the potential political power of 
CMOs, and the example of the ‘value gap’ in this chapter, under section 1.3, in particular, 
discussed PRS’ political power.   
715 Differences in the self-concepts and self-identities of the studied COs were considered in 
chapter 4, section 1.3.6 and Chapter 7, section 2.   
716 Differences in COs’ levels of policy proactivity were discussed in chapter 4, section 1.2 in 
relation to SoA’s and ALCS’ action on contract terms, in Chapter 7, section 2.2 in relation to 
ALCS’ and PRS’ input on the CRM Directive Implementation, as well as in the present 
chapter with regard to the ‘value gap’, see section 1.  
263 
 
COs’ environment is characterised by complex dynamics and power imbalances 
between individual actors. 
The copyright policy space is populated by a multiplicity of actors and, as the sample 
of 4 organisations considered in this thesis has shown, these actors have different 
interests, approaches, priorities and concerns.717 As evidenced, this applies even to 
actors who broadly represent the same copyright stakeholders: creators or 
performers. This leads to the permanent coexistence of multiple policy causes that 
compete for policymakers’ attention and agenda.718   
However, in the competition for decision-makers’ attention, not all actors are equally 
well placed to exercise influence over the direction and substance of law and policy. 
This has not previously been emphasised and discussed in the copyright law 
literature on industry organisations considered in this thesis.719 Between trade unions 
and CMOs, the latter are in a better position to wield policy influence.720 They gain 
political power through the pivotal role that they play for the functioning of the 
copyright system. Moreover, their influence is elevated through the rights that they 
administer, the significant size of individual right holders that they represent, and the 
information that they hold. What is more, these actors generally allocate more 
resources to participate in policy, whether through the administration of certain All-
Party Parliamentary Groups, the maintenance of contacts with high-ranking policy 
                                                     
717 Differences in the priorities and concerns of individual COs emerged on the one hand in 
relation to the private copying exception in chapter 6. Moreover, a juxtaposition of the 
narratives of chapters 4 and 5 which discussed SoA’s and MU’s approach to the issue of fair 
contract terms also revealed how differently the two unions had approached this issue, 
especially as the MU ultimately prioritised another legal matter. The thesis offered many 
examples of distinctions in the positions of the studied organisations, for instance between 
MU and PRS on the issue of contract terms (Chapter 5), or between ALCS and PRS with 
regard to the implementation of the CRM Directive (Chapter 7).   
718 See section 1.5.1 of this Chapter for a summary of the competing issues captured in this 
thesis. 
719 See Chapter 3, section 1.4. 
720 This argument is made in Chapter 7, section 1. See, also, for instance, the comparison 
between the resources of ALCS and SoA in Chapter 4, sections 1.3.2, 1.3.3, and 1.3.4, but also 
the discussion on the dependence of SoA on ALCS in section 2.1 of that chapter. 
Furthermore, chapter 6 argued that MU and BASCA benefitted from the support of the 
music industry CMOs, and UK Music, in the judicial review case, see Chapter 6, section 2.3.     
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officials, or to the preparation or commissioning of evidence in support of a particular 
policy cause. The unions, in contrast, are more limited in the amount of policy 
influence that they can wield. This is due to, among other things, the shifting role of 
trade unions following the regulatory weakening of their representation and 
regulatory functions.721 In this respect, in chapter 5 I discussed the challenge that the 
MU faces with regard to the lack of activism and political engagement among its 
members.722 Moreover, as observed both in the context of contract terms, as well as in 
relation to private copying, unions’ policy behaviour is also constrained by the more 
limited resources that these organisations allocate to policy-relevant activities. 
Particularly in the case of SoA, this results from the CO’s generally lower resource 
capacity.723 The thesis also discussed how unions’ resource allocation should be 
considered in the context of these organisations’ exceptionally wide mandates.724 
These mandates effectively prohibit unions from channelling too many resources into 
copyright law related matters, let alone into any one particular issue within this policy 
domain.  
Power imbalances, however, also exist among organisations of the same type. 
Chapter 7, as well as the recent policy development on the ‘value gap’ showed that 
PRS appears to wield more policy influence than ALCS and seems to act in a more 
proactive manner, with a clearly pursued objective of offering thought leadership on 
matters of copyright policy development and implementation.725 Based on the private 
copying case, as well as with regard to the ‘value gap’, this thesis also suggests that 
power imbalances exist not only between actors, but also between creative sectors.726 
On both of the above issues, other creative sectors, such as the audio-visual or the 
picture industry, also had vested interests in relation to private copying and the ‘value 
                                                     
721 See Chapter 3, section 2.2.3.  
722 See Chapter 5, section 3.1.1. See also Chapter 4, section 1.3.3 for a consideration of this 
problem in relation to SoA. 
723 See n 499. 
724 See Chapter 4, section 1.3.3 and Chapter 5, section 3.1.2. 
725 See Chapter 7, sections 2.2.2, and 2.4. See also Chapter 8, section 1.3. 
726 See Chapter 8, section 1.5.2.  
265 
 
gap’. Yet, on both occasions, it was actors from the music industry that demonstrated 
particularly effective joint action. In both cases, this stakeholder behaviour achieved 
tangible outcomes for copyright law, though in the case of the ‘value gap’, the 
adoption of the proposed Directive on copyright in the Digital Single Market is not 
yet a matter of fact.  
As a consequence of the large number of actors and competing policy causes, of 
power imbalances, as well as of colliding interests, organisations form coalitions and 
networks. In line with Ansell and Mahoney’s reasoning, organisations collaborate 
with others in order to further their particular policy cause.727 These coalitions and 
networks form both on the basis of mutual interests, as well as interdependence. In 
this regard, chapter 4 showed the collaboration between SoA and ALCS to be 
reflective of their shared goal in furthering the interests of authors, but also of SoA’s 
reliance on ALCS to amplify its C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign.728 Similarly, chapter 6 
presented how the private copying exception brought the MU, BASCA and UK Music 
together as they had a common overarching goal.729 At the same time, I questioned 
whether BASCA and the MU alone would have gone forward with a judicial review, 
given the entailing financial burden of a judicial challenge. The ‘value gap’ issue 
exemplified a further case of joint industry action, and, in fact, of the success of such 
action. The dependence of weaker actors on stronger organisations or on multi-
stakeholder alliances suggests that if acting on their own, less powerful organisations 
may be less likely to have their particular policy cause heard and acted on by 
policymakers.  
Joint or concerted action between organisations, as well as activities that are 
supported by multi-stakeholder organisations, like UK Music, or the British 
                                                     
727 Ansell and Mahoney argue that organisations benefit from their participation in networks 
and coalitions as these formations amplify organisations’ own agendas and signal to 
policymakers that their issues enjoy wider industry support, see chapter 3, sections 1.5.2 and 
1.5.3.  
728 See Chapter 4, section 2.1. 
729 See Chapter 6, section 1.3. 
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Copyright Council, send policymakers important signals.730 They indicate that certain 
issues bear relevance for an entire creative industry, or at least for a larger subset of 
stakeholders within that industry. They further create the impression of existing 
unanimity among the represented organisations as to the measures necessary to 
address a particular issue. However, the positions advanced through such groupings 
are not accurate representations of the needs and priorities of all participating 
actors.731 Rather, they are the product of compromises. For one, in the presence of 
power dynamics, some organisations exercise more influence within industry 
alliances and umbrella organisations than others.732 Furthermore, given the diversity 
of stakeholders represented in bodies like UK Music, or the BCC, and the conflicting 
interests that exist between these stakeholders on certain policy issues, there are 
inherent limitations to the types of issues that can be advanced through multi-
stakeholder bodies. Chapters 4 and 5, for instance, demonstrated how antagonism 
between creators and performers, on the one hand, and publishers and producers on 
the other, meant that neither the BCC, nor UK Music could back the unions in their 
policy causes.733 Chapter 6, on the other hand, offered evidence of disparities between 
the views of individual members of UK Music and the collective UK Music view on 
the private copying exception. The effect of attempting to reconcile the interests of 
multiple stakeholder groups was also evident in PRS’ approach to forming a position 
on members’ voting rights in the context of the CRM Directive.734 When several 
organisations act together on a certain issue, this has the effect that the common 
position will necessarily be filtered down to what is mutually acceptable. The more 
diverse the membership of any network or coalition is, the more likely it is that some 
                                                     
730 See Chapter 3, section 1.5.3. See also Chapter 4, section 2.3.3 and Chapter 5, section 3.2.3. 
731 For instance, Chapter 6, section 2.3 describes evidence considered by Green J in the 
private copying judicial review that the views of individual UK Music members varied from 
UK Music’s collective view. The disparity between individual organisations’ positions and 
those presented through industry alliances was also discussed, among other places, in 
Chapter 7, section 3. 
732 See the example of PRS’ influence within UK Music and the BCC discussed in this 
chapter, section 1.3. 
733 See Chapter 4, section 2.3.3 and Chapter 5, section 3.2.3.  
734 See Chapter 7, section 2.3.2. 
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of the views and interests held by different contingents within this body will not 
surface in the ultimate position that it adopts and advances.  
In the context of the presented findings on COs as policy actors and their 
environment, another conclusion of this thesis is that  
differences in the behaviour and power of individual actors, and in the dynamics 
that govern their interactions are not fully understood by policymakers.  
The same applies to IP reviewers, the media, and, at least in part, to academic circles.  
Chapter 3 considered the portrayal of COs in IP reviews, in the media, and by some 
academics.735 I discussed Hargreaves’ sweeping statements about the impact of 
stakeholder behaviour and about how ‘lobbying on behalf of rights owners ha[d] 
been more persuasive to Ministers than economic impact assessments.’736 These 
statements did not consider possible variations in the extent of influence exercised by 
individual actors. The media as well as academic representations of COs had also not 
critically distinguished between the views and actions of different types of 
organisations, or of different organisations of the same type altogether. With regard 
specifically to CMOs, this thesis pointed to policy submissions by academics, which 
had treated CMOs in general terms when arguing that they wield particular policy 
influence, thus suggesting that all CMOs followed similar behavioural patterns in 
policy.737 Moreover, I evidenced policymakers’, as well as the media’s uneven 
engagement with input from different copyright actors.738 One example of this was 
policymakers’ response to UK Music’s ‘Measuring Music’ report and policymakers’ 
lack of response to the MU’s survey ‘The Working Musician’, which was thematised 
in chapter 5.739 This chapter also presented evidence of various CO respondents’ 
perception that policymakers are more concerned with the positions of multi-
stakeholder alliances than with those of individual organisations as the former are 
                                                     
735 See Chapter 3, sections 1.2, 1.3, and 2.3.2.  
736 Hargreaves (n 4) 6. 
737 See Chapter 3, sections 1.2 and 2.3.2.  
738 See, for example, Chapter 4, section 2.3.2 and the present chapter, section 1.2.  
739 See Chapter 5, section 3.2.2. 
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assumed to speak for the whole spectrum of relevant stakeholders.740 This signifies an 
incomplete understanding of the differences and power dynamics between 
individual actors.  
2.3. The effects of stakeholders’ behaviour and environment on copyright law 
and policy 
The third objective of this thesis was to consider the effects of COs’ behaviour and 
environment on copyright law and policy. The following conclusions can be drawn 
with regard to this question.    
In light of complex stakeholder dynamics and power imbalances between 
individual actors, as well as policymakers’ insufficient understanding of these 
phenomena, some creators’ issues will not surface onto copyright policy agendas 
and will thus remain unaddressed by copyright law.   
As a result of power dynamics and collaborative action, some policy issues are 
advanced by a larger subset of organisations, through a larger volume of concerted 
lobbying action, or by more powerful actors and industry alliances.741 Both the private 
copying judicial review and the ‘value gap’ cases are examples of this. Relatively 
weaker, comparatively resource-poorer organisations, or organisations acting alone 
and without support from important industry networks will struggle to assert their 
voice and advance their cause over such issues.  Among the issues considered in this 
thesis, the matter of creators’ (and performers’) unfair contract terms was primarily 
advanced by smaller and weaker organisations. It was not supported by the BCC or 
other influential industry alliances, and was ultimately not acted upon by the UK 
                                                     
740 See Chapter 5, section 3.2.4.  
741 This was also discussed in section 1.5 of the present chapter.  
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lawmaker.742 Policymakers likely get uneven exposure to different policy matters.743 
Those issues that are carried by more powerful, proactive and vocal actors, or by 
larger groups of organisations, including important umbrella organisations, are more 
likely to win the attention of policymakers and make it onto decision-makers’ 
agendas for action compared to other competing causes. A contributing factor to this 
may be seen in the uneven coverage of different issues in the media.744   
Furthermore, policymakers’ perception of the importance or relevance of a given 
issue may be skewed by the interest constellations that form in relation to it, as well 
as by certain actors’ strategies of overstating their case and their representation unit. 
In this respect, this thesis offered further evidence corroborating Williamson and 
Cloonan’s argument that some actors purposefully conflate ‘the music industry’ and 
the ‘recording industry’ and generally aim to convey that their particular issue affects 
the entire industry in broader terms. 745 This thesis also argued that multi-stakeholder 
                                                     
742 There are other examples of issues that fall outside the scope of this thesis, which have 
repeatedly been raised by the studied unions without any legislative or policy consequence. 
For instance, on numerous occasions the MU has raised the issue of the so-called ‘right against 
the user’. S 182D CDPA 1988, in application of Article 8 of Directive 92/100/EEC, now Article 
8 (2) of Directive 2006/115/EC, grants the performer a right to equitable remuneration from 
the owner of the copyright in the sound recording where a commercially published sound 
recording of a qualifying performance is played in public, or is communicated to the public. 
However, subject to Article 8 (2) of the said Directive, the performer in fact has this right 
against the user of the phonogram. In the UK, record companies as the right holders in sound 
recordings have the sole ability to licence and collect remuneration. According to the MU, this 
UK implementation of Article 8(2) was the result of a powerful lobby by record companies. 
The MU raised this issue in the context of the Implementation of Directive 2011/77/EU and in 
its response to the 2012 All Party IP Group’s inquiry into ‘The Role of Government in 
Protecting and Promoting Intellectual Property’. However, no further action has been taken 
by policymakers to re-consider this matter.    
743 I discuss this in relation to the ‘value gap’ in section 1.5 of the present chapter. See also 
Chapter 5, sections 3.2.3 and 3.2.4.  
744 My research demonstrated that the private copying exception and the response of music 
industry organisations through a judicial review, coupled with the problem of the ‘value 
gap’ received considerably more publicity, including through a wider range of sources, 
compared to SoA’s and ALCS’ C.R.E.A.T.O.R. campaign, and certainly compared to the Fair 
Internet campaign, which the MU supported. Similarly, chapter 5 discussed how MU’s 
research ‘The Working Musician’ had not been reported on by the media or publicly taken 
up by policymakers unlike UK Music’s ‘Measuring Music’ report, see Chapter 5, Section 
3.2.2. 
745 See Chapter 3, section 1.4 and  Chapter 5, section 3.2.1.2  
270 
 
alliances like the BCC, the Alliance for IP, or UK Music, purposefully present 
themselves as speaking on behalf of their whole respective industry, or even of the 
creative industries overall (in the case of the BCC), thus expanding the validity of 
Williamson and Cloonan’s claim beyond the confines of the music industry alone. 
Yet, as demonstrated, there are limits to the types of issues that these umbrella bodies 
can support and advance, just as there are limits to the extent that their common 
positions do in fact reflect the priorities and concerns of all of their members.  
Moreover, based on the demonstrated ability of music industry actors to take effective 
joint action in the context of private copying, as well as the so-called ‘value gap’, this 
thesis also suggested that further power imbalances may exist between different 
creative industries, although more research is necessary as will be discussed in the 
following subsection. This could mean that issues of importance to one particular, 
less influential or less vocal industry, may also go unnoticed or unheard.746  
A further effect of stakeholders’ behaviour and environment on copyright law relates 
to the substance of policy outcomes, out of which substantive copyright law is made.  
Given the disparity of views and positions on many copyright law issues, 
policymakers often attempt to shape copyright law and policy outcomes as a 
compromise between different stakeholder positions. However, this does not 
always produce sound or appropriate results for copyright law.  
Policymakers’ approach to tackling specific issues by attempting to strike a 
compromise between different positions was evidenced on several occasions.747 By 
doing so, policymakers aim to keep a greater subset of copyright stakeholders 
content. However, the case of the private copying exception in particular exemplifies 
how compromises may in fact produce disappointing outcomes for all.  The current 
                                                     
746 In the context of the ‘value gap’ an organisation from the picture industry made the case 
that the needs of that creative sector had been overlooked, see section 1.5.2 of the present 
chapter.  
747 It was illustrated in relation to the private copying exception (Chapter 6, section 4.2), the 
‘value gap’ (see n 693), creators’ contract terms (Chapter 4, section 3.2), and in the context of 
Article 17 of the CRM Directive (Chapter 7, section 2.2.2).     
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status quo fails to produce a sensible outcome for copyright law and instead brings 
the law into disrepute. What is more, the illegality of private copying was not an 
outcome that any one stakeholder desired. It also fails to address the interests of 
consumers, technology manufacturers, as well as right holders.  
Moreover, compromises may lead to inappropriate outcomes for copyright law to the 
extent that the policy process from which they emerge may not offer an accurate 
picture of the full range of interests that require balancing, or of the actual extent to 
which particular stakeholders are affected. This could result in certain interests being 
sacrificed. Chapter 4 discussed how the EU’s approach to tackle the problem of unfair 
terms could be seen as a compromise in so far as it aimed to address some contractual 
problems, such as the lack of transparency, while at the same time leaving many 
others (from the perspective of creators and performers), such as the overly wide 
scope or long duration of rights transfers, unaddressed.748 An evaluation of the 
adequacy of the Commission’s proposal to address the contract terms issue falls 
outside the scope of this thesis and would require a thorough examination of evidence 
and literature that consider the situations of creators and performers, as well as 
publishers and producers. However, based on the insights into the policy process and 
stakeholder environment gleaned from this thesis, doubts remain as to whether this 
compromise would amount to a balancing of interests between the affected 
stakeholders, as is desirable for copyright law and policy. For instance, the balancing 
act itself may be influenced by the positioning (or lack thereof) of influential actors 
on a given issue as this could affect policymakers’ perception of the extent to which 
particular interests need to be redressed. It was discussed that in the UK, important 
industry actors like the British Copyright Council did not add their voice to authors’ 
campaign for fair terms despite ALCS’ and SoA’s membership within this umbrella 
organisation.749 Moreover, the interests that policymakers primarily take into account 
                                                     
748 See Chapter 4, section 3.2.  
749 Publisher organisations, on the other hand, actively rejected the idea that contract terms 
were at the heart of creators’ problem. No UK policy action followed on this issue. 
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may well be those of the more vocal actors750 and these in turn may be overstating 
their case.751 With these considerations in mind, even when policymakers attempt to 
address the interests of different stakeholders through compromises, the outcomes 
may not represent an accurate balancing of interests.     
Finally, based on the research presented in this thesis, certain observations can be 
made regarding copyright stakeholders’ behaviour and the objective of developing 
evidence-based policy. Challenges to this objective are a common phenomenon across 
various fields of policy.752 This thesis has shown that in the copyright policy domain, 
the behaviour of organisational actors can complicate the objective of evidence-based 
policy. Challenges arise from the proximity of these actors to the copyright process 
and from the way they intertwine information and advocacy in their evidence 
submissions.753 In this respect, the thesis confirmed Harker’s argument that evidence 
submitted by industry actors is often intertwined with targeted advocacy, a point also 
made by Hargreaves in his IP review.754  It also showed that the objective of 
developing evidence-based policy is challenged by the fact that, often, certain 
evidence is contested by different actors, or the overall picture of the evidence 
presented by stakeholders to policymakers is inconclusive, given the contradictory 
messages embodied in different evidentiary input.755 This directly reflects the 
antagonism that exists between different copyright stakeholders on certain issues. 
This was primarily considered in relation to SoA’s relationship with the Publishers 
                                                     
750 In the context of the ‘value gap’, for example, sections 1.4 and 1.5.2 of the present chapter 
considered views of right holders from the picture industry, as well as views of academics and 
other stakeholders that did not appear to have been sufficiently taken into account by the EU 
lawmaker. 
751 This thesis corroborated Williamson and Cloonan’s argument that organisations like the 
IFPI, or the BPI conflate the terms ‘recording industry’ and ‘music industry’ to overstate their 
case, see Chapter 3, section 1.4 and Chapter 5, section 3.2.1.2.  
752 Adam La Caze and Mark Colyvan, ‘A Challenge for Evidence-Based Policy’ (2017) 27 
Axiomathes 1; Ronald Bayer, David Merritt Johns and Sandro Galea, ‘Salt and Public Health: 
Contested Science and The Challenge of Evidence-Based Decision Making’ (2012) 31 (12) 
Health Affairs 2738. 
753 This is discussed in Chapter 7, section 2.5, as well as in section 1.3 of the present chapter.  
754 See Chapter 3, sections 1.2 and 1.4, Chapter 4, section 2.3.2 and Chapter 5, section 3.2.1.2 
755 For instance, this was illustrated in the disagreement between the Publishers’ Association 
and SoA as to the reasons for authors’ low earning levels, see Chapter 4, section 2.3.1. 
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Association and MU’s relations with the BPI in the context of creators’ and 
performers’ contract terms. At the same time, however, this thesis also provided 
evidence that copyright stakeholders can, in fact, also hold the government to its 
objective of developing evidence-based policy, particularly when this aligns with 
their interests – a more positive facet of the interaction between industry 
organisations’ behaviour and the government’s objective that neither Hargreaves nor 
Harker have acknowledged. The very basis, on which MU, BASCA and UK Music 
succeeded in their judicial challenge of the private copying exception was the 
argument that the evidence relied upon by the government had been inadequate to 
justify the lack of a compensation scheme.756    
2.4. Implications of this research  
The conclusions and observations drawn from the research presented in this thesis 
have important implications for a number of actors.   
2.4.1 Implications for researchers 
The focus of this research was primarily confined to the policy work of SoA, ALCS, 
MU, and PRS and could thus offer some insight into the workings of a subset of actors 
across two creative industries. Further research is necessary to map the dynamics and 
workings of other actors within the studied creative industries (music and 
publishing), such as broadcasters or online intermediaries, in order to understand 
how their behaviour and action fits into the emerging picture. Research should also 
focus on actors within different creative industries, such as audio-visual or the picture 
industry as older and established sectors, or on gaming as a newer and increasingly 
important sector. In this way, it will be possible to ascertain whether certain creative 
industries, like music, are indeed more dominant policy influencers than others. 
Furthermore, it will help us understand which particular actors within these 
industries are the ones that successfully drive forward policy issues. Moreover, 
questions of power imbalances between individual actors and industries could also 
be pursued through research with and on policymakers themselves. Such research 
                                                     
756 See Chapter 6, sections 1.3 and 3.1.  
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could study the perspective of policymakers on their interactions with different actors 
and on the way these actors advance their issues. This would offer insight into the 
extent to which issues fuelled by different actors do in fact reach decision-makers and 
what, ultimately, determines the way policymakers set their agenda for policy 
development. Research with policymakers could also examine where such officials 
themselves see challenges in the adoption and implementation of copyright law and 
policy.   
A larger body of research mapping stakeholder differences and dynamics across 
numerous creative industries is also necessary considering the fact that, in general, 
the politicians responsible for the setting of policy in a given area tend to change and 
rotate. As such, policymakers who have had less exposure and experience in dealing 
with the complex copyright landscape may find it more difficult to navigate this 
policy space. Authoritative, independent research on stakeholders in the creative 
industries could therefore enable policymakers to be more aware and discerning of 
the ways in which different stakeholders try to exercise influence over copyright 
policy.  
The thesis revealed a discrepancy between the general representation of stakeholders 
in IP reviews, some academic submissions, and in the media, on the one hand, and 
the actual differences in the behaviour and priorities of individual organisations, on 
the other. It follows that future research and IP reviews should therefore undertake a 
more granular approach in distinguishing between the interests and behaviour of 
different actors, if they are to present a more accurate picture of the creative 
industries.  
2.4.2 Implications for the media 
The media, too, could differentiate more clearly between the particular organisations 
that fuel a certain issue. Mainstream media, in particular, such as the BBC and the 
Guardian, could do more to contextualise the reported actors against other 
organisations and stakeholders in the industries when informing about a specific 
event, in order to portray the diversity of views and priorities among different actors, 
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as well as the different functions that various types of organisations serve.757 
Moreover, the media has the potential to play a balancing role in relation to existing 
power dynamics between industry actors by providing more equal coverage of 
different issues and industry campaigns.   
2.4.3 Implications for policymakers 
The present research also has implications for policymakers. On the one hand, it 
highlights the value and importance of COs for copyright law and policy in light of 
the different roles and functions that they perform. In light of this, it is important that 
policymakers continue to work with these actors in the making of substantive 
copyright law. This thesis also observed the potential of industry actors to challenge 
the government’s objective of developing evidence-based policy through these actors’ 
own submissions of evidence that are often intermixed with advocacy. With this in 
mind, it is important that the IPO continues to undertake and commission 
independent research on policy-relevant matters in order to complement and verify, 
to the extent possible, information communicated from industry stakeholders.758   
In view of the differences that exist between organisational actors, not only in terms 
of the issues that they prioritise, their positions and approaches, but also in terms of 
their varying levels of policy proactivity, policymakers should be careful not to 
equate organisational actors, even when these represent the same broad category of 
copyright stakeholder, like ‘right holders’. Policymakers should also specifically not 
equate the views and positions advanced by multi-stakeholder alliances with those 
of their individual members. Furthermore, they need to continuously bear in mind 
                                                     
757 For instance, no information was provided on the individual claimants that banded 
together for the private copying judicial challenge, other than the names of the 
organisations, see n 125.   
758 The IPO commissions research on a range of copyright and general IP matters, see 
‘Intellectual property research publications commissioned by the IPO that cover copyright’ 
(IPO, 5 July 2016) < https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/intellectual-property-
research-copyright> accessed 21 August 2017. See also ‘Intellectual property research: IP in 
general’ (IPO, 23 September 2016) < 
https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/intellectual-property-research-ip-in-general> 
accessed 21 August 2017.  
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the existence of power dynamics and imbalances between individual actors and 
actively seek to engage with those actors, whose voices and issues are heard less, or 
not heard at all in policy debates. Copyright law will never be able to address the 
issues of all actors. However, if it is to balance the interests of the different 
stakeholders, then it is important that these interests and issues are at least all 
considered.  
2.4.4 Implications for COs  
Finally, the insight that this thesis offered on the behavioural differences among 
individual actors, on the factors that contribute to these differences, on the 
environment within which COs operate, as well as the effects of all of the above on 
copyright law and policy could also be beneficial for the studied COs themselves.  
In general, an awareness and a better understanding of the varying self-concepts and 
levels of proactivity between organisations could lead individual COs to reflect on 
their own strategies, priorities and understanding of their role, and their intended 
role, in policy. COs could thereby make more conscious choices about the manner 
and timing of their policy action, about their allocation of resources, as well as their 
interactions with other industry players. 
Specifically, this thesis suggests that COs, particularly less powerful COs (i.e. trade 
unions and professional associations like MU, SoA, BASCA, and WGGB), need a 
separate collective identity, in order to ensure that the issues, positions and priorities 
that are of particular importance to them can also regularly surface on the copyright 
policy agenda, alongside those advanced by other stakeholders. A collective body for 
COs should exclude CMOs, especially since these, like PRS, usually represent 
multiple stakeholders, and may generally have priorities that relate more closely to 
their economic functions. Based on the observations made within this thesis, a 
collective identity for COs may be particularly important for COs in the music 
industry, given the presence of powerful and influential actors like PRS who, as 
shown, cannot accurately represent the interests and priorities of music creators.  
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Although a collective identity already exists for unions through the Creators’ Rights 
Alliance, based on the research conducted for this thesis, it does not appear that the 
CRA, in its current set-up and operations, presents an effective counterforce to more 
powerful actors and multi-stakeholder organisations. Yet, a strong collective identity 
is necessary to advance those issues on which UK Music, the Alliance for IP, or the 
British Copyright Council would prefer to remain silent. It is necessary, in order to 
more powerfully challenge one-sided messages about the healthy state of certain 
creative industries, especially when the reality for the creators and performers within 
those industries may be different. A collective identity is further necessary because, 
as I have shown, organisational actors appear to exercise more influence over policy 
when they act in unison. Moreover, the positions advanced through stakeholder 
alliances will always necessarily be a compromised version of the individual 
organisations’ views. Yet, with a separate collective entity for COs, at least the starting 
point for such compromise would likely be based on more common ground. It is 
important that COs have a real possibility of being more vocal and assertive 
collectively so that decision-makers can feel and consider the full weight of the voice 
of creators, alongside the voices of other stakeholders, when they make copyright law 











Table 1 provides an overview of the total number of interviews conducted with 
operatives from different creators’ organisations that participated in this research.  
Name of Organisation Number of Interviews conducted 
Authors’ Licensing and Collecting 
Society 
6 
British Academy of Songwriters, 
Composers and Authors 
1 
Musicians’ Union 10 
Performing Right Society 6 
Society of Authors 1  











Table 2 provides a list of the individual respondents, who opted for option (1) of the 
participation consent form (see ANNEX B) and thus agreed to be identified by name. 
Name of Organisation Respondent Interviewed759 
Authors’ Licensing and Collecting 
Society 
Richard Combes, Head of Rights and 
Licensing  
Authors’ Licensing and Collecting 
Society 
Barbara Hayes, Deputy Chief Executive 
Authors’ Licensing and Collecting 
Society 
Benjamin Pearson, Policy Development 
Advisor 
Musicians’ Union Peter Thoms, Sessions Official 
Musicians’ Union John Smith, General Secretary 
Musicians’ Union Isabelle Gutierrez, Head of Government 
Relations and Public Affairs 
Musicians’ Union Horace Trubridge, Assistant General 
Secretary Music Industry 
Musicians’ Union Naomi Pohl, London Regional 
Organiser 
Musicians’ Union Dave Webster, National Organiser, Live 
Performance 
Musicians’ Union Diane Widdison, National Organiser, 
Education & Training 
                                                     
759 Respondents’ designations within their respective organisations, as listed above, relate to 




Musicians’ Union Michael Sweeney, Recording & 
Broadcasting Official 
Musicians’ Union Ben Jones, National Organiser, 
Recording & Broadcasting 
Performing Right Society Frances Lowe, Head of Legal, Policy 
and Public Affairs 
Performing Right Society  Tim Arber, Head of Membership 
Support 
Society of Authors Nicola Solomon, Chief Executive  
Writers’ Guild of Great Britain Bernie Corbett, General Secretary  
Table 2 
A follow-up interview by telephone was conducted with Nicola Solomon, SoA, and 










 Participant Information and Consent Form 
 
A copy of the Participant Information and Consent Form, as provided to ALCS respondents, 
is provided below. The form that was made available to research participants was tweaked 
slightly in a few places, depending on the organisation to which the respective participant 
belonged, in order to take account of the particular functions of each organisation. These 




















INFORMATION SHEET FOR PARTICIPANTS 
Creators’ Organisations Research Project 
About the Project 
This research project will explore the role played by creators’ organisations in the way copyright law 
is operationalised and exploited within existing and emerging business models. It will look into how 
creators’ organisations represent creators, how they extract value for creators in the way copyright 
law is interpreted and applied, what challenges (pertaining to shortcomings in the law, industry 
practices, or other) they encounter in the process and what steps they take. This research is being 
organised and conducted by Ms Nevena Kostova, PhD Candidate at the University of Edinburgh, under 
the supervision of the Principal Investigator for the project, Dr Smita Kheria, Lecturer in Intellectual 
Property Law at the University of Edinburgh.  
The Project is being undertaken as part of the research programme for CREATe, the Centre for 
Copyright and New Business Models in the Creative Economy jointly funded by UK Research Councils 
(www.create.ac.uk). This project is situated within CREATe’s ‘Creators and Performers: Process and 
Copyright’ research theme.    
Why is this Project being done? 
Creators’ organisations perform a myriad of functions (representative, advisory, educational, etc.), 
which significantly shape the framework within which creators operate in practical as well as legal 
terms. One of the objectives of these organisations is to ensure that copyright is an economic asset 
not just for content exploiters but also for the original creators. In recent years, copyright law itself 
has been undergoing numerous changes in an attempt to address some of the challenges which have 
emerged with the shift from analogue to digital content creation, dissemination and consumption. 
Many of these changes are still at the stage of implementation and several issues pertaining to new 
business models in the creative industries have yet to be addressed. It is therefore a particularly 
relevant time to focus our attention on the role that creators’ organisations play in furthering the 
interests of creators in this changing landscape and on the various challenges that these organisations 
may face.  
What does participation involve?  
I would like to spend approximately one hour talking to you about the above mentioned themes in 
the context of your work on contractual terms and the recently adopted private copying exception 
[…]. The aim of the interview is to explore how your organisation works/has worked with the law of 
copyright on these topics. How does ALCS negotiate licensing terms which can extract maximum value 
for its members and how are these terms being influenced by changing business models? What steps 
does and did ALCS take to represent and protect the interests of creators in the context of the private 
copying exception as well as unfair contract terms? What are the challenges that ALCS faces in its 
efforts to bring forward copyright policy and legislation which will benefit creators? The interview will 
be recorded for the purposes of transcription, analysis and reporting the results of the project. You 
may be asked to clarify or answer follow up questions by e-mail or in person, if you agree to it. 
I would also like to spend a few days in your organisation, in order to observe the day-to-day activities 
which ALCS undertakes on the issues of contractual terms/ fair remuneration and private copying. This 
will allow me to gain a richer understanding of the actual process by which ALCS performs its function 





What are the benefits of contributing to this project? 
The aim of this project is to deliver empirically grounded insight into the role of creators’ organisations 
in the creative industries and their impact on the modalities of copyright frameworks, i.e. on the way 
copyright law is interpreted and operationalised. Moreover, the project will identify legal and practical 
shortcomings which hinder creators’ organisations from extracting maximum benefit for creators 
from existing and emerging business models. The findings of this research will therefore directly 
benefit organisations like yours by delivering the basis for developing a road map to tackle these 
shortcomings. At the same time, because of the very focus of this research, the success of the project 
will very much depend on your contribution.  
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
A disadvantage may be the time put aside for the interview (approx. 1 hour). The interview itself will 
be arranged at a time and location which is convenient for you (between January-June 2015).  
In addition, if short-term observation is possible, my presence on your office premises may necessitate 
a small amount of additional time for orientation. I will endeavour to cause as little disruption to the 
regular activities as possible. The extent of my access to meetings and specific activities will be at your 
discretion. 
Can you withdraw from the project? 
Yes. Participation in this project is entirely voluntary. If you agree to an interview then it can be 
stopped at any time and it is open to you to pass any question. If you have given an interview and 
want to subsequently withdraw your participation you may do so at any point up to 21 calendar days 
after the interview. You may equally withdraw your consent to the use of data gathered from 
observation within this period.  Thereafter, your data will be merged with the rest of the data for 
analysis purposes. If you wish to withdraw you should e-mail me (see contact details below). There 
are no consequences to deciding you no longer wish to participate. 
What about confidentiality? 
The organisations which will be studied will be named and your affiliation with an organisation will 
not be confidential. However, if you wish for any part or all of your interview data to be anonymous 
in relation to your name and designation in the organisation, then all necessary steps will be taken to 
ensure the same. In this case, if any specific quotations are used then the quoted participant will be 
described using an anonymous identifier (e.g. Interviewee No 3 of Organisation X). All consent forms 
will be stored in a separate, secure (locked) location from the project data itself. 
Furthermore, any data from observation will not expose the actions of individual organisation 
members or representatives unless they explicitly agree to this. 
What will happen to all the data? 
All data will be saved securely and confidentially during the lifetime of the project and only I and the 
PI will have access to them. The data and consent form will be securely retained at the University of 
Edinburgh until the end of the project and for five years thereafter. The project data will then be 
destroyed.  
At the end of the project, observation data and interview data for which anonymity as outlined above 
has not been requested will be made available in an accessible and appropriate data repository in the 
form of redacted transcripts or redacted audio-recordings. Such extracts may also be shared through 
blogs and other media. Interview data for which anonymity has been requested will only be made 
available in the data repository if such data continues to be of significant value after all measures have 
been taken to ensure the agreed level of anonymity has been met. Any extracts used from such data 
will always meet this level of anonymity.  
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What about the results of this project? 
The results will be published and disseminated in the form of a PhD thesis, journal articles, conferences 
papers, blog posts and other documents. If you decide to participate then I will notify you of any future 
publications of the research findings.  
Who has reviewed this project? 
The project has received ethical approval from Edinburgh Law School, University of Edinburgh. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider this invitation. 






INTERVIEW AND OBSERVATION CONSENT FORM 
Creators’ Organisations Research Project 
 
By signing below, I agree with the following statements and consent to my participation in the project:  
• I know that it is up to me whether or not I want to take part.  
• I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet and have been given a chance to ask 
questions and to discuss this study. 
• I can withdraw from this research without giving any reasons up to 21 calendar days after the interview. 
This period will also apply for withdrawing my consent to the use of data obtained through observation. 
(thereafter both interview and observation data will be merged with other data for analysis).  
• I am not being rewarded financially or otherwise for my participation. 
• I understand that Nevena Kostova will record the interview unless I object.  
Please indicate by inserting the number (1) or (2) (as described below) how you wish to participate:  
___________________ . 
(1) I agree to be identified by my name in relation to my contribution to this project. I grant all permissions 
necessary to enable the storage, archiving, sharing, reporting and dissemination of my contribution to this 




(2) I do not want to be identified by my name or designation within the organisation. If any specific quotations 
are used I will be described using an anonymous identifier (e.g. Interviewee No 3)) which will include a 
reference to my affiliation with, but not my role within, the particular organisation (e.g. Interviewee No 3 
of Organisation X). I grant all permissions necessary to enable storage, archiving, sharing, reporting and 
dissemination of my contribution to this project (to the extent outlined in the Information Sheet) as long as 
I am not identified. 
 
Print Name:  ________________________________________________________ 
E-mail:   ________________________________________________________ 
Phone (optional): ________________________________________________________ 
Signature:  ________________________________________________________ 
Date:   ________________________________________________________ 
 
Contact Details: 
Ms Nevena Kostova 
Edinburgh Law School 
University of Edinburgh 
Old College, South Bridge,  
Edinburgh, EH8 9YL 
Email (preferred): nevena.kostova@ed.ac.uk 
PI Name: Dr Smita Kheria, Email: smita.kheria@ed.ac.uk 
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